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Author Topic: information and self-organization
James A. Barham
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Icon 1 posted 04. March 2002 23:47      Profile for James A. Barham   Email James A. Barham   Send New Private Message       Edit/Delete Post 
Bill asked me if I would put in my two cents' worth, as a naturalistic critic of Darwinism and a proponent of self-organization theory as the best way of understanding the teleological character of life.

It is hard to know where to begin---there are so many different issues here that are all interconnected. But let me just focus on information.

It seems to me that "information" is one of the most ambiguous words in our contemporary scientific lexicon. Before we can discuss its relevance to the problem of immanent teleology (as I prefer to say, rather than "design"), we need to disambiguate it in at least two ways:

First, we must distinguish between an ontological notion of "structure" or "pattern" and an epistemological notion of "information" as structure that is meaningful for a cognitive agent. I am a realist; I believe that there are natural kinds and that the word has its own inherent structure, at least in some respects. There are not just arbitrary categories that we impose on the world; rather, we discover structure in the world. Now, if you are willing to grant me that much, then perhaps you will agree as well that if there were no living things, there would be no "information" at all, only structure, because information is inherently structure that is meaningful, and meaning presupposes the existence of a cognitive agent (i.e., a living thing).

That is one distinction. The other distinction is between objective and subjective senses of information. By objective information, I mean information that it used by a given organism for its own purposes, and that would exist even if no other organism existed in the world. It is objective in the sense that it is not observer-dependent. I believe that information in this sense is utilized in the fundamental life processes of all organisms. But the problem arises when we forget that other organisms are centers of their own being ("pour soi" in the terminology of the existentialists) and speak as though all information were generated by our own observation acts. When we speak of the "information content" of DNA, for example, we are speaking subjectively of the information content of the sequence as it appears to us in the context of the Shannon theory. But this observer-dependent sense of information may have little or nothing to do with the way information is utilized by the organism. In truth, we do not know enough to say. Certainly, the naive view that the genome can be interpreted straightforwardly as a bit string is fast becoming passe (see the New York Academy of Sciences collection edited by L.H. Caporale, or the important work of Richard von Sternberg). Therefore, I do not believe it is useful to reify information when talking about organisms in the way that the Shannon theory does when talking about communication channels. Certainly, information in some broad sense is ubiquitous in living things, but the Shannon formalism probably has little relevance to information in the objective, or non-observer-dependent, semantic sense.

Bill's idea of the "conservation of information" is of course quite correct within the context of Chaitin's algorithmic information theory, but I do not think it useful for understanding the real world of living things. The problem is that Chaitin's idea applies to formal systems ("the theorems deducible from an axiom system cannot contain more information than the axioms themselves do"), but organisms are not formal systems! If we merely assume that they are, then we are begging the main question at issue.

As Robert Rosen wrote (Life Itself, p. 191): "The assertion that formalizations suffice in the exression of Natural Law, and hence, that causal entailment is to be reflected entirely in algorithms, is a form of Church's Thesis . . . If it were true, the consequences that follow from its truth would clearly have the most staggering implications for all aspects of human thought. For good or ill, it is not true, not even in mathematics itself."

It seems to me that information theory is simply the wrong formalism for thinking fruitfully about the problem of immanent teleology (or design, if you prefer). What is the right one?

Well, the generation of structure in the most general sense is best explained within the framework of quantum field theory, and in particular the notion of symmetry breaking. As Pierre Curie said 100 years ago, "It is the dyssymmetry that creates the phenomenon." I am not quite sure what the "conservation of information" thesis would have to say about the formation of an ice crystal, for example, but clearly it plays no part in the conventional physical understanding.

Now, equally clearly life transcends the sort of symmetry breaking that we find in inorganic forms of condensed matter. So the real problem, as I see it, is how to account for the fact that living things are constantly shifting matter around in such a way as to perpetuate their own existence, thus resisting the second law. Clearly, something is going on that transcends the ordinary laws of physics and chemistry, which in the end boil down to energy minimization, because the whole point of life is to expend work pushing uphill against energy gradients. Unfortunately, we simply do not have a clue how this is possible. And yet it clearly happens, so there has to be an explanation. I have speculated that it may be connected to some sort of topological conservation principle (as opposed to the Noether principle) possibly connected with Hans Frauenfelder's "minimum frustration principle" in the protein state of matter, which arises from the enormous size and innumerable self-interactions in proteins.

