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Topic: Karl D. Stephan: Tegmark’s Parallel Universes: A Challenge to Intelligent Design?
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Pim van Meurs
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Member # 541
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posted 04. May 2003 16:39
Chris: Anyway, to direct the focus back toward the topic at hand, I’ll say it again – I agree that some of Max’s ideas are intriguing. But they do indeed fit into the CTMU framework in an obvious way, and the CTMU is ID-consistent. So, then, is the ultimate logical extension of Max’s ideas.
Does this mean that you disagree with the reviewer of Tegmark's work that suggests that Tegmark's multiple universes poses a challenge to ID? Do you agree or disagree with my observation that Tegmark's work does pose a challenge for Dembski's eliminative filter approach to detecting ID? I am curious as to the extent of ID friendliness of Tegmark's ideas and CTMU which is claimed to include Tegmark's ideas which suggests to me that for all practical purposes you would agree with Tegmark. Certainly Tegmark's success in promoting his ideas in scientific as well as 'laymen' publications may even be considered a implicit victory for CTMU?
Also your statement that "ID theory is about biological origins" needs some qualifiers. In biology ID theory may be about origins although it seems to be far more interested not in the origins as much as the evolution.
Intelligent design as proposed by Dembski for instance is a "set theoretic complement of the disjunction regularity-or-chance" or the "negation of chance and regularity" and in Dembski's own words ". Within biology, Intelligent Design is a theory of biological origins and development."
[ 04. May 2003, 17:10: Message edited by: Pim van Meurs ]
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 06. May 2003 15:03
quote:
Does this mean that you disagree with the reviewer of Tegmark's work that suggests that Tegmark's multiple universes poses a challenge to ID?
The suggestion that I must agree with Max simply because Max’s cosmological scenario can be interpreted within the CTMU seems a little hasty. In particular, I’d have to differ strongly with any assertion that Tegmarkian multiverse theory is complete as it stands.
Superficially, Tegmark’s work can be seen as posing a challenge to ID. I’ve even pointed out why; Max is trying to understand the universe as a product of deterministic exhaustion and summation rather than design. Faced with troublesome "anthropic" coincidences, Max wants to use a selection principle to extrapolate and concretely reify probabilistic resources in such measure as to explain the status quo merely by applying the laws of probability to first-order Markovian combinations of physical state and laws of physics. He justifies the multiverse not by observing it, but by recognizing it as a necessity of forming a certain preferred kind of explanation for the universe...an explanation consisting solely of probability theory and distributed laws of physics. The possibility of design is simply ignored (but not explicitly denied).
In other words, Max wants to put the explanandum before the explanans and retrodictively construct an explanation conforming to certain logically unnecessary and scientifically unjustified constraints. He then wants to turn the tables yet again and "retrodictively predict" the explanandum from this explanation. It’s a circular exercise from start to finish. But whereas the CTMU recognizes this kind of circularity as a basic feature of the scientific process and explores the implied mathematical structure (supertautological SCSPL), thus potentially avoiding the concrete reification of inobservable quantities, Max doesn’t bother with this stage of theorization. He has wisely left that stage of reasoning to a metaphysical logician like me (where analytical metaphysics properly includes physics).
You mention Bill Dembski’s 3-way distinction between determinacy, nondeterminacy (chance) and design. In the CTMU, this distinction comes down to the 3-way distinction between determinacy, nondeterminacy and self-determinacy, the last being associated with telic recursion and the others being secondarily defined with respect to it. Telic recursion is just another term for "metacausation"; instead of simply outputting the next state of a system, it outputs higher-order relationships between state and law (or state and syntax).
Regarding the distinction between origins and evolution, not too many people are clear on it. This distinction is based on the standard view of causality, in which there seems to be a clean distinction between the origin and application of causal principles, specifically first-order Markovian laws of nature. In the CTMU, origins distribute over causes in a new kind of structure called a conspansive manifold, and are therefore not cleanly distinguishable from causality. Both are products of a higher-order process, telic recursion. To put it in simpler terms, evolution consists of events which originate in causes which originate in (teleological) metacauses. So in the CTMU, to talk about evolution is to talk about metacausal origins by ontogenic transitivity.
