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Author
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Topic: Cosmogony, Holography and Causality
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gedanken
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posted 10. October 2003 02:13
Thanks, Mark, I don’t think I would want to bother Dr. Stapp.
I want to make clear that I don’t want anything of mine to be taken as asserting any expertise that is intended to reject anything that Dr. Stapp said. Rather the only points of which I would take a different direction are not “disagreements”, but rather discussion of issues different from those addressed by Stapp. (Also note he posted the correspondence here on his web page, see link provided in Mark’s second previous post above.)
For example he disputes the statistic of the Everet FAQ. I have no problem with that, and ask the readers to check out the facts for themselves. In other words I have no reason to take one over the other, nor to dispute either (simply noting slight but manageable incongruity). But the issue may be discussion of slightly different topics, rather than a dispute of the facts themselves between those sources. Copenhagen is completely accurate taken operationally. That is not in question—and that is partly Stapp’s point about use in practical cases. His point appears to be that to carry out prediction of any sort of system behavior, perform the calculation and use Copenhagen as the model for how to decide what to do to perform the calculation. It works. He is done, and leaves the rest to the philosophers. (That is why I would not want to bother him. Arguing on “parsimony” is too close to the philosophical argument.)
AH, there seem to be at least 144 such Stapp – Klein papers. The second, stapp-kiein.txt, shows that Klein has a better grip of the issues I was discussing with regard to the “movable boundary” than I should ever have. My area of interest would be much more toward the nature of human thought issues. (Which are, by the way, not issues of physicist’s expertise, though relating to the physics requires some expertise in both areas. My physics background makes me just knowledgeable enough to be dangerous here, and my AI background makes me interested.)
And by the way, though Stapp claims to leave some of the issue to the philosophers, his clearly philosophical book seems to belie that.
Also of great interest, now that I have read most of the way through the Klien-Stapp paper (linked above) : Operationally there is no difference between Stapp’s position, and MW! What is the key to understanding this? The key is that Stapp refers to a universal “representation of knowledge” in the quantum result. This is a shared or common element with CI and MW. Here we avoid the various personages, each with a different potential for causing his/her own occasion of “collapse”. (Note the discussion with Klein on persons in China causing collapse in California—precisely in line with a point I brought up here.) Stapp resolves this by the quantum decision resulting of knowledge of the entire universe, and all persons can share in that knowledge if they examine the results. Stapp refers to CI discussing “our knowledge”. How does this universal knowledge gained in the entire (and single) universe differ from a similar event in MW? The only difference is that in MW, the worlds split and it is one of those split worlds in which our present experience has taken a path. (The facts of alternate versions or copies of “us” is ignored in MW, taking all those other copies of “us” as in different worlds, and only that copy which is in this copy of the multiple worlds is considered for further calculation.) You see there is no difference, except for the MW claim of the existence of the alternate path worlds, with respect to the result as seen in this (in continuation in each instance) world!
But that distinction does remove my issue from Rex’s point, of the moveable boundary. It substitutes the “useful fiction” perspective. You see, what I am saying is that one can take a “useful fiction” perspective, and get a “crisp” QM result. OR one can take a “fuzzy result” picture and potentially claim a tighter conceptual connection to the real world as opposed to simply having a “fiction” that works computationally and operationally. Either picture fits the “fuzzy” knowledge model (and that is not a “physics” statement). [I’m not going to edit this paragraph out, but it contains a mistake. There is a distinction between the decision point, occurring in either MW or CI, and the issue of continuing the wave interactions including all forms of entanglement and interaction. The problem, of course, it that those distinctions exist in both MW and CI. The “collapse” in CI is a branching decision in MW, but is otherwise no different. But the choice to continue to calculate interaction is something that I don’t understand. This continuation is related to our issue—and I must leave it for another day.]
[ 10. October 2003, 02:53: Message edited by: gedanken ]
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gedanken
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posted 10. October 2003 11:11
I thought I had resolved some issues of the last paragraph. (See notes at end)
Let’s examine a sequence of events:
code:
*(S0)
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A
/ \
(S1) / B (Sb)
/ / \
/ / \
(S1)(S2) (S3)
Our sequence of events can be viewed in a Markov framework, but I will simply discuss the branching probabilities of events.
We start in state S0, at “*”. In event A, there are two paths (left, right). Give them, for example, probabilities of L 1/3, R 2/3 branch. Then event B, L 1/2, R 1/2. Thus the probability of each final state S1, S2, and S3 happens to be 1/3.
