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Author
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Topic: Mental Realism: Rejecting the Causal Closure Thesis and Expanding our Physical ...
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Micah Sparacio
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Member # 6
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posted 16. December 2002 16:22
I'd love to get feedback on this...how can it improve?, where is it sorely missing the mark?, is it nonsense? I'm also more than willing to offer clarifications (I'm sure that plenty are needed).
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Mental Realism: Rejecting the Causal Closure Thesis and Expanding our Physical Ontology
In this paper I argue for a non-reductive theory of mental causation that denies the primary tenet of contemporary theories of mind: the causal closure of the first-order physical world. I begin by briefly considering non-reductive theories of mental causation, coming to the conclusion that they all succumb to the causal exclusion problem elucidated by Jaegwon Kim. I contend that the exclusion problem highlights a fundamental error in contemporary philosophy of mind and provides us with a choice between two general and mutually exclusive options. After providing this critique, I conclude by arguing for an expanded conception of the physical, one that acknowledges the real ontological status of higher-level emergent properties and their unique causal powers.
Non-reductive Physicalism: Why it just doesn’t work
Commitment to physicalism is very common in contemporary philosophy and often serves as a guiding metaphysical principle when developing theories of ontology. The commitment involves two basic principles: 1. there is some fundamental stuff (e.g. particles, fields, strings) from which everything in the universe is made and 2. this fundamental stuff interacts in particular ways such that the properties of this stuff and their relations are responsible for each and every event (i.e. change in properties) that happens in the universe. More simply: there is physical stuff and every physical event has a physical cause.
The most widely accepted theories of mental causation over the last few decades are what some describe as non-reductive physicalism. The theories are non-reductive in the sense that they retain realism about the mind (which really does have causal influence in the world). They are physicalist because they retain the causal closure thesis.
There are several problems that plague non-reductive physicalism. I will discuss what I take to be two of the more significant issues. The first of these involves the dependency of non-reductive physicalism on the causal closure thesis. I contend that this thesis has significant flaws which warrants our reconsideration of it as a metaphysical principle. The most important of these flaws lies in the difficulty we have in specifying exactly what we mean by “physical.” What exactly is a “physical” property? Do we have a set of criteria for demarcating between physical and non-physical properties (1996, Lowe, 56)? If we are doubtful about the nature of the very things that are causally closed (the physical) then why invest so much energy in maintaining this principle? It seems that the causal closure thesis lacks explanatory power precisely because it is lacking in specificity: how do we apply the principle in a useful way if we don’t even know what a physical thing is? Ultimately, the principle ends up restricting our theories of mental causation at the service of speculative, vague and ambiguous conceptions of the physical world. It is an unnecessary constraint that artificially constricts our metaphysical options.
An additional criticism of non-reductive physicalism is found in the problem of causal exclusion. Put simply, the problem is this: if physical events have physical causes (required by the causal closure thesis) then what causal work is there left for the mental. Furthermore, it can be argued that if all mental events supervene on their base physical events, and all physical events have physical causes, then the only two causal directions that exists are from the physical to the physical and the physical to the mental. Every physical event that had subsequently been attributed to a mental cause is now seen to have a direct physical cause. Under non-reductive physicalist theories of mind, mental causation becomes dispensable. A good analogy for the exclusion problem comes from the classic example of the singing lady who breaks glass when her voice reaches a certain pitch. It is important to note that her singing involves both a semantic property and a pitch property. The semantic meaning of the phrase, though certainly a real part of the phrase, has no causal role in the breaking of the glass. The pitch property alone is causally sufficient (1996, Lowe, 74). In just the same way, if we assume that every physical event has a physical cause, though the mental accompanies the physical, it appears to be impotent.
Once non-reductive physicalism is removed as a reasonable option for explaining mental causation, the situation regarding the nature of the mental becomes much clearer. The reason for this should now be obvious: non-reductive physicalism tries to unite two incompatible theses. How can we reasonably expect to take the causal closure thesis seriously if we insist on being realists about mental causality? It turns out that either the mental falls within our conception of the physical (and its closure) or it does not. If the former, then we are left with either scientific eliminitavism or epiphenomenalism. If the latter, then we are left to make sense of a world in which the mental is real. This can involve adopting a form of dualism, or, as I advocate, expanding our conception of the physical to incorporate second-order mental properties. Doing this, however, requires that we abandon the causal closure thesis, and the notion that only first-order properties (those properties of the fundamental particles and their aggregates) deserve a place in our ontology.
After this admittedly brief analysis of non-reductive theories of the mind, we are left with what Jaegwon Kim calls “stark choices” (118). It appears that there is no middle road to travel. Either we are realists or anti-realists about the mind (119). We can’t be both. Either the mental has real causal powers or all causation is really only first-order physical causation. If we choose the former, then we are left with the task of discovering and describing the ontology of the mental. If we choose the latter, we are stuck with trying to understand how our current physical models allow for such distinct forms of causation: how are we to explain the reality of goal-directed causation by recourse to blind, purposeless relations between fundamental, first-order properties?