As for the question of whether or not I agree with Karl (Stephan) regarding the opposition of multiverse theory to ID theory, the answer would be yes and no. As I’ve already said, Tegmark’s work can be seen as posing a challenge to ID in its reliance on pure mathematical determinism and concomitant exclusion of teleology. However, Karl seems not to have read my paper, which provides a framework for disposing of this challenge. In fact, this challenge has already been met on a very advanced level right here in PCID.
[ 06. May 2003, 15:04: Message edited by: Christopher M. Langan ]
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Karl D. Stephan
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posted 07. May 2003 11:21
Erik (member #160) says that I have ignored the 50% of good science in Tegmark’s article. Logically, there are theories which make predictions about in-principle unobservable features of the universe, which can also be tested empirically using observable data. I agree that what counts as an “observation” is partly a matter of custom and familiarity. Yes, the track in a bubble chamber is not a direct observation of a particle; it is merely the effect of the particle’s passage through the chamber. But this kind of thing almost amounts to semantical hairsplitting. What is objectionable about Tegmark’s infinite universe (Level I) is not the fact that it appears to be supported by experimental data, but that he uses its infinity in a way that allows him to claim the real existence of all possible worlds. With such a claim, literally everything is predicted and therefore everything is explained. This does not seem to me to be a way either to predict or to describe the actual observations we make.
In connection with predictions about our own observable universe, I confess I did not examine the concept of our universe as being drawn from an ensemble of possible universes in my original paper. If I understand this correctly, the argument goes something like this: A particular theory of multiple universes predicts that, for the sake of argument, one out of every seventeen billion will have intelligent life. Would the ensemble then be a set of seventeen billion universes, and the well-defined probability measure be the chance that one out of every seventeen billion has intelligent life? If that is what is meant, then the objection still remains that there are great problems in calculating the probabilities involved. Rather than go into this in what was already a rather lengthy review, I just skipped it.
Prof. Robert Koons remarks that we should avoid identifying “science” with “theories well-supported by the evidence” and “philosophy” with “unsupported speculation.” Although the first pair of phrases seems apposite to me, I believe he means them to contrast with a tone I adopted toward the end of my article which appears to disparage philosophy as compared to science. I did not mean to disparage philosophy per se. The point I was trying to make was that Tegmark claims the mantle of science for matters that are better classified as philosophy, because of the nature of the assumptions one must make about them. There is nothing wrong with explicitly stating philosophical presuppositions of whatever kind, and then deriving a logical, air-tight set of conclusions from them. What I object to is the kind of pseudo-science which appears at first glance to be hard, objective, experimentally-based scientific conclusions, but which upon closer examination requires the reader to make philosophical presuppositions which are not that clearly stated at the outset.
Regarding how the Big Bang model is consistent with infinite space, I think the problem is that we intuitively picture in our minds a little dot of something that starts out small and gets bigger with time. This picture is erroneous. I am not a physicist, so I must rely upon those who are for any explanations along these lines. Physicist Paul Davies writes in The Matter Myth (Simon & Schuster, 1992) about his early attempts to understand the Big Bang: “My initial image was of a very concentrated lump of matter sitting at a point in space. At some instant, for some reason, the lump exploded, sending fragments rushing away at great speed, eventually to become the receding galaxies. I now know that this concept was totally wrong. . . .Later, I tried to picture a singularity by imagining all the matter in the Universe squashed into a single point. . . . I was careful not to fall for the mistake of envisaging the point mass surrounded by space, however; I knew space would have to be shrunk to a point as well. This image worked well enough for a finite, closed model universe of the sort Einstein had invented, for we can all imagine something finite in size being shrunk to nothing. But there was an obvious problem if the Universe is spatially infinite. If the initial singularity was just a point, how could it suddenly change into infinite space? . . . . The problem is compounded here because there are actually two infinities competing with each other: there is the infinite volume of space, and there is the infinite shrinkage, or compression, represented by the big-bang singularity. However much you shrink an infinite space, it is still infinite. On the other hand, any finite region within infinite space, however large, can be compressed to a single point by the big bang. There is no conflict between the two infinities as long as you specify clearly just what it is you are talking about. Well, I can say all this in words, and I know I can make mathematical sense of it, but I confess that to this day I cannot visualize it.”
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Parallel
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posted 08. May 2003 00:09
Christopher M. Langan wrote:
quote:
Max is a newcomer among the innovators. As I've said, the entirety of ensemble theory exists implicitly in the CTMU (along with a considerable amount of high-level structure that ensemble theory lacks).