BUT there is a sequence, first event A, then later event B. We could label a state Sb at node B, and states could thus be divided S1, Sb, rather than S1,S2,S3. Then we could examine the world from the standpoint if we knew we were in state Sb. (This, as opposed to our initial assumption of starting is state S0 at “*”.) From that viewpoint, the distribution is S2, S3 with 50/50 rather than S1,S2,S3 with 1/3 probabilities. This is a differing viewpoint only—it is a view of the starting and ending state only, not an essence of the real world! In other words, it is a decision of what knowledge we are going to examine. Two distributions (S1 1/3, S2 1/3, S3 1/3) and (S2 1/2, S3 1/2) are based on different decisions of our knowledge.
Now consider these branches as quantum events. If we start at beginning state S0 (at “*”), then we see the 1/3 distribution, but if we start at state Sb, we see the two 1/2 distributions. This can be viewed as the quantum “smearing”. If we choose to ignore our knowledge of event B, then we are viewing a smeared distribution including S2,S3. If we choose to additionally ignore our knowledge of event A, we are viewing a smeared distribution including S1,S2,S3. But the “smearing” is simply a matter of viewpoint.
[Added in edit] (I don’t want this to be misunderstood. Clearly slit experiments produce quantum-effect determined distributions. Rather the above is intended to be a particular case in which a set of discrete events entail in causal sequence according to the diagrams. Quasi-classical connections are postulated at all other points, to translate the quantum event to observable proportions with only low noise levels. Actually the slit experiment can be constructed to produce the events A and B. There exist single electron firing guns that can fire a single electron at will. Fire at a slit. Then place a couple of detectors, labeled “L” and “R”, such that the coverage is of the probability proportions specified for the event A (or B) as desired. The result of the A “right” event path is to fire a second such setup for event B, otherwise do nothing on such trigger. In each case if no measurement was made of either path, repeat the mechanism repeats the firing of the electron so as to get a good reading. The intervening equipment is “low noise” semi-classical scale device. Note that we can know the intermediate result in this setup as humans, but don’t necessarily need to examine the result.) [/end edit]
Now in MW, there is a ‘split’ into multiple universes at knowledge of event A. Then another splitting into multiple universe paths at event B. But in CI, we simply interpret at our moment of knowledge of event A a “collapse” (of the distribution). But viewing from standpoint of state S0, and viewing in our particular world if there are multiple branches at the present in MW (or just in our single universe in CI), but viewing the final state set S1,S2,S3 from that initial state S0, we see in either case the distribution of 1/3 for each of those final states. In other words the “smearing” is a statement of which part of our potential knowledge we are examining at the moment. If we consider all of our knowledge after the experiment, we actually know whether we have state S1, S2, or S3 with complete certainty. There is no smearing of the result, whether we are in a MW world individual path, or if we are in a CI world with a particular outcome. No difference.
The “smearing” issue is quite distinct from the issue of interpretation, MW, or CI. The choice of whether we follow the quantum wave equations from state S0 to the final states S1,S2,S3 alternatives, or if we start at a different starting state, is one of choice of our investigation. The “smearing” is a choice of our investigational view and has nothing to do with CI or MW interpretations.
Now examine a further result, say from state S3. Say that was a trigger into the Geiger counter. After that point, there is a lot of amplifying electronics, etc., with quantum processes. But these quantum processes obey pretty much classical electricity laws. In other words the “click” is amplified with a very high concentration of probability into the click we hear and the meter movement. The 99% confidence distribution is quite narrow, of that assembly of an enormous number of quantum events, further branching states C... etc, along the path of the Geiger counter electronics. It is these branches that, due to construction of the Geiger counter, have a high probability of resulting in an audible “click”, that goes with the point of Dr. Stapp that “I think a many-worlder would say that the smearing out would not be observed because it would be too small.” I think this is an example of that case and what is meant, and beyond that is an issue of various persons discussing slightly different topics.
Now the MW objection is essentially a statement that we don’t observe the Geiger counter in a state of 1/3 “click” smeared out. But of course we don’t. Rather we have interpreted that we are in a particular world path that included state S3, and we are now in that path. (And in a CI world, we now know the outcome of the branching path, it reached state S3.) But viewing from either interpretation we have no “smearing” in our observation due to the QM ‘interpretation’ framework!