But I am no physicist, and this is just hand-waving. What is exciting is that there are more and more physicists and biologists saying that the current Darwinian-mechanistic picture is fundamentally flawed. So, when a critical mass of people start working on the problem, maybe we will make progress toward solving it. In the meantime, the most important thing we can do is get the word out that the whole natural selection-based view of life is a castle built on sand.

James Barham


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Janitor@MIT
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Icon 1 posted 06. March 2002 14:17      Profile for Janitor@MIT         Edit/Delete Post 
Imagine, James A. Barham, what its like to be eaten alive by mice. I thought I would quibble you into paroxysms of frustration, even though I basically I agree with you. But instead I’ll join you in hand waving and maybe together we can work up a good breeze. I also wondered about the favored method of analysis here on another topic (but no one seemed very interested): ISCID: Signal agreement, and the role of information in the organization of complex systems

Despite its obvious and intuitive heuristic and metaphoric value, in the actual application of information theory to biology many significant problems arise. It seems that every author who has considered the application in any detail has come away with many more problems and paradoxes than solid and useful conclusions. There are difficult analytical and theoretical problems:

One problem relates to the quantification of information. Shannon derived the information metric by initially modeling the transmission of information (notice the circularity) as a discrete stochastic Markovian process. The measure of information depending on the transition probabilities of the ith to jth bit. It is these transition probabilities that determine the information content in each “bit” and any message. Limits are defined that make this measurement possible: the set from which each instance is drawn must be finite, the duration of the transmission of each bit, the interval between the transmission of each bit, and the total message length must be finite. A further limit is implied later when Shannon deals with “equivocation:” each instance drawn from the set must be differentiable.

In biology all these limits are problematic. The finitude limits remain, in that we expect that they are met, but in (biology) being neither zero nor infinite, they are intractably “large” for the purposes of analysis/computation. Leading to the obvious inference that bioinformation is “complex” or “improbable.”

But the measure is made over the set and each instance on the basis of transition probabilities. Where did the set come from? Biologists appear to have accepted some sort of “anthropic argument” about the origin of the set. This is unacceptable. Petitio principii. The set must be accounted for on material first principles.

Even if given the set the real measure is in the probabilities of the selections made from the set. So we have to account for this sampling process. In biology we actually know little about the transition probabilities in each instance. We can make “guesstimates” on the basis of instantaneous rates/frequencies (over experimental time), but “confidence levels” permitting extrapolation (over evolutionary time)are low. Biological models presume stationarity and symmetry because of the analytical difficulties, while at the same time molecular phylogeny and population genetics tells us these assumptions are not well warranted. (Biological evolution is not an ergodic process.)

Shannon eschews any consideration of "meaning," but he can't quite escape it. The stochastic model he chooses later gives him some problems in the coding theorems. Particularly w.r.t. “equivocation,” as it relates to the “representation” of information and not exactly to its measure. I don’t recall if Shannon notices that equivocation does not necessarily change the entropy of the received message. (There’s a paradox here: equivocation is only possible if the instances are not inequivalent, but if they are not then how do we know an instance is an “equivocation”?) A “specificity” principle needs to be introduced here, because if the entropy is not changed in equivocation (as, ingeniously, in the DNA code) then what is required is a specific instance by instance comparison of the source/destination messages. (To do this Shannon awkwardly introduces yet another “observer” into the system.)

The way the DNA code handles equivocation highlights the fact that the code scheme conditions these transitions (e.g., its fixed length, prefix, complementarity, and position dependent statistical [“wobble”] properties), but the problem is to account for these properties, which obviously can’t be done on the basis of transition probabilities! This is just to say that we have little knowledge of the “production rules” for the strings. No doubt these production rules also represent significant constraints across all levels. The presumption is that the production rules are purely “functional” and on biological theory “axiomatic” production rules are not possible. But how can functional constraints explain the origin of the production rules which themselves “represent” the functional constraints?

I keep going round and round in circles here! Eigen suggests that we simply step inside the circle (and try to not let it bother us), and Pattee suggests that we make an “epistemic cut.” These are interesting ideas, but I don’t know why I find them…well, you know.

These are difficult problems (at least for me): I think its utterly unremarkable that natural processes and contingencies impress themselves as a sort of literal “representation” upon some material medium as die and cast. This was the very basis of the (defunct) protein theory. But how do the same natural forces impress an apparently “symbolic” and “axiomatic” representation of themselves upon a material medium? That’s exactly how they impress themselves upon our minds. But that’s just too weird!

And when I refer to “production rules” its utterly unremarkable that production rules are found in nature. But what we find in the genome are not exactly “production rules” for generating strings. The strings are not simply a stochastic concatenation of bits. They are functional representations. They are not simply registers of information. They do something. They are algorithms. (I’ll leave to you to insert the now familiar circularity w.r.t. the algorithms.)