Allegedly supporting that bold claim Mr. Langan cites a PCID paper of his published last year. However, Dr. Tegmark's work has been published years prior to Langan's paper. So I question Langan's assertion that Tegmark is the newcomer here. Additionally, I fail to see how the passage Langan quotes contains resemblance to Tegmark's work.
A graphic outline of Dr. Tegmark's original pathbreaking work on multiverse theory can be found at his site
http://www.hep.upenn.edu/~max/multiverse1.html
"The universe ... is both One and Many." Dionysius The Areopagite
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 08. May 2003 01:21
quote:
Allegedly supporting that bold claim Mr. Langan cites a PCID paper of his published last year. However, Dr. Tegmark's work has been published years prior to Langan's paper. So I question Langan's assertion that Tegmark is the newcomer here. Additionally, I fail to see how the passage Langan quotes contains resemblance to Tegmark's work.
...except that the first paper on the CTMU was published in 1989, in the journal of an exclusive group to which I belonged. Entitled "The Resolution of Newcomb's Paradox", it utilized a (then brand new) computational model of the universe based on nested virtual realities. The model was called NeST, short for Nested Simulation Tableau. Subsequently, other papers on the CTMU were published in that journal and elsewhere, some developing its cosmological implications. This can all be documented.
If what you mean is that priority automatically belongs to the first person who gets a given idea into Scientific American (or some other big-name periodical), I'd have to take exception to that, particularly since I had a brief correspondence with a SciAm editor named George Musser several years ago. I briefly described the theory and asked him whether he’d be interested in publishing an account of it. He wasn’t. But I can document the correspondence, so when it comes right down to it, his taste in cosmology articles and authors wouldn’t count for much in a priority dispute.
As far as concerns your inability to see how Tegmark’s work fits into the CTMU despite the fact that I just explained how it fits into the CTMU, I don’t think I need bear any responsibility for that. The paper is out there, and Max’s "level 4 multiverse" fits into it just as described. Of course, unlike multiverse theory, the CTMU manages to avoid any blanket physical reification of abstract structures. In fact, the mathematical structure of the CTMU goes so far beyond that attributed to the multiverse that there’s no need to pretend that conventional multiverse theory, if we can even call it that with a straight face, is in the same league.
By the way, I find your tone unnecessarily confrontational. Nobody is accusing Max of knowing anything about the CTMU before producing his work, and no one is accusing Max of plagiarism. I’ve even said that I like some of Max’s insights. What bothers me a little is the readiness with which some authors, perhaps including Max, assume that they’re completely in the know about what’s been going on in their fields of interest. Some people don’t run (or write) in the same circles, and often, this is because the circles in question are closed to them.
Last but not least, the issue here isn’t whether Max is entitled to credit for his work – of course he is! – but whether it represents a threat to ID. To explain why it doesn’t, I was forced to mention the CTMU, which just plain flat-out predates Max’s work (unless Max was writing on this subject back in the eighties). If anyone doesn’t like this, I can only sympathize.
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Noel Rude
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posted 08. May 2003 17:06
Many Worlds, if I'm not mistaken, was first proposed (at least seriously) in physics in order to account for the collapse of the wave function, i.e. that quantum phenomena, which become realized upon observation, actually have every possibility realized in some world. Once again, if I'm not mistaken (always possible with yours truly), Many Worlds first enters mainstream science as a way around certain teleological effects of mind. Frank J. Tipler, as I recall, in his (1995) The Physics of Immortality, devotes a section to showing that most major physicists have subscribed to Many Worlds. Thus when the controversy over Anthropic phenomena emerged Many Worlds was there to be invoked by those convinced that the laws of physics are contingent.
A friend used to joke that Many Worlds was destined to be embraced with the same partisan zeal as Darwinism, that the day is coming when teacher will warn, "Now Johnnie, you may question Many Worlds at home or at church, but in science class ..."
Well, that day might not be here yet, but if biology continues to be confronted with evidence that makes Darwinism look too serendipitous for the short life of this universe, then we know that Many Worlds is out there, and its efficacy in dismissing teleology on the quantum and anthropic levels could be cited in support of its theoretical validity in such questions as the origin of life. I wonder ... does Max Tegmark invoke Many Worlds for biological evolution, and if so is he the first to do so?
