|
Author
|
Topic: On Progress, Readdressing Reality Theory, & Information in the Holographic Universe
|
Pim van Meurs
Member
Member # 541
|
posted 19. August 2003 00:27
Chirs writes:
communication is a two-way street. When one person takes another to task for being a poor expositor, he runs the risk of being called a poor listener in return. I can only hope that my critics will bear this in mind
But this is also a two-edged sword. As Jacob so appropriately points out, "Langan laments that parallel and Pim accuse him of using a corrupted definition of theory and accused them of being planted on the materialistic side of the Cartesian dualism. He however doesnt make the effort to clearly define what he means."
As I pointed out before "scientific truths are per definition 'truths' discovered by science"."
An interesting issue which Chris may want to ponder on further is my earlier discussion
quote:
Chris: By definition, an origin is something that can be accessed by (logically-fortified) causal regression;
In case of origin or design of life or this universe this would involve a regression of historical paths. Chris suggests that CTMU may be able to contribute to identify such origins, I am certainly interested to hear about any such attempts.
It seems that CTMU is irrelevant as to resolving the issue of Intelligent Design versus methodological naturalism since ID relies strongly on empiricism.
Do we need the CTMU? I have failed to see any compelling reasons that the CTMU adds significant to the issue of for instance ID versus natural pathways. I doubt that Jacob, and for that matter even I, have made up our minds about CTMU. However failing any clear explanation of what CTMU is and what it contributes, I would say that the ball is in the court of those proposing CTMU. Proposing it as what though?
IP: Logged
|
|
chimp
Member
Member # 333
|
posted 19. August 2003 01:25
"Reflections on Kurt Godel"(p.195)
quote:
Axiom 1. (Dichotomy) A proprerty is positive iff its negation is negative.
Axiom 2. (Closure) A property is positive if it necessarily contains a
positive property.
Theorem 1. A positive property is logically consistent(i.e.,possibly it has
some instance).
Definition. Something is God-like iff it possesses all positive
properties.
Axiom 3. Being God-like is a positive property.
Axiom 4. Being a positive property is (logical,hence) necessary.
Definition. NE(x): x necessarily exists if it has an essential property.
Axiom 5. Being NE is God-like.
Theorem 3. Necessarily there is some x such that x is God-like."
Some links to Goedel's Ontological Argument:
http://www.stats.uwaterloo.ca/~cgsmall/ontology.html
Interesting...
I found the error? in Chris Langan's CTMU, in that the unbound telesis(UBT) contains all positive properties yet it itself has no negation, which means that it itself is not a positive property, therefore it cannot contain all positive properties.
Goodbye CTMU?
Axiom 1. (Dichotomy) A proprerty is positive iff its negation is negative.
Axiom 2. (Closure) A property is positive if it necessarily contains a
positive property.
IP: Logged
|
|
Jacob Aliet
Member
Member # 578
|
posted 19. August 2003 06:18
Michael wrote:
"If Jacob honestly wants to learn about the CTMU (as opposed to preserving or expanding his own wriggle room by ignoring my previous explanations), he can politely and sincerely ask constructive questions about it like anyone else can."
I have learnt about the CTMU thanks to you.
I have noted your previous responses and I acknowledge that you have answered plenty of the questions that have been asked. I ask you not to be discouraged by more questions.
I think I asked questions that were pretty specific and constructive. For some unfathomable reason, you chose not to answer them. I will give this another jab. I feel energetic today.
You have said I can ask constructive questions. I have and will ask them again.
It was stated that scientific truths are by definition, truths discovered by science. In response, you delved into Truth and truth and claimed that the only actual truths can be determined only logically but not empirically.
You also assert that each empirical observation only qualifies as scientific truth if it maps to a generative mathematical model of inference. (And it would be good to bring out the meaning of the word "generative")
There are two issues here:
1. There is already a definition of "scientific truth". You are stating that empirical proofs do not qualify as truth unless they are put under other "tests" and they meet other criteria.
From my knowledge, you have no authority to redefine "scientific truth". But that in itself does not invalidate your attempts to redefine scientific truth. It just sets the bar a little higher for you.
2. You have not demonstrated that there are higher truths that escape our observational models. Until you do that, your demands for other additional qualifications for scientific methodology to be able to discover scientific truths, is without basis and arbitrary.
So I will ask you again to define "truth", "scientific truth" and since you have endorsed "truth" and "Truth", share with us how the degrees of certainty are established as one moves from "truths" to "Truths".
Are these degrees of certainty based on empirical tests (ie observation) or on conformity to mathematical models?
Are these mathematical models subject to falsification and tests? If they are - are they falsified by empirical tests or by other models?
