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posted 14. June 2004 16:19
Metaphysical Considerations for External World Skepticism
by Micah Sparacio
Abstract: External world skepticism (EWS) has intuitive force. If I don’t know that I’m not a brain in a vat (BIV), then how can I possibly know that I have two hands? By the principle of closure, it seems that not knowing that I’m not a BIV implies not knowing that I have two hands. Epistemological solutions to the problem have typically relied on one of three strategies: reject the skeptical scenario (e.g. I know that I’m not a BIV), deny the principle of closure, or contextualize knowledge. Each of these solutions seems to deny something intuitive regarding the force of EWS. Drawing on Chalmers recent work , I will argue that the problem of EWS is intimately tied to how we conceive of the proper relationship between our ontology and our concepts, and that a metaphysical analysis can provide clarity on the issue. However, I reject Chalmers’ thesis that metaphysics can solve global skepticism about the external world. Rather, I make a weaker claim; namely that the bite of EWS is significantly weakened if we consider our ordinary epistemic response to the micro-macro relationships of the physical world. I conclude with a dilemma: either contemporary physical theories should leave us skeptical about our knowledge of the macro physical world or external world skepticism is philosophically benign.
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[ 14. June 2004, 16:23: Message edited by: Moderator ]
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