It is worth briefly noting that if we retain adherence to the causal closure thesis, one of our remaining options (discussed above) is epiphenomenalism, which I believe faces two daunting tasks. Epiphenomenalism asserts that while the mental has a real ontology it is causally impotent. The first problem for epiphenomenalism, then, is in calling the mental real, if it exerts no causal influence. Indeed, as Jaegwon Kim points out, one of the most reasonable criteria for something being real is the possession of causal powers (and thus properties) (119). But if the mental is causally impotent, it must not possess properties (which are individuated and defined based on causal powers). The second problematic hurdle for the epiphenominalist is that of explaining how, if mental states have no causal influence, we are able to acquire knowledge about these states? How do we represent or refer to these states via language if there are no (downward) causal connections between the mind and our brain (Koons, 28)? Though epiphenomenalism may be able to survive these critiques, its value as an explanatory theory is questionable.
It now seems that there are only two legitimate options when it comes to theories of mental causation. Either, we can be strict scientific eliminativists or we can acknowledge that mental properties are real things, with a real ontology, which exert a real causal influence on the world. The eliminativist properly understands and applies the causal closure thesis, taking it to its logical conclusion. The mental realist acknowledges that mental states are fundamental and irreducible with real causal powers and thus rejects the causal closure thesis. The non-reductive physicalist, on the other hand, tries to save the best of both worlds but ultimately fails. Either, the fundamental stuff and its relations are all that exist, or our conception of the physical needs to be expanded to include the irreducible emergence of fundamental, higher level physical properties and causal influences.
The Causal Influence of the Mind
I will here provide a sketch of some of the salient features that I would like to see in a satisfying account of mental causation. In doing so, I will point out reasons for preferring mental realism to eliminativism or mind-body identity. In what proceeds I have been heavily influenced by the work of E.J. Lowe and Robert Koons.
I begin my investigation into the nature of the mental by (1) affirming the real ontological status of mental states. This helps us to account for glaring dissimilarities between first-order physical causation and what we view as mental causation. In particular, it accounts for the discreteness, generality and flexibility of goal oriented mental causes (described below). However, while affirming the ontology of mental properties, one could still defend an epiphenomenalist view by declaring that the mental is causally impotent. But epiphenomenalism, in viewing mental states as causal dead ends, simply does not satisfy our pre-theoretical intuitions. There are additional reasons for questioning the coherency of epiphenominalism (I’ve described these reasons in an earlier section). It seems clear, in opposition to both eliminativism and epiphenomenalism, that (2) the mental (whatever it is we are describing when we use the word) does indeed have a unique causal influence in the world and is part of the natural causal order of events. We must, therefore, be able to (3) differentiate between mental causes and first-order physical causes. It appears that the significant distinction is to be found in (4) the teleological nature of mental causation: it is ends oriented. The contents of intentions, desires, deliberation and decisions are typically related to future states of affairs. In contrast, (5) first-order physical causation “always appears to be undirected or blind” (1997, Lowe, 10).
As indicated in (2) above, the mental is part of the natural causal order of events. It therefore seems that rather than initiating brand new chains of physical causation “out of nowhere,” (6) the mental facilitates and constrains first-order physical properties towards an end or a goal. The mental can be seen as coordinating a group of mutually independent physical events, increasing the probability that a certain end state will be reached (1997, Lowe, 10). Similarly, the mental might be conceived of as a second-order physical state which, given the proper first-order state, significantly increases the probability of reaching any one of a group of causally sufficient intermediate states which thereby bring about the intended end state. Koons has recently described this as teleological propensity enhancement (19-21). It should be noted that this point stands in favor of the mental realist position over the eliminativist or reductionist views for the following reason: the specificity and discreteness of a mental cause in reference to its intended effect is lost when it is identified with a physical cause or cluster of causes (i.e. neural events). The reason for this is straightforward: teleology is not present in our modern conception of physical causation.
The teleological propensity of mental causation reveals a significant feature about the role of the mental in causal chains: (7) the desired goal is a flexible generalization and therefore can often be realized via a target set of different possible physical states. When I form the intention to raise my right hand I do not have a specific physical instance in mind: neither the precise placement of my fingers nor the precise millisecond at which I raise my arm matters. The same can be seen in a game of Scrabble. When a player lays down the letter tiles, the mental constrains the general ordering of letters but is otherwise flexible regarding how each letter is situated within its box on the game board. The end state is flexible enough to allow for widely varying, yet successful physical realizations.