Chris wrote: "On the other hand, if he’s already made up his mind that the CTMU is "useless" and simply wants to hold needlessly forth to this effect, then what more is there to discuss?"
Chris, there is a difference between stating something is useless and asking questions about the relevance of something. In your paper, you do not explain how CTMU can improve the scientific models as far as biological origins are concerned. Is there somewhere you have explained the applicability of CTMU to science?
As I understand it, its a reality model - it makes lots of sense even though it leaves some fundamental questions unanswered such as why and how SCSPL self-refines from the UBT. But we have many reality models some religious, some not.
Bottom line is, these reality models have never demonstrated that scientific laws are underpinned on such models. As soon as that is done, the diligent scientists who are right now back-bent, squinting down microscopes, will stop, stand up, turn round and pay attention to armchair philosophy.
Until that is done, they cant be blamed for what you characterise as funnel vision turned to tunnel vision. There are diseases that need curing and phenomena that need to be understood.
It has also not been explained whether understanding why scientific laws are as they are, based on a reality model, can improve our application of those laws. It seems, even if we could, it would be superfluous because we still would be subject to the same same laws.
Chris writes : "But because I’m not a masochist either, I see no need to let Jacob get away with insinuating that I’m the only technical author whose writing he is unable, for whatever reason, to understand or evaluate."
I never did state that I cannot understand your writing. Oh, I do understand it alright. There are just some things it fails to explain. Loose ends if you like.
Chris states : "Meanwhile, if Jacob thinks that something I’ve written above is unclear, then why doesn’t he ask for specific clarification? If his question is meaningful and non-repetitive,..."
You reserve the right to respond or not to respond to questions. However...
We all have other things to do and I think each question posed should be taken very seriously.
If a question is meaningless, at least demonstrate that it is, otherwise, there is still that same same wriggle room that allows for arbitrary overlooking of certain questions. So we only answer the questions we like.
I will still appreciate an answer to RBH's question concerning determining the truth between two claims concerning some matter, a question you effectively subverted using an SCSPL explanation. Instead of providing a method/methodology.
Another question needing answering is my hypothetical one - how we could determine the truth or falsity of a God-based reality model (where we have an invisible being presiding over a cybernetic system that uses a GCGPL - God Configuring God Processing Language and where this reality/God evolves from a UBG [Unbound God] etc).
And how we would determine its utility in helping us understand the world and our origins.
As Pim stated:
quote:
...unless CTMU can escape its constraints of tautological self evidence, I doubt that CTMU will have any practical application although it may make for good theoretical discussions. But of course I am open to any new evidence that might force me to revise my truths :-)
Chris stated:
quote:
By definition, an origin is something that can be accessed by (logically-fortified) causal regression; interminably delaying access by contextual expansion and outright combinatorial explosion is flatly inconsistent with answering the question. Foiling this endless-delay tactic in any final sense requires a generative-deductive theory of reality (the CTMU). In the CTMU, reality is deductively identified as its own origin (as explained above), which in turn implies that causality is generative.
Reality originates from itself or from unreality?
And if reality originates from itself - doesnt that mean its pre-existent/eternal? The idea of "originates from" makes it temporal - in which case, where did the mother reality come from?
Tower of turtles.
The phrase in bold above seems to have been formulated without any basis other than convenience. To state that "the only way to foil this endless-delay tactic in any final sense requires a generative-deductive theory of reality" seems pretty ad hoc. And if all we want is "foil" the problem, then there are so many possible solutions.
[ 19. August 2003, 09:50: Message edited by: Jacob Aliet ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Christopher M. Langan
Member
Member # 264
|
posted 19. August 2003 14:36
Jacob Aliet states that "There is already a definition of 'scientific truth'."
No, there is not, except perhaps in the minds of people who don't understand the actual relationship between truth and science. Therefore, I do not require any special authority beyond that of the actual relationship to properly define it. Jacob also takes me to task because I "have not demonstrated that there are higher truths that escape our observational models." Because the derivation of mathematical truth relies on an axiomatic rather than an observational class of models, no such demonstration is immediately required (though it could easily be produced at a cost of yet more of my time). The shift from truth to Truth has nothing to do with "degrees of certainty"; it has to do with a sudden shift from an observational model, with respect to which truth is not inferentially accessible, to a generative model, in which it is. Thus, when Jacob later assures us that he "never did state that I cannot understand your writing," I'm afraid that no such confession will be necessary.
