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Author
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Topic: On Progress, Readdressing Reality Theory, & Information in the Holographic Universe
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Pim van Meurs
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Member # 541
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posted 28. July 2003 02:38
Chris, when you used the tautologically erroneous statement "The short and punchy answer is that standard scientific methodology is inadequate for the verification of inferred scientific truth" you were using terms perhaps in a somewhat imprecise manner.You usage of the term may have been clear to you but in written and even oral communication, what is clear to you needs to be clearly and precisely communicated. Or as Parallel stated it "As Pim succinctly observed, "scientific truths are per definition 'truths' discovered by science"."
Self evident, obvious, tautological thus surely suitable to be truths ;-)
Thus Parallel was not compounding any errors when he pointed out your confusing usage of terms. Parallel then continues to exemplify some scientific truths which Chris rejects based on simplicity and ambiguity. Does truth have to be complicated or non-ambiguous? Perhaps we can make the follow statement that all mammals require oxygen? Or should we make it even more simplistic and formulate it as a tautology?
The usage of vaste majority and known is not necessarily subjective but it limits itself to for instance life on this earth as explored by science. As such it is a truth. Simplistic, and perhaps elegantly true.
I would also like to point out that truth may be logically correct, formally verifiable and still (empirically) useless. Most tautologies come to mind since they merely describe what is true, although some may be simplistic. So unless CTMU can escape its constraints of tautological self evidence, I doubt that CTMU will have any practical application although it may make for good theoretical discussions. But of course I am open to any new evidence that might force me to revise my truths :-)
I do agree with Chris that the exchange has been somewhat fascinating and I wish that Chris would have addressed some of my questions. Parallel, RBH and others have raised some good questions that deserve an answer. Chris may consider them to be broken records but to some of us they are excellent questions, although other may want to reject them.
[ 28. July 2003, 02:40: Message edited by: Pim van Meurs ]
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Parallel
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posted 28. July 2003 10:00
Pim nicely covers the points I’ve raised in response to Mr. Langan’s request for feedback. I’d just like to add that, while Langan is correct that “theory” can be applied to pure mathematics, the use of “Theoretic” in CTMU, which purports to be a theory about how the physical universe operates, implies this main definition:
quote:
Theory : 1. A set of statements or principles devised to explain a group of facts or phenomena, especially one that has been repeatedly tested or is widely accepted and can be used to make predictions about natural phenomena.
While Langan says he could not make sense of my argument, I think it’s well understood that, with respect to new ideas related to physics, the term “theory” generally stands somewhere between “hypothesis” and “fact” on a scale of certitude. Which in this case is to say “theory” implies the tentative restrictions imposed by empirical science, which is precisely what Langan is claiming to be absolved of. With that in mind, he might consider the arguably more accurate title, “Cognitive Teleological Model of the Universe”.
"Truth is what stands the test of experience." Albert Einstein
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 28. July 2003 14:13
Regarding possible kinds of truth, RBH asks a good question. "Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that the 'direct apprehensions' of two people differ on some matter. On what grounds can one decide between them? What is the certifying agency that says 'This one is true, that one illusory'?" That agency is the distributed cognitive-perceptual syntax of the self-spoken language of reality (or in CTMU terminology, of SCSPL). It can be shown that if reality is connected - if we are really united in an objective manifold of common perception - this level of syntax must exist. Remember, science is primarily concerned with the formulation of general laws of nature as required for prediction, and these are just structural and grammatical components of this distributed reality-syntax.
Regarding the methodology associated with this consistency-enforcing, connectivity-enforcing agency, RBH asks whether "the purpose of the new experimental methodology that you and others are working to develop, to decide among conflicting direct apprehensions? Or are all direct apprehensions of equal standing and no conflict is expected among them?" On the distributed level of SCSPL syntax - i.e., on the level of direct apprehension - no such conflict is possible. If there is a conflict, then by definitive deduction, we have either a deviation from syntax (illusion) or a simple misunderstanding.
