|
Author
|
Topic: On Progress, Readdressing Reality Theory, & Information in the Holographic Universe
|
Wilston
Member
Member # 336
|
posted 20. July 2003 15:21
Considering that this is my first post to the ISCID message board, I’d like to briefly recapitulate on some of the topics that have recently been featured on ISCID. In doing so, I hope to readdress and extrapolate upon what I think are some pertinent issues and questions in regards to the ID research program.
I share the following thoughts which I recently posted on another forum.
If established to be valid or true, the theory of Intelligent Design would be one of the most groundbreaking scientific discoveries, and its implications, even now, would probably be more grandeur than originally thought. However, Intelligent Design theoreticians will need to employ a “model of reality” in order to move from conceptualization to empirical analysis. Let there be no doubt that Intelligent Design holds significant promise for our understanding of human origins, but by the same token, ID theoreticians will need to figure out what kind of application will be used or created to go about actualizing experimental work in the laboratory. Fair enough, Michael Behe’s concept of Irreducible Complexity gives us special insight into the intricacies of the living cell, and William Dembski’s conceptual framework of specified complexity provides us with a powerful tool for detecting design, but nevertheless, we still have no actual application for doing real laboratory research. In Dembski’s paper, Becoming a Disciplined Science - Prospects, Pitfalls, and Reality Check for ID , he quotes an ID advocate who writes this:
quote:
An enormous amount of energy has been expended on "proving" that ID is bogus, "stealth creationism," "not science," and so on. Much of this, ironically, violates the spirit of science. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. But on the other side, too much stuff from the ID camp is repetitive, imprecise and immodest in its claims, and otherwise very unsatisfactory. The "debate" is mostly going around in circles. The real work needs to go forward. There is a tremendous ferment right now in the "evo/devo" field, for instance. Some bright postdocs sympathetic to ID (and yes, I know how hard a time they would have institutionally at many places) should plunge right into the thick of that. Maybe they are at this very moment: I hope so!
I believe that ID is making steady progress conceptually, but experimentally, ID is currently lacking scientific merit. Right now, the core issue isn’t verifying ID in the laboratory, but the issue boils down to this: What plans do ID theoreticians have so as to start doing some sort of empirical investigation? For instance, is it that we don’t currently have the technology, the resources, or the expertise required to do empirical analysis, or does ID need a complete “model of reality” before it can start doing any full fledged experimentation? It’s interesting to note that theoretical physicists, not having any actual observations of what really goes on at the quantum level of reality, heavily rely on abstract and excruciating math to hold any weight to their theories about subatomic particles.
So, will ID theory be relegated solely to mathematical formulations, or does ID need a “model of reality” whereby it can make predictions about the feasibility, of say, designing spacecraft for interstellar space travel? More so, within the confines of ID theory, would we be able to analyze or scan a piece of material from the past, say through a specialized machine, and give a percentage estimate of its likelihood of being intelligently designed. Such a machine, a time machine, would have to be able to understand how information, matter, and energy function in relation to space-time. In effect, the time machine would be like looking into the past, even though we ourselves wouldn’t be able to manipulate the past or interject ourselves into it, as I would think that is God-forbidden. What is more, superstring theory happens to be one of the hottest topics in physics, as theoretical physicists hope to find a theory that can unite all the forces of nature, then again, this wouldn’t explain why anything should even exist, but is it along that mode of thinking that ID theoreticians can formulate a “model of reality”?
What ID will desperately need, say, 20-100 years from now, is some sort of technological application, we need a means of technology created from the foundations of a thoroughly developed “model of reality”, which can suit ID for the purpose of practical experimentation and help us understand our role as “demiurgic beings” or “creative agents” within the universe. I believe that ID theoreticians need a model that will take into account a mapping of cognition onto reality, as Christopher Michael Langan postulates in his paper: The CTMU , and ID theoreticians will need a concise definition of information and intelligence. So, considering that our perception of reality is an analogue of our cognition, how could we use a “model of reality” such as the CTMU?
quote:
Science is nothing but perception. - Plato
In summation, it is my understanding that the ordering of information, matter, and energy, as understood from the field of theoretical physics, may give us extraordinary insight into the assemblage of complex systems as a function of the flow of information in time. More so, ID may not be able to answer the question of why we exist or take us to the source (i.e. the Designer(s)), but with an application worthy of consideration, we can use the theory of ID to ascertain that we are indeed the product of an intelligent force or entity, and better yet, with the right things in mind, who knows, maybe we can use our understanding of ID to investigate the designer(s). ![[Smile]](smile.gif)
…
Scientific American: Information in the Holographic Universe [Physics] Theoretical results about black holes suggest that the universe could be like a gigantic hologram.
In regards to holography, do any of you think it may be beneficial to the ID research program? Apart from the biological sciences, where does ID fit in when it comes to the physical sciences (e.g. Theoretical Physics). I like to think of ID theory as having two branches, the “softcore branch”, and the “hardcore branch”. Right now, it seems to me that ID theory is currently working in the “softcore branch”, as it is still in the process of becoming a mature scientific theory. However, as for “hardcore ID”, that will be some time away, at least until there is a “model of reality” that ID theoreticians can work with, and who knows, maybe “hardcore ID” will be the key to designing a time machine. ![[Wink]](wink.gif)
…
I have loosely presented some questions and concerns that I think should be fully addressed by the ID community. I anticipate that all replies to this thread will be extrapolations upon those questions and concerns, and in the process, we might gain some new insight.
