But what if we were to grant some of the inflatons to which Dembski refers here? Does that really do damage to any intelligent design hypothesis? Suppose, for example, that the many worlds hypothesis of Hugh Everett were correct. (I secretly wish that it were, for I’d like to think that in an alternate universe the possibility that I’m a professional musician is being played out) Laying aside the evidential questions, why would it do any damage to an Intelligent Design hypothesis? Could it not be argued that if all possible possibilities are carried out in an infinite number of alternative worlds, then one of those worlds would contain the possibility that an intelligent designer was necessary to bring about the existence of the cosmos known to that world, and was also necessary to bring life itself into existence, and that we happen to be living in just such a world? Given the unlimited scope of the many world’s hypothesis, how could this possibility be eliminated?

I realize that these hypotheses were concocted in order to rule out non-naturalistic explanations. However, I can’t help but wonder if the unintended consequence of these sorts of hypotheses is that they make it easier to smuggle an intelligent designer back into the picture.

Consider what Dembski writes in the article:

“The four inflatons considered here allow for unlimited probabilistic resources. Now the problem with unlimited probabilistic resources is that they allow us to explain absolutely everything by reference to chance, not just natural objects that actually did result by chance and not just natural objects that look designed, but also artificial objects that are in fact designed. In effect, unlimited probabilistic resources collapse the distinction between apparent design and actual design and make it impossible to attribute anything with confidence to actual design.”

Could it not also be argued that given unlimited probabilistic resources that a supernatural intelligent designer becomes a possibility as well? To put it another way, wouldn’t the ‘chance’ of there being a supernatural intelligent designer increase to the level of probabilistic resources available to account for his existence? If so, then the price of inflating probabilistic resources to boost the explanatory power of chance is increasing the possibility of the intelligent designer as well.

And if that’s true, then it would seem that such inflationary hypotheses and their proponents stand a better ‘chance’ of keeping an intelligent designer out of the picture in a universe of limited probabilistic resources then inflating those resources to near infinity.

There's probably a good chance I've missed a step here somewhere and there's an equally good chance someone will point it out.