"... laws whose operation is discernible only in the special sorts of situations in which the higher-level emergent properties manifest themselves. Features which are emergent in this more robust sense may be termed "emergent1b"; they involve "emergent causal powers" whose operation is described by the emergent laws." (p. 174)

In my view, this middle position falls into either weak emergentism, strong emergentism, or no emergentism at all. Emergence is not an epistemological phenomenon; it is a metaphysical phenomenon. Just because I see a law I didn't see before does not mean that the law is emergent in any metaphysically significant sense. The question is whether this law is normative (i.e. causally efficacious) or merely descriptive. If the law is merely descriptive, then the described activity is [presumably] explainable in lower-level terms, and we have nothing but weak emergence. If the law is causally efficacious and irreducible to simpler laws, then either it is simply one of the primitive forces in the cosmos, and not "emergent" in any metaphysically significant sense at all, or it is strongly emergent. Therefore, I don't think this middle position is tenable.

The second version of etiological Epicureanism is primitivism. Primitivism is a methodology that allows treating a non-ultimate cause of X as an ultimate cause of X, or treating an incomplete cause of X as a complete cause of X. This can result from a failure to recognize the inadequacy of the non-ultimate / incomplete cause to account for its effects and/or to account for itself. It can also result from an attempt to force the chain of explanation to end prematurely, either because of a over-evaluation of the cost of adding further layers of causation / explanation or because of an ideological commitment to the sufficiency of the given cause / explanation. This approach results in the proliferation of ‘primitives’ that are not in fact primitives at all. The proliferation of false primitives can be prevented only by rejecting primitivism. If we accept primitivism, we have no non-arbitrary way to moderate its scope. Furthermore, when carried out to its full extent, primitivism results in a kind of phenomenalism that eliminates causation, and thus science, altogether.

The third version of etiological Epicureanism is mysterianism. Here science simply throws in the towel, claiming we can't know the cause of X, though not denying that X has some kind of cause. Mysterianism is wholly distinct from, say, a mathematical proof showing that some proposed mathematical operation cannot be done. Mysterianism is not based on proof at all, but on repeated failure to discover the cause of X. What is wrong with this approach? During our investigation of any part of reality, we might arrive at what appears to us to be a mystery. This mystery either has a solution or it does not. If this part of reality is intelligible, then the mystery does in fact have a solution. If this part of reality is unintelligible, then the mystery does not have a solution. Thus when we arrive at an apparent mystery, we have two choices: we can assume that the apparent mystery is soluble, or we can assume that the apparent mystery is insoluble. This choice makes two errors possible: assuming that an insoluble mystery is soluble, or assuming that a soluble mystery is insoluble. Of these two errors, the latter is much more damaging than the former to the enterprise of science. Assuming that an insoluble mystery is soluble is indirectly damaging in that the limited resources of science are wasted on an effort that is unavoidably fruitless. But no advancement in truth is lost since science cannot establish that the mystery is in fact insoluble. Assuming that a soluble mystery is insoluble is a much more damaging error because it prevents what would have been an advancement in truth. Were we to prefer this assumption, we could isolate ourselves from many areas of knowledge. Moreover, giving up on the intelligibility of any part of reality reduces the justification for assuming that any other part of reality is intelligible. For these reasons, the scientist is always obliged to assume that any apparent mystery is not an actual mystery.

