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Author
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Topic: On Progress, Readdressing Reality Theory, & Information in the Holographic Universe
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Jacob Aliet
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Member # 578
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posted 22. August 2003 08:20
Jason quips: " Langan correctly observed that these laws cannot be proven generally true in an observational model because all observational models lack inferential access to Truth by virtue of their not being axiomatic models."
Its a shame that you have joined this discussion and straightaway embarked on using ambiguous terms. When you say "Truth", you mean mathematical truth (or axiomatic truth) - that should be clear.
I doubt that you would want to appear like one of Langans acolytes by just uncritically taking his side of a debate. Truth, in the sense of scientific truth refers to "consistency with fact" or "actuality". Whereas your "truth" refers to something entirely different. For your axiomatic truth to rise to any meaningful level, it will have to be ckecked for conformity with fact. Otherwise, it remains in the realm of abstract maths and philosophy.
This discussion has been protracted because of the ambiguous use of the word Truth/truth. Indeed, Langan uses "scientific truth" synonymously with " truth". I would like this to stop forthwith.
Langan also treats CTMU as a theory yet, at best, it can be considered a theorem (even though it also has a heavy philosphical side). Its incorrect to peddle an axiomatic system as one capable of "competing" with empirically tested and p
[ 22. August 2003, 10:43: Message edited by: Jacob Aliet ]
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David Garrett
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Member # 759
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posted 22. August 2003 10:18
quote:
So whats it gonna be fellaz?
You wanna symbols around or you wanna do the experiments?
What's it gonna be? How about you quit speaking out of ignorance of the CTMU, Jacob, and actually read Chris's paper before you go and attack the author's use of his own (adequately defined) terms.
You keep putting the cart before the horse. Science needs the CTMU, not the other way around. You might want to start with learning what "the problem of induction" is.
quote:
[People, this is the problem: I state that all ideas are conjectures or hypotheses until they are tested via experimentation, multiple times by different people. If their propositions are confirmed, they are accepted as scientific theories.
No, people, this is the problem. Jacob only understands what "inductive" reasoning is and doesn't understand the other side of the logical coin.
quote:
JY and CML state, no, experimentation and observation alone are not enough. What you get from scientific methodology is only conjecture. You can only confirm these conjectures by inferring from axiomatic systems.
Who is right?
That is what it boils down to.
And once again you don't even understand what they are saying. They are not picking deductive/inductive sides here. Induction and deduction are BOTH logical approaches to truth. You fail to realize that the Scientific Method is but one of these (and the more problematic to boot), yet you claim that it is the only way and the best. Sorry my friend, the SM dearly needs the CTMU to overcome the problem of induction.
quote:
One is materialist, the other is not. Are analytic, idealistic or non-material methods alone the best way of understanding our material/synthetic world? Can thought alone dictate what is or isn't true materially - with human fallibility and all?
Can we determine that the earth is rotating around the sun based on logic and mathematics alone?]
Once again, they aren't picking sides. You are! You need both, my man...especially a model of reality that marries the two!
Dave
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Jacob Aliet
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Member # 578
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posted 22. August 2003 10:32
quote:
You are! You need both
Yes, we need both. And we have used both in science. But it has not been demonstrated that we need reality theories in order to be certain of the truthfulness of scientific truth. In this debate, logicomathematical methodologies have been conflated with reality theories. And it has been argued that science uses NO logicomathematical methodologies hence cannot discover Truth.
CTMU does not solve the problem of induction. I know it claims it can solve it.
[ 22. August 2003, 10:40: Message edited by: Jacob Aliet ]
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Jacob Aliet
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Member # 578
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posted 22. August 2003 11:09
The scientific method does not use induction alone where induction is involved.
Whether one can describe the systematic, research-based methods that involve trial and error, falsification tests, measurements, multiple independent tests, vigorous evaluation, eliminative tests, observation, prediction, experimentation, deductive reasoning, the use of mathematics and equations, followed by publishing then peer review etc as INDUCTION is another matter.
I can say induction, where used to refer to the scientific method, is a strawman. It hardly begins to describe what the scientific method is.
