posted 06. March 2002 23:57                    

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Omen/Hunch (The first mode leads to what Peirce identified as the Open Iconic Tone)

This type of inference deals with the possibility of a possible resemblance. A more concrete way to characterize this type of reasoning is to describe it as reasoning in order to determine the possibility that our initial observations might serve as omens for possible evidence. An omen is a sign whose resolution is in future acts of inquiry and observation. When the inference of the omen is more implicit, we might call it a hunch. For instance, an archeologist might guess that she should examine the banks of an old stream bed, because she might possibly find something that might possibly be an artifact. This type of inference we traditionally consider to be merely a subjective act. However, it is an abduction, and one that is systematically related to other types of abductions.

Symptom (The second mode leads to what Peirce identified as the Open Iconic Token)

This type of inference deals with possible resemblances. Here we have the case where we are trying to decide whether or not some actual observation has enough properties to be considered as some case. A more concrete way to characterize this type of reasoning is to describe it as reasoning in order to determine whether our observations serve as symptoms for the presence of some more general phenomenon. A symptom is a sign whose action is ongoing in the present. For instance, our archeologist, let us say, finds a smoothed stone. It is not immediately clear whether or not the smoothness is natural or man-made, and so she has to make an inference. In these inferences, we often find a dependence on prior experience is involved.

Metaphor/Analogy (The third mode leads to what Peirce identified as the Open Iconic Type )

This type of inference deals with the manipulation of resemblance to create or discover a possible rule. A more concrete way to characterize this type of reasoning is to describe it as the mode of inference that uses analogy and metaphor to create new potential rules of order. For example, suppose our archeologist is unhappy with current theories of migration to describe the movements of the ancient tribes whose artifacts she has been collecting. She needs to generate a new conceptual frame of reference. Since most, if not all, general conceptual frames are metaphorical in nature (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), it makes sense to create a new root metaphor to guide the formation of the new frame of reference. In order to do this, she can shift her metaphorical base deliberately, using a principle that Shank (1987) has called the Method of Juxtaposition. Suppose, she decides to look at tribal migration as if it were like, say, reading behavior. What areas of investigation does this new metaphorical area of juxtaposition suggest? Notice that there is no requirement that the juxtaposition make explicit sense. We can get away with this due to the fact that human beings are compelled to render any juxtaposition as meaningful, or at least as meaningful as possible. In fact, juxtapositions which are arbitrary can be quite useful, in that they can lead to new areas of insight and understanding.

Clue (The fourth mode leads to what Peirce identified as the Open Indexical Token)

This type of inference deals with possible evidence. A more concrete way to characterize this type of reasoning is to describe it as reasoning in order to determine whether or not our observations are clues of some more general phenomenon. A clue is a sign which indicates some past state of affairs. Therefore, any act of reasoning which centers on clues is an act that tries to infer what past states of affairs or circumstances were, and is therefore an act of detection. For example, our archeologist discovers a number of pottery shards next to the smooth stone. Is there any connection between the two, or is it just a coincidence? In order to make a judgment, she looks at the shards and looks at the smooth stone, searching for evidence of some physical connection. If she finds pieces of pottery on the stone, then she has a potential clue that the stone was used, for some reason she does not know yet, to shatter the pots.

Diagnosis/Scenario (The fifth mode leads to what Peirce identified as the Open Indexical Type).

This type of inference involves the formation of a possible rule based on available evidence. A more concrete way to characterize this type of reasoning is to describe it as reasoning in order to discover possible diagnostic judgments amidst our observations. It is the act of reasoning that also finishes off the detection process by the creation of plausible scenarios from the body of clues. For instance, our archeologist notes that the shattered pots are all placed in a shallow pit, and there are other smooth stones organized around the edges of the pit. She then starts the process of assembling these individual observations no longer as observations, but now as potential scenarios. As scenarios, these patterns of clues take on a possible unity of character.

Explanation (The sixth mode Peirce identified as the Open Symbolic Type)

This type of inference deals with a possible formal rule. A more concrete way to characterize this type of reasoning is to describe it as reasoning in order to form a general plausible explanation. For example, suppose our archeologist is trying to account for a puzzling collection of artifacts. She has never seen burnt sticks with smooth stones attached to them. As tools, these implements have been weakened by having been burnt. If she shifts her mode of explanation, though, she can make better sense of them. Suppose, instead of being tools, these artifacts have religious significance? The burnt sticks might serve to illustrate some ritual point. Note that this explanation by itself carries no weight of certainty, but it might serve to simplify other explanations, and create a pattern to account for other data. This explanation, if it holds, allows us to summarize a lot of separate pieces of evidence, and a number of alternative scenarios, into a single coherent explanation that has the additional advantage of serving as the basis for meaningful insight. That is, a good explanatory hypothesis does not just explain the obvious. It directs us toward the less obvious, and sheds light on areas once seen as unclear or unconnected.

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