RBH goes on to ask: "If the issue of biological origins can be "logically and philosophically" decided without some new experimental methodology, why do we we need that methodology? And is there a distinction worth making between "logically and philosophically decided" and "experimentally decided"? That is, what is gained by having some new experimental methodology if Truth can be arrived at via pure thought? Why do experiments at all?"
Some truths can be deduced by pure thought; others, particularly those involving some degree of freedom or self-determinacy, cannot. The new methodology will be designed to distinguish deterministic processes governed by distributed syntax from processes involving freedom and intelligence, which involve the spot-synthesis of "localized syntax". The trick is to distinguish localized from distributed syntax. The CTMU is the sole framework in which this distinction can be made.
Incidentally, what RBH might call "truth with a small t" is clearly of potential value, particularly in the absence of deduction. Instances of "truth", broadly including the products of scientific empiricism, are generally developed with respect to restricted contexts. Without contextual limitations, very little of a material nature can be even tentatively decided. Unfortunately, many proponents of neo-Darwinism recognize no such restrictions. In response to what seem to be extremely low probabilities for certain (irreducibly and specifiedly-complex) compound events, they invariably set out to de-restrict the context in order to multiply probabilistic resources and thereby raise the probabilities, even to the point of endorsing bizarre cosmologies in which realities proliferate beyond infinity (we've seen that maneuver on this very board). When it comes to explosively or implosively enlarging the sample space in order to provide themselves with probabilistic resources, they dwarf any nuclear blast!
This maneuver is neither logically nor scientifically supportable, particularly in answering questions about origins and ultimate causation. By definition, an origin is something that can be accessed by (logically-fortified) causal regression; interminably delaying access by contextual expansion and outright combinatorial explosion is flatly inconsistent with answering the question. Foiling this endless-delay tactic in any final sense requires a generative-deductive theory of reality (the CTMU). In the CTMU, reality is deductively identified as its own origin (as explained above), which in turn implies that causality is generative. Working from these realizations, we can restrict the context in such a way as to meaningfully address the source and means of evolution. To avoid an open causal regress in which nothing is ever decided, we need CTMU-style logico-algebraic closure, and - here's the kicker - because this kind of closure is implicit in naturalism, the CTMU locks metaphysical and methodological naturalism into compliance using pure logic.
[As regards the latest remarks of parallel and Pim, I regret to say that I'm at a loss. I point out that a theory is a well-defined logico-algebraic structure with certain properties and requirements with which conventional scientific models and methods are incompatible; in response, they adduce a corrupt definition of "theory" that neatly embodies the very problem I've been trying to address. They stay squarely planted inside the materialistic half-court of Cartesian dualism, and tirelessly keep their dialectical merry-go-round spinning, by conspicuously ignoring key distinctions recognized by competent theorists the world over. What can one possibly say in the face of such determination? Only an awed silence seems appropriate.]
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RBH
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posted 28. July 2003 15:37
I'm pressed for time this week, and so will respond only briefly to Langan's latest posting. Several points he made deserve comment, but I'll mention just one. He wrote quote:
In response to what seem to be extremely low probabilities for certain (irreducibly and specifiedly-complex) compound events, they invariably set out to de-restrict the context in order to multiply probabilistic resources and thereby raise the probabilities, even to the point of endorsing bizarre cosmologies in which realities proliferate beyond infinity (we've seen that maneuver on this very board). When it comes to explosively or implosively enlarging the sample space in order to provide themselves with probabilistic resources, they dwarf any nuclear blast! (Emphasis added)
As I read (and, indeed, have made some of) the various responses to IDists' claims about the improbabilities of evolution (very briefly defined as naturalistic science's currently accepted explanation for the development of the diversity of life on earth following OoL) associated with irreducible complexity and specifiedly-complex processes and/or structures, a significant focus of the responses is on the "seem" locution above. That is, rather than "invariably" (and illegitimately?) expanding the context in order to gain probabilistic resources, the responses deny the (im)probability claims by pointing to various flaws in the (very few and far between) (im)probability estimates. For example, the claim that irreducibly complex structures are unevolvable with any plausible probability is, the responses argue, based on a flawed understanding of what evolutionary processes (local and undirected) can actually do by way of 'finding' pathways on high-dimensioned fitness landscapes, on a casual disregard of common evolutionary processes like cooption, and on studied ambiguity concerning issues like the appropriate unit of analysis and PDF for estimating probabilities. That is, the principal critique of IC and SC claims is that they are not as unevolvable as the flawed (im)probability estimates (the few there are) seem to imply: The 'seeming' is illusory. Put still another way, the responses are more often that the formalism of the IDists' (im)probability calculations is badly mapped onto the entities, processes, and relationships in the world and hence the results of the calculations bear no necessary relationship to reality.