Might materialist philosophy ultimately be saved by Many Worlds? Maybe. But what do I mean by materialist philosophy? This: Materialism denies that teleology is fundamental/elemental. For example, any theory that derives human agency from a complex mechanism, be it "material" or "nonmaterial", is mechanistic and materialist. The mind, of course, expresses itself -- no doubt even its consciousness as also its agency -- through the mechanism of body and brain. But is there at its core something as elemental as, say, the electron? If we do not think so, if we suppose that chance and necessity are quite enough without making design elemental, then we are materialists. And potential Many Worlders?
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Pim van Meurs
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posted 10. May 2003 22:53
Parallel: I think that it important to distinguish between 'can be fitted in CTMU' and was predicted by the CTMU. Given the nature of the CTMU I do not believe that Chris would be arguing that CTMU actually predicted parellel universes. In fact given Feynman's example of a TOE in the undeniably correct shape of Sum(i) U_i=0 where U includes all known and (unknown) laws of the universe as follows:
U_i=F-ma
etc. Making this the most 'simple' TOE yet with little predictive power or even explanatory power.
As I understand parallel universes it follows from theoretical models of our universe, has some supporting evidence and can at least in principle be falsified and/or distinguished from other theories. As such the parallel universes theory, which is according to Chris 'included' in the CTMU may be correct or may be wrong.
What I find more interesting is a discussion of how these parallel universes affect the idea of intelligent design. My argument is that although the ID inference proposed by Dembski would surely be impacted by parallel universes, ID itself is likely to remain unaffected by such a theory.
Nevertheless I find the parallel universe theory/hypothesis to be a fascinating application of physics and the arguments by Tegmark about the universe having low information content for instance are fascinating from a scientific perspective and may help us formulate future hypotheses related to cosmology, quantum mechanics etc.
As a physicist I find the 'simplicity' of the parallel universe approach quite intruiging.
Parellel welcome to ISCID, you seem to be somewhat familiar with the ideas of Tegmark and others in this area so I am interested in hearing some of your ideas about the impact of parallel universes on ID, its status as a TOE and other issues that may be relevant for this forum
[ 10. May 2003, 22:57: Message edited by: Pim van Meurs ]
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 11. May 2003 05:06
The CTMU "includes" multiverse theory in the sense that multiverse theory can and must be interpreted in the CTMU.
Remember, although it is tempting to think that Max is basically conducting physics and cosmology as usual (where "as usual" connotes materialism and determinism), he is actually working from more or less controversial premises explicitly including the following: (1) mathematical structures are formal systems; (2) at least one mathematical structure (formal system) is isomorphic to the physical universe; (3) mathematical and physical existence are basically the same.
Equating physical reality to a formal system leads inevitably to the conclusion that physical reality has formal, i.e. linguistic, structure. It is fundamentally linguistic in nature, and in consequence, physics and cosmology are directly answerable to formal (logical and language-theoretic) criteria. Concisely, reality is a kind of language.
SCSPL is simply the kind of language in question...the reality-structure implied by the hypothesis to which Max subscribes. Therefore, to whatever extent multiverse theory is valid, it belongs in the CTMU (I've already described exactly where). In fact, the CTMU constitutes a general answer to the very question that Max aims to solve: what is the mathematical structure to which the universe is isomorphic?
Since the full explanation is somewhat more technical than would be appropriate here, I'm working it into a paper-in-progress.
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Parallel
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posted 12. May 2003 21:58
Pim van Meurs, I agree with your assessment that an eternal Intelligent Designer seems to map efficiently onto multiverse hypothesis. I see nothing inherently antithetical to design in multiverse theory. Even more, the architectural complexity of proposed multiverse models seems to speak to design.
That said, any assumption that ID requires some new theoretical system such as the CTMU to save it from Tegmark appears extraneous. Additionally, Meurs' comments raises the question that if the CTMU contains Tegmarkian theory as Mr. Langan claims, then how could Tegmarkian theory contain what the CTMU lacks, such as the ability to be falsified? Such a disjunction appears to refute Langan's assertion that Scientific American rejected his allegedly similar ideas some time before accepting them from Tegmark.