My discussion of (6) and (7) above provide us with a conception of the mental as being causally efficacious by means of generalized constraint. This is significant because it allows the mental a role in the natural causal order without breaking first-order causal chains or eliminating the causal efficacy of the mental. Indeed, it allows us to (8) affirm the uniqueness, and autonomy of mental causes. The role that the mental plays in causation is fundamentally different, guiding and constraining first-order chains of physical causes towards target-sets of end-states which will fulfill particular mental goals. In the same way that a train track guides a train, the mental causes guide selected first-order chains of physical events towards a desired goal. If the track is removed, the train does not get to its destination.
The affirmation of (8) may cause us some anxiety regarding exactly what the mental is and how it is situated within the physical world. If the mental possesses new and unique causal powers (and therefore properties) that are irreducible to any first-order properties and relations, and if we affirm (1) the real ontological status of mental properties, then at first glance it appears that we might be describing a form of substance dualism: new, autonomous “stuff” coming of the blue, with new and unique properties. However, it is my contention that worries about dualism arise in this situation because of the problematic causal closure thesis. As I see it, the causal closure thesis requires that any sort of causal emergence be reducible to the fundamental level of first-order causation: nothing above and beyond. If we insist on defining physicalism circularly, by reference to the questionable causal closure thesis, my theory is certainly not a physical one. However, if we (9) expand our physical ontology to include higher-level properties and their intrinsic causal powers, then my view stands within the physicalist picture of the world.
Under my view, (10) mental properties are emergent from complex physical systems and are thus dependent on their base physical constituents. However, these constituents do not determine the mental properties that emerge. Rather, they emerge as autonomous, second-order physical states with novel, intrinsic properties which enter into the natural causal order as generalized constraints on first-order causal chains. (11) Though they are emergent and dependent, mental states are not determined by or reducible to the relations of the first-order properties of their physical base.
The view that I sketched above has several points that stand in its favor (which I will now discuss) and two primary flaws. On the positive side, I provide a way of understanding how mental states are able to fit within the causal order without the need for interaction rules between separate substances. This is accomplished by regarding mental states as emergent physical states possessing second-order intrinsic properties (with no analogue in the first-order domain) that are dependent on and realized by certain first-order structures. The mental state’s causal influence lies in its unique ability to guide and constrain first-order physical chains and thereby neither initiate new causal chains “out of thin air” nor interject “in place of” first-order causes. Rather, mental causes can be seen as streambeds or channels which provide a path in which first-order physical causes proceed. This path significantly increases the probability of reaching an end-state which satisfies the mental goal.
My view also takes seriously the sharp contrast between the results of goal directed causation and the purely blind causation of first-order physical relations. First-order chains of causation proceed in an independent, chaotic, and globally-blind fashion with no end state in mind. Rarely do such independent causal chains converge on the highly specific functional patterns which are markers of mental causation (it is possible that the origin of life is one counter example, though even this is questionable). This distinction between mental and physical causes seems to be fundamentally embedded into the way we understand the world. Indeed, our very languages take note of this clear dissimilarity between mental and first-order physical causes. For example, we are quick to point out the difference between natural death and premeditated murder or natural objects and artifacts. However, we never suppose that a murder was caused outside of the natural order: supernaturally. Nor are we confused into thinking that newly discovered pottery artifacts required some “ghost in the machine” as their cause. Since both our natural languages and common sense ontology demarcate between the results of first-order causation and the results of mental causation, we should be suspicious of attempts to blur the line. In fact, such distinctions in our ontology are essential to our very way of life (e.g. communication). Additionally, projects such as SETI’s search for advanced extra-terrestrials would not get off the ground were it not for this distinction between causal powers. In their search, SETI is seeking patterns in radio frequencies from space that will tip them off to the unmistakable (and rare) effects of mental causation (as opposed to commonly occurring natural radio frequencies). If they could not make this fundamental distinction in their search, there would be no criteria for the discovery of intelligent life: the current criterion being that only mental causation guides first-order physical causation towards a range of potential complex end-states which satisfy a specifiable goal. Certain complex physical patterns (the end states which realize a mental goal) are typically sufficient for determining a mental cause.
Finally, this theory has the distinct advantage of affirming the generalized nature of mental causation. It is clear that the mental has causal influence without having to micro-manage each particular first-order property to reach a desired goal. Rather, the causal powers of the mental lay in the ability to increase the probability of reaching a target-set range of intermediate physical states, which subsequently realize one of a range of desired end-states. This is a significant observation, for it goes to show that the mental is not constrained to particulars. The mental is flexible and general enough so that when I sign my credit card slip I need not worry about the positioning of each molecule of ink nor whether my previous signature exactly matches the current one. As a side note, though it is outside the scope of this paper, I think that causal flexibility may be a feature of emergence in general (consider the flexibility of biological life in overcoming obstacles in the pursuit of an end state).
Two Critiques
Now that I have laid out a model of mental realism, I will critique what I see to be the two primary shortcomings (which have persistently been on the top of my mind as I’ve written this paper). The first problem can be summed up in a common refrain: how does it work? How does the mental emerge, and more importantly how exactly does the mental constrain chains of first-order physical causes. Sure, I’ve asserted that it happens, but is that satisfying? Don’t we want to fill in the explanatory details? Also, have I not resurrected the traditional problem of interaction?