To claim that we must perform verifying experiments in other galaxies before we can be sure of the truth of scientific laws is the height of absurdity.
Is this the new radical skepticism with regards to empirical method? Very interesting. Very. Even if one could make intergalactic journeys and even if time travel was possible and one could go and perform experiments in the past and in the future, the brute facts would be - how we observe things NOW how they are - that is what we would use to make our planes, cure our illnesses.
And ANY change to natural inanimate phenomena, if any, is either negligible or irrelevant. Or detectable and predictable via the scientific method.
Saying that scientific findings are not reliable based on what is called the problem of induction is simply silly. Science continues to discover new things everyday, science continues to correct its previous theories, find cures for diseases and so on and so forth. Human experience shows that the scientific method IS reliable. Anything else is pure conjecture.
It seems to me this is an ideological war. No evidence has been offered that there are higher truths that the scientific method cannot access without reality models. No example of any Truth has been given whatsoever.
Its just a belief. Or a wish for that matter.
Arguments are being made between CTMU not needing any empirical suport, to CTMU looking for empirical support. No methodology has been given to determine truths between two axiomatic systems except personal preference. Applicability of CTMU to science has not been provided.
Now that ad hominems are aimed at me, its time for me to close the door on this discussion.
I wish you brilliant logicians good luck ![[Wink]](wink.gif) .
[ 22. August 2003, 11:48: Message edited by: Jacob Aliet ]
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Christopher M. Langan
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Member # 264
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posted 22. August 2003 12:11
Regarding the "ideological war" in which he purports to be involved, Jacob writes that "No evidence has been offered that there are higher truths that the scientific method cannot access without reality models. No example of any Truth has been given whatsoever." Yet, the problem of induction has been explained to Jacob several times, and not a glimmering of comprehension has been displayed in return.
Although Jacob might honestly think that I'm dancing around his questions, what I'm seeing is Jacob dancing around the answers. Many of us have seen the late-night commercials for Life Alert, in which an elderly person falls to the floor and cries "Help! I've fallen and I can't get up!" To me, Jacob's posts cry "Help! I'm locked in a bad model and I can't get out!"
We've already established beyond all doubt Jacob's unmistakable propensity to err on the side of empiricism. To me, this is so utterly transparent that I consider any further discussion of these matters with Jacob himself to be futile. But if Jacob has some super-logician, some twinkling star in the academic sky, who in his sheer bureaucratic competence can put the brakes to the CTMU (or just to my "bad argumentation"), then bring him on. Of course, in my personal opinion, one might as well stick an apple in his mouth and hand over plenty of salt, pepper, and a bag of charcoal briquets while one is at it, since by the time I'm finished with him, he'll probably feel like everyone at the luau has had a piece, so to speak. For this, he'll have only himself and Jacob to thank.
I almost get the impression that Jacob may have heard some of my braver and more tireless critics refer to the CTMU as "bafflegab" and "word salad", claiming that it contains elementary mistakes in logic and/or set theory and/or [fill in the blank]. However, Jacob should probably exercise a certain amount of caution in the weight he ascribes to such critiques and their authors. You see, I've already met a number of those people on this or that Internet bulletin board, and if the truth be told, they didn't fare quite as well as they pretend they did, nor I so badly. If Jacob doubts this, then he's free to get one of the "really smart" ones, the most capable thinker and debater, to challenge me under his real name in a neutral forum. I predict that Jacob will have trouble finding any takers.
Although the stated excuse will probably run something like "superbrains is a waste of time," "nobody listens to that crap!", "the guy's ideas are nebulous and vapid," "he reminds me of my five-year-old", "we used to rap about that stuff over a bong!", "Langan understands nothing about real science" and so on ad nauseam, the real reason - a simple fear of defeat - will shed no glory at all on the reputation or self-image of the excusemaker. Those whom Jacob considers to be his behind-the-scenes supporters, those shadowy knights of the intellect, simply don't want to be humiliated in public, and they know or strongly suspect that it would happen just like clockwork. They'd rather watch Jacob be humiliated instead. I advise Jacob not to get sucked into the very trap they've learned, by means of hard knocks, to avoid. Remember, even if I were nothing but a big dummy myself, the CTMU is tautological, and that means I couldn't lose an argument over it if I tried.