[Added in edit] So at this point, has the MW interpretation theory ignored such a simple construction? My argument is that it cannot have ignored such a construction. But clearly this distribution concatenation is implied by normal quantum mechanics theory. Any “decoherence” theory must accommodate that the system will produce a reasonably accurate probability decomposition of events (such as A) in proportions specified. I don’t think that anyone readily accepts a MW concept in which Schrodinger’s cat is in a superposition of dead and alive states at a 33 or 50% level such as could be constructed.[/end edit]
I could relate this to the “fuzzy” knowledge issue at this point—but I want to put that in a separate post so as to not confuse the issues here. I think that clarity on this specific issue is important. Rex (or Erik or anyone with extended QM knowledge) could comment if appropriate.
The development of this presentation is based on my reading of the very fine argument between Klein and Stapp from 1998, as well as the discussion from Stapp on our issue, and some other papers on Stapp’s site. (All links given somewhere in last few posts.)
--[Added in edit]...
However here is a list of various papers of relevance of Dr Stapp’s, many of later dates, that seem to disagree with this presentation. I find the 1998 Stapp-Klien to be the most coherent and understandable. The later papers seem to contradict that paper. So I leave the issue in a quandary in terms of my understanding Dr. Stapp’s position.
Reply to Mszlazak on Many worlds, epistemology, and ontology.(10/9/03) (Mark’s question, posted in this thread.)
Answers to Kathy's Questions about Many-Worlds (Oct 22, 2002) ** Note discussion of “smearing” issue, apparently with a different meaning from my presentation.**
Answers to more Questions from Kathy (Oct 30, 2002)
Role of consciousness (Exchange with Stan Klein, May 7, 2001)
Dialog with Klein on "Decoherence, QZE, and ...": (March 14-18, 2000)
Answers to Klein and Nunn, Feb 8, 1999.
Replies to Klein, Globus, Josephson, Sarfatti, Hayes, and Sloman Aug 19-21, 1998
***Stapp-Klein Dialog . Sept 1-5, 1998 I find this to be particularly coherent and readable, noted above.***
--- Dr. Stapp’s Book, Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, and some notes of my own below:
Sequence of chapters of Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, Dr. Henry Stapp (PDF files, June 30, 2003)
CH1: Introduction
CH2: Penrose-Hameroff Approach
CH3: Bohm Approach
CH4: von Neumann/Stapp Approach
CH5: The Eccles-Beck Approach
CH6: The Jibu-Yasue Approach
CH7: Directions for Future Research
Chap 1 explains the “smeared out” strict Schroedinger equation and issue.
(This describes how from a given starting point, equation evolves in manner wherein uncertainties grow over time. I think there is at least some relevance to my presentation above from a probability model of the simplified Markov-like sequence, wherein we know an initial state but do not know the resulting state. The sequential divisions of probabilistic events divide to produce even less knowledge of the future. The Schroedinger equation is a slightly different uncertainty relationship, describing an actual “cloud like” property which will accordingly grow. We know that there are wave aspects, including interference, that relate to this, including multiple simultaneous paths possible through multiple slits, taken for example by an electron. Key relationships, I think, is that initial knowledge as I described in state S0 becomes more distributed and defocused, as our knowledge is uncertain about which of states S1,S2, or S3 will occur in end state of branching structure. I think there is a correspondence to the Schroedinger case, in that if we knew of the occurrence in state Sb, then we refine our knowledge of future states to S2, S3. This of course ignores the interference possibilities in multi-path, which are changed when we gain knowledge like presence in state Sb of the diagram, in a vague sort of equivalence, but that presentation was not considering interferences. So my presentation was relating to knowledge based view of the spreading state, changing final state knowledge. Key point left out, once again, was interference effects and relationship of “knowledge” to those interference effects.)
Mathematician von Neumann shows an equivalence that generalized Copenhagen to including the physical states of the human rather than requiring the human “outside” of the system. But interpretation must occur involving a set of “basis vectors” upon which the events must be described in the QM analysis.
Brain dynamics are considered in light of QM itself. Though chapter discusses neuroscience, it also discusses the way that the “basis vectors” are established for the computation by human choice, over which quantum events are essentially measured.
(I claim that there is a relationship between choice of basis vectors in this description, and the simplified starting state view in the simplified Markov sequence I presented. Essentially be specify the basis vector for the QM calculation, we specify the starting state for the Markov sequence calculation, and results are dependent. The significant difference occurs when we have interference in the QM case, knowledge of intermediate state affects final states in interference cases of multi-path. More on this relationship later.)
Chapter 2, Penrose-Hammeroff approach, brings in a discussion by Penrose about Godel incompleteness, and claims about computabiltiy and human thought process based on those notions.
