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Author
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Topic: Natural selection and teleology
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Janitor@MIT
Member
Member # 125
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posted 26. March 2002 12:15
I have to admit that as a philosopher I make a good barber. So I can’t say that I understand why a reduction to mechanism is either necessary or desirable. The information sciences are relatively new, so they are relatively philosophically naïve and undeveloped (much like myself). But I see little inclination there to achieve some reduction to mechanism.
One of the foundational documents of the whole field was Claude Shannon’s groundbreaking Boolean analysis of electronic circuits. The paper is certainly very interesting in its own right, but I think maybe its “philosophical” importance is overlooked (as if I were any judge of such things). The operational emphasis is on the logical and syntactical relations existing among a set of elements and not on the necessary or material relations, which are ignored altogether. Probably that’s because the logical and syntactical relations are paramount and are simply not explicable by a conventional reduction to mechanism. The logic is the mechanism. (A circuit is like an expression in prepositional calculus. But I won’t get into the natural languages.)
If someone told me to explain mechanistically how this computer works, I don’t know if I could do it. (Not the least reason for which is that it doesn't have many mechanical parts.) Now, maybe that’s simply a matter of my poor powers of explanation and imagination, but I suspect its really because a “mechanistic explanation” wouldn’t be much of an explanation at all. Possibly the example is unfair, because in some sense a computer is “unnatural.” Not that its “supernatural,” but you know what I mean.
Like most people I probably think about things in the terms I was educated in. E.g., I think how marvelous is a single cell! The throughput is certainly comparable to the typical PC, on the order of ~600mHz^-sec, with the information in the genome being “thermalized” also at a comparable rate as the information in this PC, ~2-4x10^9 operations. It doesn’t strike me as odd that at a rate of SkB/operation the total information of the genome should be thermalized virtually instantaneously! (As usual my math doesn’t bear close scrutiny, but I think you see the point.) It’s not as paradoxical as stated since I know that the information is strongly conserved, even though it “powers” the cell. I’m not sure there is a mechanistic explanation of how this possible. How does this form of energy (information) power a process yet not be consumed, but instead is amplified and multiplied?! Indeed, given the inherent inefficiencies of information technologies (which are minimal), virtually all the energy lost can be accounted for by a particular logical implementation/operation, which is itself not necessary. This certainly doesn’t exhaust the “weird” things that information does.
It almost appears as if “information” violates the laws of mechanics and chemistry. But I know that can’t be true. For that reason I suspect that a reduction to mechanism would not save the phenomenon, but in achieving the reduction I would end up discarding a considerable amount of, dare I say it, information. In which case I wouldn’t think that such a reduction achieves its end: explanation. But whenever anyone tells me that something should or must be explained this way or that way, I begin to suspect that it’s not really an “explanation” that is being required.
Topically, I know that biologists have a difficult time determining exactly what the “unit of selection” is. Is it form, function, behavior? A molecule, a gene, a phenotype, a deme, what have you? I would suggest that since a satisfactory (and no doubt popular) “reduction” to informational, rather than mundanely mechanical or chemical, principles has been achieved, that the unit of selection is logical, syntactical, even semiotic. These kinds of categories seem to necessarily entail some “teleological” notions. So in explaining natural selection why shouldn't I take these "teleologies" into account?
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James A. Barham
Member
Member # 50
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posted 26. March 2002 18:08
Janitor:
I'm not quite sure whether the following speaks to your concerns, but I would like to step back for a moment and reflect on my motivations for pursuing the "emergentist" program via nonlinear science and condensed-matter physics.
I think I have two fundamental commitments, both of which I want to honor somehow, but which are in considerable tension with each other.
On the one hand, I have an urge for monism---that is, one comprehensive and coherent view of the world that ties everything together. No doubt, this is impossible to achieve, but at least I want to go down fighting. To settle in principle for anything less than one comprehensive system seems to me a cop-out. This means I reject both supernaturalism and also in-principle "complementarity" (Pattee) and other forms of subjectivism and dualism (Kantianism, constructivism, etc.).
On the other hand, I have an urge for realism---by which I mean simply that I acknowledge that the world made me, I did not make the world. This means that I owe respect to all of my experience of the world, not just the "easy" parts of it, from a scientific point of view. One way in which I feel that the realist urge must be honored is by insisting that teleology is real. I think teleology is real, because I find it in my experience of the world absolutely on a par with all the rest of my experience. It does not seem to me to be secondary or derivative or ontologically dependent on my knowledge of it. It is there, it is objectively real---if anything is.
