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Topic: Robert C. Koons: Emergent Teleology in Psychology, Physics and Biology
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posted 19. January 2003 14:16
Emergent Teleology in Psychology, Physics and Biology
by Robert C. Koons
rkoons@mail.utexas.edu
ABSTRACT—Aristotle, the inventor of biology, made final or teleological causation one of his four fundamental modes of explanation. Throughout the history of science, teleological modes of explanation have been employed quite commonly, most often in biology and in psychology and the other human sciences, but also in physics. In the modern period (by which I mean the sixteenth through the twentieth centuries), teleology came under heavy fire, first in physics (Galileo and Descartes), then biology (Darwin and 19th century German materialism), and finally in psychology (behaviorism and mind-brain identity theories).
The great problem for this tradition of hostility to teleology has been that of explaining (or explaining away) the very phenomena that led Aristotle and his followers to posit teleology in the first place. A number of recent theorists have described these phenomena as instances of a kind of information. The problem for modernists is to explain the presence (or apparent presence) of such information in a world consistently, in the last analysis, of nothing but blind, purposeless processes.
In this paper, I will focus primarily on the case of psychology. I will argue that the reality of mental causation and personal agency cannot be made to square with the modernist doctrine of physicalism: the thesis that the physical (and presumably ateleological) domain of reality is causally complete. However, I will argue in sections 13 through 15 that my conclusions about mental causation have implications for our view of physics and biology as well.
To read the entire paper, please click here
[ 19. January 2003, 22:11: Message edited by: Moderator ]
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Rex Kerr
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posted 20. January 2003 02:07
Unfortunately, Koons' paper assumes that readers are familiar with rather more philosophical concepts than I am familiar with. However, inasmuch as I think I understand it, there seem to be some odd assumptions in the paper. Perhaps these assumptions are common in this branch of philosophy, and thus the oddity is no fault of Koons. They still puzzle me.
Koons introduces a "semi-Humean" view proposed by Barry Loewer. The key here seems to be that "mental events have two aspects: physical and mental", where both events can be causal. There are apparently disagreements with a "Davidsonian" view where the mental aspects are not inherently causal, but are only by virtue of their physical correlate; these disagreements are apparently based on an attachment to notions of agency and responsibility that get messed up when a mental state is not inherently causal.
Among other objections, Koons adds on to this one:
quote:
If we take seriously the higher-order state [i.e. mental aspect] as a first-class citizen of our ontology, then we must locate it somewhere in the causal network. Such states must either be epiphenomenal (which explicitly sacrifices mental causation) or shoe-horned somehow into the causal history of physical events (which explicitly sacrifices physicalism).
Since Koons' thesis is that physicalism gives an incomplete understanding of the mind, either of these two points support his thesis.
However, what I fail to understand is why there is a dichotomy at all. Perhaps those readers who are more familiar with the problems of agency can enlighten me? It seems to me that there is no difficulty saying that something is green because it is a mixture of blue and yellow; and also saying that something excites a certain proportion of our three photoreceptor cone types because it is composed of two dye molecules with absorbance minima at 580nm and 440nm respectively.
Likewise, I have no problem with saying that I meant to type this; and also that various photoreceptors were activated, sending signals through my visual cortex and processed in light of previous inputs and development, causing a cascade of cortical events that is culminating in the activation of motor neurons that control my fingers. They are two descriptions of the same event; one on the level of human agents, and one on the level of physical mechanism of the function of said agent.
Perhaps Koons and others dislike ontology that is merely a matter of perspective, favoring that that restricts itself to what really is. But if the scientific process has taught us anything in the last couple hundred years, isn't it that it is naive to expect that it is possible to know what really is?
Koons seems to object that descriptions of the type I've given above (inasmuch as I understand his introduction of Yablo and Shoemaker) are "overdetermined". To which I would respond: so? They are overdetermined, and they are consistent. Which reasoning you use depends on which level better serves your purpose. Overdetermination is only problematic when the answers are inconsistent.
Unfortunately, at about this point, I lose track of what Koons is trying to accomplish, save that he seems to postulate that the physical portion of a mental event is "causally incomplete" and that what completes it is the higher-order mental action.
Perhaps someone else has greater insight into Koons' efforts than I do.
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 20. January 2003 07:44
Hey Rex,
Koons paper is written under the assumption that its reader will be familiar with the Philosophy of Mind and one of the most intense debates that is going on in this field. So yes, it is a very tough read (even for this guy who is a graduate student in the philosophy of mind!)
Koons' paper is working on what is called the problem of mental causation. I've given a brief summary of how I interpret the problem here:
http://www.iscid.org/dictionary/Mental_Causation
Also, let me recommed a paper I just wrote as a decent over view to the problem:
http://astro.temple.edu/~sparacio/mental-realism.html
Basically,the problem of mental causation boils down to this: is the mental just simply another description (as you indicate) for physical brain activity? Or, is the mental something distinct, with distinct properties and causal powers and thus a first-class ontology? In the first case you would be a mental irrealist, believing that ever aspect of the mental can be described by reference to first-order physical properties and their relations (strict identity theorist, eliminitavists). To many this has increasingly become unlikely after further consideration in the wake of it being wildly popular wildly popular position in the 50-60's and early 70's. In the second case, you are a mental realist, arguing that the mental has new and unique causal powers that can not be explained by reference to the first-order physical base.