Jacob continues: "In your paper, you do not explain how CTMU can improve the scientific models as far as biological origins are concerned. Is there somewhere you have explained the applicability of CTMU to science?" The relationship of the CTMU to science has been explained (with reference to the paper) right here in this thread, as well as in other recent threads on this board. Jacob goes on: "As I understand it, its a reality model - it makes lots of sense even though it leaves some fundamental questions unanswered such as why and how SCSPL self-refines from the UBT. But we have many reality models some religious, some not." The reality model we're discussing is logical, and the fundamental questions cited by Jacob have been answered therein. Specifically, "why?" is answered by the Telic Principle, and "how?" is answered by telic recursion (please refer to the paper if you find this confusing).
Jacob says that the sentence "Foiling this endless-delay tactic in any final sense requires a generative-deductive theory of reality (the CTMU)" has been "formulated without any basis other than convenience." No. it hasn't. A major point of my paper was to explain that this is a logical necessity, and I've done so with full reference to the mathematics of propositional, predicate and interpretational logic. Jacob's glib denial of this indisputable fact again suggests that if he actually read my paper, he did not understand what he was reading. While I sympathize, I must again observe that communication is a two-way street.
Finally, Jacob asks a question that echoes the repetitive critiques interminably generated by the indefatigable Russell Rierson: "Reality originates from itself or from unreality? And if reality originates from itself - doesnt that mean its pre-existent/eternal? The idea of 'originates from' makes it temporal - in which case, where did the mother reality come from?" As I’ve already stated several times, reality originates autonomously from an ontological groundstate called UBT, which consists of pure telic potential that devolves, from a logical perspective, to a superposition of logic and nonlogic. I've already pointed out that this is the origin of superposition in quantum mechanics, which features the many-valued “splitting” of 2-valued logic with respect to physical content.
And since we're now on the recurrent topic of UBT, let's kill two birds with one stone and have a look at Russell's post itself. Russell writes “Interesting...I found the error? in Chris Langan's CTMU, in that the unbound telesis (UBT) contains all positive properties yet it itself has no negation, which means that it itself is not a positive property, therefore it cannot contain all positive properties. Goodbye CTMU?”
Despite my having addressed this issue in a previous thread, Russell is engaging in serial self-repetition. Again, he is trying to disprove the CTMU using the concept of UBT (unbound telesis), this time by way of the axiomatic method as employed by Kurt Godel.
As Godel himself understood but Russell evidently does not, axioms and the theorems derived from them must be interpreted in a model in order to be applied outside the axiomatic system in which they occur (in this context, application and interpretation are equivalent concepts). It follows that Godel’s reasoning can only be applied to those theories which share, and incorporate terms defined on, Godel’s theological model. Unfortunately, Godel was unfamiliar with the CTMU, and as a possible consequence of this, his model is not logically equivalent to the CTMU in all respects. In particular, Godel’s model fails to accommodate the concept of UBT. Does this mean that UBT is “not logical”, and thus has no place in a logical theory? Russell evidently believes this with all his might. But on this count, he is chronically guilty of oversimplification. For although UBT is indeed trans-logical, there can ultimately be no "logical theory” without it. This is because UBT is what provides SCSPL with a (primitive, pre-logical) "medium of existence".
As we might have expected, Godel's choice of a model is reflected in his terminology, and specifically in his usage of the term “contain” (a term that has been considerably extended in meaning by the CTMU, where it devolves to superposition). As I’ve explained elsewhere at considerable length, UBT does not “contain” bound telesis in the usual sense; it fails to distributively incorporate any concept of extension or duration, and this rules out standard containment. It is simply a trans-logical extrapolation of SCSPL which attends the suspension of intrinsic SCSPL constraint, and naturally incorporates not only SCSPL but its logical self-negation. It follows that although negation cannot be applied in the usual manner to UBT, which implies that UBT is not what Godel would call a "positive property", it nevertheless “contains” other positive properties in the sense that it represents the suspension of their definitive constraints, and the superposition of the things thereby distinguished.
Because SCSPL consists of a closed network of intrinsically-defined constraints (remember MAP?), the surface formulation of its mathematical structure does not explicitly require UBT. Most theorists in my position would probably take this as an excuse to skirt the issue and avoid controversy. But since UBT is an implicit logical necessity, I see no point in excluding it from the discussion. The main question regarding UBT, I think, is this: if UBT is essential to logic, then why does UBT appear paradoxical and therefore antilogical? UBT is not merely paradoxical, but “meta-paradoxical” by definition. What does this mean? Paradox is what results from self-referentially applying the negation functor of logic to logic itself within logical bounds, and avoiding paradox is precisely what gives logic its discernability and utility. But if avoiding paradox gives logic its utility, then logic needs paradox in order to have utility (where the utility of logic tautologically resides in its power to exclude the negation of logic, i.e. paradox). This means that both logic and paradox exist in a mutually supportive capacity. But if so, then there is necessarily a medium of existence - a kind of “existential protomedium” or ontological groundstate - accommodating both logic and paradox. UBT is simply the name given to this protomedium, and it is why the CTMU refers to reality as a “self-resolving paradox”.