Though I do not have the explanatory details to fill in, and I acknowledge that my view remains mere speculation until we have such explanatory specifications, there is a fundamental difference between my view and interactionism. Whereas interactionism posits exclusive substances that somehow need to “find common ground”, my view of the mental keeps it squarely within the natural causal order. The mental is nothing more than second-order physical states as described several paragraphs above. Therefore, mental states have a causal influence in the very domain from which they emerge.
The second problem with my view can be best described in the following question: what does it mean to affirm the real ontological status of the mental? Ontology, after all, is the study of the nature of things. So what is the nature of the mental? Does it take up space? Is it some kind of field? Is it non-physical? Is it merely the functioning of the brain? Let me first say that these are the questions that philosophers will be left to debate for years to come. However, my intuition is that our difficulty in nailing down the nature of the mental involves two conflicting observations. First, we see the effects of the mind all over the place: we cannot reasonably deny that the mind has causal influence in the world. Second, the salient features of the physical world (e.g. properties like mass and space) dominate our conception of ontology: it is hard to make sense of a “real” thing if it is not physically identifiable. In dealing with this problem, some prefer to emphasize the first point (e.g. dualists) and others the second (e.g. eliminativists or mind-brain identity theorists). Some prefer to emphasize both (e.g. non-reductive physicalists), but as I have shown this strategy runs into significant problems: either the mind is part of the physical as currently conceived or it is not. My preference is to eliminate the causal closure thesis as it is currently presented in regard to the first-order properties of fundamental particles, and to expand our notion of the physical to include the second-order properties of complex systems and the irreducible causal influence of the mental. An expanded notion of the physical allows us to view the world as an integrated whole, rather than as a disjunctive world of exclusive substances in need of interaction laws. It also allows us to take the unique causal role of the mental seriously.
Implications
If my model of mental causation bears any resemblance to reality (and I hope that it does), then there are a few salient implications that are worth highlighting. First, there are multiple ways for a mind to realize its intentions in the physical world. The flexibility principle reveals that mental causes are not wholly mechanistic in the sense of causing particular physical states or exact routes to the desired goal. Indeed, each time I form the intention to take a shower, eat breakfast, or (occasionally) take a walk, the content of the intention is satisfied via widely disparate chains of physical causes. If this is a general feature of mental causation then it may have significant theological implications as well.
Second, though there is a range of physical states that will realize an end state, the range is limited. If we consider that the mind must hone in on this target class of realizing physical states, then we are faced with what has been called the frame problem. How does the mind focus on the salient target class, and ignore most other possibilities. One answer to this problem might be found in the mental acts of attention and deliberation, though it seems that these acts are only involved when novel obstacles arise along the way to our desired end state. It is often the case that our mind performs this “honing” act unconsciously, or in real-time, without hesitation. We therefore have reason to assume that the mental is at least partly constituted by some sort of unconscious mechanism. However, both philosophers and computer scientists continue to be baffled as to how this problem can be resolved via computational and mechanistic methods: the frame problem remains without solution.
Finally, E.J. Lowe has asserted elsewhere that it is the “essence of intelligence to seek patterns and to attempt to impose them upon otherwise chaotic phenomena” (1996, Lowe, 69). In light of my view on mental causation, the purpose of imposing these patterns upon otherwise independent causal chains is to satisfy some desired end-state. As has been noted, the end-state cannot be identified with its physical realization. In fact, there is often a target class of different physical states, each member of which can realize an end-state that satisfies the mental goal. By noting this relation (and distinction) between the end-state and its physical realization, we may be able to consider each part independently and potentially infer information about one from the other. This is especially the case when we only have immediate access to the instance of a physically realized end-state. We are able to infer from certain patterns in first-order physical structures to the target class of physical end-state which satisfy a particular second-order function. For example, when confronted with the physical realization of ancient artifacts, the archaeologist is typically able to make inferences from the features of the artifact to its function, purpose, or “end.”
Conclusion
I will end by providing a brief summary of the salient features of the mental as described in my paper. In doing so, I hope to clarify just where I stand on the issue and provide others with a tool for filling in the gaps that I have not addressed. To begin, I view the mental as second-order physical states that have unique intrinsic properties that are irreducible to the properties of the first-order physical states on which they depend. In order to take this position, I reject the causal closure thesis, and believe that new and autonomous causal powers can emerge from complex (first-order) physical structures. Though the mental is dependent on the complex structures from which it emerges, its causal powers are not to be identified with and are not determined by this dependence. The causal powers of the mental are situated firmly within the natural order and exert their causal influence without breaking or initiating new first-order chains of physical causes. Rather, mental causes are contentful generalizations which direct multiple, independent causal chains towards the satisfaction of an end goal by means of some range of end states.