[ 20. July 2003, 15:36: Message edited by: Will ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Stu
Member
Member # 482
|
posted 24. July 2003 16:31
Interesting post. But why shouldnt ID start by simply following standard scientific methodology?
Basically build a detailed enough theory to allow experiments to differentiate ID from RM&NS. Without that it can never be taken seriously. Therefore we need predictions not postdictions.
The problem I see with adopting Chris Langans CTMU for a model is that CTMU sits at too high a level to help at this early stage.(if I am wrong then perhaps Chris could clarify).A bit like using General Relativity as the starting point for a lab experiment in momentum transfer.
Having a model is a good idea! I question if its necessary to have a TOE before ID researchers can construct experiments that would allow falsification. Maybe Chris could drill down far enough to produce a sufficiently detailed sub-set of CTMU to guide the researchers, over to Chris on that one.
IP: Logged
|
|
Christopher M. Langan
Member
Member # 264
|
posted 25. July 2003 17:08
Stu asks "why shouldn't ID start by simply following standard scientific methodology?" The short and punchy answer is that standard scientific methodology is inadequate for the verification of inferred scientific truth; one needs logicomathematical methodology for that. On the other hand, if all you're looking for is empirical confirmation, then you're not looking for truth, and in that case, you're not looking for the truth about biological origins. All you're looking for is another fallible exercise in causal induction from limited observations, and given the philosophical intransigence displayed on a daily basis by both sides of this debate, that won't solve anything.
It might sound strange to hear someone say that the scientific method is not about verification (as opposed to imperfect confirmation), but that's how it is. To understand why, you need a bit of advanced logic, and specifically model theory. The scientific method, being empirical, is based on an observational model of reality subject to weaknesses like the problem of induction and the Duhem-Quine thesis, due to which certainty cannot be inductively attained. How, then, is scientific truth to be ascertained? Logic provides the answer: by deduction from tautologically self-evident certainties. In fact, aside from direct apprehension, this is the only way there has ever been to "know" anything at all.
Unfortunately for those excessively enamored of the scientific method, deduction does not appeal to an observational model, but to another kind of model entirely...a substitutive model, or what a mathematical linguist would call a generative model in which the truth property is grammatically inherited from "origins" which are themselves either axiomatic or deduced. To know the truth about the origin of something (a theorem, the first organism, the universe), two conditions must be satisfied: (1) one must be able to deduce or directly apprehend the original event or terminal antecedent, and (2) truth must be heritable along the pathway from antecedent to consequent, cause to effect.
In science and philosophy alike, that which is relevant to perceptual reality is real. In other words, relevance to reality implicatively conveys reality, and reality is heritable under the unary operations "X affects Y" and "X is affected by Y" (and under the related n-ary operations). This is what makes reality a coherent, connected structure. It also makes reality perfectly self-contained up to relevance, and a perfectly self-contained system is a perfectly reflexive system with respect to all possible functions and processes, including generation and causation. Logically, this makes reality its own origin and its own cause. So we have managed to logically deduce the origin of reality, namely reality itself (this, by the way, is the basic position of not only the CTMU but naturalism; if naturalism espouses any other position, e.g. "there is no origin!", then it can be easily reduced to bunk). So much for criterion 1.
What about criterion 2? Specifically, where's the isomorphism between the generative model of logic and the observational model of science? That's where the CTMU comes into its own. The CTMU is the theory which relates the two kinds of model as complementary aspects of reality, and thus the theory which allows us to use logicomathematical methodology to discover scientific truth. In other words, causality can only be known by inference, and the only way to show that reality mirrors inference is to show how logic, the basis of inference, is built into the infrastructure of reality.
Stu then suggests that we "build a detailed enough theory to allow experiments to differentiate ID from RM&NS." In light of my response to Stu's first question, this requires that we extend scientific methodology to embrace the native methods of logical and mathematical reasoning (which are already invoked but not fully respected by the scientific method). When we do this, causality becomes more than empirical induction in reverse; it becomes the (verification-friendly) generative grammar of reality. Again, this requires the CTMU.
Stu asserts that without a means of conducting experiments to differentiate ID from RM&NS, no theory of ID can ever be taken seriously, and that we therefore "need predictions rather than postdictions". In response, I'll merely point out that any logical theory which predicts or retrodicts any sort of life at all stands head and shoulders above neo-Darwinism, which does neither. The reason that neo-Darwinism fails to account for life post hoc, ad hoc or propter hoc is that it lacks the wherewithal to generate an ultimate common origin from which life can "descend", and it lacks any generative model of causality in which "descent" bears the required resemblance to logical deduction.
Thus far, the problem with this entire debate has been that neither side of it has a model of causality. Remember, to assert that it is true that anything causes or is the cause of anything else, you need a model supporting coupled definitions of truth and causality. If you lack such a model, then you cannot with any certainty predicate truth of hypotheses regarding causality. All you can do is talk about more or less tentative correlations within a limited experimental context. But how do you characterize the correlations? Without a solid model and definition of causality, you have no idea.
Consider these simplified hypotheses: "Life is caused by random mutation and natural selection" and "Life is caused by intelligent design." In order to decide between these hypotheses, there are several terms whose definitions must be agreed on by both camps. The first of these is "is caused by". That is, we need a common definition of causation. But this means that we require a model of causation, and to achieve certainty, it must be logically demonstrative in character. No model, no certifiable decision in favor of either hypothesis, and it makes no difference how much "empirical evidence" is offered. The hypothesis to be verified must be well-defined, and if it is defined beneath the level at which certainty is attainable regarding it, then nothing gets decided. Worse yet, if one side insists that only the artificially restrictive scientific method can be used as a means of verification, and the other side concedes to this, then real progress can't even begin.
