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Topic: Jakob Wolf: Two Kinds of Causality: Philosophical Reflections on Darwin's Black Box
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posted 11. November 2002 15:51
Two Kinds of Causality: Philosophical Reflections on Darwin's Black Box
by Jakob Wolf ABSTRACT—Michael Beheīs theory of irreducibly complex systems can be supported by epistemological arguments inspired from Immanuel Kants critique of the teleological judgement. In an irreducibly complex system you find a causality which works in two direction absolutely simultaneously. The whole is both an effect of the parts and a cause of the parts. The causal connection between the parts and the whole is simultaneously an instance of two-way cause <-> effect. An unintelligent cause-effect-relation can never demonstrate an instance of such a causality. This explains why an irreducibly complex system is not susceptible to explanation by reference to an unintelligent cause-effect-relation. We are only familiar with two-way causality when intentionality and intelligence is involved. We see this everywhere in human life. For instance, a house is the cause of the money received in rent; but, at the same time, the anticipation of rental was the cause of its being built. The relationship between unintelligent cause-effect relations and intelligent cause-effect relations in an irreducibly complex system is that the relation between the parts in the system can be explained by unintelligent causes, but the system as a whole cannot. It can only be explained by the involvement of an intelligent cause. The irreducibly complex system is never explained in the biological sciences, but always presupposed.
To read the entire paper, please click here
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The Pixie
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posted 13. November 2002 09:04
quote: No, the difference, rather, is that living matter is constituted by irreducibly complex systems, while inorganic material is not. The prefix bio- in the name of the science biology, refers to the circumstance that in this science, living matter is investigated at the level of its organization in irreducibly complex systems.
Is Jakob Wolf saying that any system that can be proved not to be irreducibly complex systems does not count as life? quote: A very simple example is given by a plant, which qua organic whole is the cause of the life of the leaves, while the leaves are at the same time the cause of the life of the plant.
I think the confusion is that life is a complex on-going process, rather than a simple effect. If you break down the process into a series of steps you will quickly find a chain reaction of cause and effect. Light causes the leaves to photosynthesise. Photosynethesis allows the plant to grow. Plant growth creates new leaves. Light causes the leaves to photosynthesise. By combining a series of effects into one process Wolf is giving the appearance of something extraordinary happening, something atemporal. To give an equivalent, but non-organic, example: The great heat in the sun causes hydrogen to undergo fusion. Hydrogen, undergoing fusion, makes the sun hot. The two effect-causes clearly have a synegy, or "mode of causality, which works with absolute simultaneity in both directions," Wolf gives the "standardly illustrated" example of "one billiard ball striking another and so causing the second to be set in motion" for simple one-way cause and effect. But a little relabelling can easily muddy the waters. Let us consider the overall process; a game of billards. In the game, one ball sometimes hits another, but the second sometimes hit the first. Clearly we have two-way causality... Or not.
I also note that Wolf has tried to head off this arguement from the start: quote: When we encounter irreducibly complex systems in nature, then, we encounter phenomena which resist explanation by unintelligent causes. We cannot fully account for such systems: they transcend our explanatory powers. When we try to get to grips with a causality which proceeds in two directions at once, it strikes us as mind-bending – mind-boggling. It would seem that human thought is so structured as to think linearly, for we inevitably find ourselves attacking the problem by resolving the complex system into something that presents a linear succession. If the mind fails to recognize that in facing the complex whole it has come up against a limit, it will find itself driven to desperately speculative remedies. If you insist on resolving the dualdirectional causality into a unidirectional version, blind dogmatism will invariably result.
Possibly. But surely we have to investigate the alternatives (that is what ID is campaigning for broadly). It the system is ameniable to a unidirtectional analysis, perhaps it will serve to highlight the "blind dogmatism" of the dualdirectional-causalists!
Pixie
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yersinia
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posted 13. November 2002 10:17
Jakob Wolf writes,
quote:
When we encounter irreducibly complex systems in nature, then, we encounter phenomena which resist explanation by unintelligent causes. We cannot fully account for such systems: they transcend our explanatory powers.
Funny, this did not appear to be the case over in the immune system(s) thread.