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Groucho
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posted 16. December 2002 16:45
quote:
It now seems that there are only two legitimate options when it comes to theories of mental causation. Either, we can be strict scientific eliminativists or we can acknowledge that mental properties are real things, with a real ontology, which exert a real causal influence on the world.
I wanted to set the record for quickest reply ever in iscid (<24 hours, apparently).
Anyway, I'm only half way through your post, but wanted to pose a question. I did a search for "animal" and "human" and found nothing, so I'm reasonanly confident you don't address the distinction. So my question is at what level of animal life does a transdendant non-physical aspect of mental activity emerge - Man? Chimpanzee?, Canine?, rodent?, single-cell organism? Virus?
[ 16. December 2002, 16:46: Message edited by: Groucho ]
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 16. December 2002 17:09
Groucho, under my view animals certainly have minds.
You also used the terms "a transdendant non-physical aspect" but if you do a search, you will not find these terms anywhere in my paper. In fact, I assert several times that on my view, the mental is constituted of 2nd order physical properties.
I haven't thought strongly about where the cut-off point is, but if I had to take a stab I would say that a minimum criteria for the mental is the ability to constrain first-order physical causal chains in the service of a goal. However, as I've said, I've not thought long and hard about this.
Hope that helps.
[ 16. December 2002, 17:18: Message edited by: Micah Sparacio ]
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Groucho
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posted 16. December 2002 17:40
Does a "human wave" (e.g. at a football game) illustrate the point you're making? i.e. a human wave does not consist of particles bouncing off of each other, but is a propogation of thought in a manner independent of elementary physical interactions.
Also, the properties of a human wave would be different, though not completely, from a physical (i.e. light, water, sound. etc.) wave. For example a human wave might die down due to lack of energy, but it could go on indefinitely and only dissipate due to boredom of the participants. Also the interference of two human waves would not act the same as the interference of physical waves.
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Presumedly there are laws of some sort governing mental processes. The goals formed in a person's mind may not be the result of the elementary movement of particles, but presumedly such goals don't emerge at random, but rather as a result of conditions external to the individual (over which he ultimately has no control). Thus, a strict determinism can still be seen at work, even if not an elementary physical determinism.
[ 16. December 2002, 18:13: Message edited by: Groucho ]
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Light Jaguar
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posted 16. December 2002 18:38
(apologies for the snip of previous conversation that appeared here...a pasting mistake) LJ
Hello Micah.
It was a very well thought out argument, and no, it certainly is not nonsense.
I guess my main query would be how you would hope to establish, (if I am understanding you correctly) that the mental consists of second order physical properties.
You said:-
Under my view, (10) mental properties are emergent from complex physical systems and are thus dependent on their base physical constituents. However, these constituents do not determine the mental properties that emerge. Rather, they emerge as autonomous, second-order physical states with novel, intrinsic properties which enter into the natural causal order as generalized constraints on first-order causal chains. (11) Though they are emergent and dependent, mental states are not determined by or reducible to the relations of the first-order properties of their physical base.
In a manner of speaking, I think you might be trying to have it both ways here. You are aiming to keep the idea of the mental as emergent from the physical, while at the same time trying to account for the fact that the mental can to some extent at least have its own real power over the physical by saying that the emergent can constrain the base from which it arose.
it is an interesting speculation, but I would have to say, that it does not explain to me how the mental (ie conscious powers, matter-with-a-sense-of-being or an attitude) manages to arise from a non-conscious base. I think that this is pretty much an irreducible problem in all worldviews where some aspect of the mental is not primary. I notice that you do not mention consciousness in your description. That is understandable, and perhaps one day it will be established how certain bundles of matter come to have a sense of their own presence, or a “first person ontology” as I believe Searle has described it. Nevertheless, I would have to say that I think it will prove most difficult to do this, if it is possible at all, and it is one reason why I favour a gnostic view of the universal ground.
I am something of a sceptic in realtion to the idea that known examples of emergent property can be extrapolated to the emergence of conscious states from matter. Some of these, for example, “liquidity” arising from water molecules, seem to well undershoot the ontological problem. I seem to recall Searle speaking of the mind-brain problem as a form of illusion, and that we do not refer to a “digestion-stomach problem”. To some extent I agree with this (I don’t think there is a mind-brain problem), but not with Searle’s solution. Digestion-stomach is like liquidity-water. The ontological issues dweling in the concepts of mind and matter seem to be spirited away in these examples; their use with respect to matter and consciousness would appear to me questionable. Perhaps a “humour-sand problem” or a momentum-music problem” would be more appropriate to the severities of the issue.
I recognise what you mean by saying that your viewpoint avoids a substance dualism. My suspicion though is that a manner of dualism is still present, except that it has now written itself into the fine print of this emergence, so to speak. If there are actually no metaphors for consciousness in this universe, then obviously examples or analogies based on physical to physical emergence cannot give an account of how consciousness emerges (at least not without some subsequent demsonstration of how it does so emerge).