Stu opines that "the CTMU sits at too high a level to help at this early stage...a bit like using General Relativity as the starting point for a lab experiment in momentum transfer." A thoughtful criticism. However, the more certainty one desires, the higher the level of model that one needs. On the other hand, if one settles for a provisional, low-level model up front, then one lacks certainty regarding the significance of one's findings, and again, nothing gets decided. Indeed, if one exclusively restricts oneself to an observational model, certain model-theoretic criteria can never be logically satisfied.
Stu says that having a model is a good idea, but questions "whether its necessary to have a TOE before ID researchers can construct experiments that would allow falsification". As explained above, having a general model is an absolute necessity, at least at the stage where general (e.g. ID, non-ID) hypotheses are to be proven. If this model can be logically derived, then there is no point in pretending to rely on low-level experimentation which can prove nothing in its absence, particularly when the whole point of such experimentation would be to arrive at the model in question.
Since natural selection is trivially observable in some contexts, there is no point in distinguishing an alternative model of evolution from neo-Darwinism in those contexts. The distinction need be made only with respect to higher-order fitness-survival relationships, possibly involving higher-order, irreducibly-(n>1)-ary fitness-critical combinations of fitness-related attributes ("irreducible complexity"). Unfortunately for neo-Darwinism, the only way it can even begin to extend itself from the micro scale to the macro scale is by showing that every step in every evolutionary pathway offers some degree of utility to the evolving organism. But as we all know, it has displayed no actual ability to do that.
Instead, neo-Darwinism finds circumstantial correlations between fitness or survivability on one hand, and certain functions and their associated genes on the other, and then launches into grand pseudo-causal generalization on that basis. It is then asserted that fitness has not been merely tautologically equated to survival, but that survival has been "caused by" certain genes and their functions! This is an exercise in circularity; certain things that have been circumstantially correlated with survival are being identified as "causes" of survival, and this particular kind of causal identification is justified in neither logic nor statistics (as is thoroughly explained in any decent elementary introduction to correlation). Thus, while neo-Darwinism claims to have refuted the putatively tautological (unfalsifiable) nature of the fitness=survival equation, it has done nothing of the kind. Nor can it ever do so given its definitive conceptual and methodological limitations.
This leads directly to a burning question: why not simply accept the tautology and embrace the theory which acknowledges and explains it, namely the CTMU? After all, it's not as though the CTMU doesn't have a defensible lock on scientific truth and verification (as explained above and elsewhere).
Stu asks whether I could "drill down far enough to produce a sufficiently detailed sub-set of CTMU to guide the researchers." The answer is yes. But meanwhile, anyone who responds to the above explanations with "that's great, but it means nothing without a new experimental methodology for all of the materially-minded instrumentalists involved in the debate" is missing the point. The point, of course, is that when nip comes to tuck, materially-minded instrumentalists have no real business "in the debate" at all.
By definition, concrete instrumentalists are neither comfortable with nor cognizant of all the demands of correct high-level theorization, qualifying at best as competent hands-on technicians who help equally-competent theorists test and refine their abstractions (thus, the well-known and well-justified symbiotic distinction between theorists and experimentalists in the physical sciences). With all due respect to the ingenuity and scientific indispensability of good experimentalists, the debate over biological origins is over the heads of those unschooled in advanced logical abstraction. A new experimental methodology will come - I and others are working hard to make it happen - but the issue of biological origins can be logically and philosophically decided without its benefit.
The history of thought displays a well-established progression: in many areas of intellectual endeavor, what used to be called "philosophy" has given way to what is now called "science". When it comes to intellectual progress, this is often the natural order of things; the broad and general, arrived at by induction from more or less scattered details, gradually gives way to the narrow and specific. Funnelvision tapers somewhat jerkily into tunnelvision, and formerly submicroscopic details emerge in ever-sharper relief as the focus tightens and the field narrows. That is, the fundibular spatiotemporal image of human intellectual progress reflects an invariant quasi-volumetric relationship between scope and informational resolution or microscopy.
So attractive is the higher resolution often associated with reductions of scope that many scientists have come to hate philosophy, the mother of science, with a terrible passion. Its scope is too wide, and the details it encompasses seem too fuzzy. Never will these scientists be driven from the paradise they have found at the constricted end of the funnel...the end boldly emblazoned with "Concrete Results Or Bust!"
Unfortunately, conviction and enthusiasm are neither a road to entitlement nor a barrier against anomaly, and anomalies - e.g. biological machines for which Darwinian explanations cannot readily be educed - have a way of compromising resolution. This sometimes necessitates a mind-expanding trip back up the funnel, and this naturally gives rise to a certain amount of resistance on the parts of those determined to stay comfortably within the concrete realm. Not to put too fine a point on it, but that's what we seem to have going in this controversy, and amazingly, some of those advocating a major change of perspective seem bent on placating, or at least working around the unrealistic preconceptions, of those who explicitly prefer tunnelvision.
Although this is not the way to achieve a final resolution of the dispute, it makes a sad kind of political sense, and in any case, "it is what it is". So I try to make the best of it, and do what I can to refine and elucidate the linkage between the logical and empirical sides of the issue. While the CTMU has already accomplished this on a high level of abstraction - at least for those who can understand it - I have no trouble admitting that there's still plenty of room for progress.
[ 25. July 2003, 17:20: Message edited by: Christopher M. Langan ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Pim van Meurs
Member
Member # 541
|
posted 26. July 2003 12:50
Chris: Unfortunately, conviction and enthusiasm are neither a road to entitlement nor a barrier against anomaly, and anomalies - e.g. biological machines for which Darwinian explanations cannot readily be educed - have a way of compromising resolution.