For reasons I have explained above, all three of these versions of Epicureanism are problematic for science. If we reject all three of these versions of Epicureanism, we require science to follow the data to the very end, without cutting the causal chains short or ignoring where they lead. What does this have to do with intelligent design? Consider all the complexity around us, including both the biological complexity and the specificity of the cosmological constants. We can ascribe this complexity ultimately either to chance, law, or intelligent design. If by ‘chance’ here we mean ‘something coming from nothing’, then given the truth of the ENNF principle and our rejection of strong emergentism, there is no chance in that sense. What about law? Like weak emergence, law produces nothing new, since it is deterministic. 'Probabilistic law' is simply law mixed with chance. But we have already eliminated chance. So, there can't be any probabilistic law given the truth of the ENNF principle. 'Probabilistic law' can only be an approximation we have created for a law we have [presumably] not yet discovered. Hence, given the truth of the ENNF principle and thus the falsity of strong emergentism, the source of all the complexity we find around and in us is either contained in laws of nature that are primitive and/or the product of intelligent design. The rejection of primitivism, however, rules out the former possibility since the laws of nature per se are not an adequate explanation of their contents any more than DNA per se is an adequate explanation of the coded information carried by any particular strand. This means that in philosophy and science there are only two ultimate positions: etiological Epicureanism or intelligent design. This applies to the problems of the origin of cosmos, the origin of life, the origin of consciousness, etc. Etiological Epicureanism is incompatible with the scientific enterprise because it is an admission that the universe is fundamentally irrational, in which case the justification for a scientific understanding of reality is undermined. Moreover, there is no non-arbitrary means of restricting the scope of etiological Epicureanism, and full-blown etiological Epicureanism is fatal to the scientific enterprise. In order to preserve science, we must reject etiological Epicureanism. Surprisingly, however, we find that in rejecting etiological Epicureanism, we are left with the truth of intelligent design theory.

[ 26 February 2002: Message edited by: Moderator ]

[ 26 February 2002: Message edited by: Bryan Cross ]

[ 26 February 2002: Message edited by: Bryan Cross ]

I considering this in reference to:

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Consider all the complexity around us, including both the biological complexity and the specificity of the cosmological constants. We can ascribe this complexity ultimately either to chance, law, or intelligent design. If by ‘chance’ here we mean ‘something coming from nothing’, then given the truth of the ENNF principle and our rejection of strong emergentism, there is no chance in that sense.

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Conceptually, there are only two ultimate species of chance. These are metaphysical chance (MC) and epistemological chance (EC). Every other form of chance can be analyzed into either MC, or EC, or a combination of MC and EC. MC is the strong or pure kind of chance whereby some effect lacks a cause. For this reason MC entails that something comes from nothing. Neither MC nor EC is in any way causally efficacious; in fact, strictly speaking neither MC nor EC is a cause at all. We predicate EC of effects which, as far as we can tell, are unintended by any intelligence and unspecified by any natural law. Such effects appear to us to be accidental to the actions of every intelligence and law. These effects are wholly caused, either by the acts of intelligent agents or by laws of nature or by some combination of both. As a consequence, EC is perfectly compatible with determinism, while MC is not.

Any effect can be rightly described by MC, EC, MC & EC, or neither MC nor EC. If an effect is said to be only partly described by MC, then it can be analyzed into that part which is wholly accounted for by prior causes and that part which is wholly uncaused. That is, it can be analyzed into one part that is wholly described by MC, and one part that is not at all described by MC. If an effect is said to be only partly attributable to EC, then it can be analyzed into that part which is known to be the intended effect of at least one intelligent agent and/or specified by natural laws on the one hand, and that part which is not known to be intended by any intelligent agents and/or specified by any natural laws. Here too the effect can be divided into that part which is wholly described by EC, and that part which cannot at all be described by EC. If an effect is rightly and completely described by both MC and EC, then it can be divided into that part which is wholly uncaused, and that part which is wholly caused but not known to be intended by any intelligent agents and/or specified by any natural laws. Finally, if an effect is rightly and partly described by both MC and EC, then it can be divided into that part which is wholly uncaused, that part which is wholly caused but not known to be intended by any intelligent agents and/or specified by any natural laws, and that part which is wholly caused and known to be the intended effect of at least one intelligent agent and/or specified by natural laws.

My argument in the quotation to which you refer only makes use of the MC kind of chance. This is because EC per se cannot be a candidate source of the complexity we find around us. Any effect rightly describable by EC is wholly caused by intelligent agency or natural laws or some combination thereof. Therefore the only version of chance capable of being a candidate in the argument I raised is MC.