(Rex and I discussed “fuzzy logic” and other aspects in pages around page 3 or 4 of this thread, dealing with the Godel issue. I feel that we agreed to very important counter-arguments against the Penrose argument. Note this is not a matter of physics, rather a matter of study of “intelligence” for which Rex and myself might be more qualified to comment. Rex for example does considerable study in this area, and I have done some research in AI applications that relate to complexity issues.)
The chapter continues with considerable physics relationships, and some issues of physics and physiology.
Chapter 3, traces Bohm approach. This is possibly of philosophical value, but in many ways leaves us with the Copenhagen approach in practical terms. An attempt was made at dealing with indeterminism. Problems include involvement of unknowable and uncontrollable parameters.
Chapter 4: VERY important This includes significant elements of Dr. Stapp’s own ideas, and concepts from this chapter appear in the various letters and discussions in his various papers, including several linked above. I shall not try to describe von Neumann’s “psychophysical theory” relating to “Pashler” result. (Read for yourself!)
Pashler’s result is a decrease in physical force a human can apply when distracted with mental activity. Pashler studies “focus” issues.
(I have extreme doubts as to von Neumann’s quantum theory of a relationship to Pashler’s result. That could be very easily explained in terms of computational considerations which essentially require nothing beyond classical theory and a computing device model. Neural activity may relate to “focus”, and “focus” on the task of physical activity concentrates more partially autonomic activity towards the force generating result. Once again, this is not an issue of physicist experience. Rex also has, I believe, done work relating to “focus” issues, if I am not mistaken, and may wish to comment. )
Dr. Stapp describes an issue of how experimenters by intention establish experimental conditions. This is related to the QM calculations including a relationship that is in essence to the CI issue of knowledge—but is related by way of these decisions of how the experiment is set up!
(Then I am very skeptical about this issue. As I will point out again in a subsequent post, there is no difference in whether we find the conditions set up by accident, or if we actively establish the conditions. The QM result from condition relationship must hold. Likewise for any other ‘law’ of physics. I have of course no denial that scientists set up such conditions, or that when they do that results apply as described. It is the dependence of theory on the scientist setting up those conditions that I am questioning most severely.)
The chapter ends in drawing a connection of the person’s own consciousness and the quantum behavior within the brain. But specifically it is posed as resolutions of the sorts of decisions from above of experimenter “choice” in establishing the vectors along which quantum events are decomposed. In this case the experimenter is left out of consciously composing those conditions, and they are left to their simple existence in the brain. Then a question is raised about why neurophysiologists should not consider these quantum relationships.
(A secondary issue arises for me here. The activity of the brain can be studied objectively from outside the particular brain being studied. Specifically the basis vectors of existing decompositions of quantum effects in the brain could be studied. This could be done by simply observing the existing chemical/physical structure, rather than intentionally setting up experimental conditions of the neurophysiology—since that neurophysiology already exists in the brain in question. All QM decomposition and thus all QM activity in the brain is adequately described by this outside or external experimenter approach. Specifically remember the Stapp-Klein Sep. 1998 discussion of information available to the “universe” rather than to the specific consciousness being sufficient for QM event description.)
Chapter 5: Compares “Eccles-Beck” approach to vN/S approach from chapter 4.
At one point, the issue of spreading (or equivalent “smearing”) of Heisenberg uncertainty is related to conscious intentions of the experimenter (by way of what is called “process 1 actions”). But the implication seems to be that the person’s own consciousness, existing in relation to the process, would relate to the QM decomposition.
(If I understand the relationship being drawn, that something special occurs in relation to QM event decomposition here because it is involved directly in “consciousness”, then I don’t understand how this differs from another case. The Geiger counter makes a recording. Later the recording is read by the human. The result of the QM event is known. But the Geiger counter works exactly the same, whether the QM decomposition relation to the “consciousness” occurs later, or at the time of the click. It matters not whether the click was read off a chart, or heard directly, the equipment would work the same in all cases. The QM theory must predict the result in all these cases, and should not differ because of the immediate proximity of the “consciousness” to the immediate resolution of the decomposition of basis vector equations. Here we get into my differences over CI, and why CI based issues can become “entangled” in the description of processes—and why I have so much difficulty with CI interpretation.)
Chapter 6: Includes description (very short) of “holographic model”.