An interesting use of terms and I would be interested in hearing from Chris how he believes one can resolve whether these anomalies may be due to a lack in our knowledge. In other words, is our inability to deduce Darwinian explanations sufficient a reason to reject Darwinian explanations? What if we can formulate 'just so' stories'?
Chris: Unfortunately for neo-Darwinism, the only way it can even begin to extend itself from the micro scale to the macro scale is by showing that every step in every evolutionary pathway offers some degree of utility to the evolving organism. But as we all know, it has displayed no actual ability to do that.
But there may be other ways to show macro scale evolutionary pathways. Perhaps 'as we all know' is more of a hyperbole here? But lets assume that Chris is right here, what does this mean for a theoretical approach which tries to infer something based on elimination for instance? If evolutionary pathways remain largely untouchable due to their distant nature, how would one calculate said probabilities allowing one to eliminate said pathways? After all absence of details on such pathways hardly invalidates Neo-Darwinism nor lends credibility to alternatives that depend on invalidating all other alternatives.
How can CTMU help us resolve these scientific questions? Certainly logical abstraction is fine in theory but when it is limited in practical application I wonder about its relevance. Perhaps as a scientist I do place too much hope on practicality?
IP: Logged
|
|
RBH
Member
Member # 380
|
posted 26. July 2003 22:19
Langan wrote quote:
With all due respect to the ingenuity and scientific indispensability of good experimentalists, the debate over biological origins is over the heads of those unschooled in advanced logical abstraction. A new experimental methodology will come - I and others are working hard to make it happen - but the issue of biological origins can be logically and philosophically decided without its benefit.
With all due respect to advanced abstract logicians, I don't think I'll hold my breath until the decision about biological origins is made manifest to us lesser folk. This appears to be tantamount to the claim that experimental methodology, whether new or old, is superfluous. If pure thought can give us the answers, why bother with messy experimental methodologies? And eschewing experimentation has the additional salutory effect of ensuring that one's theories will not be slain by inconvenient facts.
RBH
IP: Logged
|
|
Parallel
Member
Member # 744
|
posted 27. July 2003 02:16
Christopher M. Langan wrote:
quote:
The CTMU is the theory which relates the two kinds of model as complementary aspects of reality, and thus the theory which allows us to use logicomathematical methodology to discover scientific truth.
If the CTMU is "the theory which allows us to use logicomathematical methodology to discover scientific truth", how have scientists using logic and mathematics managed to discover so many scientific truths without the CTMU?
And if the CTMU is "the theory which allows us to use logicomathematical methodology to discover scientific truth", how many scientific truths have been discovered with the CTMU?
"Truth is what stands the test of experience." Albert Einstein
IP: Logged
|
|
Christopher M. Langan
Member
Member # 264
|
posted 27. July 2003 02:48
Pim van Meurs asks: "Is our inability to deduce Darwinian explanations (a) sufficient reason to reject Darwinian explanations? What if we can formulate 'just so' stories'?"
A just-so story is not an explanation. Provided that it meets certain logical criteria, it can at best be regarded as a "possible explanation". But as I've already pointed out above, neo-Darwinism lacks both the wherewithal to generate an ultimate common origin from which life can descend, and a generative model of causality in which descent incorporates logical deduction. This means that Darwinian explanations alone cannot satisfy the logical criteria in question. Therefore, they do not actually qualify as "possible explanations".
Pim opines that since there may be "other ways (than stepwise utility) to show macro scale evolutionary pathways", my usage of "as we all know" may be hyperbolic. But it isn't. Strictly speaking, Darwinism implies gradualism because it needs to keep event probabilities in line with the probabilistic resources afforded by "nature", as restrictively and arbitrarily identified with material structures and first-order laws of physics. In order to get around this problem, it has been suggested that (e.g.) certain organisms may embody information regarding entire sequences of steps on the molecular level, and that this may keep probabilities high even when the steps are individually inutile. But even if this or any comparable scenario were deemed general, it would offer no means of exceeding the known limitations of causal induction. It would thus fail to decide the issue of biological origins in favor of Darwinism.
Pim then wonders what stepwise utility might mean for a theoretical approach which "tries to infer something" based on elimination. Obviously, the first order of business for such an approach would be an exhaustive characterization of the entire probability space from which possibilities are to be eliminated. This, however, would require a global model of reality, thoroughly indebt said approach to the CTMU, and thereby eliminate neo-Darwinism in the qualification round.
Pim then asks how one would calculate certain desirable probabilities, thereby allowing one to eliminate pathways that are "largely untouchable due to their distant nature. After all," he continues, "(an) absence of details on such pathways hardly invalidates Neo-Darwinism nor lends credibility to alternatives that depend on invalidating all other alternatives." I can only observe that my post does not rely on mere eliminative reasoning.
Finally, Pim asks "How can CTMU help us resolve these scientific questions?", going on to report that while logical abstraction is fine in theory, he "wonders about its relevance ... when it is limited in practical application." In particular, Pim asks whether he, as a scientist, might place too much emphasis on practical considerations. I agree with Pim that on the concrete level, science requires a pragmatic approach. But questions regarding biological origins and fundamental evolutionary causation are not immediately practical in nature. As I've explained, they're logical in nature, and practice is secondary to logic. Similarly, while practical applications of the CTMU are in the works, they are secondary to the explanatory value of its logic.