If scientists are making significant progress explaining the origin of the fantastically, and irreducibly, complex immune system(s), then the whole premise of Wolf's article is flawed.
yersinia
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Frances
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posted 13. November 2002 12:50
Jakob Wolf argues:
quote:
Behe further demonstrates that the emergence of these systems cannot be explained by neo- Darwinian theory, which has it that all evolution can be explained in terms of natural selection working on variations produced by, amongst other things, random mutations.
In fact Behe asserts that the emergence of these systems cannot be explained by neo-Darwinian theory but in fact allows for indirect pathways.
In fact as shown by Thornhill and Ussery several such pathways which could result in IC systems theoretically exist. One may object, as Dembski does, to 'just so stories' but one has to realize that 'just so stories' are relevant in two significant aspects: First of all they undermine the claims that 'in principle Neo-Darwinian mechanisms cannot result in IC' secondly if 'just so stories' which describe imaginary mechanisms are irrelevant to Dembski, why should imaginary intelligent design (pathways) be of any interest either? It seems ironic to me that on one hand one rejects 'just so stories' and on the other hand embraces even stronger 'just so stories' in the form of an ID inference of rarefied design.
Orr and Dembski discuss this in the Boston review.
So Jakob might consider the arguments to be convincing but I would argue that in light of the reality, ICness has lost its appeal as a reliable marker of ID. [ 13. November 2002, 13:30: Message edited by: Frances ]
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andyg
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posted 13. November 2002 15:10
I realize I have posted this before, but it bears repeating in this thread: Behe is retreating from the utility of his current concept of IC. The following is from an article by Behe entitled "Reply to my critics: A response to reviews of Darwin's Black Box: The biochemical challenge to evolution" published in Biology and Philosophy, vol. 16, pp 685-709 in 2001. The article is notable for Behe admitting that the concept of IC as laid out in his book is flawed: quote:
"However, commentary by Robert Pennock and others has made me realize that there is a weakness in that view of irrreducible complexity [... that removing parts leads to a loss of function...]. The current definition puts the focus on removing a par from an already functioning system. Thus, seeking a counterexample to IC, in "Tower of Babel" Pennock writes about a part in a sophisiticated chronometer whose origin is simply assumed, which breaks to give a system he posits can nonetheless work in a simpler watch in a less demanding environment. The difficult task facing Darwinian evolution, however, would not be to remove components from a pre-existing system; it would be to bring together components to make a new system in the first place. Thus, there is an asymmetry between my current definition of IC and the task facing natural selection. I hope to repair this in future work."
Wolf would also do well to appreciate that Behe, nor anyone else, has demonstrated that a biological system is IC by his criteria - for to do that, one would have to delete each component and show that in each case, deleting one component removes all function. This is easy to demonstrate with a mousetrap (although as others have pointed out, a reduced mousetrap is still good for funtioning as a tie clip, or a device for excavating one's ears.....) but hard to demonstrate with a 40 or 50-component biological system.
AndyG
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Jakob Wolf
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posted 15. November 2002 03:55
Answer to The Pixie: You ask if a system that can be proved not to be irreducible complex does not count as life? I think, Yes. I am not sure you understand what I say about the parts and the whole in an organism. You say that life is a complex on-going system. You describe the relationship between the plant and the leaves as a successive process, but my point is that these successive processes are working within a selfregulating system. I think you are overlooking that. As I write in my paper a circle chain reaction of cause and effect is not a two way causality. You are completely right about us not knowing how far an explanation based on unintelligent causes takes us. But I think I have both empirical observations and logic on my side when I hold that it can not explain irreducible complex systems. That is not "blind dogmatism". Blind dogmatism is the case when you have no other argument than it must be possible.
To Yersinia: I have not followed the discussion about the immune system. Maybe it is not an irreducible complex system - but do you hold that irreducible complex systems doesnīt exist at all? If they donīt surely all I have written is useless.
To Frances: I think there is a important difference between "just so stories" and ID theory. "Just so stories" are speculations. ID is an interpretation based on empirical oberservations and logic. ID is simply more likely than "just so stories".
To Andyn: The discussion about the precise definition of irreducible complex systems is very interesting, but actually not essentiel to the assertion that selfregulating systems can not be explained by unintelligent causes.