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This means that in philosophy and science there are only two ultimate positions: etiological Epicureanism or intelligent design.

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I assume you are rejecting complete determinism. I don't see how our actions can be regarded as a valid search for truth if determinism is true, but I don't see where you actually make that point either.

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The proliferation of false primitives can be prevented only by rejecting primitivism. If we accept primitivism, we have no non-arbitrary way to moderate its scope.

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If we accept a primitive because it gives us explanatory power is that non-arbitrary? Isn't ID itself a primitive claim that you are arguing is justifiable because of its explanatory power? Perhaps I'm missing something here, but I don't see how it is possible to reason about the world at all without accepting some fundamental axioms.

[ 26 February 2002: Message edited by: marcus ]

In summary of Bickhard's arguments:

1) Emergence presupposes a notion of levels of supervenience, but under a revised field metaphysics, there is no reason that what we now call "constituent" levels are in fact to be considered fundamental levels which drive causation (cf. a more classic reductionism).

2) Given 1, there is no reason to assume only upwards direction of causation in the system. Causal emergence implies downward causation.

3) Organizations of process are all there is; there is no ultimate level of "real" particles on which everything else is supervenient.

4) Everything is therefore epiphenomenal, because in Bickhard's proposed metaphysics, pattern is all. There is no inherent reason to privelige any particular scale of pattern over any other.

5) From these points and others, he concludes that the possibility of causally efficacious emergence (presumably _Emergence 1_) is in principle trivial.

Bickhard goes on to offer a series of illustrations of far-from-equilibrium systems (vortex, flame, etc.) which are not supervenient on any particular defined/closed set of particulate matter. These illustrations are consonant with the notion that holding "process" or "pattern" as fundamental (as opposed to "particle") is essential to our maintaining any coherent notion of supervenience.

It seems Bickhard's goal is to lay a foundation for providing a naturalistic account of the emergence of consciousness, and for this purpose, his arguments seem entirely insufficient. Quantum metaphysics still retains the notions of supervenience, constituency and causal directionality, so they simply seem to give one greater flexibility in the direction of applicability of these notions. Not addressed at all is the distinction between determinism and randomness in the new hierarchy of constituency. Unless there is some third category of constituent, then I fail to see how a quantum metaphysics could even in principle account for free agency, rationality, or any coherent form of causal inititiation. (Is there an in-principle argument that deterministic constituents can only combine to form deterministic systems? This seems intuitively true, but the justification may be another matter.)

In my hasty estimation, Bickhard's proposal might split the horns of the Design/Epicureanism distinction (or at least postpone adjudication of it) for certain complex phenomena, in that he does seem to make a plausible case that Emergence 1 can accomplish more than we've previously given it credit for. However, I fail to see (from this paper anyway) how he's convinced himself that he has rendered causal emergence any more possible with this change of metaphysics, but I would welcome other opinions/summations of this argument for emergence.

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Ref:Emergence
http://www.lehigh.edu/~mhb0/emergence.html
Bickhard, Mark H.
Lehigh University

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I’m not sure how you are using the term ‘primitive claim’, so I cannot yet answer your question containing that term. I do believe that in certain cases ID theory has superior explanatory power, but I was not here directly arguing in support of that claim. I agree that fundamental axioms of reason are necessary. The acceptance of fundamental axioms of reason, however, is fully compatible with a rejection of primitivism.

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My apologies. I didn't read your post carefully enough. Your specification of 'primitive' may different somewhat from what I was assuming. However, I am still somewhat confused about your explanations of both primitivism and mysterianism. In fact the argument would seem to suggest that we should pursue a materialist model, for example, indefinitely and shouldn't pursue less complete, but perhaps more promising, approaches until the original model has been proven utterly false.