Just a word to the wise. (Then again, Jacob might think he's treed me like a fugitive racoon, in which case his frame of reference is so alien to mine that I'm unable to advise him at all. In that case, I humbly beg his pardon and wish him Godspeed on the golden road to wherever it is he may be going.)
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Stu
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Member # 482
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posted 22. August 2003 12:19
Which problem of induction is being referred to here? Popper killed the one I know about.
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David Garrett
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Member # 759
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posted 22. August 2003 12:47
quote:
Is this the new radical skepticism with regards to empirical method? Very interesting. Very. Even if one could make intergalactic journeys and even if time travel was possible and one could go and perform experiments in the past and in the future, the brute facts would be - how we observe things NOW how they are - that is what we would use to make our planes, cure our illnesses.
And ANY change to natural inanimate phenomena, if any, is either negligible or irrelevant. Or detectable and predictable via the scientific method.
Well, Jacob, this is a very practical view, which even the so called "brilliant logicians" find value in. But, sayin' it don't make it so. You have to back it up with proof for it be called truth. And I'm afraid the necessary logic to accomplish this feat is...you guessed it, the CTMU.
quote:
Now that ad hominems are aimed at me, its time for me to close the door on this discussion.
Ahh, the classic swan song of the CTMU antagonist. I've seen it so many times it is starting to loss its comic value. A person gets into an argument with Chris trying to find a chink in the CTMU's armor. Chris attacks their ARGUMENT. Said person is so attached to their erroneous ideals that they identify themself with their ideals. The person then declares ad hominem.
Please folks, don't fall for this. One word of advice, though. Before entering into a debate, read the material being debated. It is not just a common courtesy to the author, but also just good ol' common sense.
Dave
[ 22. August 2003, 12:49: Message edited by: David Garrett ]
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jasonyoung
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Member # 432
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posted 22. August 2003 15:25
"Which problem of induction is being referred to here? Popper killed the one I know about."
I think a better question is, "what problem of induction are you talking about?" Popper, accepting Hume's arguments against induction as conclusive, declared it dispensable and advocated deductivism. While Popper looked daring and confident wearing his sequined Traje de luces during the paseo, when it came time to address Hume's beastly and intractable "Old Riddle" in the Plaza de toros, he vamoosed, leaving behind a cloud of whirling dust.
The problem of induction concerns the logical basis of inferences drawn from observed matters of fact and applied to unobserved matters of fact. Because much of our reasoning from observed to unobserved matters of fact depends upon the connection between events, or causality, an examination of the concept itself is required to resolve the problem. Hume failed to find an a priori connection between events and dismissed causality outright. Inasmuch as causality doesn't exist (we have no justification in believing it exists), he then reckoned, our inferences from observed to unobserved matters of fact are based on a regularity of experience which we're unjustified in using as evidence for the temporal and spatial homogeneity of nature. To do this would be to fall into the trap of circularity, for we're trying to prove the uniformity of nature, i.e. discover laws, but in order to do so we must assume it as a given. We'd be putting the cart before the horse, as they say.
How does the CTMU solve this? By illustrating the logical necessity of treating causality as generative and then tautologically relating it to scientific methodology. The CTMU does, despite Jacob's protestation, solve the problem of induction.
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Jacob Aliet
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Member # 578
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posted 23. August 2003 06:14
Chris,
That was a fine post. I am no expert logician and I am not even a scientist. I am just interested in these subjects.
For those like DG, who doubt that I have read the CTMU paper, I have. Reading it does not entail that I agree with what it propounds. There are sections that I do not understand very well like sections that delve into set theory - bijections etc. But there are sections that I do understand. I fully grasp the general thrust of CTMU.
Chris, you have answered most of my questions buy you have danced around some - like RBHs earlier question. And have instead made my purported ignorance the central them of some of your posts.
Langan has alluded to the idea that I have some "super" logicians egging me on - which happens not to be the case. Whats significant is his willingness to debate them on a "neutral board". I dont know what constitutes a neutral board. I believe he was banned temporarily from ARN for what I have been told was a comical exchange between Langan, his girlfriend and a cloud of his sycophants (those that, when told that CTMU is a sound theory and failure to see that - is proof of their intellectual dwarfism, buy that argument).