Although Russell does not like the fact that UBT bears a disquieting resemblance to paradox, far better UBT than logic itself. If there were no medium in which logic could be negated - if there were no UBT - then logic would itself be indistinguishable from paradox, and in that case it and our world would fall apart. Does Russell want logic to fall apart? Maybe; maybe not. But I think it’s safe to say that Godel, a logician, did not want logic to fall apart, and this implies that he’d have been a fan of UBT.
Part of the problem here is that Russell does not accept the notion of null constraint; for him, there must always be some kind of constraint, and despite his inability to define it in juxtaposition to its complement, he takes the position that this initial constraint “just exists”. This, of course, disqualifies Russell from discussing (much less explaining) the genesis of the initial constraint, and in fact, it disqualifies him from even distinguishing the initial constraint from its complement. Sadly, failing to distinguish the initial constraint from its complement is to fail to define or distinguish the initial constraint, and this implies that Russell really has no initial constraint in mind after all. That is, while Russell seems to believe that there must be some sort of initial constraint, he cannot define this constraint by distinguishing it from its negation (if he could, then this would compel him to admit the existence of the complementary relationship between logic and nonlogic, and thus that both logic and nonlogic are superposed manifestations of something very much like UBT).
From the fact that UBT is a logically necessary self-extrapolation of logic, it follows that if Godel's theological model does not incorporate UBT, then Godel had no model of sufficient power to exhaustively characterize global reality. And if Godel lacked such a model, then his reasoning obviously cannot be used against the theory of global reality called "the CTMU". If I might be allowed a little wishful thinking, this suggests that Russell's "Goodbye CTMU" quip be replaced with a no-less-satisfying "Goodbye, Russell." But I suppose that would be asking too much.
In any event, I’m tired of repeating myself. I long ago reached the point of diminishing returns from even the most simplistic attempts to explain CTMU concepts to people who lack the ability or the willingness to absorb them (e.g. Pim, who I expect will forever fail to see any nontrivial difference between the CTMU and his own impenetrable, naively instrumentalist brand of naturalism). If ignoring repetitive criticisms is the only way for me to avoid a cyclical drain on my time, I’ll regretfully be forced to adopt such an approach. I hope that my present critics will try to remember this before sounding off again in their usual circular fashion.
IP: Logged
|
|
chimp
Member
Member # 333
|
posted 19. August 2003 14:55
Thank you for another perspective and "angle" of analysis, for the most difficut subject called the UBT.
Your explanation is very helpful. ![[Wink]](wink.gif)
IP: Logged
|
|
Dene Bebbington
Member
Member # 168
|
posted 19. August 2003 18:15
I don't fully understand the CTMU, but it strikes me that IDers should be investigating how complex specified information (CSI) fits in with it. CSI works by doing probability calculations to rule out natural processes, but as the CTMU posits teleology as a basic element of reality then does that mean there are no natural processes to rule out by probability measures?
I recall William Dembski saying words to the effect that he doesn't think Chris Langan is wrong about the CTMU. If that's the case then surely he should be showing how CSI does or does not fit in with the CTMU.
--
Dene
[ 19. August 2003, 18:18: Message edited by: Dene Bebbington ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Parallel
Member
Member # 744
|
posted 19. August 2003 21:50
Mr. Langan, you are indeed repeating yourself, as frequently as you are avoiding the questions put to you. Mr. Aliet’s posts are filled with fair and example based questions that call for example based answers, that have yet to be seen. Simply redescribing your claim of absolute truth (the CTMU) and belittling the intelligence your questioners fails to address their questions.
Langan is correct, communication is a two way street; however, the communication here is only going one way--questions put to Langan routinely fail to return answers. Which raises a question that Bebbington’s post brings to mind. Given that Langan’s paper was reviewed and approved by William Dembski and I assume others on the ISCID board, could they perhaps take some of the heat off Langan and explain what the CTMU has to offer ID theory? What is it that they see, or saw, in the CTMU? Can they answer the questions raised by Aliet and others? Perhaps if Langan cannot enlighten, they can.