What I'm thinking of in this context is the early materialist demand that Newton come up with a materialist explanation for gravity. (That is, as something like a vortex or a vacuum). Now we still don't have such an explanation. And gravity is now accepted as a "primitive" and fundamental law. Now it seems to me here that we have an incomplete explanation (given the materialist thinking of the times) being accepted as a complete explanation. Of course, by that standard, we still don't have a complete explanation of gravity. And we also have a mysterian approach. The search for a material explanation was simply given up on. No one proved that such an explanation was impossible. But I don't think anyone today would have argued that we should have probed further into that particular blind alley.

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Originally posted by marcus:
My apologies. I didn't read your post carefully enough. Your specification of 'primitive' may different somewhat from what I was assuming. However, I am still somewhat confused about your explanations of both primitivism and mysterianism. In fact the argument would seem to suggest that we should pursue a materialist model, for example, indefinitely and shouldn't pursue less complete, but perhaps more promising, approaches until the original model has been proven utterly false.

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Why do you think that my argument suggests this?

By "complete" and "incomplete" in my description of primitivism I don't mean "complete as seen from X point of view" or "incomplete as seen from Y point of view". I just mean 'complete' and 'incomplete' simpliciter, i.e. 'truly complete' and 'truly incomplete'. Just because something is thought by some people to be complete does not make it so. Just because something is thought to be incomplete does not make it so. My argument therefore assumes the truth of realism (and therefore the falsity of antirealism), but so does the scientific enterprise, so I don't see that assumption as a problem for my argument. But I think that my argument does not assume or presume any other metaphysical positions.
- Bryan

[ 27 February 2002: Message edited by: Bryan Cross ]

Wouldn't this quote justify the materialist of Newton's day in insisting on a materialist explanation for gravity? And wouldn't he be justified in arguing that accepting gravity as a fundamental law amounted to accepting an incomplete explanation as a complete explanation which would be a resort to primitivism? And couldn't the modern day materialist make the same arguments for refusing to give up their positions?

My point is that a lot of problems in science were not given a complete explanation. Instead the problem was reframed, and in the process an "incomplete" solution was accepted as a primitive law. In most cases those changes required that materialists had to amend their idea of what materialism was. The decisive influence was the greater explanatory power of the new theory. But accepting a new paradigm means giving up on old explanations (if I read Kuhn correctly). So I'm wondering how ID could be accepted as a new paradigm without some element of mysterianism and primitivism. I don't see how an explanation can be complete or incomplete simpliciter. It is only complete or incomplete within the context of the larger paradigm.

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Originally posted by marcus:
[QB]"Assuming that an insoluble mystery is soluble is indirectly damaging in that the limited resources of science are wasted on an effort that is unavoidably fruitless. But no advancement in truth is lost since science cannot establish that the mystery is in fact insoluble. Assuming that a soluble mystery is insoluble is a much more damaging error because it prevents what would have been an advancement in truth. Were we to prefer this assumption, we could isolate ourselves from many areas of knowledge. Moreover, giving up on the intelligibility of any part of reality reduces the justification for assuming that any other part of reality is intelligible. For these reasons, the scientist is always obliged to assume that any apparent mystery is not an actual mystery."

Wouldn't this quote justify the materialist of Newton's day in insisting on a materialist explanation for gravity?

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No. You seem to think that the rejection of mysterianism is a justification for assuming that there must be a materialistic explanation for everything. That conclusion does not follow. The rejection of mysterianism means only that we should not assume that any cause is wholly and intractably mysterious or essentially beyond our ken. The rejection of mysterianism entails nothing about the particular nature of causes except that they are in principle knowable to us.

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And wouldn't he be justified in arguing that accepting gravity as a fundamental law amounted to accepting an incomplete explanation as a complete explanation which would be a resort to primitivism?

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The rejection of primitivism is not per se a justification for demanding that causes be of a particular sort. The rejection of primitivism requires only that incomplete causes are not accepted as complete causes. The fact that someone can mistakenly think that cause X is incomplete is no challenge to my thesis that primitivism should be rejected. Abuse does not nullify proper use. Hence misuse of the rejection of primitivism is not evidence that the rejection of primitivism is misguided.