Many have complained of your intellectual bullying and others that your ideas are too nebulous to hold a discussion on. Almost inexorably, it seems to me, your ego comes to the fore and the discussion degenerates. Geometry = Logic? Not exactly thread comes to mind. Some say Dayton kicked some ***.
ISCID is one of the best sites for thrashing out issues. Even if my posts have been deleted, I think it has been done fairly. However, since brainstorms is an open discussion forum, a discussion will be like a football match - some come to cheer, other boo etc and the moderators have done a pretty good job at keeping the cheering and booing down.
One central question to the CTMU which many would like to know is how you intend to demonstrate corresponsence between the syntax in your reality model and real life phenomena. Because pushing around symbols and not mapping them to real life objects that they are supposed to map to really doesnt mean much if the correspondence cant be established.
Subject to your willingness, I can organize a one-to-one discussion with one person on the CTMU. What we will need to establish is a clear topic of discussion and perharps specific areas of interest - maybe two - regarding CTMU. We can have a Formal Debate at infidels -
look at some debates and the rules and procedures there. If its acceptable to you, let me know and I will start the groundwork. I am sure someone will pick the gauntlet. I suggest Infidels because it has that unique facility for Formal Debates - no room for cheerleaders. I hope the mod here doesn't take offense at this.
So, let me know if you are willing to cross over. We can handle the rest via PMs.
JasonYoung states: "The problem of induction concerns the logical basis of inferences drawn from observed matters of fact and applied to unobserved matters of fact"
What are the unobserved matters of fact? Other planets on unseen galaxies? The distant past and the distant future?
It's plainly irrational to state that "the fact that human beings have hearts doesnt mean all human beings will have or have had hearts".
You want to cross every galaxy testing whether F=ma and whether a sperm and ova will always fuse?. I wish you the best.
It has not been demonstrated that the laws of science are not applicable with regard to "unobserved matters of fact" and to suspect they might not be, without specific examples, is irrational.
Its a weak philosophical argument without any basis in fact.
Jason adds: "Hume failed to find an a priori connection between events and dismissed causality outright. Inasmuch as causality doesn't exist (we have no justification in believing it exists), he then reckoned, our inferences from observed to unobserved matters of fact are based on a regularity of experience which we're unjustified in using as evidence for the temporal and spatial homogeneity of nature."
It's called "experience". No more justification is required. There is no justification for suspecting that our inferences may differ from what has been discovered.
Even if we could travel to the past and future, and cross galaxies, skeptics can still say, "Ooh, how can we be sure with human fallibility and all, Ooh, what if other unobserved people in other unobserved universes have different laws etc, Ooh how can we rely on our perceptions...". Ad infinitum.
He adds: "To do this would be to fall into the trap of circularity, for we're trying to prove the uniformity of nature, i.e. discover laws, but in order to do so we must assume it as a given."
Just like you are assuming axiomatic systems have the power to give Truth?
And no assumption is made. All scientific laws are based on scientific research. The scientific method has been precisely built to root out assumptions and conjectures and establish facts.
If hypotheses, tests, measurements, verification, evaluation, multiple tests by independent people, publications, peer reviews and so on only give us assumptions, then you need to go and read about the philosophy of science and understand what entails an assumption and what exactly is a scientific fact.
Jason concludes: "The CTMU does, despite Jacob's protestation, solve the problem of induction."
Chris has just admitted that he has no empirical support for the CTMU - and that he and others are still looking for some. That being the status quo, the CTMU is a logical construction that promises to be able to solve the problem of induction (for those who think its a problem).
Until then, we are pushing symbols on paper and making conjectures - any any six year old can do that. If that is how it has solved the problem of induction, then I pity Jasonyoung.