RBH adds: "With all due respect to advanced abstract logicians, I don't think I'll hold my breath until the decision about biological origins is made manifest to us lesser folk." This personal decision by RBH is beyond my control. However, it was not my intention to imply that RBH is a "lesser" being. I only meant to explain why making things materially manifest to concrete instrumentalists is not what it actually takes to decide the issue of biological origins.
RBH goes on: "This appears to be tantamount to the claim that experimental methodology, whether new or old, is superfluous." While experimentation is far from superfluous with respect to questions of a material nature, it is directed toward confirmation rather than verification. Unfortunately, this makes it inadequate to decide the issue of biological origins.
RBH concludes: "If pure thought can give us the answers, why bother with messy experimental methodologies? And eschewing experimentation has the additional salutory effect of ensuring that one's theories will not be slain by inconvenient facts." In some contexts, these remarks would be well-justified. But in the context at hand, they are not. They fail to address the content of my post and are inconsistent with the spirit in which it was written. While experimentation is certainly a valid scientific enterprise, it is nonetheless inadequate to fully decide the issue of biological origins.
Let me make it clear that I have ample respect for experimentalists. Without them, science could not exist as we know it. But this does not make experimental methodology perfect or even adequate, and it does not place limitations on what can be demonstrated with logic alone. Although experiments confirming either of the major hypotheses regarding biological origins would no doubt sway open-minded people in one direction or the other, they would not actually decide the issue. Only logic can do that.
[ 27. July 2003, 11:56: Message edited by: Christopher M. Langan ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Christopher M. Langan
Member
Member # 264
|
posted 27. July 2003 03:17
Parallel writes "If the CTMU is 'the theory which allows us to use logicomathematical methodology to discover scientific truth', how have scientists using logic and mathematics managed to discover so many scientific truths without the CTMU?" The answer, once again, is that empirical science is not in the business of establishing "truths". It is in the business of tentatively confirming hypotheses. If anyone finds this distinction flawed or inordinately subtle, he or she should take the time to further investigate it.
Parallel continues "And if the CTMU is 'the theory which allows us to use logicomathematical methodology to discover scientific truth', how many scientific truths have been discovered with the CTMU?" This is just the flip side of parallel's initial mistake. The CTMU is primarily a theory of logic, not empirical science. This is what qualifies it to verify truths about the nature and origins of things. The scientific value of the CTMU resides largely in the fact that within its framework, certain logical truths can be regarded as scientific truths (as opposed to tentatively-confirmed scientific hypotheses).
As I've explained, science employs an observational model of reality. This model has a dual generative model, which is the same kind of model employed in logic and other branches of mathematics. The CTMU superimposes and links these two models, thus linking the two associated kinds of reasoning. Anyone who sincerely wants to know what conclusions, scientific or otherwise, may be reached on this basis should carefully read the introductory paper I published in PCID last autumn.
IP: Logged
|
|
Parallel
Member
Member # 744
|
posted 27. July 2003 13:38
Mr. Langan, while I appreciate your thoughtful responses, I disagree. You said the CTMU is the theory that allows the discovery of "scientific truth". Then in response to my question about how scientific truths have been discovered without the CTMU, you say science is about hypothesis testing, not establishing "truths". But hypotheses are about what may be true. Your answer rather fantastically implies that science has discovered no "scientific truths", and seems merely a semantic effort to separate "scientific truth" from science and declare by default that such truth is the exclusive property of the CTMU.
My second question was, if the CTMU is the theory that allows the discovery of scientific truth, how many such discoveries has it facilitated? Mr. Langan provided no list of scientific truths discovered via the CTMU, so the question was begged. Instead he claimed, “The CTMU is primarily a theory of logic, not empirical science. This is what qualifies it to verify truths about the nature and origins of things”. However, the nature of things - e.g., of physical entities - is the proper domain of empirical science. Scientists discover the nature of things with observation, logic, and mathematics; and they've been doing so for some time now, efficiently uncovering scientific truths without the CTMU.
If the CTMU really reveals the nature of things as Mr. Langan claims, then it should be able to make at least one (if not many) unique and testable prediction(s) about things. But from what I can tell, it does not make any testable predictions. Note the following Einstein quote about truth. I believe he's saying that truth is what stands the test of empirical observed.
"Truth is what stands the test of experience." Albert Einstein
IP: Logged
|
|
Christopher M. Langan
Member
Member # 264
|
posted 27. July 2003 15:42
The CTMU is the theory that allows the discovery of "scientific truth" because, when science is defined strictly on the scientific method, there is no such thing as a "scientific truth". There are only directly apprehended truths, logically derived truths, and in contradistinction to these, tentatively-confirmed scientific hypotheses. This is why my answer "implies that science has discovered no (certified) scientific truths."
Now, that's a stone cold fact. Science may have accidentally happened upon truths of one sort or another, but sadly, it can't certify that this is what they are. "Fantastic" or not, "semantic" or not, that's how it is. If you can show that this is not in fact the case, then be my guest. Otherwise, please address your criticisms to somebody else. When you come right down to it, this is Models & Formalized Theories 101 we're talking about here; if you haven't yet taken these courses, please fill the gaps in your knowledge before attempting to engage me in further discussion on this topic.
You go on to accuse me of "begging your question". I suggest that you read the final paragraph of my last response, and then carefully read the paper I mention. Don't care to do that? Then kindly stop accusing me of "begging questions" that are answered in the abstract at the head of the article, and please don't continue to pretend that I haven't already pointed out that logic comes before practice (those who refuse to apply logic before launching into practice are in clear violation of common sense and all but doomed to eventual failure). Because the logic I've presented here is designed to stand on its own, I don't need to provide you or anyone else with anything further in order to make my case. If I choose to elaborate in the future, well, that will be an undeserved extra.