Christopher M. Langan wrote:
quote:
...except that the first paper on the CTMU was published in 1989, in the journal of an exclusive group to which I belonged. Entitled "The Resolution of Newcomb's Paradox", it utilized a (then brand new) computational model of the universe based on nested virtual realities. The model was called NeST, short for Nested Simulation Tableau. Subsequently, other papers on the CTMU were published in that journal and elsewhere, some developing its cosmological implications. This can all be documented.
Well, the fist step in documenting something that's "out there" is to provide the information necessary to facilitate documentation, such as the appropriate journal citations. How else can we as members of the public review the contents of your paper(s) in order to assess the veracity of your intellectual priority claim?
"The universe ... is both One and Many." Dionysius The Areopagite
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Jacob Aliet
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posted 13. May 2003 07:59
CTMU is a broad philosophical theory (given its based on the abstract mathematics of set theory...perharps "metaphysical" would be better). It can support evolution (per SCSPL, UBT etc), the existence of God (hology, pantheism etc) and ID.
That it can "engulf" Tegmarkian Parallel universes does not in itself show that parallel universes is not a threat to ID. One can say that CTMU is like a flute; it can be blown to any tune one desires.
IMHO, any "theory" that can explain causality without invoking an intelligent agent (especially when its resultant in something as elegant as our universe - from what Max calls "frogs eye view"), is a threat to ID.
Parallel universes, given the "wastefulness" of multiple "copies" of phenomena, refute the presence of an "intelligent" agent in the origin of our universe and in cosmic causality (and Max handles it quite well in the context of Occams razor in parallel universes). This is the similar to wastefulness that is often raised when one is arguing for sub-optimal design eg. when examining the sightless eyes of cavedwelling creatures, phenomenal waste of life in nature etc.
Purpose is the driving force behind an intelligent agent (specified complexity comes to mind) - any evidence of "senseless" or wastefulness challenges the existence of such a designer - on all levels (biological to cosmological).
[ 13. May 2003, 12:30: Message edited by: Jacob Aliet ]
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 13. May 2003 12:36
Parallel asks "if the CTMU contains Tegmarkian theory as Mr. Langan claims, then how could Tegmarkian theory contain what the CTMU lacks, such as the ability to be falsified?"
This question rests on the assumption that there is no theory that is both tautological and nontrivial in the a posteriori sense. To those who don't happen to share this assumption, the question is meaningless. On the other hand, were someone to insist that the question is meaningful anyway (and damn the torpedoes), then one would need to prove that this assumption is valid (and good luck).
But there's an even worse problem connected with this question. First, multiverse theory can only be "falsified" relative to certain assumptions, the truth of which is not uniquely implied by the tests proposed. Meanwhile, because the CTMU is explicitly tied to such empirical details as the rate of apparent cosmic expansion, quantum nonlocality and so on, it has been logically and empirically validated. Multiverse theory, on the other hand, has no support at all. That is, even if multiverse theory supports the observation that "the universe is expanding at an accelerating rate", then one must go in search of a logical model, in the formal sense, of multiverse theory. Next stop: the CTMU.
Parallel goes on to say that "the fist step in documenting something that's 'out there' is to provide the information necessary to facilitate documentation, such as the appropriate journal citations. How else can we as members of the public review the contents of your paper(s) in order to assess the veracity of your intellectual priority claim?"
The paper cited, The Resolution of Newcomb's Paradox, was published in Noesis: The Journal of the Noetic Society, number 44, December 1989-January 1990, pages 3-12. I don't know whether random members of the public can find older back issues of this journal, but I can, and if anyone with any real weight in such matters were to challenge me on this, I'd simply put myself to the trouble of producing them. And that would be that.
Jacob Aliet opines that the "CTMU is like a flute; it can be blown to any tune one desires".
Well, not really, but I guess that one would need to read up on it a little, and understand what one has read, in order to figure out why.
Jacob then asseverates that "any 'theory' that can explain causality without invoking an intelligent agent (especially when its resultant in something as elegant as our universe - from what Max calls "frogs eye view"), is a threat to ID."
Unfortunately, quite apart from the question of intelligent agency, multiverse theory cannot "explain" anything in the strict logical sense, because although some people are in the habit of mistakenly calling it a "model" of reality, it does not meet the formal criteria applying to models. To really explain anything, it would need a model of its own, and as I've been saying, that could only be the CTMU (unless and until it runs afoul of the CTMU, is which case it is out the window on logical grounds alone).