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Christopher M. Langan
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Member # 264
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posted 23. August 2003 11:43
Jacob Aliet, determined to keep his error streak snowballing furiously downhill, claims that I think he has "super-logicians egging him on". If so, I hasten to point out that this was meant as sarcasm; I have no reason to believe that Jacob has any behind-the-scenes contact with anyone who actually understands logic. In response to my suggestion regarding a neutral forum, Jacob then alludes to the ARN board. While I can't recall losing a debate at ARN - quite the opposite, in fact - I personally do not regard it as a "neutral forum". In fact, I think that although it presents itself as an "ID-friendly" board, perhaps with the best of intentions, its policies and choice of moderators are somewhat inconsistent with this claim (which doesn't necessarily mean that things can't or won't change in the future). Jacob then accuses me of "intellectual bullying"; if being correct makes one a bully, I suppose he may almost have a point.
Jacob then says that somebody calling himself "Dayton" is perceived to have won an argument against me at ARN. I merely recall rejecting Dayton's peremptory claim that logic could reveal nothing about the geometry of the physical universe (something that Dayton, despite what he and others may like to think, can neither know nor prove). If Dayton still maintains that he possesses knowledge regarding this claim, then the burden of proof obviously remains entirely on Dayton, and this is a burden that to my own knowledge Dayton has never met. Consequently, Dayton's attempted vindicatation of doctrinaire empiricism with examples from geometry has gained no credibility since I first questioned it, and this makes Dayton and his erstwhile activities at ARN old and somewhat boring news from my perspective.
Jacob goes on: "One central question to the CTMU which many would like to know is how you intend to demonstrate corresponsence between the syntax in your reality model and real life phenomena. Because pushing around symbols and not mapping them to real life objects that they are supposed to map to really doesnt mean much if the correspondence cant be established." This was explained in the paper, but perhaps Jacob requires a bit of repetition and/or simplification. Proof: Suppose that there is some degree of noncorrespondence between cognitive syntax and perceptual content (observed phenomena). Then there exist items of perceptual content which do not correspond to or coincide with cognitive syntax. But if these items do not coincide with cognitive syntax, then they are unrecognizable, i.e. inobservable (since cognitive syntax is by definition the basis of recognition). But then these items are not included in perceptual reality (the set of observable phenomena), and we have a contradiction. Therefore, perceptual reality must coincide with cognitive syntax. This establishes the existence of the mapping to which Jacob refers, and we can leave the details for later.
Still unsatisfied, Jacob then makes a curious offer. "Subject to your willingness, I can organize a one-to-one discussion with one person on the CTMU. What we will need to establish is a clear topic of discussion and perharps specific areas of interest - maybe two - regarding CTMU. We can have a Formal Debate at infidels - look at some debates and the rules and procedures there. If its acceptable to you, let me know and I will start the groundwork. I am sure someone will pick the gauntlet. I suggest Infidels because it has that unique facility for Formal Debates - no room for cheerleaders. I hope the mod here doesn't take offense at this."
Is Jacob by any chance referring to "Internet Infidels"? If so, I'm afraid that this is not a neutral forum by any stretch of the imagination. It contains participants and moderators known for belittling and vituperating ID supporters, often by name and often to what seems to be the verge of libel. I believe it is sponsored by an organization which champions an ideology called "metaphysical naturalism". Strangely, this organization seems to define "metaphysical naturalism", a phrase which explicitly refers to a meaningful relationship between metaphysics and nature, in a way particularly friendly to materialism and even to atheism, which would seem to leave the term "metaphysical" clinging to the term "naturalism" like an abandoned spider web or the empty shell of a long-deceased barnacle. (This is only my opinion, of course; it is in no way associated with ISCID or its administrators or moderators.)
Finally, Jacob goes after Jason Young, in the process adding to his error streak. "Chris has just admitted that he has no empirical support for the CTMU [error] - and that he and others are still looking for some. That being the status quo, the CTMU is a logical construction that promises to be able to solve the problem of induction (for those who think its a problem). [If Jacob fails to recognize the problematic nature of induction, then this too is an error.] Until then, we are pushing symbols on paper and making conjectures [error] - any six year old can do that." [Error number 4 in this paragraph alone.]
I hope that the above proof of the existence of a cognitive-perceptual mapping, which is straightforwardly based on the definition of "recognition" with respect to any meaningful model thereof, proves helpful to Jacob, RBH and others who have had trouble with it in the past. In return, would it be too much to ask that Jacob find somebody else to hound for a change (besides me and others whose only crime is to display a little understanding of the CTMU)? Thank you.