(I agree with the vague association of the “hologram” and the brain function. But only so up to a point. Holography is a linear process, and the brain is highly non-linear. So that relationship breaks down quickly. But there is an amazing connection in some manner to neural-network behavior outputs and holographic lookups, in that the distributed weighting of effects combine in an overall result. Where I have problems is that the experimenter has been lost once again. I think that non-intelligent processes and intelligent processes must both obey similar QM equations and descriptions, simply because the information needed for their understanding can be obtained by external observation. Once again I refer to Stapp-Klein dialogue of Sept. 1998, wherein a “universal” level of knowledge is recognized that is not specific to a particular person for QM equation resolution. We no more observe “spreading” of QM states in the Geiger counter than we do in the brain when observing largely macro-scale events. Both the Geiger counter and the brain can be understood with similar science from the standpoint of how one analyzed the physics. Obviously the complexity is different, and the number of multi-disciplinary studies needed for complexity issues.)
[ 11. October 2003, 02:46: Message edited by: gedanken ]
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Mark Szlazak
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posted 10. October 2003 17:46
Gedanken, for the sake of confirming accuracy I've forward a link to your responses and let's see what comes back. If it happens, it may not be until next week.
Now going back to the original issue about the MW-decoherence view being a real alternative to CI. Maybe I'm just being simplistic but here's my take on why I believe it's not. Forgetting the PR, if the main players working on the MW-decoherence view really don't see it as a fully worked out alternative when compared to CI but rather a work in progress, then why should I call it an alternative view?
[ 10. October 2003, 17:54: Message edited by: Mark Szlazak ]
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gedanken
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posted 10. October 2003 18:11
Yes, see my edit of above just posted. My understanding from of "Stapp-Klein Dialog. Sept 1-5, 1998." is not consistent with Dr. Stapp's later writing. I understand that my intentional oversimplificaiton is indeed an oversimplification of the detailed issues of that level of MW.
But I prefer to keep to the simplest form of the issues, like the correspondence principle. QM must reduce to the corresponding classical result when taken to classical realms, and must make consistent ordinary predictions. It must, for example, not require specialized intentional 'experimental' choices in reducing to simple classical results, as no particular choices relating to QM are necessary to make a simple classical observation. In the above, I take the Geiger counter example as a quasi-classical result, taking gross amplifier responses as a pseudo-classical result in the sense that it may be based on quantum phenomenon, but produces classical level measurables like current, etc. We know that the noise levels of the amplifier are not significant, we simply listen during the non-"click" times of the Geiger counter to see that, and note that the Geiger counter also works to produce clicks when stimulated. This can be likened to the Schrodinger cat--the mechanism is still classical from all reasonable levels of analysis. The Geiger counter clicks, that is an observable.
"If a Geiger counter clicked in a forest, and there was no one to hear it, did the Geiger counter actually click?"
Interesting dialog on "Many Minds" which at least raises some similar issues. See "dialog 3" and "4".
To answer Mark's point, I don't think that CI is "fully worked out" in a different sense. It produces its own absurdities. I have already pointed out (multiple times) that I don't personally accept MW. It is only an alternative in relative terms. And I additionally use an argument from authority that it is considered by well-known physicists (whether a majority is basically irrelevant to me). I think their reason for considering MW is not its being "fully worked out", but rather the failures of CI in comparison.
In fact, my major focus on MW was that the MW arguments show the skepticism and problems with CI. It is the CI critical arguments presented in presentations on MW that I was pointing to in the first place. So we share not accepting MW.
I found Dr. Stapp’s Sept 1998 paper’s explanation of a variation of CI (more or less describing a “useful fiction”) to be one of the best defenses of CI—but a defense that makes my major point without considering MW as an “alternative”. And then the conditions identified in Dr. Stapp’s Sept 1998 paper suggest an almost equivalent MW approach. I’m going to present one more argument in a subsequent post, relating to this entire subject, which may make a more coherent presentation.
[ 10. October 2003, 23:44: Message edited by: gedanken ]
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Mark Szlazak
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posted 10. October 2003 20:37
Gedanken,
While we wait for a possible response, you bring up the issue of size.
In some recent EPR-type experiments the polarizers used are seperated 10 kilometers apart, and that's makes the quantum connect objects that size as well. They maybe "thin" but they're quite "fat." Recently, a recipe for making a large quantum object, about a hundred trillion atoms or bacterium size, has been published. Not cat-size yet but moving in that direction. Here's the link.