Perhaps I should clarify something. In the 20th century, science-as-usual became involved an unseemly tussle with certain inconvenient facts of logic like undecidability, the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem and the Duhem-Quine thesis. In particular, the last of these says that any given set of empirical observations can be explained by multiple distinct theories. It follows that when we are inevitably confronted by such theories, we need to ask a question: which explanation is better substantiated on rational, logicomathematical grounds? In this context, the answer is clear: by the nature of its design and construction, the CTMU has a tremendous explanatory advantage over multiverse theory.
Now let's get back to multiverse theory and its "challenge" to ID. Although Max's recent SciAm paper is really just a survey - that's how Max sums it up in the synopsis - he makes some "predictions". Here they are:
Prediction 1: The mathematical structure describing our world is the most generic one that is consistent with our observations.
Prediction 2: Our future observations are the most generic ones that are consistent with our past observations.
Prediction 3: Our past observations are the most generic ones that are consistent with our existence.
I need merely point out that these aren't really what most scientists, e.g. biologists, would consider "predictions". Each involves the term "generic", which points to the fact that Max is talking about an ensemble average (where the cosmic ensemble to which he refers can only be indirectly observed by way of the average itself). But is multiverse theory the only way to explain such an averaging effect? Hardly; we can explain it as a syntactic function of SCSPL, and in fact must do so, for otherwise, those trying to function on this realm of discourse, including multiverse theorists, would lack a coherent language in which to formulate their hypotheses and inferences. Therefore, were these predictions to be found true, they would not confirm multiverse theory except insofar as it has a place in some larger theory providing multiverse theory with a supporting syntax, language and model. Hello, CTMU.
I can't, of course, force anyone who is firmly attached to the idea of a physical, material multiverse extending to infinite distances in trans-physical space to change his mind. But I can observe that the notion of a multiverse that is at once physical and material, and yet trans-physical and trans-material, is plainly in need of reformulation ... the kind of reformulation that only the CTMU can provide. I can also observe that the CTMU not only supports the existence of an intelligent designer, but apodeictically implies it.
Since the particular brand of multiverse theory tendered by Max Tegmark logically implies the CTMU on formal (mathematical) grounds, prior to any question of empirical confirmation, and since the CTMU logically implies the existence of an intelligent designer, multiverse theory implies the existence of an intelligent designer.
And we really can't put it any more simply than that, can we?
[ 13. May 2003, 12:42: Message edited by: Christopher M. Langan ]
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Pim van Meurs
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posted 14. May 2003 00:12
Parallel: I agree with your comments that it is hardly self evident that CTMU contains Tegmarkian theory other than perhaps in a tautological manner (a TOE of course includes all other theories) and does seem to be complicated by the fact that if the CTMU is a TOE and it include a potentially erroneous theory such as Tegmark's. If that is indeed the case then one may conjecture whether or not the CTMU is not merely an unnecessary wrapper.
What is even more fascinating to me is that the CTMU seems to require one to share assumptions which do not seem to be self-evident and thus the TOE becomes a TOE_according_to_X.
Nevertheless I would like to point out that Mr Langan may be arguing the wrong issue namely the impact of Tegmark's model or CTMU on intelligent designers versus intelligent design. Remember that the paper's title was formulated in a question "Karl D. Stephan: Tegmark’s Parallel Universes: A Challenge to Intelligent Design?"
As I have argued, the existence of multiple universes seems to be quite a challenge to intelligent design as proposed by Dembski. Which is why Dembski spent some time addressing this question in NFL. On the other hand one may wonder if Tegmark's Universes have any impact on "intelligent designers" and I would argue, of course not.
The CTMU may hold a theoretical explanatory advantage over multiverse theories but since it seems to include multiverse theories according to the author and since it is hardly self evident that it adds any explanatory power, I am not too interested in pursuing this particular aspect of the thread which is also steering us away from the far more interesting issues raised by Tegmark and Karl.
As far as the intelligent designer alluded to by Chris, I wonder if Chris can explain if this intelligent designer was caused by something, whether it preceded or postceded the universe, did it always exist, does the intelligent designer have any powers over the universe which go beyond what is considered 'natural powers'. What does the CTMU really predict? A single intelligent designer? What did this intelligence design? How does the CTMU predict both the intelligence, the existence and the extent of the design performed by the designer?