[ 23. August 2003, 16:47: Message edited by: Christopher M. Langan ]
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RBH
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posted 23. August 2003 12:34
Since the 'mapping' question was originally mine, I'll interject a short remark here. In answer to it as posed by Jacob Aliet, Langan wrote quote:
Proof: Suppose that there is some degree of noncorrespondence between cognitive syntax and perceptual content (observed phenomena). Then there exist items of perceptual content which do not correspond to or coincide with cognitive syntax. But if these items do not coincide with cognitive syntax, then they are unrecognizable, i.e. inobservable (since cognitive syntax is by definition the basis of recognition). But then these items are not included in perceptual reality (the set of observable phenomena), and we have a contradiction. Therefore, perceptual reality must coincide with cognitive syntax. This establishes the existence of the mapping to which Jacob refers, and we can leave the details for later.
This proof is related to the potential for conflicts of 'direct apprehensions' question that I also asked and that was not clearly answered. According to Langan's theory, direct apprehension of the world is one of the two ways of accessing "Truth-with-a-capital-T." (The other is logical derivation.) It supposes that (human) perceptual content is in the end a veridical representation of reality: we all share the same perceptual reality and there can therefore be no real perceptual conflicts, only apparent conflicts.
Langan's answer to my question about the agency for resolving potential conflicts among direct apprehensions was that it quote:
... is the distributed cognitive-perceptual syntax of the self-spoken language of reality (or in CTMU terminology, of SCSPL). It can be shown that if reality is connected - if we are really united in an objective manifold of common perception - this level of syntax must exist. Remember, science is primarily concerned with the formulation of general laws of nature as required for prediction, and these are just structural and grammatical components of this distributed reality-syntax. (Emphasis added)
This answer embodies my reservations about the CTMU: it is (once again) a syntactic theory, a theory of symbols manipulated according to formal rules on the basis of the symbols' shapes. But the general laws of science are not merely syntactic: they have content. They refer to entities, processes, and relationships in the (perceptual) world. It is the actual mapping (that Langan says is a detail to be dealt with later) that assigns meanings (interpretations) to the symbols being manipulated by the syntactic rules.
Langan's existence proof above (subject to reservations associated with whether conflicts among direct apprehensions can actually be resolved that way) does establish that some mapping must exist, but it is the "details" that Langan says can be left for later that are in fact critical to assessing whether SCSPL's syntax is in fact the underlying syntax of the real universe. Without those details, that is, absent an explicit mapping from the symbols and operators of the syntax to the entities, processes, and relationships of the (perceptual) world, the CTMU floats in thin air, unconnected to what it is intended to explain. Without those details it is uninformative. Until those "details" are taken care of, it has no interpretation in terms applicable to the content of the perceptual world and thus offers no explanations.
RBH
[ 23. August 2003, 12:44: Message edited by: RBH ]
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 23. August 2003 16:30
RBH claims that the proof I offered "is related to the potential for conflicts of 'direct apprehensions' question that I also asked and that was not clearly answered." He then elaborates: "According to Langan's theory, direct apprehension of the world is one of the two ways of accessing 'Truth-with-a-capital-T.' (The other is logical derivation.) It supposes that (human) perceptual content is in the end a veridical representation of reality: we all share the same perceptual content and there can be no real perceptual conflicts, only apparent conflicts."
My answer, which RBH subsequently repeats, was this: "It can be shown that if reality is connected - if we are really united in an objective manifold of common perception - this level of syntax [governing the relationship among the direct apprehensions of numerous subjects] must exist. Remember, science is primarily concerned with the formulation of general laws of nature as required for prediction, and these are just structural and grammatical components of this distributed reality-syntax." The clause "it can be shown" refers to the section of my paper dealing with syndiffeonesis, and that was clearly written. The direct apprehensions of multiple subjects tautologically require a joint medium possessing a unified description distributing over the medium as syntax. So as far as I'm concerned, RBH has been answered clearly enough, and without benefit of supposition.