You also say that "the nature of things - e.g., of physical entities - is the proper domain of empirical science." Thanks for the opinion. But given that the scientific method is restrictive, and that it relies on an observational rather than a generative model of reality, can you establish the intellectual adequacy of your viewpoint? As I've already observed, you cannot.
You then assert that "scientists discover the nature of things with observation, logic, and mathematics." Tentatively, yes; with certainty, no. That is, they merely confirm hypotheses while making a lot of guesses, mistakes and oversights, which is unavoidable given the canons of empirical methodology, which mandate the slapdash observational application of mathematical formalisms for which observational models of reality lack support.
Given all of these mistakes on your part, do you really think that you're being fair to poor Albert Einstein by trying to weigh him in on your side of the scale? Please, a little respect for the dead.
[ 27. July 2003, 15:44: Message edited by: Christopher M. Langan ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Pim van Meurs
Member
Member # 541
|
posted 27. July 2003 18:26
Chris: This is why my answer "implies that science has discovered no (certified) scientific truths.
It may have discovered such truths but being science it cannot claim them to be truths and I do not believe that science can determine truths unless formulated in a tautological manner which reduces their scientific applicability. Additionally as Parallel has argued so aptly, scientific truths are per definition "truths" discovered by science. A somewhat tautological argument which of course is true by nature. Science deals in scientific truths.
Alternatively as parallel points out no evidence of scientific truths discovered by the CTMU have been provided so the claims seem to be tentative at most.
Parellel, respectfully quoting Albert Einstein ponders "If the CTMU really reveals the nature of things as Mr. Langan claims, then it should be able to make at least one (if not many) unique and testable prediction(s) about things. But from what I can tell, it does not make any testable predictions. " I do not believe Chris has even attempted to address this issue other than by claims of what he perceives to be 'mistakes on parallel's part'. It may be helpful if Chris were to address this very relevant issue raised by parallel, whether or not parallel may be wrong on other issues.
I am not certain if CTMU would allow us to detect said truths. Certainly I am looking forward to any such attempts to apply CTMU.
Chris states further:
A just-so story is not an explanation
It may or may not be. A just so story is a first attempt to formulate a testable hypothesis. But my question was if such (possible) explanation (ofcourse in science everything is always tentative) or the lack thereof is sufficient a reason to reject Darwinian theory or alternatively accept ID?
As far as gradualism is concerned and Darwinian evolution, it may be important to explain the term gradual(ism) in this context. For instance the incorporation of pre-existing the mitochondria by cells can still be gradual and yet a complete system falls in place. Of course there may be cases in which the data are lacking to allow us to decide the issue of biological origins in favor of Darwinism but that also seems to suggest that there are competing theories or explanations. As far as I understand ID, it does not provide competing theories, certainly not the limited approach taken by Dembski in the Design Inference and subsequently in NFL. Dell Ratzsch deals in detail with some of the problems AND limitations of Dembski's design inference in the book we are reading right now for one of the discussion groups.
Chris ponders about the requirements for elimination of alternative pathways which would require a global model of reality and seems to suggest CTMU as a possible candidate. If this is correct then I would like to see Chris explain how CTMU can help us determine the likely pathways to a particular systems, lets say the flagellum. When I asked Chris about eliminative approaches I was trying to determine 1) what Chris's viewpoints are on such approaches 2) if CTMU could be helpful in this area.
Chris opines "But questions regarding biological origins and fundamental evolutionary causation are not immediately practical in nature"
Of course such a subjective statement inevitably means that people may disagree with such a claim. In fact biological origins and fundamental evolutionary causation may be very practical, even in the near future.
So I am looking forward to see if the CTMU can escape its limits of merely logical consistency to a more practical application. I am encouraged to hear that people are making efforts to achieve this and I would be interested in any progress made in this area.
IP: Logged
|
|
Wilston
Member
Member # 336
|
posted 27. July 2003 20:50
Langan writes: The CTMU is the theory that allows the discovery of "scientific truth" because, when science is defined strictly on the scientific method, there is no such thing as a "scientific truth". There are only directly apprehended truths, logically derived truths, and in contradistinction to these, tentatively-confirmed scientific hypotheses. This is why my answer "implies that science has discovered no (certified) scientific truths."
With all due respect, I am of the increasing opinion that current methods of scientific inquiry and scientific achievement are simply incidentals of our limited “perceptual feedback” (i.e. our scientific prowess has yet to find its potential if we are limited to what we can only perceive). Henceforth, I concur with Chris that the scientific method is not a definitive solution or criterion for establishing or veryfying whatever truth may be out there. As a matter of fact, the sciences don’t establish truths; they merely serve to explain a set of phenomena so that we may gather a working knowledge of how to manipulate our physical reality (e.g. technological innovation), hence the term, “operational science”.
Keep in mind this definition from Merriam-Webster Dictionary: Scientific Method - principles and procedures for the systematic pursuit of knowledge involving the recognition and formulation of a problem, the collection of data through observation and experiment, and the formulation and testing of hypotheses.
The scientific method so happens to be limited in its ability to establish truths or absolute truth (i.e. under the presumption that absolute truth exists) because it is restricted to what can be observed and experimented with. Furthermore, given all the “scientific laws” that have thus far been established, they can only be given credence under the assumption that the universe in which we exist has a set of fixated rules or “governing syntax”. Therefore, we can’t form a “model of reality” solely from the schemas of the scientific method. Also, we can only deem, as implicit, that the universe is uniformitarian in nature. Then again, who says laws can’t be broken or circumvented?