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So I'm wondering how ID could be accepted as a new paradigm without some element of mysterianism and primitivism.

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I'm not sure I understand this sentence. Why do you think that some element of mysterianism and primitivism is necessary in order to accept ID?

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I don't see how an explanation can be complete or incomplete simpliciter. It is only complete or incomplete within the context of the larger paradigm.

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This may be the primary source of our disagreement. If your statement were true, then we could never compare paradigms, nor could we compare explanations across paradigms. The fact that we can compare paradigms shows that we are not paradigm-bound, and that some explanations are more complete than others simpliciter. If that were not the case, we would have no way of determining which explanations are superior, or which paradigms are superior. That is antirealism. Like I said earlier, my position assumes the truth of realism. If your criticism of my argument is that it is not antirealist, then I freely admit it.
- Bryan

[ 28 February 2002: Message edited by: Bryan Cross ]

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The rejection of mysterianism means only that we should not assume that any cause is wholly and intractably mysterious or essentially beyond our ken. The rejection of mysterianism entails nothing about the particular nature of causes except that they are in principle knowable to us.

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The rejection of primitivism requires only that incomplete causes are not accepted as complete causes. The fact that someone can mistakenly think that cause X is incomplete is no challenge to my thesis that primitivism should be rejected.

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But Newton did not replace a material explanation for gravity with another explanation. He replaced it with no explanation at all. He (or his followers) said it should be accepted as a fundamental fact, a primitive, needing no further explanation.

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So I'm wondering how ID could be accepted as a new paradigm without some element of mysterianism and primitivism.
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I'm not sure I understand this sentence. Why do you think that some element of mysterianism and primitivism is necessary in order to accept ID?

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Now I know you've said you're not talking about explanations from this or that perspective, and the current scientific view is certainly a perspective. But where is the perspective-free view against which mysterianism and primitivism are to be judged? This is why I don't understand what you mean by explanation simpliciter.

Do you mean it in some global sense like, "the world is unexplainable"? Then why don't you just say that's what it means?

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I don't see how an explanation can be complete or incomplete simpliciter. It is only complete or incomplete within the context of the larger paradigm.
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This may be the primary source of our disagreement. If your statement were true, then we could never compare paradigms, nor could we compare explanations across paradigms. The fact that we can compare paradigms shows that we are not paradigm-bound, and that some explanations are more complete than others simpliciter.

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If that were not the case, we would have no way of determining which explanations are superior, or which paradigms are superior. That is antirealism. Like I said earlier, my position assumes the truth of realism. If your criticism of my argument is that it is not antirealist, then I freely admit it.

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I think you are right that the only reasonable explanation for the complexity and order of our universe is intelligent design. My question is what happens when your analyses is applied to intelligent causes.

It seems to me that if intelligence is the source of all the complexity we find in nature, it must likewise have an antecedent cause. For if it does not, it is either (1). strongly emergent, (2). a primitive, or (3) a case of mysterianism. If (1), the ENNF principle should rule it out. If (2), the acceptance of one primitive invites many other primitives into science, with no non-arbitrary way to stop this proliferation and consequent threat to science itself. And as you pointed out, (3) is incompatable with science also.

Here, then, is a dilemma. For if intelligence is not a case of (1), (2), or (3) above, it must of necessity be entirely determined by natural laws. Therefore, the appeal to intelligent design is no explanation at all and should rather be attributed to the antecedent laws. Thus it seems that the determinism that Epicurus wanted to avoid rears its ugly head.

The only way around this that I can see is to assume that an intelligent cause is truly free and undetermined by natural law, capable of generating effects for which there is no antecedent cause. In other words, intelligence is a legitimate (real) primitive. The problem I see with Bryan's analysis is the lack of a justification for why intelligence is legitimately viewed this way.