Regarding "the agency for resolving potential conflicts among direct apprehensions", RBH quotes me to the effect that this agency is "the distributed cognitive-perceptual syntax of the self-spoken language of reality (or in CTMU terminology, of SCSPL)." This, says RBH, "embodies my reservations about the CTMU: it is (once again) a syntactic theory, a theory of symbols manipulated according to formal rules on the basis of the symbols' shapes ... (but) the general laws of science are not merely syntactic: they have content."
As I've previously made clear, the CTMU is actually a distributively self-referential theory which model-theoretically relates cognitive-perceptual syntax and its formal embodiment to perceptual content, which appears to us in terms of attributes conventionally called "physical observables". I've also made it clear that physical observables can be regarded as SCSPL predicates semantically bound by, and defined in terms of, SCSPL syntax. The laws of science, insofar as they can be logically certified, can be regarded as a (mathematically secondary) level of SCSPL syntax - that's what makes them "laws of science (as opposed to mathematics)" - and their parameters and contents are perceptual arguments of syntax bound by syntax.
The whole point of the proof which RBH dismisses is that if physical observables were not bound by SCSPL syntax, then they would be unrecognizable within the structure of SCSPL reality. In the theories of computation and cognition alike, to be "recognized" is to be bound by the accepting syntax of an acceptor (i.e., by the computational or cognitive protocols of an accepting automaton or entity). On the other hand, no binding = no recognition, which in the perceptual realm translates to "no perception". So In effect, any part of reality unbound by the syntax of reality would be unrecognizable to any part of reality itself, and would not be included in perceptual reality for real entities bound by SCSPL syntax.
RBH ends with the assertion that "Langan's existence proof above (subject to reservations associated with whether conflicts among direct apprehensions can actually be resolved that way) does establish that some mapping must exist, but it is the details that Langan says can be left for later that are in fact critical to assessing whether SCSPL's syntax is in fact the underlying syntax of the real universe. Without those details, that is, absent an explicit mapping from the symbols and operators of the syntax to the entities, processes, and relationships of the (perceptual) world, the CTMU floats in thin air, unconnected to what it is intended to explain. Without those details it is uninformative. Until those "details" are taken care of, it has no interpretation in terms applicable to the content of the perceptual world and thus no explanations."
Now we've arrived at the crux of what seems to be RBH's confusion regarding the CTMU. As I've repeatedly made clear, syntax is stratified, and the CTMU works from a high level of reality-syntax comprising certain tautological aspects of the relationship between syntax and the language thereby generated. As regards the basic structure of reality, nothing else need be supposed, assumed or conjectured. In particular, minute details of syntax need not be given. In fact, the CTMU is perfectly happy to leave many such details to empirical methodology. But this does not change the fact that empirical methodology is based on a model of reality which is artificially restricted with respect to SCSPL (in which it logically requires embedment), and is accordingly limited in its power to reveal "truth".
Thus, when RBH asserts that "it is the actual [detailed] mapping...that assigns meanings (interpretations) to the symbols being manipulated by the syntactic rules," he is not entirely correct. A certain level of meaning resides in syntax itself, and in the tautological relationship of syntax to language. To RBH's flat denial that anything of interest can be deduced about nature on that basis, I can respond only that as far as I'm concerned, it can be and has been. So although I respect RBH's right to disagree, I'm afraid that I consider him to have come out on the short end of this exchange.
[ 23. August 2003, 16:36: Message edited by: Christopher M. Langan ]
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Parallel
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posted 24. August 2003 00:32
quote:
One central question to the CTMU which many would like to know is how you intend to demonstrate corresponsence between the syntax in your reality model and real life phenomena. Because pushing around symbols and not mapping them to real life objects that they are supposed to map to really doesnt mean much if the correspondence cant be established."
But where is Mr. Langan's SCSPL syntax? Apart from talking about an SCSPL syntax and tossing in a few symbols in the process, where in Langan's paper is the actual logicomathematical syntax? It seems that he merely describes what this syntax does, asking readers to assume that it exists and is logical without ever proving that it actually exists. Why argue over something that has never even been shown to exist? Where's the math? Where are the formal proofs?