Schrodinger's cat comes closer
[ 10. October 2003, 20:41: Message edited by: Mark Szlazak ]
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gedanken
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posted 10. October 2003 20:44
I may mention "classical scale" but I mean for the reader to figure out whether classical conditions apply. Size per se does not matter, a slit experiment can cover meters, and an EPR experiment can (as noted) cover miles. So with respect to that meaning one has to use judgment. Just that under many normal conditions, for example, a "classical" scale object would be like a ball, as opposed to an atom. In that case the ball is "classical" scale, the atom "quantum scale".
I hope not to get off into a general discussion of QM, but to stick to the issue of whether it must basically be a "useful fiction".
NOTE substantial update to post several above, including Dr. Stapp's book details and links.
[ 11. October 2003, 02:52: Message edited by: gedanken ]
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chimp
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posted 11. October 2003 06:55
It seems that the "non-locality" phenomena is a type of linear independence.
Penrose and five fold symmetry:
http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_tiling
http://nonlocal.com/quantum-d/v2/mporter_03-14-97.html
In the long run, useful fiction is misleading? But it is helpful in the brainstorming process, or to help codify the observations that we make. Yet, all mathematical proofs are either true, or false, with no in-between.
Even the fuzzy logics must be interpreted with a stable 2V logic backdrop. The real observable world cannot correspond to exact True or False though. For example, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Our cognitive machinery is probably wired in such a way, that allows us to make sense of the world?
What if generalized fuzzy logic is the backdrop, and 2V logic is what we percieve because of certain resolution factors via Planck's constant, h?
DxDp >= hbar/2 , where hbar is h/2pi
Then treat the entire universe as a quantum particle. An n-dimensional universe, as a resonating unified field, with frequency of damped oscillation.
If nothing is represented as a point of equilibrium, something can come from nothing, as a phase differential, which must be allowed, when the point of equilibrium is also a type of infinite probability space.
Two types of concepts are related by an invariance principle:
[ 0 + 0 = 0]<---->[aleph_0 + aleph_0 = aleph_0]
[ 11. October 2003, 13:56: Message edited by: Russell E. Rierson ]
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Mark Szlazak
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posted 11. October 2003 13:28
Gedanken wrote:
quote:
To answer Mark's point, I don't think that CI is "fully worked out" in a different sense. It produces its own absurdities. I have already pointed out (multiple times) that I don't personally accept MW. It is only an alternative in relative terms. And I additionally use an argument from authority that it is considered by well-known physicists (whether a majority is basically irrelevant to me). I think their reason for considering MW is not its being "fully worked out", but rather the failures of CI in comparison.
Gedanken, I too can complain about anything I don't like. I can have car complaints between two cars but if one of them doesn't have and engine and drive train, it doesn't work, and it's not really a car. In this comparison, my car complaints don't have much meaning and are definitely not philosophical complaints about cars. In my mind, the question still is whether MW is even an alternative interpretation to QM. Gedanken, do you think I can I solve all typically solved QM problems with it, even those found undergrad physics texts? Does MW even work as a valid altertive interpretation?
Since our issue/context is whether MW even makes it to "first base", then why even care about some bad feels about CI or the "price of rice", they're irrelevent.
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jasonyoung
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posted 11. October 2003 13:37
Gedanken, citing the respective metaphysical shortcomings of the Copenhangen and Many-Worlds Interpretations of the quantum mechanical calculus, advocates the instrumentalist view, wherein theories are construed as useful and convenient calculating devices for moving from observed sets of data to predicted sets of data. Theoretical statements are thus divested of ontological import, and the ontological implications of theories and models can be summarily dismissed. Epistemically speaking, instrumentalism gives a functional account of concepts and rationality, and their utility in predicting and controlling our interactions with the experienced world of phenomena becomes the only criterion scientists are permitted to use when selecting between competing theories and models. Truth and reference, two of the historically most significant issues in epistemology, are exchanged for the much more craven "warranted assertability", and any semblance of metaphysical realism is defenestrated along with any chance of ever getting our hands on a coherent and exhaustive explanation of experienced reality.
All of this would be fine were we not discussing a theory which resolves the long-standing debate instrumentalists have been having with metaphysical realists by establishing on firmer epistemological ground an edifice of knowledge acquisition. To repeat and summarize: the CTMU makes the questions you've been debating in this thread historical footnotes, which is mighty hilarious given the contents of the post which initiated it. So, my advice, read Mr.Langan's paper, and after that, read it again.