The fact that intelligence is, in practice, viewed this way is exemplified by the fact that we do convict people of crimes (we don't convict the natural law antecedents of comitting crimes), we say that certain arrangements of stones were caused by ancient peoples and not the antecedent conditions that generated those peoples, and the Enigma codebreakers assumed that the decoded messages came from intelligent agents rather than from the laws that formed those intelligent agents. The question is, why do we view intelligence this way? Why do we view intelligence as a break in the chain of cause and effect? It is common sense to do so, but it is not immediately obvious why such a move is justified. I suspect that there is rich territory here just waiting for philosophers of mind and intelligent design theory to explore.

Another question: what about truly stochastic events in the world (e.g., radometric decay)? There do, in fact, seem to be certain events for which there are no antecedent causes, that seem to violate the ENNF principle. What do you (Bryan) do with them?

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But what requires a cause in one paradigm may be accepted as fundamental in another and therefore in no need of explanation.

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This statement assumes the truth of antirealism, i.e. that whether X requires a cause depends on the perspective of the observer. Realism maintains that X’s causal dependency is not dependent upon the perspective of the observer but on the nature of X.

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Are you saying that mysterianism is simply the claim that nothing can be known?

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No. That would be global skepticism.

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Or are you saying it is the claim that we should quit looking for a particular cause of a particular phenomenon? The way you express it sounds like you're saying the latter.

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Mysterianism might imply that we should quit looking for a particular cause of X, but mysterianism per se is the view that the cause of X is intractably beyond our cognitive powers.

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But Newton did not replace a material explanation for gravity with another explanation. He replaced it with no explanation at all. He (or his followers) said it should be accepted as a fundamental fact, a primitive, needing no further explanation.

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How is that a problem for my argument?

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The current scientific establishment claims that matter and motion can explain everything, including intelligence. ID would claim that we should give up looking for an explanation for intelligence (mysterianism) and would also say that we should accept intelligence as a fundamental element (primitivism) along with matter and motion.

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There are different forms of ID. The most basic form of ID (called ‘mere ID’ or ‘basic ID’) makes no claim about the metaphysical nature of intelligence. This form of ID allows that intelligence could ultimately be reducible to matter in motion, since this form of ID allows that intelligence could have evolved from matter in motion. This form of ID does not claim that we should give up looking for an explanation for intelligence, or that we should accept intelligence as a fundamental element. So clearly a rejection of mysterianism and primitivism is compatible with that form of ID. A stronger form of ID proposes that at least some of the activity of intelligent agents cannot be reduced to any combination of law and chance. But this form of ID does not require that all intelligent agents have no cause. Therefore, this form of ID would claim that we should not give up looking for an explanation of intelligent agents that are caused, though it would claim that we should accept intelligence as a sui generis (i.e. irreducible) mode of causation. This form of ID as well is compatible with a rejection of mysterianism and primitivism. Here’s why. Mysterianism per se is not the view that we should give up looking for the cause of X. It is the view that we cannot know the cause of X. ID never claims that we cannot know the cause of X. ID is perfectly compatible with the claim that for anything having a cause, that cause can be known. A rejection of mysterianism is not the claim that everything has a cause. A rejection of mysterianism is compatible with there being something(s) that are uncaused. Accepting intelligence as a fundamental mode of being is compatible with a rejection of primitivism. A rejection of primitivism does not disallow the acceptance of primitives per se; a rejection of primitivism disallows the acceptance of non-primitives as primitive. In other words, a rejection of primitivism requires that we reject all false primitives. Since intelligence is not a false primitive, therefore rejecting primitivism does not require rejecting ID, nor does accepting ID require acceptance of primitivism.

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Now I know you've said you're not talking about explanations from this or that perspective, and the current scientific view is certainly a perspective. But where is the perspective-free view against which mysterianism and primitivism are to be judged? This is why I don't understand what you mean by explanation simpliciter.