Mr. Langan, your impressive vocabulary and verbal indications of grasping diverse abstract concepts appears to betray a very high IQ. A media report I read said your IQ tested as high as 195. That's impressive! I thought the ceiling for adult IQ tests was around 150. What IQ test allows for such a high score? Was your 195 score from a test taken during your childhood?
"Truth is what stands the test of experience." Albert Einstein
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 24. August 2003 03:48
Parallel asks "where is Mr. Langan's SCSPL syntax? Apart from talking about an SCSPL syntax and tossing in a few symbols in the process, where in Langan's paper is the actual logicomathematical syntax? It seems that he merely describes what this syntax does, asking readers to assume that it exists and is logical without ever proving that it actually exists. Why argue over something that has never even been shown to exist? Where's the math? Where are the formal proofs?"
SCSPL syntax cannot be finitely enumerated. Nevertheless, as I've explained repeatedly above, it can be treated as a well-defined constant in its own right (provided that its existence can be established by means of syndiffeonesis and/or other concepts, something which has already been accomplished in plain view). This constant can then be implicated in relationships involving other variables and constants, e.g. a constant representing SCSPL as a whole. Given this fact, the PCID paper contains all the math I need to make my case, at least for those capable of understanding the kinds of math employed. As far as concerns formal proofs - that is, proofs in which concepts have merely been replaced with symbols - it is abundantly clear that any such proof would be thoroughly lost on anyone who has already displayed an inability to keep track of the concepts represented by the symbols.
Regarding my IQ, and for that matter parallel's IQ, they are not at issue here. Moreover, I have neither the intention nor the obligation to provide personal information to anonymous strangers, much less to an anonymous stranger who has gone to what I consider bizarre lengths to establish an adversarial relationship with me. Regarding the limitations of IQ tests, that's a controversial issue well beyond the topic of this thread, in the context of which it constitutes a transparent attempt at diversion.
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Parallel
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posted 24. August 2003 23:05
Langan responded “SCSPL syntax cannot be finitely enumerated. Nevertheless, as I've explained repeatedly above, it can be treated as a well-defined constant in its own right (provided that its existence can be established by means of syndiffeonesis and/or other concepts, something which has already been accomplished in plain view). This constant can then be implicated in relationships involving other variables and constants, e.g. a constant representing SCSPL as a whole. Given this fact, the PCID paper contains all the math I need to make my case, at least for those capable of understanding the kinds of math employed”.
So the SCSPL syntax cannot be finitely enumerated, which means it cannot be enumerated. How can an infinite syntax be known or evaluated? Mr. Lagan says “its existence can be established by means of syndiffeonesis and/or other concepts”. So it seems the SCSPL syntax is an inexpressible concept that is inferred to exist by way of other concepts. This sounds more like divination than logic, more like myth than mathematics.
Then here’s Langan’s response to my question about the whereabouts of any formal proofs for the CTMU
quote:
As far as concerns formal proofs - that is, proofs in which concepts have merely been replaced with symbols - it is abundantly clear that any such proof would be thoroughly lost on anyone who has already displayed an inability to keep track of the concepts represented by the symbols.
His only response is to say I’m too stupid! This is a regrettably common response from Langan. When you ask him “Where’s the beef?”, you get the usual Langan Knuckle Sandwich Special, hold the beef. His response to my next question was no less remarkable.
Langan wrote “Regarding my IQ, and for that matter parallel's IQ, they are not at issue here. Moreover, I have neither the intention nor the obligation to provide personal information to anonymous strangers, much less to an anonymous stranger who has gone to what I consider bizarre lengths to establish an adversarial relationship with me”.
Langan’s touted high IQ is hardly a private issue, it’s his claim to fame. If Langan feels his IQ score is a private matter, why does he make reports available to the public at his website that claim his IQ is 195? You can’t have it both ways Mr. Langan, why, that wouldn’t be logical. Here I am, once again asking you “Where’s the beef?” On what IQ test did you score 195?
Also, sorry that you find my asking you to support your claims to be bizarre and adversarial. I don’t see why you should hold that view if your claims can be supported.
"Truth is what stands the test of experience." Albert Einstein
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