As for the possibility of the two-valued logic not applying on the microscale, this is.. plainly false. Listen: many-valued logic doesn't work if two-valued logic doesn't work; you cannot have one without first having the other, which should be fairly apparent when one considers a statement such as, "something is either X or not-X". Likewise, something either exists or it does not exist. There isn't a coherent 'in between' state as such a state is precluded by definition!
One hopes further exhortation won't be needed to overcome the inertia of a ponderous and clumsy worldview. The mysterious mental maneuver needed to prevail upon an anguishing stasis is incomparably subtle and perilous, however, so one small piece of advice may be appropriate: easy, you know, does it, son (random allusion, just for fun).
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gedanken
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posted 12. October 2003 01:28
[First two parenthetical aside points, the first of which I apparently have to explain again, though explained on previous pages:
1)
This is a general statement on “fuzzy logic” and how I brought it up, I’ll respond to Jason Young below, this is background.
I don’t agree with “fuzzy logic,” for consideration as a useful logic for a large number of circumstances.
(Therefore demonstrating failures or conditions of application of fuzzy logics are of little relevance to my consideration.)
The failings of “fuzzy logic” are the same as the multitude of two value logics—that they do not produce completely accurate descriptions of any real world situations. Just as mathematical proofs give us very useful results that approximate measurable situations, likewise the various logics themselves applied to real world situations. They provide very useful guides, helping us to refine our thinking in very useful ways.
But combinatorial explosion of details prevents any of the logics from completely accurately dealing with individual real-world situation. (Notwithstanding its usefulness in providing approximating understanding.)
Fuzzy logics can be operationally useful in some circumstances (not so much for proof or analysis, but in systems implementation) precisely because linearization or continuous functionalization of partial-truth rules can produce better approximation with less rule explosion in some real-world situations. But an explosion of logic combining rules itself occurs in trying to refine application to any given real-world situation beyond a certain point, making “fuzzy” logics as useless as two valued logic in complete resolution of these issues, and in fact makes “fuzzy” logic even less useful in most circumstances due to increased complexity in utilization.
And as generalizations, logical statements only approximate the real world situations they try to deal with due to the original failure in the combinatorial explosion of details that produce inaccuracies in the original detailed situations that the generalizations were intended to handle.
My point in discussing “fuzzy logic” is rather to bring up the importance of considering the degree error in arbitrary given statements, as an approximation to real world situations. Human thought processes work with neural-network pathways that inherently produce and operate with “fuzzy logic” like constructs. So thought patterns, including analyzing “logic” itself, necessarily proceeds with processes that have a “fuzzy” or approximating basis which has some relationship to mathematically defined “fuzzy” logic descriptions.
By recognizing the fuzzy nature of understanding of real world situations, at least one does not become falsely arrogant in thinking one has an ultimate answer.
A second point in that early argument was to point out that fuzzy logics (with their own “syntax” differing from a two-valued logic) constitute a greater set of “logics” than the various two-valued logics considered.
Beyond that, I suggest reading the presentations made by Rex and myself near page 3 or 4, which I think made my point sufficiently in detail.
2)
In answer to Mark, on our side-trip:
Largely the “classroom” kind of problem would have the same answer with MW as with CI. The reason is that there would be no distinction at that level of problem description between MW’s splitting, and CI’s collapse. The mathematics essentially gives the same result; it is “interpretation” behind the math that differs—as I understand it. This is why many descriptions say that MW cannot be experimentally differentiated from CI. The point is that they result in the same observable. If they result in the same observable, the calculations must produce the same results.
Now there are more esoteric aspects of MW in which the question of decision of when “splitting” occurs and how often may indeed affect the calculations. Likewise we have those same sorts of questions in the art of calculating from a CI standpoint. One can, as active “observer” choose to modify the point at which the “observation” is taken. A different point of observation implies a different allowance for progress of the Schroedinger equations, for example. But once again, most textbook questions would pretty much establish the experimental conditions, and so the equation evaluations would wind up being the same. The esoteric aspects of the different interpretations would not come into play. Thus they get to “first base” in the same manner, being indistinguishable in the first base hit.
]
Main point
Jasonyoung,
I plead completely guilty to having a “clumsy world view”. But consider that if a worldview lead one to considering the number of angels dancing on the head of a pin, that I might consider that more ‘refined’ world view to be less meaningful than my own clumsy view. I don’t find the situations to be dramatically comparable, but do have some similar reactions. (And indeed, such a “world view” with many angles on the head of a pin might have a great deal of self referential self consistency.)