"Truth is what stands the test of experience." Albert Einstein
IP: Logged
|
|
Claire
Member
Member # 725
|
posted 20. August 2003 00:29
As an ounce of support for Chris (an ounce of platinum is worth quite alot) I think that the comment regaring the CTMU by him
"medium of existence - a kind of “existential protomedium” or ontological groundstate - accommodating both logic and paradox"
is without doubt going to answer what seems to be my inperpretation when zoning in, that is the word "accommodating". I (which is not the same as it is correct but can throw us foward to towards what could be a better consensus) think that this word is similar(ish) to "contributing". I also think that any logic system when contributing is worth more by the fact that it "accommodates" and going by what Chris says:
"This means that both logic and paradox exist in a mutually supportive capacity. But if so, then there is necessarily a medium of existence - a kind of “existential protomedium"
...in taking the term "mutually supportive capacity" then there must be an allready created "existential protomedium" value that it supports in a mutual capacity; that it could contribute to a mutual capacity (very similar(ish)). This value could be a type of science we allready use. The CTMU "could" improve its quality, by an ounce of thought, to ten fold IF its support of the "protomedium" contains some or all of this value.
Claire
IP: Logged
|
|
chimp
Member
Member # 333
|
posted 20. August 2003 02:45
quote:
Chris Langan: Although Russell does not like the fact that UBT bears a disquieting resemblance to paradox, far better UBT than logic itself. If there were no medium in which logic could be negated - if there were no UBT - then logic would itself be indistinguishable from paradox, and in that case it and our world would fall apart. Does Russell want logic to fall apart? Maybe; maybe not. But I think it’s safe to say that Godel, a logician, did not want logic to fall apart, and this implies that he’d have been a fan of UBT.
Since perceptual reality is a counterbalance between freedom and constraint, with freedom as the complement of constraint, freedom is within ...perceptual reality.
UBT[freedom] is a predicate that distributes over reality, yet, ultimately, it is independent of a negation. Yet again, it is a form of "telesis", where telesis is either bound or unbound. This bound-unbound duality is describable as a symmetry, where the invariance principle{symmetry} is independent of the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic.
Yes, Aristotle's law of excluded middle is really an invariance principle. Symmetry forms the basis of logic.
A V ~A
T|F = F|T = T
The invarince principles{symmetry} have no "paradox" in and of themselves. In fact, paradoxes have their own invariants, which points to the true generalization...
The universal laws of nature are explained in terms of symmetry. The completed infinities, mathematician Georg Cantor's transfinite sets, could be explained as cardinal identities, akin to "qualia" from which finite subsets, and elements of subsets, can be derived.
Completed infinities, called "alephs" are distributive. The distributive identity "natural number" or "real number" describes an entire collection of individual objects. The transfinite identities are in a one to one correspondence with a proper subset of themselves i.e. they are distributive.
Again, UBT and BT are intimately connected through their identity, which is ..."telesis" Telesis is bound or unbound... Two quantities that are different, yet the same. One slam dunk for syndiffeonesis ... UBT<--->BT form an invariance principle.
Symmetry.
Can scientific objectivity be best characterized by the concept of invariance?, as explicated in category theory, rather than the concept of truth? as explicated in mathematical logic?
Yes.
If the mathematical structure that is isomorphic to perceptual reality, is, contained within the SCSPL formalism, then it will agree with, and correspond exactly TO objective reality. In other words, it will explain the dark matter enigma, as well as other unexplainable phenomena...
[ 20. August 2003, 02:50: Message edited by: Russell E. Rierson ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Zachary Aufdemberg
Member
Member # 335
|
posted 20. August 2003 03:56
Jacob Aliet wrote:
quote:
Bottom line is, these reality models have never demonstrated that scientific laws are underpinned on such models. As soon as that is done, the diligent scientists who are right now back-bent, squinting down microscopes, will stop, stand up, turn round and pay attention to armchair philosophy
So you're saying scientists shouldn't rationally makes sense of their perceptions? ![[Confused]](confused.gif)
Parallel wrote:
quote:
Mr. Langan, you are indeed repeating yourself, as frequently as you are avoiding the questions put to you. Mr. Aliet’s posts are filled with fair and example based questions that call for example based answers, that have yet to be seen. Simply redescribing your claim of absolute truth (the CTMU) and belittling the intelligence your questioners fails to address their questions.
I'm amazed that a response consisting of 10-plus paragraphs of densely packed ideas is greeted with complaints that he's merely redescribing his own theory in more detail. I'm not sure what people expect.
[ 20. August 2003, 05:07: Message edited by: Zachary Aufdemberg ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Jacob Aliet
Member
Member # 578
|
posted 20. August 2003 09:23
Langan states, in response to my request, that he doesnt need to demonstrate that there are any truths that observational models alone cannot access. He however claims that observational models are inadequate in determining actual Truth.
It is clear that whereas Langan complains that there are truths that require reality models and logicomathematical methodology (where there is none), he cannot provide even one example of such truths. I will leave that issue at that.