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The Pixie
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posted 15. November 2002 04:42
Jakob Wolf Thanks for the reply. quote: You ask if a system that can be proved not to be irreducible complex does not count as life? I think, Yes. I am not sure you understand what I say about the parts and the whole in an organism. You say that life is a complex on-going system. You describe the relationship between the plant and the leaves as a successive process, but my point is that these successive processes are working within a selfregulating system. I think you are overlooking that. As I write in my paper a circle chain reaction of cause and effect is not a two way causality.
On what basis do you claim that "selfregulating" is not "a circle chain reaction of cause and effect"? My lack of biology may show at this point, but my understanding is that a biological system maintains stasis by reacting to variations, and adjusting accordingly. For example, a high blood sugar level causes the pancreas to excrete insulin, which causes sugar to be absorbed into various cells and so blood sugar is reduced. If blood sugar drops, glucagon is released, causing cells to release stored sugar. Overall we have a system that maintains blood sugar levels in a very narrow range; a self-regulating system. But it is all simple cause and effect. Do you know of any examples that are "atemporal"? quote: You are completely right about us not knowing how far an explanation based on unintelligent causes takes us. But I think I have both empirical observations and logic on my side when I hold that it can not explain irreducible complex systems. That is not "blind dogmatism". Blind dogmatism is the case when you have no other argument than it must be possible.
Blind dogmatism is also the case when you say that it cannot be possible. I am aware of many attempts to account for the so-called "irreducibly complex" systems by naturalistic means (I am not qualified to comment on them, but they have been discussed at length here and at ARN), so to say "impossible" is premature at best. For myself, I would merely say that it might be possible.
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Jakob Wolf
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posted 15. November 2002 08:08
The Pixie: I am not a biologist either, but I would say about your example: a biological system that maintains stasis is a system with a telos, an intention, namely maintaning stasis. All the processes in the system are liniar mechanical releases, as you explain it, but the system as a whole with its telos is not explained by these processes. It is explained how it works, but not that it has stasis as its telos, that is presupposed. It is the relation between the whole with its telos and the parts and their mechanical interactions that is an instance of a two way causality, where the cause and the effect works in both directions absolutely simultaneously. You seem to say, as biologists usually do, the system is explained if you explain how it works, but what is missing, I think, is the telos "behind" the processes. Is a machine explained if you explain how it works? To some extend, yes, but it is not explained that what we are explaining is a machine (a system with a telos)and that is not unimportant, because that is what constitutes what it is and constitutes the processes in the maschine. Many biologist hold that all this talk about a system with a telos is superfluous - and in some way it is. If all you want is to explain how the system works, it is superfluous. But then you must concede that you presuppose something that you do not explain. That is the problem.
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The Pixie
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posted 15. November 2002 18:41
Jakob Wolf
I am still unclear on some of this. From your last post:
quote: a biological system that maintains stasis is a system with a telos, an intention, namely maintaning stasis
If you are allowing this rather broad definition of telos, then I think most biologists will readily agree that telos exists in living things. But surely in the context of ID telos has a more specific meaning; that the organism fulfils a purpose external to the organism, a purpose for the designer. quote: It is explained how it works, but not that it has stasis as its telos, that is presupposed
I am not sure what you mean here. Why is stasis presupposed? I would imagine that stasis was discovered by biologists before the exact chemistry of insulin was known. I think if you look at any textbook discussing this system, they will all discuss how the overall effect is to maintain stasis as well as describing the cause-and-effect steps. quote: It is the relation between the whole with its telos and the parts and their mechanical interactions that is an instance of a two way causality, where the cause and the effect works in both directions absolutely simultaneously
Is the thrust of your thesis that the overall process (eg stasis of blood sugar level) is occurring simultaneously with the under-lying chemistry, which occurs in a traditional linear cause-and-effect way? This would be like a game of billiards, perhaps. We have an underlying process of billiard balls hitting each other (normal cause-and-effect, and pretty meaningless of themselves) but if we look beyond that we see another process, the game itself (revealing purpose), occurring simultaneously.