By way of a sort of “design” instrumentalism I can treat the DNA code and the genetic program as a formal system, but received theory (the standard model of origins) requires me to do so purely as an ad hoc instrumentalism. I can’t possibly take these “metaphors” and “heuristics” seriously! But the “standard model of origins” doesn’t account for the code/program. So all I really have is the metaphor! I don’t find this very satisfying: a metaphor is not a scientific theory. Unless, of course, that these are more than “mere metaphors”…

Additional theoretical problems are the apparent observer and time dependency of information. These problems also lead us into “strange loops.” But I’ll spare you.

(Did I just make Dr. Dembski’s argument without once implying that the strings are improbably complex?!)

Feel the breeze? LOL

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Columbo
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Icon 1 posted 06. March 2002 15:59      Profile for Columbo   Email Columbo   Send New Private Message       Edit/Delete Post 
James,

You wrote:

quote:
Originally posted by James A. Barham:
... as a naturalistic critic of Darwinism and a proponent of self-organization theory as the best way of understanding the teleological character of life....

... I do not believe it is useful to reify information when talking about organisms in the way that the Shannon theory does when talking about communication channels. Certainly, information in some broad sense is ubiquitous in living things, but the Shannon formalism probably has little relevance to information in the objective, or non-observer-dependent, semantic sense.



I understand 'reify' to mean 'taking something abstract to be something material.' Now, if I understand information "in the semantic (language-like) sense" correctly, then although it is not material, it isn't abstract either. It is a real, non-material object with properties. As an example, consider the message in a book. It is the product of a mind, and it is symbolized in text. It can be transmitted, corrupted, corrected, and acted upon. The actual material used for recording the message is entirely arbitrary, as is the choice of symbols.

Complexity and specificity can be detected in the material, and point to the choices made by an intelligent agent. Notice too that the complexity of the symbolized material (be it Sanskrit, morse code, or DNA nucleotides) is an arbirtary choice of a designer, unrelated to the complexity of the both the specification and the actual message. I think that the complexity of the specification is indirectly measured, and the complexity of the message is directly measured, in the complexity of the phenotype.

(A simple specification, for example, would be "Choose every other interger from 1 to 1000, while a complex specification would be the plans for building a space shuttle.)

Given this, do you think that ID theorists are 'reifying' information?

Also, I believe Dembski has made it clear (sorry, I can't recall where just yet) that CSI is not equivelant to Shannon information. If this is so, then does it matter that it "has little relevance to information in the objective, or non-observer-dependent, semantic sense?"

Columbo

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James A. Barham
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Icon 1 posted 06. March 2002 19:27      Profile for James A. Barham   Email James A. Barham   Send New Private Message       Edit/Delete Post 
To Janitor@MIT:

I think that we agree for the most part, although you are obviously better versed in the technical details of information theory than I am, and I may have missed some subtle points of disagreement. But basically I take you to be saying that the seemingly arbitrary, code-like or symbolic aspect of DNA (and not just DNA has this characteristic, by the way---see Marcello Barbieri's "The Organic Codes" [forthcoming from Cambridge UP]) requires some sort of explanation, and yet such an explanation seems---nay, is---impossible in terms of ordinary biochemistry, etc.

So what are the options? One is to take the problem to be merely "epistemological" in nature (like Pattee does), meaning that we have to be satisfied forever with the sort of unsatisfying "complementarity" that we seem stuck with in quantum mechanics. Another option, of course, is to invoke supernatural causes.

All I wish to say is that a third option exists---namely, to investigate the possibility that science may be able to describe some sort of conservation laws for molecular biology which are "topological" in nature (i.e., other than the "Noether" conservation principle which is equivalent to energy minimization). Hans Frauenfelder has hinted that the "minimum frustration principle" in proteins may play such a role, and Herbert Froehlich, A.S. Davydov, and others have come at the problem from the direction of coherent modes or resonances in proteins related to the fact that they are electric dipoles (electric dipole quanta). I have suggested (as tentatively as I can) that these two ideas might fruitfully be related to each other. This is certainly hand-waving, but at least it is suggestive of what a "third way" between the Pattee and ID forms of despair might look like.

To accentuate the positive, the thing we all seem to agree on is that the Darwinian position that there is simply no problem here is not a viable option.