And if the CTMU does not allow intelligent design as proposed by Dembski to be falsified, then would it not suggest that it fails to capture the impact of the existence of parallel universes on the theory of intelligent design as explained by Karl and Dembski alike? And if the CTMU both predicts the existence of an intelligent designer and the falsification of intelligent design then do we not have some conflicting issues here? Of course in a multiverse universe there could be at the same time an instance in which the CTMU was false and correct, couldn't it? Are we sure we are living in the universe in which the CTMU has any relevance I wonder :-)
Back to Tegmark and Karl's comments: I do argue like Dembski that the hypothesis of multiple/parellel universes would impact the intelligent design significantly. While it surely does not negate the existence of an intelligent designer it also includes multiverses without such a designer and it surely does not necessitate the existance of an intelligent designer or does it?
Tegmark's ideas are extremely fascinating and intellectually stimulating. I find that they raise many interesting questions and the fact that Tegmark shows both supporting data as well as ways to disprove parallel universes. Which also raises the question that if the CTMU implies Tegmark's multiverses and if Tegmark's falsification proposal can be shown to actually apply then we may be possible to reject Tegmark's multiverses and the CTMU? Or is the CTMU somehow protected from such falsifications?
Jacob's analogy of the CTMU with a flute may be helpful in exploring these issues as it seems to have remained as a valid observation, Chris's mild objections notwithstanding.
Are multiverses wasteful? Or are multiverses indicative of a low information content since it seems to require far less information to specify an infinite set of multiverses than a limited set of say n=1. Tegmark btw has another very fascinating paper on this topic. Truely brilliant even if wrong :-)
Here
quote:
At first sight, an accurate description of the state of the universe appears to require a mind-bogglingly large and perhaps even infinite amount of information, even if we restrict our attention to a small subsystem such as a rabbit. In this paper, it is suggested that most of this information is merely apparent, as seen from our subjective viewpoints, and that the algorithmic information content of the universe as a whole is close to zero. It is argued that if the Schrödinger equation is universally valid, then decoherence together with the standard chaotic behavior of certain non-linear systems will make the universe appear extremely complex to any self-aware subsets that happen to inhabit it now, even if it was in a quite simple state shortly after the big bang. For instance, gravitational instability would amplify the microscopic primordial density fluctuations that are required by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle into quite macroscopic inhomogeneities, forcing the current wavefunction of the universe to contain such Byzantine superpositions as our planet being in many macroscopically different places at once. Since decoherence bars us from experiencing more than one macroscopic reality, we would see seemingly complex constellations of stars etc, even if the initial wavefunction of the universe was perfectly homogeneous and isotropic.
I hope that I have said it as simple as I can.
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jasonyoung
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posted 14. May 2003 01:28
"I agree with your comments that it is hardly self evident that CTMU contains Tegmarkian theory other than perhaps in a tautological manner"
Pim: As Christopher Langan noted above, Tegmarkian multiverse theory assumes three things to be true: i) mathematical structures are formal systems; ii) at least one mathematical structure is isomorphic to the physical universe; iii) mathematical and physical existence are basically the same.
Again, as Chris noted above, "equating physical reality to a formal system leads inevitably to the conclusion that physical reality has a formal, i.e. linguistic structure". Because both Tegmarkian multiverse theory and the Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe equate physical reality to a formal system, the validity of each is contingent on its adherence to the logical and language theoretic criteria of formal systems.
Since the SCSPL of the CTMU answers the question (while satisfying the aforementioned criteria) posed by both Tegmark and Langan when they set out to create their respective ToEs ("what is the mathematical structure to which the universe is isomorphic?"), it seems rather obvious why the CTMU subsumes Tegmarkian multiverse theory. Simply and briefly put, because the SCSPL is the formal system isomorphic to reality at its most general level (whether that be a single universe or a cosmic ensemble), Tegmarkian multiverse theory must be interpreted within the SCSPL of the CTMU.
"Which also raises the question that if the CTMU implies Tegmark'"
The CTMU doesn't "imply" Tegmarkian multiverse theory. See above (not only of my post, but of Langan's prior posts, as well).
