warren_bergerson
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Member # 262
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posted 13. November 2002 10:33
Noel,
Quote: - because we can imagine three types of explanation (with combinations thereof): chance, necessity, and design. Now ID is bringing back design -- which is even better -- and ID does not deny chance and necessity.
Chance and design, or more formally stochastic causation and ‘teleological or intelligent causation produced by design processes which are complex causal processes’, are forms of complex causation. The fundamental problem in trying to analyze complex causal relationships is the lack of mathematically/logically precise definitions of complex causation.
The discussion of design and design processes, as well as the discussions of evolution and evolutionary processes, all seem to be based on vague, imprecise, semantic, metaphysical concepts of complex causation. This metaphysical vagueness may be acceptable in academia, but it will never result in any scientific resolution of the issues being discussed.
The failure to develop and apply mathematically precise definitions of complex causal relationships is somewhat surprising, because 1)it does not appear to be particularly difficult to do using set theoretic mathematics, and 2)defining and analyzing complex causation in terms of set theoretic mathematics appears to offer solutions to so many of the issues being debated.
One of the key ‘problems’ in developing mathematically precise definitions of complex causation seems to be the erroneous belief that there is some type of metaphysical reality behind both simple and complex causation. Many people seem to have a lot of problem with the idea that causation is simply a mathematical/logical concept invented by humans to aid in analyzing the world. In terms of the formalist/Platonist dichotomy you introduced earlier, I would suggest it seems people have a problem accepting formalistic views.
In order to formally and precisely define complex causation mathematically, you start with a set theoretic definition of permanent and universal causation (A always causes B) of the form (property A is always associated with property B). Starting with the simplest form of causation, more complex forms of causation are formed simply developing new ways of expressing the simple causal relationship. By transforming or changing how the relationship is expressed, it appears to be relatively easy to develop definitions of stochastic causation, of teleological causation, and of the complex causation(logic machines) which generates teleological causal relationships. [I will be glad to discuss the techniques involved. ]
Once you have mathematically precise definitions of different forms of complex causation, then you can begin to analyze how complex causation is or can be used in scientific analysis. [ A mathematical/predictive scientific theory is an expression of a causal relationship meeting certain criteria. Constructing scientific theories using complex causal relationships involves some interesting technical issues. ]
Once you resolve the issue of how complex causation is used in scientific analysis, then you can address issues such as 1)‘non-materialistic design inferences (scientific analysis can not logically generate such inferences because scientific analysis involves searching materialistic/deterministic solution spaces. Since the search space can never be exhausted, scientific analysis can never ‘suggest’ non-materialistic explanations.), 2)the generation or extraction of information, and 3)the nature of the mind body relationship.
Just as the key to the development of Newtonian physics was the development of an appropriate form of mathematics, so the key to development of an effective design science will be the development of an effective mathematics of complex causation. It is, at least IMO, interesting that there is so much interest in complex causation, and so little apparent interest in developing rigorous mathematical definitions of complex causation.
Karl Stephan presents an interesting argument in support of the claim the that ‘scientific analysis may provide support for the assertion that ‘biological design’ may be the result of non-materialistic/non-deterministic design processes’. The argument is flawed for two reasons. First, EA’s do not and can not represent materialistic/deterministic scientific explanations for biological design. As should be obvious, the argument or inference "if can not be explained by A, then might be explained by B", is the same as ‘might be explained by B’ if explained by A is known to be false.
Second, scientific determinism is not a testable hypothesis but a premise or assumption used in scientific analysis. Scientific analysis assumes the existence of a deterministic/materialistic explanation and then searches an inexhaustible set of possible deterministic/materialistic explanations in order to find one compatible with all known facts.
To repeat the point of my comments, the issues of ‘EA’s’ and ‘external design inferences’ can be readily resolved if we go back and develop a rigorous mathematics of complex causation.
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