I won't comment on the "bizarre cosmologies." I know too little about them to say anything cogent.
RBH
Added in very late edit: This is not to say there aren't attempts to expand the probabilistic resources - for example, by various manipulations of Drake's equation - but that a primary response has been to examine the (im)probability estimates.
[ 28. July 2003, 17:32: Message edited by: RBH ]
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David Garrett
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posted 28. July 2003 17:04
Amazing! It never ceases to amaze me how Chris can go to such great detail to explain something and the only effort put forth in understanding is 'what can we quibble over?'
The bottom line is there is no other path to Truth other than reasoning. Namely, the flavors are 'inductive' and 'deductive'. It would seem, from the amount of propaganda on the market, that inductive reasoning (scientific method) has somehow transcended its rational roots and is in no need of a gratuitous 'thank you' to logic, reason, or model theoretic construction meta-logic. But if you read through the steps of the scientific method, it is all about finding a theory of truth (which translates into - "model of reality"). On the other hand, logic is the sole proprietor of the deductive flavor of reasoning. In this field it is perfectly acceptable to regard a tautology as inviolate in its truth value. Chris has shown, for those who have read his work, that a tautology applied to the construction of meta-logic and model construction yields deductions that are impervious to falsification.
As far as the endless quibbling over what the CTMU proves or predicts, let me just say this - any empirical data must be explainable within a model. The model possessing the most explanatory power is the one most valuable. Any model possessing explanation up to isomorphism is a real gem. Any empirical data that is in line with a deductively/inductively merged and derived explanation such as the CTMU, which has more explanatory power than any to date, is subsumed within the overarching isomorphic model. The biggest predictions of the CTMU lie in the explanatory, dual-aspect-monism underpinnings of a logically coherent reality, without which the scientific method would be incomprehensible if not impossible.
David Garrett
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Pim van Meurs
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posted 28. July 2003 17:07
Chris: In response to what seem to be extremely low probabilities for certain (irreducibly and specifiedly-complex) compound events, they invariably set out to de-restrict the context in order to multiply probabilistic resources and thereby raise the probabilities, even to the point of endorsing bizarre cosmologies in which realities proliferate beyond infinity (we've seen that maneuver on this very board).
It is relevant to realize that probababilities are to be calculated with respect to all regularity/chance pathways in order to reject all such occurrences and be able infer design. A good example is the flagellum in which we see an 'explosion of probabilities' through the formulation of a set of random chance occurrence all to be multiplied. On the other hand, for ID to be viable, at least ID as it is defined by Dembski, would require that all such scenarios, however bizarre they may seem to someone, be assigned corresponding probabilities. An eliminative approach inevitably suffers from the imagination of those who formulate scientific hypotheses.
Chris: By definition, an origin is something that can be accessed by (logically-fortified) causal regression;
In case of origin or design of life or this universe this would involve a regression of historical paths. Chris suggests that CTMU may be able to contribute to identify such origins, I am certainly interested to hear about any such attempts.
It seems that CTMU is irrelevant as to resolving the issue of Intelligent Design versus methodological naturalism since ID relies strongly on empiricism.
Chris is of course full entitled to not address the issues raised by me or Parallel and reject them as 'dialect merry go round spinning' or 'ignoring key distinctions recognized by competent theorists' but such appeal to ad hominem and authority hardly will help in successfully resolving the issues raised, it merely will allow one to delay it.