As for the rest of the questions in your post, I'd recommend perusing the CTMU paper itself for the answers.
-JY
(Pardon me for interloping)
[ 14. May 2003, 01:40: Message edited by: jasonyoung ]
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Erik
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posted 14. May 2003 03:07
While I don't want to contribute to the shift in emphasis from Karl D. Stephan's article to the marketing of the CTMU, I can't resist three questions for Christopher M. Langan and Jasonyoung: You have both claimed that Tegmark's ensemble hypothesis leads to the conclusion that physical reality is answerable to logical and language-theoretical criteria. What are "language theoretical-criteria"? Exactly which logical and language-theoretical criteria do you have in mind? Why isn't it a problem that Tegmark's hypothesis allows for the possibility that our universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure that has higher cardinality than any language?
Erik
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 14. May 2003 05:42
I think we may have a little misunderstanding regarding the manner in which the CTMU encompasses other theories. Since the CTMU is built on the TOE called "logic", let's use logic as an example. Logic is a required syntactic ingredient of any theory, which is just another way of saying that logic descriptively includes any correct theory. This doesn't mean that every theory is logical; it means that on the assumption of its correctness, it is expressible in terms of logic. Logic is thus more than an "unnecessary wrapper" for theories; theories fail without it. Theories thus have only three possible states: in verifiable conformance with logic; in tentative conformance with logic; in the garbage bin. The CTMU "includes" a theory like Tegmark's in exactly this sense. Like logic, the CTMU contains no assumptions; all of its principles, along with its explanatory power, are self-evident on the model-theoretic level of discourse (at least to one who is actually paying attention to it and knows the subject matter).
Some might argue that an infinite regress passes as a causal explanation of nature. But it doesn't, because an infinite regress never reaches the causal origin or "first cause" of nature, which is also the causal identity of nature. In contrast, the CTMU identifies nature as its own causal identity, recognizing it as its own cause, effect and causal agency. That's called "closure", and without it, one doesn't have a causal explanation (since a causal explanation is really what is being "enclosed" by the identity). This is deduced rather than "predicted". The CTMU does not allow ID to be falsified because ID turns out to be a condition of causal closure, which is in turn a condition of meaningful theorization on the ontological level.
Erik, perhaps bent on marketing multiverse theory rather than the CTMU, asks three questions. (1) "What are 'language theoretical-criteria'?" (2) "Exactly which logical and language-theoretical criteria do you have in mind?" (3) "Why is[n't] it a problem that Tegmark's hypothesis allows for the possibility that our universe is isomorphic to a mathematical structure that has higher cardinality than any language?"
1. Language-theoretic criteria are the definitive structural and dynamical features and constraints of languages and model-theoretic isomorphisms between languages and their universes, particularly in metaphysical contexts like multiverse theory.
2. Since the logical and language-theoretic criteria I have in mind were very clearly stated in the CTMU description that I published in PCID last year, I don't feel that I'm being rude to suggest, along with Jason, that those who want to know about them should go and look for them there. But just for the sake of civility, three of the most basic are consistency, comprehensiveness (true of a TOE by definition), and closure (equivalent to the analytic self-containment of reality with respect to relevance, which simply means that if something is sufficiently real to affect reality, then by definition, it is a part or aspect of reality itself). When such criteria are properly applied and developed in a model-theoretic context, the results are far from trivial.
3. In conventional mathematical usage, there is no such thing as an isomorphism between sets or structures of different cardinality. If one likes, one can try pulling a trick or two related to the Skolem paradox and the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem, but frankly, that's more in line with the CTMU than with multiverse theory. So if Max "allows for this possibility" even while stating that reality is isomorphic to a formal system - and this seems to be a fairly accurate description of what Max is doing - then that would be a problem, all right. But it would be Max's problem no less than mine.
By the way, I seem to be getting criticized for leading the thread away from Karl's paper and the impact of multiverse theory on ID. Since the CTMU is relevant to both of these topics, I don't know quite what that means; it's a bit like criticizing somebody for referring to arithmetic while trying to describe addition and multiplication. On the other hand, I have no problem with those who find something to like in the work of Max Tegmark. Multiverse theory is an interesting topic indeed, and I commend both Karl and Max for writing interesting and entertaining papers.
[ 14. May 2003, 05:59: Message edited by: Christopher M. Langan ]
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