Pixie
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Jakob Wolf
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posted 21. November 2002 03:14
The Pixie: You say ID telos means that the organism fulfils a purpose external to the organism, a purpose for the designer. I must say I donīt understand what you mean. I think telos in the context of ID means nothing else than observing an intelligence in the system, maintaning stasis is an expression of intelligence. The ID assertion is that this cannot be explained by immanent causes. Your billard-game analogy is not bad. The game is only a game because intelligent players play it.
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Mark Szlazak
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posted 21. November 2002 11:22
Good morning people.
I've got a little problem that's been bugging me about both ID and neo-Darwinism (i.e., materialist theory).
First, materialism in general and therefore neo-Darwinism are to me both factually and logically false. Some may want to argue this but just play along for a bit.
I'm sympathetic to panpsychism or panexperientialism and you can look to Whitehead for a good version of that view. In this view whole entities from quarks to humans to the cosmos have "feelings" or "interiority" or "subjective experience" and also "freedom" or "volition." This doesn't mean that dust thinks or writes poetry about the deep feelings it has for the dirt down the street, there are different grades and degrees of these qualities in whole entities. Some entities are at very low levels and come together as aggregates like rocks but the aggregate has no more experience or power that the "sum of its parts" and can be treated mechanically. Others bring in more than the "sum of its parts" and form a higher level entity with more experiential capacity and more volitional power. This view is in the same spirit as those that view consciousness or "information" as fundumental (e.g. Chalmers) plus it adds an indeterministic (i.e., not Laplacian determinism) factor.
Now onto some aspects of ID.
It seems to me that Dembski's filter works really well for high-level designs which use low-level parts and the design occurs over a relatively short period of time. Notice the analogies that are initially given like watches, computers, cars, Mount Rushmore, etc.
Now these analogies are claimed by opponents not to fully generlize into biological systems. I agree. However from my point of view, specified complexity isn't needed for design either.
If low level entities feel and have intensions then they have low level designs and desires that they may have the capacity to realize. Survival being one. This primitive design evolves with time as the organisms consciousness evolve and that evolution is affected to some extent by their ever evolving desires. So the "rub" as I see it for the ID filter is that design maybe happening everywhere at various levels of complexity all the time. High level design doesn't need high level designers, thus this filter works only well on restricted classes of entities.
Highly specified complexity by itself wouldn't reliably parse entities into the design/non-designed catagories and these are needed before the question is even asked as to what or who did any grand or "high level" designing! Dumb mechanism seems presupposed everywhere and everywhen before design arguments have any strong force. If mechanism is false then so is neo-Darwinism and design arguments don't mean as much either.
As an aside, one could say that the dominant mind of the cosmos (or mind seperate to that of the cosmos) influences the lower level entities ... but isn't that beside the point. [ 21. November 2002, 18:39: Message edited by: Mark Szlazak ]
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The Pixie
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posted 22. November 2002 07:31
Jacob Wolf quote: You say ID telos means that the organism fulfils a purpose external to the organism, a purpose for the designer. I must say I donīt understand what you mean. I think telos in the context of ID means nothing else than observing an intelligence in the system, maintaning stasis is an expression of intelligence. The ID assertion is that this cannot be explained by immanent causes.
When you say "observing an intelligence in the system", are you looking for indications of a possible external intelligence or are you determining if the organism itself is intelligent? I presume the former (otherwise I would question why you think bacteria and plants are intelligent). If you want to use telos in a broad sense, then most mainstream evolutionists would accept that organisms exhibit telos; they have a purpose which is to survive, to procreate and more specifically to promote their genes into later generations (whether through intelligence or not). But surely this is not what ID proponentents are talking about. If a thing is designed, then the deisner has a purpose in mind when designing it (eg a car is designed for getting from A to B, a painting to be aesthetically pleasing, they are not designed just to be). quote: Your billard-game analogy is not bad. The game is only a game because intelligent players play it.
Actually it is your analogy, you use it in the article as the classic example of cause and effect. My point is that from one perspective it is classic cause and effect, and from another it is apparently exhibiting atemporal two-way causality. I would guess that for any multi-step cause-effect cascade process, you could do the same, whether it was a biological process or not (avalanch, the sun, etc).
The Pixie
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