Moderator
Administrator
Member # 1
|
posted 08. January 2003 07:46
Featured in PCID Volume 2.3
Mental Realism: Rejecting the Causal Closure Thesis and Expanding our Physical Ontology
by Micah Sparacio
micah.sparacio@iscid.org
ABSTRACT—In this paper I argue for a non-reductive theory of mental causation that denies the primary tenet of contemporary theories of mind: the causal closure of the first-order physical world. I begin by briefly considering non-reductive theories of mental causation, coming to the conclusion that they all succumb to the causal exclusion problem elucidated by Jaegwon Kim. I contend that the exclusion problem highlights a fundamental error in contemporary philosophy of mind and provides us with a choice between two general and mutually exclusive options. After providing this critique, I conclude by arguing for an expanded conception of the physical, one that acknowledges the real ontological status of higher-level emergent properties and their unique causal powers.
To read the entire paper, please click here
To discuss this paper, please click here.
[ 03. November 2003, 12:33: Message edited by: Moderator ]
IP: Logged
|
Topic Closed
Printer-friendly view of this topic