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Your question presumes the truth of antirealism. The choice between perspective-bound and perspective-free is a false dilemma. Every [finite] observer has a particular perspective, but that does not mean that we are perspective-bound. The fact that we can choose to leave our own ‘paradigm’ for another ‘superior paradigm’ shows that we can stand outside our paradigm and judge it from ‘above’ it. I explained this in my previous post. I don’t think this forum is the place to discuss the realism / antirealism issue, though I would be glad to discuss it with you privately.

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Do you mean it in some global sense like, "the world is unexplainable"? Then why don't you just say that's what it means?

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No. A “better explanation of X simpliciter” means a “better explanation of X in fact”, not merely from any particular perspective. If you don’t believe in the ability to speak about things in themselves, then you won’t be able to make sense of ‘better explanation simpliciter’. The phrase ‘better explanation simpliciter’ presumes the truth of realism and the falsity of antirealism, and I’m not going to defend realism here any further.

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I don't understand this at all. I'm not sure we're in disagreement. I think we're not communicating very well.

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In my view, there seems to a very significant disagreement. I’m a realist, and you are saying many things that are very antirealist, whether you know it or not (though you also seem to be supporting realism as well; see below.) I don't think the difficulty is merely a communication problem.

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Of course we can compare paradigms. Newton makes certain predictions and Einstein makes others. Einstein's fit the data better.

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As soon as you say ‘better’, you are admitting that there is a paradigm-transcendent standard (to which you, a finite observer, have access) by which you can judge between paradigms.

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I think the data should be respected and all explanations and interpretations should be judged by there faithfulness to the data. I think that would be a realist position.

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Agreed. That is a realist position.

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Regarding explanations and interpretations of the data, I don't see how the term realism would apply. (Other than as I've stated above.)

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The view that some explanations of the data are [paradigm-transcendently] better than others is a realist position. The view that some interpretations of the data are [paradigm-transcendently] better than others is a realist position.
- Bryan

[ 28 February 2002: Message edited by: Bryan Cross ]

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It seems to me that if intelligence is the source of all the complexity we find in nature, it must likewise have an antecedent cause. For if it does not, it is either (1). strongly emergent, (2). a primitive, or (3) a case of mysterianism. If (1), the ENNF principle should rule it out. If (2), the acceptance of one primitive invites many other primitives into science, with no non-arbitrary way to stop this proliferation and consequent threat to science itself. And as you pointed out, (3) is incompatable with science also.

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I don’t agree that there is no non-arbitrary way to stop the proliferation of primitives. Such a claim presumes that there are no true primitives, or else (saying the same thing) that there is no real difference between primitives and non-primitives, or that there are no true non-primitives. That presumption is incompatible with science, common sense, and rationality. So, if there is a difference between true primitives and true non-primitives then the job of the scientist/philosopher is to use that difference to figure out which are the primitives and which are not.

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The only way around this that I can see is to assume that an intelligent cause is truly free and undetermined by natural law, capable of generating effects for which there is no antecedent cause. In other words, intelligence is a legitimate (real) primitive. The problem I see with Bryan's analysis is the lack of a justification for why intelligence is legitimately viewed this way.

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I agree that intelligent agency is a primitive mode of being and acting. John, you say that the problem with my analysis is a lack of justification for why intelligence is legitimately viewed as a primitive. By ‘analysis’ I take it you are referring to my original argument at the beginning of this thread. Do you think the conclusion of my argument does not follow from the premises? In that argument, I’m not trying to say everything there is to say about ID, so I can't be faulted for what I'm not trying to do. I’m only trying to show that a rejection of all three forms of etiological Epicureanism implies some form of ID.

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Another question: what about truly stochastic events in the world (e.g., radiometric decay)? There do, in fact, seem to be certain events for which there are no antecedent causes, that seem to violate the ENNF principle. What do you (Bryan) do with them?

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I’m *much* more certain of the truth of the ENNF principle than I am that radiometric decay has no cause.

- Bryan

[ 28 February 2002: Message edited by: Bryan Cross ]