If silence can be instrumental in this then let it be so and let the questions and issues raised remain as 'to be addresses at a (much) later time'.
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Claire
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posted 28. July 2003 20:43
Hello there,
Chris writes
"The CTMU is the theory that allows the discovery of "scientific truth" because, when science is defined strictly on the scientific method, there is no such thing as a "scientific truth". There are only directly apprehended truths, logically derived truths, and in contradistinction to these, tentatively-confirmed scientific hypotheses. This is why my answer "implies that science has discovered no (certified) scientific truths." "
All sentences in brackets below are my thoughts and are not directly related to the quote.
So, looking at your wording it could also suggest:
"The CTMU is a theory, that uses its own method in CTMU terms, to discover a type of truth that might not "yet" be "proven" within the "scientific method" term, but only if those "scientific truths" within the "scientific method" are used "strictly" at current as apposed to less strict ones(this may be debated). From this inception the "CTMU method" could "allow" a type of "discovery" of "scientific truth". Still considering these conditions, the CTMU uses its own method that does not have to include "directly apprehended truths" ," logically derived truths" and in contradistiction to these "tentatively-confirmed scientific hypotheses" (these may be debated) and under the same conditions "of" the "CTMU method" the CTMU " truths" may not be equal to, but could be more valuable than, the concept of "certified" truths that are discovered using only the "scientific method"."
Claire
[ 29. July 2003, 23:36: Message edited by: Claire ]
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Stu
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posted 29. July 2003 15:50
One thing troubles me. Much though I appreciate Chris Langans achievment with CTMU, I am a little nervous when Truth (capital T) is claimed.
CTMU is based upon a set of tautologies and logical argument. My problem is that any logical/mathematical proof is a computation, and thereby falls under the theory of computation, a science. From that it has been said that proof theory has been misclassified, and it should be viewed as a science.
If a science then the truths reached are tentative, albeit at a higher level than typical science truths are viewed.
Chris, anyone, care to set my mind at rest?
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Claire
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posted 29. July 2003 23:25
Hya again,
I think Chris's theory is very clever and is "towards" a contribution to understanding (as are other theories) so it should be given credit like wise. I don't think it's an absolute contribution of everything because I think that could be quite a hard task to achieve. I think that what makes knowledge an evolving concept is the type of truth seeking itself as well as the result being the truth that is sought. I also think that truth could be fluid or at least different, which could be directly related to the angle of enquiry towards it.
Claire
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 30. July 2003 05:33
Stu writes "One thing troubles me...I am a little nervous when Truth (capital T) is claimed."
Mathematicians claim Truth all the time. Indeed, because the truth-Truth distinction is just one of certainty, i.e. probability, everybody who claims "truth" (t) implicitly claims some measure of "Truth" (T), or the attribute denoting inclusion in a formal system or recognizable class of facts or perceptions mutually related by an inferential schema or "scientific theory" (which is required to exhibit logical consistency and thus to tacitly incorporate the formal system of logic). That is, scientific truth t is just the assignment of a subunary, usually subjective probability to logical truth T; if t does not come down to a probabilistic stab at T and thus devolve to generative logical inference, then it is meaningless.
T is recognizable in a formal system or inferential schema because it is a deductively heritable attribute. Thus, if T is present in an antecedent expression known by deduction or direct apprehension to belong to the system or schema of interest, then it is present in any consequent expression generated by the proper application of the rules of substitution governing the evolution of said system or schema. Unfortunately, while every claim of t is probabilistically defined on a claim of T, the observational model of science fails to support T and thus fails to support t (as a probabilistic function of T), thus putting science in default of its own validative criteria. A scientific theory is supposed to be isomorphic to its universe; if it is required to be consistent and thus to implicitly incorporate logic, but its universe is observationally modeled in such a way that the generative mechanisms of logic are excluded, then the required isomorphism is lacking, and truth is out of the picture.