Langan states : "The shift from truth to Truth has nothing to do with 'degrees of certainty'".
Langan had earlier stated : "...the truth-Truth distinction is just one of certainty".
Clearly, Langan is contradicting himself. To cover this up, he shifts the argument to "sudden shifts" from observational to generative model. Which also contradicts his earlier statement:
"..if t does not come down to a probabilistic stab at T and thus devolve to generative logical inference, then it is meaningless"
Something that is meaningless can't be attributed with any certainty now can it?
When two things differ in terms of certainty, doesn't that by implication mean that they differ by degrees of certainty?
Notice Langan's use of the word "devolve" above.
Even if Langan is intent on sustaining a Truth-truth dichotomy, they still differ in terms of degrees of certainty except he assigns one zero certainty value.
But thats a trivial issue. Onto more important issues...
Langan does not explain the applicability of CTMU to science - a question me and Pim van Meurs have asked many times. He claims it has been explained in this very thread. I assume he is referring to the same contentious explanations that he offered earlier as answers.
Langan states: "'why?' is answered by the Telic Principle".
Very punchy. In your megafoundation site, you equate the telic principle to "what God thinks is right".
In this link
If it happens because God thinks it is right, I guess that is as punchy as it can get.
Langan writes: "'how?' is answered by telic recursion". I don't have to ask why Telic recursion because I will be told Telic Principle and Telic principle just is - the will of God.
Thank you for your answers. Very enlightening ![[Smile]](smile.gif) .
Langan states : "reality originates autonomously from an ontological groundstate called UBT"
That may be the case but there is no evidence that it is the case. It's just a hypothesis. I hope you are working on ways of supporting your ideas with empirical data.
So the UBT is real. Being real itself means its "bound". But paradoxes are just fine with CTMU, so I wont go there. But if the UBT is real, then it is part of reality and reality then cant be said to originate from it.
Other than these last questions I am asking, you have failed to explain how having a reality model like the CTMU can help improve the scientific truth of the earths rotation around the sun to Truth.
You have also avoided the question of what methodology one would use in falsifying the God-based reality model I postulated.
Most importantly, you have failed to define the terms I asked you to define. Terms you used in a novel and misleading manner. I guess we can repeat that communication is a two way street and leave them undefined.
Thanks for your responses anyway. Good luck in finding empirical support for the CTMU and its relevance to science.
IP: Logged
|
|
Christopher M. Langan
Member
Member # 264
|
posted 20. August 2003 12:07
Jacob Aliet writes "Langan states, in response to my request, that he doesnt need to demonstrate that there are any truths that observational models alone cannot access. He however claims that observational models are inadequate in determining actual Truth. It is clear that whereas Langan complains that there are truths that require reality models and logicomathematical methodology (where there is none), he cannot provide even one example of such truths. I will leave that issue at that."
Examples of laws that cannot be proven generally true in observational models include the laws of gravity and inertia, Coulomb's law, the invariance of the speed of light, and any other physical law that Jacob can think of. Proof: The solar system is locally situated within the universe. Therefore, it is impossible to observe the entire universe from the earth. Therefore, no empirically falsifiable law that compactly expresses observations made from the earth or its immediate environs is observably true throughout the entire universe, and counterexamples to the law may exist in other locations. Therefore, the truth of the law cannot be observationally certified. Therefore, if its truth is to be certified at all, logicomathematical methodology is required (Q.E.D.). It's called the problem of induction, and what it means is that the power of deductive reasoning is ultimately absent from observational models.
Not satisfied with leaving it at that, Jacob then writes "Langan states : 'The shift from truth to Truth has nothing to do with degrees of certainty.' Langan had earlier stated : '...the truth-Truth distinction is just one of certainty.' ... Clearly, Langan is contradicting himself." Since the phrase "degrees of" is absent from my earlier statement, Jacob has erred again. The discrete logical distinction between certainty and uncertainty does not depend on incremental distinctions associated with "degree of confirmation", a concept notoriously riddled with intractable paradoxes from Hempel's Ravens to Goodman's Grue. Jacob then compounds his error by conflating the certainty-confirmation distinction with my earlier statement to the effect that so-called "scientific truth" comes down to a probabilistic stab at actual (logical) truth.
Jacob then asserts that "Langan does not explain the applicability of CTMU to science - a question me and Pim van Meurs have asked many times. He claims it has been explained in this very thread. I assume he is referring to the same contentious explanations that he offered earlier as answers." This is Jacob's third error. In a nutshell, I stated that the CTMU conjoins the generative model of logical deduction, which characterizes the CTMU itself, to the observational model of science (as detailed in the paper I published in PCID, where it is explained by certain duality principles including conspansive, topological-descriptive and constructive-filtrative duality). This explanation was factual rather than "contentious". This brings Jacob to 3 errors and counting.