I certainly cannot deny it as a bare possibility that consciousness “somehow” manages to emerge from matter. My root objection to the idea is, I guess, Occamish in nature. One has to account for a second genesis (small g) or creative event in many ways more problematic than the first. And my own solution would incline towards the idea that “matter” is misdiagnosed, and that even elementary patterns have a psychoid base which grope their way (via evolutionary process) to psychoid complexity (organisms and minds).
I hope my amateur ramblings have not bored you too much. I am still finding my feet here, so I may have got the balance wrong. I enjoyed your article.
[ 16. December 2002, 19:20: Message edited by: Light Jaguar ]
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 16. December 2002 19:23
LJ,
Your concerns are my own. I see what you've written below as the critical flaw:
quote:
My suspicion though is that a manner of dualism is still present, except that it has now written itself into the fine print of this emergence, so to speak.
When it comes down to the nitty gritty, I think that we just don't fully understand the basic nature of the fundamental world. I think that our current conception of the physical world is extremely limiting and find a great deal to admire in the work of Chalmers, Strawson, McGinn and others who recognize this and are willing to feel around in the dark for potential solutions.
For example, McGinn thinks that our understanding of space is lacking due to epistemic constraints on our evolved brains. Strawson and Chalmers both think that our notion of the physical needs to be expanded, with experiential properties properly considered as fundamental along with other fundamental properties like space and mass. Chalmers has even considered the possibility that protoexperiential properties are fundamental, having dual physical and experiential aspects.
In any case, my paper was more directed towards the causal effects of the mental. I would be happy just to posit that the mental exists (without adhering to a specific form of emergentism) and then to catologue some of the unique features of mental causes as opposed to first-order physical causes. My main intent was to observe that there is a fundamental difference and to note the way the mental has a real causal influence on the world.
BTW, this was my first serious graduate level paper. It was certainly a new experience.
[ 16. December 2002, 20:05: Message edited by: Micah Sparacio ]
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John Bracht
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posted 16. December 2002 20:12
Hey Micah,
I really liked your paper. It reminds me of all the discussions we used to have last year ![[Smile]](smile.gif) .
I guess I have two main concerns. The first is well-stated by Light Jaguar, that you seem (like the non-reductive physicalists) to be trying to have it both ways: trying to state that the mental is a genuine property, but nonetheless is emergent from a purely physical base. Intuitively, this seems flawed. I think the problem is that emergence is highly deterministic: given pre-emergence conditions X, Y will always emerge. Think of the fact that given a hot stove and a pan with a thin layer of water, hexagonal convection cells will always form. Given the right conditions for one of Kauffman's self-organizing systems (or computer programs), we can predict with quite good specificity exactly what we will see. In fact, it seems to me that any variation that we can't account for in these emergent systems is simply due to our inability to know every detail about the systems in question (we don't know the precise positions and momenta of every molecule of water in the pan, so we can't tell exactly where the hexagonal boundaries will form every time)--but such knowledge would theoretically leave every emergent system perfectly predictable.
Yet the same is not true of mental causation. It seems highly unpredictable and truly "free" (though there will be plenty of debate about whether the mental is causally free or not). It just doesn't seem constrained in the same way as emergent properties are, and it seems that there is no way to know enough about the prior conditions to predict what a mental cause will produce. So I guess my concern is that you are tying a law-like cause to a very non-law-like effect. Intuitively, it seems to me that wedding a genuine mental causation to a physical base is to make a category mistake.
My second concern has to do with this statement:
quote:
The causal powers of the mental are situated firmly within the natural order and exert their causal influence without breaking or initiating new first-order chains of physical causes.
As I think about my day today, I can identify places where I initiated entirely new causal chains. For instance, when I rode my bike home from the lab. It seems that my action of getting on the bike and pushing down on the pedals while steering initiated a brand-new causal chain that resulted in getting me home. Without my actions, my bike would have just sat there at the bike-rack. That particular causal chain would not have been initiated. Another example: today I picked up the phone and dialed the number for the Cloud-9 shuttle to take me to the airport on Thursday for my flight home. I have confidence that my initiation of this causal chain (and the fact that I gave them my credit card number!) will result in the shuttle meeting me at the bus-stop near my apartment and taking me to the airport (and eventually I will end up at home). Surely, without this initiation of the causal chain (by me picking up the phone and dialing), the shuttle would not come to the bus stop and I would be here all Christmas break. It seems clear to me that if I were not here my phone would not have dialed itself--I had to initiate that causal chain.
The only way, it seems, to get out of this problem is to assert that there was some physical cause which caused me to dial that phone (or get on my bike). But this results in viewing the mental as merely an epiphenomeon, since it's the physical causes doing all the work and the mental just goes along for the ride (no pun intended! .