This problem has everything to do with the "mysterious" relationship between mathematics and science. Science needs to apply mathematics in the course of theorization, and indeed predicates of various assumptions and hypotheses a kind of "empirical truth" based on probability functions of mathematical truth. Yet, its underlying observational model fails to map itself to the generative model of mathematical inference, and thus fails to support any kind of truth at all! This ultimately renders it incapable of decisively answering questions of any kind, let alone fundamental questions about the nature of reality. This is what the CTMU aims to fix.
Stu continues: "CTMU is based upon a set of tautologies and logical argument. My problem is that any logical/mathematical proof is a computation, and thereby falls under the theory of computation, a science. From that it has been said that proof theory has been misclassified, and it should be viewed as a science. If a science then the truths reached are tentative, albeit at a higher level than typical science truths are viewed."
Those who want to classify proof theory as an empirical science are those who want to use computers to prove mathematical theorems, e.g. as computers were used by Appel and Haken to "prove" the four color theorem. The idea is that as long as computers are executing programs equivalent to formal systems, they can be trusted at some acceptable level of reliability to correctly determine the validity of mathematical conjectures. Obviously, this approach relies on the premise that machines are faithful to the formal systems in which they are programmed. So we see that it is really formal systems which come first; machines are only being relied on to model those systems in the course of long and tricky inferential procedures.
In fact, computers themselves have emerged from a branch of mathematics (computation theory) dealing with abstract machine models amounting to generic formal systems. So no matter how you cut it, proof criteria remain logical rather than empirical.
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Stu
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posted 30. July 2003 14:16
Thanks Chris, a quality response.
I am still unsure due to the fact that it was your physical brain that produced the theory (not implying anything derogatory, it could be anyones brain but CTMU is from you). In an analogy with the computer producing proofs, the same criteria applies i.e reliability, ability to execute formal systems etc. As it is not possible to exhaustively evaluate your source code and hardware (to get confidence of correct functioning), we can only try to evaluate the output.
Presumably it is logically possible that an error has been made, and therefore CTMU needs to be tested in some fashion before truth can be claimed. In one sense no different to any claim of a mathematical or logical proof. But also against reality. Why? It needs an acid test in case the (potential) error is too subtle for anyone to spot (I am thinking here of Euclidian geometry, considered True for a long time before being shown to be incomplete). Just because CTMU may well turn out to be the best description of reality we have does not mean it can claim absolute truth. Or am I missing something obvious?
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chimp
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posted 31. July 2003 14:35
http://www.phys.ncku.edu.tw/mirrors/physicsfaq/General/occam.html
quote:
Ernst Mach advocated a version of Occam's razor which he called the Principle of Economy, stating that "Scientists must use the simplest means of arriving at their results and exclude everything not perceived by the senses." Taken to its logical conclusion this philosophy becomes positivism; the belief that there is no difference between something that exists but is not observable and something that doesn't exist at all. Mach influenced Einstein when he argued that space and time are not absolute but he also applied positivism to molecules. Mach and his followers claimed that molecules were metaphysical because they were too small to detect directly. This was despite the success the molecular theory had in explaining chemical reactions and thermodynamics. It is ironic that while applying the principle of economy to throw out the concept of the ether and an absolute rest frame, Einstein published almost simultaneously a paper on Brownian motion which confirmed the reality of molecules and thus dealt a blow against the use of positivism. The moral of this story is that Occam's razor should not be wielded blindly. As Einstein put it in his Autobiographical notes:
"This is an interesting example of the fact that even scholars of audacious spirit and fine instinct can be obstructed in the interpretation of facts by philosophical prejudices."
The question becomes: Is the SCSPL formalism, which employs the tautological A V ~A , i.e. law of excluded middle from the Aristotelian logic, that we all know and love, powerful enough and general enough to encapsulate the total perceptual reality?
If SCSPL is isomorphic to our perceptual reality, it must give a quantum theory of gravity that makes new predictions. It must resolve the mysterious dark matter mystery.
A question was asked on the ARN forum a few months ago: If a hypothetical 2-D being lived on some manifold and that being wished to determine the geometry of said manifold, could the hypothetical 2-D scientist determine the geometry of his world using logic alone, or would that individual need to make some sort of measurement?
Obviously there would need to be some sort of measurement-observation.