Jacob then accuses me of "equating the telic principle to 'what God thinks is right'". I never made such a statement, and although something like this is implied by statements I actually made, Jacob has proven unable to work within the required implicative framework. Lest his incapacity fall short of a clean-cut error, Jacob then predicts that he will be told that "the Telic principle just is - the will of God." Unfortunately, this is subject to the problem of induction as outlined above, and I would not in fact have put it so starkly. This brings Jacob's error count to 4.
Not yet satisfied after having made four egregious errors, Jacob says that although it may be true that reality originates autonomously from an ontological groundstate called UBT, "there is no evidence that it is the case. It's just a hypothesis. I hope you are working on ways of supporting your ideas with empirical data." Of course I'm continuing to look for empirical data, and with some considerable success (since everywhere I look, I see existence rather than nonexistence). However, since UBT is essential to logic (as already explained), and since this constitutes powerful mathematical evidence that it exists, empirical confirmation is unnecessary...and Jacob has now chalked up error number 5.
Determined to break his own record, Jacob then writes that "being real itself means its bound...But if the UBT is real, then it is part of reality and reality then can't be said to originate from it." Although UBT is not bound by SCSPL, which accounts for the kind of reality that is central to science, Jacob makes seemingly deliberate errors of omission and misinterpretation. Nobody ever said that SCSPL reality is equivalent to the extrapolated level of reality ascribed to UBT; in fact, I've repeatedly said quite the opposite. Conservatively speaking, this brings Jacob's error tally to 6. He's batting a thousand and still going strong.
Six little lead balloons are sufficient to load the six-gun with which Jacob evidently wants to blow both of his feet off, but it never hurts to load up a spare magazine. So Jacob persists with "you have failed to explain how having a reality model like the CTMU can help improve the scientific truth of the earths rotation around the sun..." As I've explained, while the earth's rotation around the sun can be directly observed as long as it is in progress, the problem of induction (as manifest in Goodman's paradox) prevents the associated orbital mechanics from being generalized to all of time, and that's round number 7 in Jacob's extra mag. The erroneous accusation of non-explanation pushes the total up to 8.
Jacob then accuses me of "avoiding the question of what methodology one would use in falsifying the God-based reality model I postulated." Again he is incorrect; as I've stated on numerous occasions, logical tautologies like the CTMU are empirically unfalsifiable by definition. Error number 9.
Finally, Jacob states that I have "failed to define the terms I asked you to define. Terms you used in a novel and misleading manner. I guess we can repeat that communication is a two way street and leave them undefined." Since I have no idea what Jacob means, I guess we'll have to settle for 9 and leave it at that. (Then again, we can also give him a bonus point for his accusation of "contentiousness" in error number 3, elevating his score to a round and satisfying 10.)
So that about wraps it up. Thank you, Jacob, for wishing me "good luck in finding empirical support for the CTMU and its relevance to science". Although we don't really need empirical evidence for mathematical relationships, it's out there in profusion, and I therefore accord you a modicum of sincerity.
Now via con Dios (or not).
[ 20. August 2003, 12:28: Message edited by: Christopher M. Langan ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Jacob Aliet
Member
Member # 578
|
posted 21. August 2003 12:38
Langan says "Examples of laws that cannot be proven generally true in observational models include the laws of gravity and inertia, Coulomb's law, the invariance of the speed of light, and any other physical law that Jacob can think of."
What Langan fails to realize is that ALL these laws were proven without the CTMU. What can CTMU add to our understanding of them?
All along, my question has been what the CTMU can add to science. Are we finally ready to admit that CTMU cannot help science in any specific way?
Langan states: "Proof: The solar system is locally situated within the universe. Therefore, it is impossible to observe the entire universe from the earth."
First of all, I dont know what you are onto here. Who asked about observing the solar system? Secondly, the impossibility of observing the entire universe has got nothing to do with the solar system being in the universe, but the (immense) size of the universe plus other constraints like the speed of light.
But what do you mean by "the entire universe"? Do you mean the visible region?
Langan continues : "Therefore, no empirically falsifiable law that compactly expresses observations made from the earth or its immediate environs is observably true throughout the entire universe, and counterexamples to the law may exist in other locations. Therefore, the truth of the law cannot be observationally certified."
Provide an example of such a law please. What do you have in mind - Empirical laws - like Keplers?, Definitional laws like Newton's F=ma? Or derived laws like Newtons laws of gravitation?