Now, reductionism honors the monism urge, but it violates the realism urge because it is saying that our perception of teleology in life is some kind of illusion. On the other hand, as I said, any form of dualism or supernaturalism violates the monism urge (at least for me).
So, how can I possibly have both monism and realism? I believe that the notion of emergence as it has been developed by contemporary physics, especially in the so-called "effective field theory program," is the best way, if not the only one. Maybe it leaves a lot to be desired, but it seems to honor my twin fundamental commitments better than any other metaphysical approach that I know of.
I am sitting here listening to a Beethoven piano concerto while I type this. There is no way that reductionism is ever going to do justice to this experience. But I don't want to settle for saying that human beings represent a breach in the fabric of being---a bifurcation of nature, in Whitehead's phrase---either. Only emergentism has a real stab at doing justice to everything we know about reality, while at the same time somehow tying it all together. Or so it seems to me.
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Bryan Cross
Member
Member # 51
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posted 26. March 2002 23:03
James,
You are begging the question because your argument that Millikan is in error assumes the falsity of her position.
**Why must Millikan agree that she has to have an account of function that does not itself involve teleology? I see no reason why she must agree to that.**
You said that you would like to see your arguments addressed in rebuttal. I have already addressed your four pieces of evidence in my previous post. I can find only one argument in your March 21 post (the shell-game argument), and that argument contains at least one premise (see **…** above) that begs the question.
Any position whatsoever can be adequately defended if ‘burden of proof’ arguments are adequate defenses. I am looking for something more substantive than ‘burden of proof’ arguments, and I won’t participate further in this discussion if that’s all that is offered here.
Concerning emergence, I show the impossibility of emergence in my thread: “Etiological Epicureanism and Intelligent Design”.
- Bryan
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James A. Barham
Member
Member # 50
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posted 27. March 2002 08:10
Bryan:
I think we need to distinguish between two kinds of Darwinian claims: (1) Pure eliminativist and fictionalist claims by people like Dennett and the Churchlands, which do not really attempt to show how reduction of teleology to mechanism works in detail, but simply claim that teleology is an illusion; vs. (2) more empirical reductionist claims by people like Millikan and Dretske and Papineau who believe there is something to explain, and then proceed to try to explain it via "reduction," relying chiefly on the selection principle.
I am arguing that the first group are ignoring an unignorable aspect of reality, while the second group cannot carry their program through successfully because the selection principle itself covertly relies on the functional organization of the organism. I still fail to see how this "begs the question" of the success of the claim the second group is making. It seems to me that you are simply assuming that natural selection is unassailable in principle, and then accusing anyone who calls it into question of "begging the question" of its unassailability.
I think you are factually mistaken if you believe that Millikan would not mind being accused of relying on irreducible teleological concepts. Her whole program consists precisely in showing how "teleofunctions" (her term) can be reduced to mechanistic interactions via the selection principle. But that is an empirical claim that can only be settled by citing passages from her work, and I'm afraid I don't have time to do that right now. So I'll have to let that pass. (If you can find passages supporting your interpretation---that irreducible teleological concepts are fine by Millikan---I would sure like to see them.)
I will check out your thread on emergence.
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Stephen Wright
Member
Member # 195
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posted 08. April 2002 10:27
Jakob Wolf presented his interpretation of a Kantian view of teleology, in comparison with the modern formulation for evolution, very well. Natural selection is a strongly observed principle, especially visible in the world of living things competing for scarce resources. It seems to act like a filter over the course of time refining the strength of inherent traits and bringing other potential traits into prominence. This aspect of natural selection, when separated from its natural history setting can be applied in a universal manner. The impact strength of Darwinism, in part, is because of the effectiveness of this principle and our ability to observe its results.
The question as to whether natural selection, has a teleological aspect requires posing precise definitions. This will also enable review of its specific ability to predict results. When viewed as a filter in a stream of events, it is just a mechanism or process variable. Natural selection is a description of a statistical tendency for more potent variables to produce results with greater frequency than less potent competitors. The individual traits, behaviors, forces, ideas, a characteristic of single entities or groups should be interacting and competing continuously in the same field of activity with sufficient duration for the emergence of selection. This definition requires relative competition and observes the selected traits as having a tendency for self-perpetuation.