But that leads to another question regarding logic: Could a computer with almost unlimited computational capabilities, generate a holographic world, using the laws of logic alone? Could a computer generate its own programming i.e. could it be "creative"?
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 31. July 2003 15:09
Stu writes that he is "still unsure due to the fact that it was your physical brain that produced the theory." The brain works in a regular way, and because brains are physically embedded in nature, this implies that nature possesses a constant syntax acting as a source of regularity (a syntax consists of the "regular" parts of a language, in this case the language of nature). Because the physical world cannot exist without regular laws of nature reflecting the invariants of its structure, dynamics and composition, syntax has priority, and the physicality of the brain cannot be used as an argument against this syntax or its reflexive implications. In particular, since the laws of logic are the most basic (and general) rules in this syntax, physicality provides no basis for criticizing logic, and because the CTMU is a tautological extension of logic, physicality provides no basis for criticizing the CTMU. Logic distributes over physics, not vice versa. The CTMU, like the rest of mathematics, is abstract and in this sense beyond concrete physicality.
Stu continues: "In an analogy with the computer producing proofs, the same criteria applies i.e reliability, ability to execute formal systems etc. As it is not possible to exhaustively evaluate your source code and hardware (to get confidence of correct functioning), we can only try to evaluate the output."
Because the CTMU is to some extent its own output - consider that the syntax of logic is self-generating - those who are unable to discover whether it deviates from logic by direct evaluation are unlikely to succeed by evaluating its output. The output must be properly interpreted, and anyone unable to evaluate the theory on its face would probably be unable to correctly interpret its concrete implications. In any case, since it is impossible to evaluate anything without applying logical rules of evaluation, anyone evaluating these rules and finding them inadequate would necessarily be proving his own evaluation inadequate in the process. By finding your own rules of inference in error, you'd be undermining your own reasoning and thus sawing the floor out from under your own feet. Because the CTMU is a tautological extension of logic, questioning its integrity entails the same kind of risk. As for the possibility that an error was made in developing the logic, the CTMU is straightforward enough to be checked without the aid of a computer.
In any case, we need to keep our eyes on the ball. When one devises a validation function based on an empirical procedure designed to confirm that one or more formal systems have been correctly applied, the argument of the validation function is still an abstract formal system. Those who suggest that mathematical results should be checked by computer are relying on (mechanically modeled) formal systems - I've already explained this above - and those advocating that validation be predicated on multiple runs or samples is proposing to apply yet another formal system to boot, namely the mathematical theory of probability. Again, no matter how you slice it, abstract structures rule the roost. They're presupposed by the very concept of physicality. The CTMU is about the entailments of this fact.
Stu then presumes that it is logically possible that an error has been made, and that the CTMU needs to be tested in some fashion before truth can be claimed. Good point; mathematical proofs, all of which lay claim to absolute truth (as implied by the term "proof"), get checked by other mathematicians all the time, and are sometimes found to be wanting. All I can say is, nobody's stopping anyone who knows how to do so from checking the CTMU. In any event, rational methods, and not empirical methods, are conventionally used to check mathematical reasoning. From a verificative standpoint, computers can do no more than confirm their programmers' logic.
Stu seems to acknowledge this when he writes: "In one sense no different to any claim of a mathematical or logical proof. But also against reality. Why? It needs an acid test in case the (potential) error is too subtle for anyone to spot (I am thinking here of Euclidian geometry, considered True for a long time before being shown to be incomplete). Just because CTMU may well turn out to be the best description of reality we have does not mean it can claim absolute truth. Or am I missing something obvious?"
"Absolute truth" - what you've been calling Truth with a capital T - denotes inclusion in an inferential language. That is, it denotes generation by the syntax, in particular the generative grammar, of the language in which inclusion is asserted. Absolute truth is claimed for the CTMU because the CTMU is identified by definition with cognitive-perceptual syntax and the relationship of that syntax to the language thereby generated, i.e. cognitive-perceptual (rational-empirical) reality. Regarding Euclidean geometry, the syntax status and absolute truth of which seems to be precluded by the putative independence of the parallel postulate, it is still syntactic in the sense that at the level on which it is formulated, it is the "local default geometry" of human cognition and perception. (Since even the spacetime manifold of General Relativity is flat in the microscopic limit, we cannot say that elliptical and hyperbolic geometry are vying with flat Euclidean geometry for conceptual priority. Geometrically, they can only be defined by reference to a flat tangent space representing their "average".)