Anyway, those are my thoughts at this point. I'm sure I've missed some key ideas somewhere (biologist that I am!). I look forward to your response.
John
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 16. December 2002 21:17
Hey John. Yeah, those were great days ![[Wink]](wink.gif)
2 responses:
1. Though I agree with the thrust of the first criticism, I would point out that there are many conceptions of emergence. The two extremes are A. weak emergence where that which emerged may not have been predictiable but is explainable in retrospect and B. strong emergence where new stuff pops out (a new substance perhaps) There are a whole lot of intermediate positions as well. My position is one where the system remains wholly physical but does things that are no explainable by reference to the first-order things from which they emerged (i.e. there is no teleological analogue in the first domain). Still, after all that, I must concede that I may be having my cake and eating it too. I need to think more deeply about this.
2. I'm not denying that your intentions and subsequent actions had REAL and NOVEL causal influence over the world and brought about things that would not have happened had it not been for your intentions and actions. However, I would argue that your intentions did not initiate new causal chains but merely guided/directed existing physical chains of causation towards your goal. Indeed, you did not have to micromanage the precise placement of each microphysical particle in your endeavors. In fact, there are probably countless variations on the physical states that would have satisfied your intentions. It is therefore hard for me to imagine that the causal influence of the mental is to bring about precise causal chains. Rather, I like the idea of the "streambed" analogy that is used to reinforce the idea that the causal influence of the mental is to re-direct chains of physical causes in order to realize a certain target set of physical end-states.
Or something like that. In any case, your assertions that you are sure that you are free don't do anything to my argument because I affirm the very thing that you are asserting Only, I disagree that you are *initiating* new chains of physical causation. The distinction is small: initiate new vs. guide pre-existing towards a goal
[ 16. December 2002, 21:21: Message edited by: Micah Sparacio ]
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John Bracht
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posted 16. December 2002 23:28
Hey Micah,
I guess I'm struggling to understand the importance of "micromanaging the particles" in your response above. You seem to imply that initiating a new causal chain can only occur if individual particles are micromanaged. But I see no reason why that has to be. It still seems to me that I initiated some brand-new causal chains that would not have been initiated otherwise--in any shape or form. Sure the particles that participate in that causal chain would have existed, but the causal chain itself would not (the particles would have been doing something else, and presumably would have been part of a different causal chain).
So I still argue that I initiated some brand-new causal chains that would not have otherwise existed (though the particles which participated in them would still have existed). This is consistent with what I observe in the world around me--people build houses, cars, etc., out of particles that would otherwise have been doing something else (certainly, I would never argue that initiating a new causal chain requires bringing matter itself into being). Intelligent agents are molders and sculpters of the matter in the world. But it seems to me that they are still initiating causal chains that those particles would not otherwise participate in. It seems to me that the question of micromanaging particles, or of the fact that there are any number of possibilities for me to initiate a given causal chain, are completely irrelevant to the fact that I did, in fact, initiate a new chain. What am I missing?
John
P.S. It just occurred to me that perhaps the best way to think of mental causation is that it "hijacks particles" from their original causal chain and diverts them into some other, goal-oriented end result. Something like a fork in a tree, where some particles continue on their original way, and those selected by the mental cause are diverted into a new causal chain. Is the tree entirely new? No, but the extra branch, added by intelligent causation, certainly is. Maybe, to borrow the original metaphor of a stream and riverbed, the intelligent caus can be thought of as trenching in a new path for the water to flow, and diverting some of the water from the river into this new trough. Just a thought.
[ 16. December 2002, 23:39: Message edited by: John Bracht ]
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Mark Szlazak
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posted 17. December 2002 18:10
FYI Micah,
Gregg Rosenberg examines causation and it's problems in his book. Oxford University Press should have it out at the end of 2003.
A Place For Consciousness
He calls his position "liberal naturalism," you might find it interesting.
[ 30. December 2002, 19:24: Message edited by: Mark Szlazak ]
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Noel Rude
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posted 17. December 2002 20:29
Micah mentions:
quote:
The most important of these flaws lies in the difficulty we have in specifying exactly what we mean by “physical.” What exactly is a “physical” property?
This would seem a simple one -- materialist reductionism allows into its world only chance and necessity (a la Monod, Dembski, etc.). Thus whatever the physicists tell us matter is, as long as it doesn't include teleology at the fundamental/elemental level, materialists buy it.
But suppose we're not just dualists but trialists -- that we hypothesize the world to be matter and information AND soul. Oddly (but maybe not so oddly) the animist tribes I work with say this is how it is. But then suppose that conscious, intentional beings are the convergence of all three. Thus intention/agency does not supervene on either matter or information -- it is one leg of a tripod consisting of all three.
Now if mind/soul is really elemental then at some level telekinesis really does exist -- mind moves matter. And suppose that those who imagine that mind emerges from the randomness of the quantum realm have it backwards. Suppose it is at this level of randomness that elemental mind can influence quantum events (and thus initiate causation on down through the neurons and muscles and so on).