Now it is important to realize off the bat that this is not the classical argument between monists and dualists over mind-body dualism. It is far more subtle and nuanced. There are monists who simply argue the mind emerges from and is dependent on its physical base but, that the physical base does not *determine* mental activity. There are non-reductive physicalists who want to remain squarely on the physicalist side while retaining realism about the mental, though this position has been widely called into question by Jaegwon Kim and others as of late. There are epiphenomenalists who believe that the mental is *real* but that it has no causal power, and is thus causally impotent. This preserves the cherished "Physical Causal Closure Thesis". However, this brings into question our notion of *real* because some metaphysicians think that the best measure we can have on something being "real" is whether it has causal powers -> can it do anything.
In any case, Koons position merely seems to be that the mental requires an expanded physical ontology. The current physical ontology which insists that everything can ultimately be explained by reducing it to first-order physical properties and their relations. Koons is arguing that although this is a cherished metaphysical position, the mental demands more if we are to take it seriously - on its own terms.
On to another topic that you raised:
quote:
Likewise, I have no problem with saying that I meant to type this; and also that various photoreceptors were activated, sending signals through my visual cortex and processed in light of previous inputs and development, causing a cascade of cortical events that is culminating in the activation of motor neurons that control my fingers. They are two descriptions of the same event; one on the level of human agents, and one on the level of physical mechanism of the function of said agent.
There are several situations in your latest post where you tried to make the case that the mental is just another description for what is going on at the physical level. However, in both of your examples your physical explanation left out a KEY factor that has become probably the most significant debate in modern philosophy: the KEY is phenomenal experience. We don't even know where to start in addressing the problem of phenomenal experience scientifically. Our current notion of physics leaves no room for intrinsic phenomenal properties.
If you can give me a legitimate physical explanation of the "what it's likeness" to experience green or even the experience of constructing and typing these words, then you will instantly become the world's most famous philosopher.
What I'm saying is this, that if we step back and take the mental seriously (especially its causal powers and the phenomena of experience) without trying to force it into our favorite metaphysic, then we are faced with some major dilemmas, none of which seem clearly *right.*
Further suggested reading:
Mind in a Physical World by Jaegwon Kim (Book)
Self, Agency and Mental Causation by E. J. Lowe
Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness by David Chalmers
Consciousness and Space by Colin McGinn
What is it like to be a bat? by Thomas Nagel
Mental Reality by Galen Strawson (recommended highly - sober acknowledgements from a materialist monist -> it was Strawson who gave me the concept of needing to expand our physical ontology, if only to properly deal with experience)
[ 20. January 2003, 07:54: Message edited by: Micah Sparacio ]
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warren_bergerson
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posted 20. January 2003 09:32
The article by Robert Koons provides an informative discussion of some of the modern views on teleology. In reading the discussion, however, one gets the feeling that roles of teleology in science and in metaphysics are being confused.
Teleology or teleological causation, as I understand it, is the common observation that some phenomena such as behavior or the evolution of a wing has the ‘APPEARANCE’ of being caused by some future goal or purpose. Teleological causation thus has the appearance of causation moving backward in time. Backward causation is almost universally viewed as logically unsound.
There is, of course, a logical/mechanical explanation for teleological causation. A behavior or evolutionary phenomena is not caused by a future event but by an ‘expectation’ of a future event. The ‘expectation’ can in turn be defined mechanically in terms of the interaction of selection, variation, and preservation. In modern computer or logic machine terminology, teleological or purposeful or goal-oriented causation can be described/explained in terms of information processing. Specifically teleological causation can be explained in terms of search routines that generates multiple variations of a relationship or behavior and selects relationships likely to achieve a goal, (or selects out relationships unlikely to achieve a specified goal). We can easily write mechanical computer or logic machine programs which simulate generating teleological causation.
There are two serious potential drawbacks to the use of this mechanical form of teleological causation in generating scientific explanations of the purposeful behavior exhibited by biological systems.
The first potential problem is the ‘magnitude of processing’ problem. The teleological behavior of biological systems is extremely complex and highly dynamic. Very, very large volumes of mechanical information processing are required to produce or simulate the teleological behavior of biological systems. The problem is whether there is evidence supporting the existence of the required level of information processing. Only in recent times with the use of the electronic computer have we been able to identify the types of front loading which can produce the required levels of information processing. It appears, given current knowledge of computer systems, that the magnitude of processing problem can be resolved. This technical mathematical knowledge of information processing clearly has not yet penetrated to either philosophy of science or to the life sciences.
The second potential problem with the mechanical form of teleological causation is fitting it to the scientific paradigm. The scientific paradigm can only be applied effectively to analysis of causal relationships which are ‘scientifically deterministic’. The scientific paradigm can only by applied effectively if there is a realistic expectation that a causal relationship will produce consistent results for 1)observation of past events, 2)current testing and validation, and 3)future ‘predicted’ occurrences. Since by definition the teleological form of causal relationships change over time, it would not at first seem possible for teleological causal relationships to satisfy the requirements of scientific determinism.
There does, however, appear to be a solution to this problem if one recognizes that 1)teleological causal relationships do not change randomly but in a specified direction, and 2)scientific theories do not predict what happens in the real world, but what happens under ideal conditions. As I have discussed elsewhere, these two features appear to make it possible to formulate predictive mathematical theories using the mechanical form of teleological causation.
SUMMARY
Biological systems are clearing purposeful, teleological or goal oriented. From the days of Aristotle we have had a logical explanation of teleological causation. It is, however, only with the development of the computer that we have begun to understand how teleological causation actually operates and how this powerful form of causation can be used in scientific analysis. Clearly the knowledge being acquired from the field of computerized information processing has not yet effectively penetrated into either the life sciences or into the philosophy of science.
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