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Jacob Aliet
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posted 18. August 2003 02:05
One thing that makes this discussion circular is lack of clarity. Clarity about meaning of terms being used. It is possible that the participants have tacitly sanctioned this ambiguity because it gives them wriggle room. This wriggle room can be exploited at will by either side and constructing reductio ad absurdums and demonstrating lack of internal consistency by deconstruction of either theory becomes difficult. Each claims correctness and each accuses the other of incapacity and so on an so forth.
Which isn't useful.
Langan laments that parallel and Pim accuse him of using a corrupted definition of theory and accused them of being planted on the materialistic side of the Cartesian dualism. He however doesnt make the effort to clearly define what he means.
RBH introduces Truth and truth. But it doesnt seem to clear things - because the working of the putative scale of certitude has not been defined. People seem to be talking past each other. Without a common understanding of terms, we cannot effectively communicate. So I suggest we back up and start there and because Langan is the one who has been accused of using corrupted or uncommon definitions, I suggest he defines truth, theory (and in the context of CTMU being a theoretic model) and reality. In the process, Langan can tell us how we can determine actual truth.
Langan says we need logic to ascertain scientific truth. Dont scientists use logic in assessing scientific findings? The argument that has been made implicitly is that empiricism is mutually exclusive with logic, or that experiments can be carried out without logicomathematical methodology. RBH can confirm whether that is the case.
Question for Langan - when something has been put through "empirical confirmation" - what else does it need to be taken through before it qualifies as truth? And under what situations is it necessary - when things are complex and ambiguous?
One scientific truth is the earths rotation around the sun. Is that a truth or a Truth? How can CTMU help in increasing our certainty about this scientific fact? And in the absence of CTMU, what happens to the level of certainty about that scientific fact?
Going to the basics, what is CTMU? is it valid to juxtapose it with scientific methodology and compare its vaunted "ability" with the ability of science? Is it warranted?
AFAIK, CTMU is a reality theory that is supposed to be able to "provide new models and new paradigms in terms which reality can be understood". To be more exact, CTMU does not concern itself with the study of natural phenomena (which science does), it instead "wants" to explain why scientific observations appear as they do. Sadly, CTMU itself fails to explain why the universe is self-selecting and self-multiplexing and as much as its supposedly a logicomathematical model, it has no clear mathematical model that can explain for example how and why SCSPL actually self-refines from the UBT. Being a supertautological, reality-theoretic extension of logic it fails to explain its importance and its relevance in the understanding of our world. Its like some fellow knocking your door and claiming he is there to save you yet there is no evidence such salvation is required.
It's my observation that sciences' problem of induction alone does not justify letting in this huge animal called the CTMU into our backyards. Langan is making bold claims and yet the utility of CTMU is neither here nor there. It has not improved anything and its still unclear how it can. Langan says we lack a model of causation without which we cannot determine the truth between ID and Evolution. He does not explain how we can test this model of causation, why it is indispensable, and how we can determine its reliability and correctness.
A question for Langan, if someone came and said "hey, you can't determine the truth of scientific findings without God - the source of and reality" and he proceeds to explain how his God theory is logically consistent with a heavy dose of neologisms and demonstrates the circularity of science and its inadequacy in providing explanatory model. He can throw in fine tuning and other teleological arguments and give a spin to the anthropic principle then use the set theory heavily while establishing "reasonable doubt" concerning the reliability of the scientific enterprise.
Between the theory this person would give us and yours which are both not falsifiable or testable, how would we determine the valid and the useful one? What methodology would we use? How do we determine the utility and correctness of a reality model?