Yes ... just talking off the top of my head here ... brainstorming, if you will. But deep in my gut I suspect that we'll never get anywhere until we give intention elementarity just as matter and hopefully also information.
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Jules
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posted 20. January 2003 14:33
Micah,
I just read your paper. I haven't read all the preceding comments, so perhaps I'm just repeating previous questions. I'm a little confused about what non-reductive physicalism is. Apparently it asserts both physical and mental realism? But it adheres to the causal closure principle? And only allows for first-order causal efficacy? So wouldn't that entail that mental events just are first-order physical events?
Second, if mind is emergent from the physical, and is a class of second-order events, does this means that it supervenes on the physical? And if so, does it supervene logically or naturally?
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 20. January 2003 15:29
Jules, good questions.
Non-reductive physicalism is an attempt to be a realist about the mental (non-reductive) while adhering to the causal closure thesis (physicalism). It became very popular for several decades and was basically a backlash against strict eliminativism or identity theories which denied any causal relevance to the mind.
Non-reductive physicalism relies heavily on the notion of supervenience: the mind supervenes on the brain. However, Jaegwon Kim has raised some serious problems with non-reductive physicalism and, as far as I'm concerned, has shown that it is no longer a viable option. Why is this? Because if you accept the causal closure thesis, then all physical events have physical causes and therefore there is no causal role left for the mental (which is what the non-reductive physicalists are seeking to preserve). If physical event p1 causes mental event m1 (m1 supervenes on p1 - p1 is the base of m1) and mental event m1 causes mental event m2 with a physical base p2 and mental event m2 causes physical event p3, then, via the principles of transitivity and overdetermination we can eliminate the causal role of the mental events because each physical event had a sufficient physical cause.
BTW, you can't just say (as you do above) that non-reductive physicalism asserts both physical and mental realism because, after all, so do the dualists. The dualists believe that there is a real physical world and a separate mental substance.
Finally, I'm still not sure what to make of supervenience. It seems like a fancy filler word to cover up our ignorance. What does it really mean for something to supervene on something else? I understand how it is used in the technical literature but I don't think that it is causally specific - perhaps a causal black box.
Like I said in my paper, I'm not really sure what I think about the nature of the mental (does it emerge? what does it mean to emerge?): the purpose of my paper was to look at some of the salient features of the way the mental appears to exert causal force. I can't fill in the exciting details by any means, all I'm doing is saying "here are some interesting features about the mental...it would be great to understand how they work, however right now we just don't know but we can be fairly sure about one thing: a committment to the causal closure thesis keeps us from considering the mental on its own terms, as it appears to us"
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Rex Kerr
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posted 21. January 2003 08:59
Micah, you lay out an interesting speculative model, but I'm afraid I have similar sentiments to the previous posters who worry about a hidden dualism. Specifically, in order for the model to advance beyond tentative speculation, I think you will have to fill in more details about the relationship between the second-order and first-order physical properties. Particularly puzzling to me is that the second-order properties are not wholly dependent on the first-order properties--otherwise you'd just be restating eliminativism, as the second-order properties would be necessitated by the first-order properties. This also raises a thought-experiment: could there (logically, if not existant-in-this-universe) be identical first-order configurations of matter with identical properties, one of which had mental capability and the other of which did not?
I also continue to have difficulty understanding the objections to eliminativism. If the first-order properties of atoms and such in a given configuration undergoing a certain set of state-changes is me, as I define myself, I simply don't see the problem. I have no trouble supposing that I exist. If I am not a fundamental property or entity in the universe, then I am implemented somehow out of fundamental pieces. I simply don't see how this has any impact on mental causation in a practical sense.
If we draw an imaginary box around "me" (the implementation of my mental capacity), we see various activity at the borders: perceptions go in, goal-oriented action comes out. I'm having difficulty seeing why it matters what is in that box as far as the net result goes. The observable net result is that I can undertake goal-directed behavior (among other things). Until very recently, though, our entire society and philosophy was based on what we knew about the actions of the box while being unable to penetrate the box in any meaningful way. That's fine. But we could also put a box around flames and attribute some transcendent quality of fieryness to them in our ontology; this in no way means that it is not a rapid oxidative reaction, though, once we look inside the box.
How is it different with the mind?
(Note: I am not saying that the mind is necessarily an emergent property wholly caused by interactions between fundamental particles; I am just doubting that we have any good reasons based on any evidence that it mustn't be.)
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Jules
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posted 21. January 2003 21:03
I need a little help with the definitions.
Eliminativism
Identity Theory
Meanwhile, I've skimmed Chalmers' book on consciousness. At first it sounds like he wants some kind of Epiphenomenalism. But later he links consciousness to the physical by psychophysical laws. Which would give him something like your theory, wouldn't it?
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