Natural selection works as a principle of prediction in several categories of creative processes producing observable phenomena. In the case of biological natural selection, the perpetuating mechanism is DNA replication. Here exists creation of both physical material and instructions for process control. The copying of genetic material involves a physical aspect and an information aspect. This crossover between two fields of events leads to an incomplete understanding of natural selection. Selection of the stronger variable by natural means works to impartially shape the spectrum of results. Natural selection is a variable that may or may not predict any specific occurrence and is not part of the essence of the trait or of the process. As a mechanism, it should have no inherent purpose, only predictive influence on the range of the results. Seen in this manner a teleological implication is removed. However, predicted by natural selection is a connectedness with information content available in the environment.
Physical process events are played out by inanimate bodies and living bodies. Both appear to be influenced by natural selection. The leverage of an applied force, from a potential to a successful completed activity, is similar whether it is an animal gathering food using a superior locomotive trait or a chemical process going forward because of a strong catalysis agent being present. In the world of substance and energy strong potential traits are delivered to existing reality by having a higher statistical probability of generation. In the animate category, through Darwinism, many acknowledge the capability of this principle to produce an array of traits shaped to connect with the environment where they have activity. Likewise, in the case of local inanimate matter and forces, they are predicted to be in states dictated by the physical information from the surrounding environment.
Segregation of these processes may be conducive to viewing a clearer picture. Sorted by event field or category, the data for review creates a pattern that may clarify the issue of association with teleology. This pattern, left by the effect of natural selection on environment, points to complexity in physical structures, which increases the potential for information to flow in. Natural forces driving matter/energy have evolved a full palate of elements and fine-tuned forces, abundant with variation and synergistic interaction. The weak anthropic principle is demonstrated by these selections made by the laws of physics. This imprint of information in the observable fabric of the physical world appears to be the result of unfolding processes in inanimate nature.
The strong anthropic principle is descriptive of the crossover of information to intent. The pattern of order and complexity in matter/energy points to a connection with information. Likewise, information when observed is positioned into the web of intent. All organic material has an innate association with the living environment as potential food in the cycle of life. Each time we look at the face of the living world, in situations of interaction, intent is seen from the integrated organization of the information. That natural selection appears intentional is because it exists in the context of self-aware competition. The environment’s interaction content is purposeful in this context of awareness. Jakob Wolf pointed out that the will to live, as implied in Darwinism, is the obvious substantial force streaming through the events in living reality. The results created by this process indicate a systemic pattern where matter is organized to receive information and information is positioned to receive intent. The teleology is not in the mechanism, the characteristics or the process. It is in the emerging meaning from living things having the ability to observe themselves.
Natural selection is a variable that also predicts results in teleological analysis. A similar pattern can be found, corresponding to analysis of the physical and informational process fields. Purpose isn’t in the selected forces that have created the potential for information, but exists holistically in the three levels, simultaneously. It is an operating synergy created during events, with consequences in each field. This design emerging from defined physical processes is at the core of a prediction in a world being molded to incorporate connectedness and intent. Contextual connection to the environment means that information and intent are readily exchanged. The behavioral sciences are discovering the patterns from natural selection that enable statistical review of the strongest traits from nature and reason. Emotional intelligence, as popularized by Daniel Goleman’s books, reveals that living emotional systems draw on semantic information that carries intent, not just from the physical brain, but also from multiple sources within the body’s systems. (Emotional Intelligence, pages 166 to 168, Bantam Books 1995) I suggest that this fact contradicts consciousness being understood as an epiphenomenona.
It seems possible to conclude that the pattern from the general principle of natural selection is the same in each category of events. These significant spheres of activity are physical, informational and intentional. A trend, in each field over long periods of time, shows statistical results indicating enhancement of interaction and variety. Data from a naturally selected process points to a specific trait’s relative influence among a group of competing traits. A stronger force, a greater number of elements, a better idea, a more motivated group or a successful individual can be inferred from repetitive data distribution. This would be consistent with Kant’s criteria for knowledge: constant conjunction plus inference. The case can be made that the effect of natural selection, in a matrix of worldly events, imprints potential receptacles for crossovers of matter to information and information to intent. Rather than Stephen Jay Gould’s metaphor of a drunk staggering away from the wall of simplicity to complexity, it appears that natural selection relentlessly filters out simplicity to let complexity, variety, interactive information and intent dominate in the environment.
[ 15 May 2002, 15:09: Message edited by: newchurchguy ]
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