More so, perhaps there is phenomenon we have yet to come to the knowledge of that seemingly brake, say, some or all the known laws of physics, yet concurrently, such “transcendental phenomenon” may not actually be braking the laws of physics as are currently understood by convention, but perhaps such phenomenon is simply an abstraction or unknown by-product of reality that can’t be detected by the scientific method, in that case, we would then need a “model of reality” that can encapsulate such phenomenon or be able to anticipate its discovery. Would this be a better alternative then relying on scientific formulations that are dependent on the verification of scientific hypothesis?
Keeping that in mind, just-so stories about the origins of life, albeit speculative, can’t serve as clear-cut explanations of our existence. The reason for this being that our understanding of the mechanisms at work in the universe is still limited and not all mechanisms can be accounted for by scientific musings. I highly doubt that working with the scientific method alone can account for all known and unknown phenomena, as such is the idea behind empiricism and scientism. But, don’t mistake me for being against the scientific method. The scientific method is a great tool, but at the same time, it is an incomplete method for determining “scientific truth”.
As for a “model of reality” such as the CTMU or other derivations of it, I don’t think it is the purpose of any such model to explain the most pertinent question of all, ‘Why do we exist?’ Rather, the most crucial aspect of any “model of reality” is that it be able to give an accounting, by encapsulation, of all known and unknown phenomena. That being said, it’s not so much a TOE that we currently need (e.g. a TOE that explains all the forces in nature), as I don’t know if such a TOE, such as a Unified Field Theory, would be beneficial to “origins science,” but instead, we need a “model of reality,” on a class of its own, that can incorporate all sets of known and unknown phenomena, be it already discovered or within discovery’s grasp.
Such incorporation may not immediately give an explanation of whatever known or unknown or phenomena there may be, but then again, since the scientific method has certain limitations and restrictions, a “model of reality” wouldn’t be restricted as the scientific method in ultimately coming up with an explanation, and keep in mind that the scientific method wouldn’t necessarily serve as a progenitor of a “model of reality”. A “model of reality,” such as the CTMU, must bear logic as its backbone, and the CTMU does this perfectly fine. Nevertheless, as for what application we might conjure or create from a “model of reality,” only time will tell. But yes, logic and organization is the basis of our perceived reality, and scientific truth or absolute truth, whatever you may call it, can’t be established without having a coherent “model of reality”.
One more thing to think about, we may have the logic to formulate a “model of reality,” but would that necessarily mean we would have the resources to go about constructing an actual application? Who knows, we’ll have to wait and see, but if history serves as a good indicator, what we think of today as science fiction may possibly become scientific fact. Here’s a thought, perhaps our society must progressively become more altruistic if we are ever to garner the required resources and expertise to facilitate an environment whereby we can reach new technological heights.
[ 27. July 2003, 21:18: Message edited by: Wilston ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Parallel
Member
Member # 744
|
posted 27. July 2003 22:52
Wilston wrote:
quote:
The scientific method is a great tool, but at the same time, it is an incomplete method for determining “scientific truth”.
Wrong by definition. As Pim succinctly observed, "scientific truths are per definition 'truths' discovered by science". The term Mr. Langan used, "scientific truth", inherently defines the variety of truth discovered by science upon which the given caveats of science are imposed. Yet Langan and Wilston apparently define "scientific truth" as truth per se and thereby attempt to deny science any claim to truth. The necessity for oxygen to sustain the vast majority of known lifeforms is just one example of a truth discovered by science.
Christopher M. Langan wrote:
quote:
Because the logic I've presented here is designed to stand on its own, I don't need to provide you or anyone else with anything further in order to make my case. If I choose to elaborate in the future, well, that will be an undeserved extra.
Well, I guess that settles it.
If the truth of Langan's CTMU is above the restrictive uncertainties of scientific empiricism, why does it purport to be a theory, e.g., the "Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe"? By defining the CTMU as a "theory", Langan implies that it is subject to the very empirical restraints he declares it to be above.
Einstein, who I assume was another knucklehead who missed "Models & Formalized Theories 101", elaborated further on his view on truth expressed in my previous quote when he wrote:
"As soon as science has emerged from its initial stages, theoretical advances are no longer achieved merely by a process of arrangement. Guided by empirical data, the investigator rather develops a system of thought which, in general, is built up logically from a small number of fundamental assumptions, the so-called axioms. We call such a system of thought a theory. The theory finds the justification for its existence in the fact that it correlates a large number of single observations, and it is just here that the 'truth' of the theory lies".
Einstein, A. 1951. [5th ed. 1952, (1961)]. Relativity, The Special and General Theory. New York: Bonanza Books.
IP: Logged
|
|
RBH
Member
Member # 380
|
posted 27. July 2003 23:32
Let me try again without the somewhat flippant tone I used in my last posting. Langan wrote quote:
There are only directly apprehended truths, logically derived truths, and in contradistinction to these, tentatively-confirmed scientific hypotheses. This is why my answer "implies that science has discovered no (certified) scientific truths."