Langan needs to explain why we have to verify that these laws are observably true throughout the "entire" universe, before the truth of the laws can be observationally certified. Is there a specific law that does not apply when one leaves the milky way?
Does Langan mean that if we could make intergalactic journeys galaxies and carry out tests in all galaxies, then, and only then will the truth of laws related to such tests be "observationally certified"?
Langan states : "Therefore, if its truth is to be certified at all, logicomathematical methodology is required".
And scientists have used these logicomathematical methodologies (in one form or another - except without word salads and reformulations of Platonic aeons and Anslems ontological argument with teleologic expositions).
But they did not have CTMU or a reality theory and yet they achieved it. Is it your assertion that we cannot know for sure whether we are in the universe unless we use a reality theory?
Langan states: "Of course I'm continuing to look for empirical data"
I think this is the most significant statement in his last post. But then again, why look for empirical data yet information obtained via observation is meaningless and has zero truth value?
Langan states: "everywhere I look, I see existence rather than nonexistence"
Existence, in no way implies a UBT exists or existed. There is a huge difference between propositions that are conceivable and propositions that are possible. At the very best, if we were to allow that your statement above is vacuously true (like "all elephants in a loaf of bread are pink"), the existence of the UBT would be trivially true.
About UBT being essential to logic, you are entitled to your opinion. But it would be good to see some data.
Langan states : "Nobody ever said that SCSPL reality is equivalent to the extrapolated level of reality ascribed to UBT"
Aah, the platonic aeons. Perharps the demuigre exists between the UBT and SCSPL reality?
Langan writes: "As I've explained, while the earth's rotation around the sun can be directly observed as long as it is in progress, the problem of induction (as manifest in Goodman's paradox) prevents the associated orbital mechanics from being generalized to all of time, and that's round number 7 in Jacob's extra mag."
But the CTMU will allow "the associated orbital mechanics from being generalized to all of time" - how exactly? Thats the question you need to answer.
Langan states: "Again he is incorrect; as I've stated on numerous occasions, logical tautologies like the CTMU are empirically unfalsifiable by definition".
Thats because its got nothing to do with reality. Whether thats a good thing or not is another issue. It cant fit into any observational model. That explains a lot concerning how much we can rely on it to provide us with a model of reality.
But then, we cant call CTMU a theory because a theory "is an explanation of a set of related observations or events based upon proven hypotheses and verified multiple times by detached groups of researchers".
Langan closes by stating that CTMU is just an interesting concotion of mathematical relationships with no need of empirical support. Very interesting. That must bring my errors to 20 no?.
...
Langan, laws, theories, models and other creations of the mind are all conjectures or tentative hypotheses UNTIL they are put through empirical tests. Whether a theory is accepted or rejected will be dictated by the results of tests - observation or experiment.
And this is not a problem of induction - you are making the same error Hume, Born, Russel, Kant and others made.
The fate of a theory, its acceptance or rejection, is decided by observation and experiment - by the results of tests. Hypotheses, reality models, CTMUs, IDs God theories are all fine. But their fate...
Observation and experiment.
[ 21. August 2003, 12:47: Message edited by: Jacob Aliet ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Pim van Meurs
Member
Member # 541
|
posted 21. August 2003 13:00
Langan states : "Therefore, if its truth is to be certified at all, logicomathematical methodology is required".
But surely the CTMU has the same problems in certifying the validity of said laws? So what does CTMU contribute to science seems to be a very valid and still mostly unaddressed issue. Rather than focus on what Chris may consider to be Jacob's 'errors' it may be helpful or even useful for him to more focus on his own. Rethoric may be helpful in circumventing addressing these issues but in the end rethoric will not be able to hide the absence of argument.
[ 21. August 2003, 13:02: Message edited by: Pim van Meurs ]
IP: Logged
|
|
jasonyoung
Member
Member # 432
|
posted 21. August 2003 15:03
"What Langan fails to realize is that ALL these laws were proven without the CTMU."
Evidently you're having trouble reading, Jacob. Langan correctly observed that these laws cannot be proven generally true in an observational model because all observational models lack inferential access to Truth by virtue of their not being axiomatic models. A generative model (a member of the axiomatic class of models) is necessary to provide the inferential muscle to raise a mere aggregate of observations to the level of Truth or Law. Ergo, your statement is false and your error streak continues.
The rest of your post is either a mildly amusing, albeit wry, attempt at foraneous humor or an ironic admission of complete ignorance.
Pim said:
"But surely the CTMU has the same problems in certifying the validity of said laws?"
Why are you posing a question that was preemptively answered by Chris in this very thread (and his paper.. the entire thing is an answer to this question)?
IP: Logged
|
|
|
Topic Closed
Printer-friendly view of this topic