Langan says materially-minded instrumentalists have no business in the debate at all - why is this so? Has empiricism been found completely useless? How can one studying nature or reality for that matter ant material be not materially minded? And what does materially-minded mean? Does it mean this discussion is for philosphers and theorists alone?
Langan claims that he and "others" are working hard to come up with a new experimental methodology. He admits that he has none at the moment - doesnt it appear a bit premature to rush out and make these bold claims and attack a well established methodology that has survived - what did Parallel call it - the test of experience?
In response to RBHs question of how we would determine the truth between two different ideas on some matter, Langan says we use SCSPL then says in effect that RBHs hypothetical situation would be impossible because we are all united in an objective manifold of common perception. Langan doesnt answer the question because the question asks for a methodology or method for verifying truth. Langan answers by subverting the question and says its an impossible scenario. He says the truth is self-evident (self-spoken language of reality). Let me refine RBH's question. If one person said that God exists and another said God doesnt, how can CTMU help us decide who is right and who is wrong?
Langan says CTMU locks metaphysical and methodological naturalism into compliance using logic. He however has not demonstrated that they are not compliant with anything. Nor how the "locking" is actually done and whether and how it has been done and how we can determine that it has been done.
AFAIK, ANYTHING is compliant with the CTMU - religion, evolution, archaeology, maths ...you name it. The CTMU is so broad that it has engulfed everything in the field of knowledge today. A recent discussion we had with Langan concerning Tegmarkian parallel universes and whether they are a threat to ID is a case in point. CTMU has raised itself above all else and is, in essence, a philosophical model based on abstract set theory and logic without any empirical support.
The CTMU's fomulation is logically correct. But is that enough? David Garrett says any empirical data must be explainable within a model - why? Because Langan says so? Why do we suddenly need a reality model? Has science been able to progress without CTMU? Yes. Can it reach greater heights without the CTMU? Yes. What negative consequences arise from explaining empirical data without CTMU? none whatsoever.
Do we need the CTMU?
Langan says we need CTMU to explain the nature of reality - which science has been incapable of doing (dont scientific laws explain the nature of reality?). Assuming science hasnt explained the nature of reality, are scientists incapable of explaining the nature of reality? (RBH - please help). Its my contention that scientists can explain the nature of reality even in a metalogic and metascientific manner that Chris does - but why havent they done it?
Because its futile. It adds absolutely nothing to the scientific enterprise.
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 18. August 2003 23:54
Jacob Aliet writes that “One thing that makes this discussion circular is lack of clarity. Clarity about meaning of terms being used. It is possible that the participants have tacitly sanctioned this ambiguity because it gives them wriggle room. ... Each claims correctness and each accuses the other of incapacity and so on an so forth. Which isn't useful.”
Since I agree with Jacob regarding the undesirability of circular and ambiguous dialectic, I’m not going to engage in it. If Jacob honestly wants to learn about the CTMU (as opposed to preserving or expanding his own wriggle room by ignoring my previous explanations), he can politely and sincerely ask constructive questions about it like anyone else can. On the other hand, if he’s already made up his mind that the CTMU is "useless" and simply wants to hold needlessly forth to this effect, then what more is there to discuss?
As those familiar with a broad spectrum of scientific literature can attest, Jacob and anyone else who shares his mindset can easily be pointed to any of ten thousand mainstream papers that are so full of abstruse technical jargon and/or nebulous, tentative, undefined or model-free conceptualizations that any layman would be lucky to wade through two consecutive sentences without mishap, let alone calculate their ultimate utility. Because I’m neither a cynic nor a sadist, I won’t do that. But because I’m not a masochist either, I see no need to let Jacob get away with insinuating that I’m the only technical author whose writing he is unable, for whatever reason, to understand or evaluate.
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: communication is a two-way street. When one person takes another to task for being a poor expositor, he runs the risk of being called a poor listener in return. I can only hope that my critics will bear this in mind. Meanwhile, if Jacob thinks that something I’ve written above is unclear, then why doesn’t he ask for specific clarification? If his question is meaningful and non-repetitive, I’ll probably try to find the time to answer it.
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