I easily and without objection agree that science has discovered "tentatively-confirmed" hypotheses, where there is some continuum of tentativeness/confidence, and that science cannot claim to have established capital T Truths. I further agree that quote:
Now, that's a stone cold fact. Science may have accidentally happened upon truths of one sort or another, but sadly, it can't certify that this is what they are. "Fantastic" or not, "semantic" or not, that's how it is.
if by "certify" one means that the capital T Truth of some scientific proposition or hypothesis is established beyond all doubt. Not beyond merely reasonable doubt, or beyond some faint lingering hint of possible doubt, but all doubt. Which is not to say that science in its benighted way hasn't stumbled onto some useful, fruitful, and even enlightening stuff in which one is justified in having some reasonable confidence, as much confidence, in fact, as I'd say human knowledge is capable of commanding. But that's not necessarily capital T Truth, which seems to be Langan's goal.
My questions have to do with the other two categories of knowledge claims, those based on direct apprehension and on logical derivation. Take the former first. Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that the 'direct apprehensions' of two people differ on some matter. On what grounds can one decide between them? What is the certifying agency that says 'This one is true, that one illusory'? Is that the purpose of the new experimental methodology that you and others are working to develop, to decide among conflicting direct apprehensions? Or are all direct apprehensions of equal standing and no conflict is expected among them?
Then Langan says (as I quoted above) quote:
With all due respect to the ingenuity and scientific indispensability of good experimentalists, the debate over biological origins is over the heads of those unschooled in advanced logical abstraction. A new experimental methodology will come - I and others are working hard to make it happen - but the issue of biological origins can be logically and philosophically decided without its benefit.
If the issue of biological origins can be "logically and philosophically" decided without some new experimental methodology, why do we we need that methodology? And is there a distinction worth making between "logically and philosophically decided" and "experimentally decided"? That is, what is gained by having some new experimental methodology if Truth can be arrived at via pure thought? Why do experiments at all?
Later we might explore (if I decide that I have the time and inclination) the question of the relationship between a syntactic derivation and its semantic content. That takes me back nearly 40 years to graduate school, and I'm not sure I want to spend the time that would be required to rehearse that material. I think my two questions above, about reconciling conflicting direct apprehensions and the need (or lack thereof) for an experimental methodology, be it new or old, given the asserted adequacy of pure thought to decide questions, will do for now.
RBH
IP: Logged
|
|
Christopher M. Langan
Member
Member # 264
|
posted 28. July 2003 02:00
Parallel asserts that "scientific truths are per definition 'truths' discovered by science ... 'scientific truth' inherently defines the variety of truth discovered by science upon which the given caveats of science are imposed." I see what parallel is trying to get at, but as I've already stated, it just doesn't wash. While my own usage of the phrase "scientific truth" was clearly predicated on the availability of a generative model of reality (the CTMU), parallel lacks such a model. So whatever parallel means by "scientific truth", it isn't the kind of truth recognized in logic (which is, after all, the formal language of truth). Needless to say, logical rules of derivation are not subject to what parallel calls "the (empirical) caveats of science".
Compounding his error, parallel states that "the necessity for oxygen to sustain the vast majority of known lifeforms is just one example of a truth discovered by science." We can call this a "truth" only insofar as it is so simple, and involves so little inference, that it is for all practical purposes directly apprehended (I've already explicitly allowed that direct apprehension is a route to truth). On the other hand, if this conclusion requires a nontrivial amount of inference, then calling it a "truth" requires an isomorphism between the generative model of logical inference and an observational model containing oxidizing lifeforms. Again, parallel lacks such an isomorphism. Given this fact, it is almost overkill to point out the ambiguity and wriggle-room implicit in the phrase "vast majority". The same applies to parallel's reliance on the adjective "known", which indicates that his example is at least partially about subjective knowledge states.
Next, Parallel says that "If the truth of Langan's CTMU is above the restrictive uncertainties of scientific empiricism, why does it purport to be a theory, e.g., the 'Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe'? By defining the CTMU as a 'theory', Langan implies that it is subject to the very empirical restraints [sic] he declares it to be above." Even after staring at this for minutes on end, I still can't make sense of it. The term "theory" has a strict mathematical definition based on the application of generative rules of inference to axioms and theorems. According to this definition, even logic itself is a theory. In any case, theories are not defined in such a way that they are necessarily subject to empirical constraints. In this respect, the term "theory" differs sharply from scientific methodology. This dissonance between scientific methodology and scientific theories, i.e. theories with scientific content, reflects the self-conflicted nature of science.
Parallel then quotes Einstein to the effect that theories consist of assumptions to which logic has been applied, and that a "theory finds the justification for its existence in the fact that it correlates a large number of single observations ... it is just here that the 'truth' of the theory lies". Notice that Einstein places "truth" in quotes, ostensibly because he was aware of the distinction between the provisional "truth" of an assumption-ridden scientific theory and truth as it is logically evaluated with respect to syntax, semantics and interpretation.
You know, this whole exchange has been truly amazing. First, I explain that scientific empiricism and instrumentalism fail to support the concepts of truth and verification due to their reliance on non-generative observational and utilitarian models (where truth is the abstract mathematical identity studied in logic). It's not as though this can be rationally disputed; it's a hard fact. Next, I explain that logic and mathematics work from a different (generative) kind of model more amenable to formal verification, and point to an alternative theory of reality (the CTMU) which conjoins the two kinds of model and thus opens logical routes to verification in fields formerly limited to confirmation. (Note that the failings of empirical and instrumentalist models exist independently of the CTMU.)
So what happens next? Incredibly, my points are immediately rejected on the grounds that they are not in line with empirical and instrumentalist criteria. And to ice the cake, it is summarily demanded that I demonstrate my ability to satisfy these criteria regardless of their inadequacy, which is exactly what I'd set out to explain in the first place.
Truly, this is a world of many wonders! (So what if some of them resemble broken records.)
IP: Logged
|
|
|
Topic Closed
Printer-friendly view of this topic