To Columbo:

You dislike my claim that ID theory "reifies" the notion of information, and go on to say that "the complexity of the symbolized material (be it Sanskrit, Morse code, or DNA nucelotides) is an arbitrary choice of a designer." But this simply begs the question. The question at issue, from a self-organization perspective, is precisely whether DNA ought to be conceived of in the same way as languages and codes. Obviously, the founders of molecular biology agree with you here, and I am very much in the minority in disputing that this is a correct characterization, but I am not alone. See Peter Godfrey-Smith, Lenny Moss, Sahotra Sarkar, and others on the ways in which DNA fails to satisfy the rigorous definition of a code.

However, I do not wish to stake my claim on technical points, but rather on the fundamental and incontrovertible fact that the cell is acting intelligently at all times on its own behalf. Certainly, information in some sense or other is relevant to its activity, but it is far from clear that either the Shannon or the Chaitin sense is the correct way to understand it. In saying this, I am not denying that we can give a Shannon or Chaitin interpretation to DNA; rather, I am questioning whether these interpretations get at the heart of what is going on intrinsically, so far as the cell itself is concerned. I think there are strong theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that they do not, that they are superficial and subjective views of biological process.

I have offered an entirely different, dynamical and objective interpretation, based on ideas borrowed from nonlinear dynamics. In a nutshell, we may model a protein as a highly nonlinear oscillator correlated with the "correct" external conditions that are necessary to sustain its functional action by means of a low-energy trigger, where "correct" means apt to preserve the dynamical stability of the oscillator. On this model, "information" lies in the tendency of such a trigger to predict the success of the functional action (i.e., the oscillation), where, again, "success" means preserving the dynamical stability of the oscillator (see my "A Dynamical Model of the Meaning of Information," BioSystems, 1996, 38: 235-241).

Of course, this is highly abstract, and hardly capable of refutation, or indeed connection with any kind of quantifiable physics. So it scarcely qualifies as a theory at all. It is more in the way of a philosophical thought experiment. But at least it is an example of the sort of thing that we need in order to understand what information is in a sense that is objective (non-observer-dependent) and intrinsic to the life processes themselves.

I'm not sure that this addresses all of your concerns, but perhaps it clarifies a little what I mean when I claim that the subjective, observer-dependent conception of information fails to get at the heart of the problem.

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Jules
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Icon 1 posted 17. March 2002 22:00      Profile for Jules   Email Jules   Send New Private Message       Edit/Delete Post 
James,

I'm afraid everything said here is over my head. However, I felt I owed you the courtesy of replying to your topic, since you were kind enough to visit mine. I had suggested that you start a topic on whether it is legitimate to compare organisms to machines. That was before I saw this topic. I imagine there is some way of incorporating that question here. And maybe you could answer my question of whether you are proposing a kind of vitalism. I remember reading part of a book about half a year ago that described how the fundamental parts of a cell seem to magically organized themselves into larger parts. I was in awe. Coming from a Christian background, I was reminded of Jesus' words that God is a God of the living. It suddenly struck me that perhaps God has never created anything that is really "dead." I realize that you don't share my belief in God. However, I don't see why that should stop me from being open to your ideas, which may fit in rather well with my theological ones.

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James A. Barham
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Icon 1 posted 17. March 2002 23:45      Profile for James A. Barham   Email James A. Barham   Send New Private Message       Edit/Delete Post 
Jules:

I can't really speak to the theological aspect of your question, although I have read the work of some process thinkers who were thesists with great interest (I am thinking especially of David Ray Griffin).

As for whether what I am advocating is "vitalism," I have mixed feelings. On the one hand, that is a very loaded term that it would be better to steer clear of, if possible. On the other hand, I am by temperament allergic to euphemism. I have in fact embraced the term "neo-vitalism" in some of my work. But there is an important distintion between contemporary neo-vitalism (or "molecular vitalism" as a recent article by Marc Kirschner et al. had it) and the older forms of vitalism, which posited a vital force that was unconnected to any other concepts in science.

The crucial point about the new perspective is the attempt to tie in the teleological organization of the living state to what we know about the self-organizing, collective, and coherent powers of matter in general, via nonlinear science and condensed-matter physics. So, yes, with that caveat, I guess I would have to say I am a kind of vitalist. Anyway, it seems just plain common sense to say that there is something utterly distinctive about living matter.

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Jules
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Icon 1 posted 18. March 2002 00:09      Profile for Jules   Email Jules   Send New Private Message       Edit/Delete Post 
James,

Wish I knew what linear science was, and condensed-matter physics. Yes, I agree that there seems to something categorically different about living matter. However, given my theological take on things, I would tend to say that all matter is living. Maybe we're just too small to observe how the "non-living" matter around us is organized into living systems much larger than us. Just a hunch.

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