Then if you saw an argument with great complexity, which proposed to have explained a “free energy” or “perpetual motion” system, would you recommend reading the argument over and over until one actually understood it? Or would you immediately suspect that premises and/or logic had failed, possibly due to fuzzy claims distributed throughout the work, simply upon reading of the conclusion? Of course to locate any error, one would have to delve into details—requiring many readings for example. (My work with Dr. Dembski’s “Explanatory Filter” has had that character, and only gives up its refined secrets with enormous study. But it is much like Dr. Dembski’s description of looking at an evolutionary algorithm, to eventually discover what he calls the location in which the SC is “inserted” into the algorithm.)
But I shall indeed continue to study Mr. Langan’s presentation. It does have very interesting aspects. I certainly don’t claim to disagree with either all of its methods or conclusions. I do particularly disagree with certain conclusions presented here on page 1 and most clearly on page 4, relating syntactic nature of the universe.
In fact I rather like the description given by Aliet Jacob that “In its place, Langan posits his pantheist theory which engulfs the front-loading aspect and goes further to have the self-aware God distributing himself over reality.” And Mr. Langan’s opening post, that CTMU “...implies that a self-aware designer distributes over reality, or in theological terms, that ‘God configures Himself as reality.’ ” That conclusion (as opposed to the statement that CTMU implies such), with suitable understanding of what “God” means, is quite compatible with my own beliefs.
I have no objection to those aspects as stated, but may question if they have actually been demonstrated in any meaningful way by Mr. Langan.
But as to your statement:
quote:
As for the possibility of the two-valued logic not applying on the microscale, this is.. plainly false. Listen: many-valued logic doesn't work if two-valued logic doesn't work; you cannot have one without first having the other, which should be fairly apparent when one considers a statement such as, "something is either X or not-X". Likewise, something either exists or it does not exist. There isn't a coherent 'in between' state as such a state is precluded by definition!
You are mistaken if you read the concurrence of statements in this thread about “fuzzy logic”, and other statements about quantum theory as meaning that my statements about “logic” failing to represent reality are restricted to “microscale”. I make that bold assertion about macroscale statements, macroscale observations and objects!
I challenge the readers to name a single aspect of physical reality that can be described with logical statements in which there is no question of error or degree of imperfection in the description.
We learn our various logics by first postulating the concepts, which may be called axioms. (Now we may not create the mental image of the axiom first, but rather do so with something akin to an inductive process of repetition, yet the second aspect I now name remains the same.) We then refine our acceptance of the logic as useful by experience. (I know that Mr. Langan’s argument against this, I simply don’t buy it. The and / or sort of logic is based on our tendency to form categories or to make associations. The first associations are of images, such as “mother” but in a feeling rather than symbolic manner. This moves on to an ability to use names or other associations which we may eventually describe as “categories”, and that we do clustering and then name or otherwise remember those clusters. But those names are not necessarily “syntactic”, there is no requirement of a language aspect. These clustering and even naming aspects are of the human, not inherently of the world! Yes they surely correspond to worldly characteristics in some manner – but this is precisely where I claim that macroscale mapping is always fuzzy!)
quote:
Likewise, something either exists or it does not exist. There isn't a coherent 'in between' state as such a state is precluded by definition!
If one precludes the “in between” by definition, perhaps one has made a foolish definition. Perhaps one has made a definition of how one classifies worldly experiences in such a way that no worldly experience actually applies. But I suspect that one is simply mistaken, performing in the end fuzzy thinking.
When “something exists” we must be specifying what is the subject of the discussion, what the subject of “exists” is referring to. But the problem here is not necessarily about questions of whether some object exists in our experience of the real world. (This could occur in a quantum event in progress.) Rather often the issues are whether an object is properly described as that subject—failure of the object to “exist” is to fail in part to match what is sought, rather than partial existence of some object per se. But that failure to accurately match the subject of the sentence still makes a logic statement approximate representation of reality.
From there, abstractions are always even more approximate, because they depend on an induction of already approximate experiences. (Note that reliability of “induction” is a separate but related issue.)
Of course with my point about “fuzzy” concepts, if one takes “syntax” as a sufficiently fuzzy concept, then of course the statements to which I am objecting become true (in fair degree). But of course Mr. Langan apparently goes on to define “syntax” (perhaps using different words intended to replace that symbol) in very precise terms.
Any emergent complexity understanding of human understanding must be recursive and self-referential somewhat along Mr. Langan’s lines. And of course the ‘circular’ argument cannot be an ‘evil’ (correctly identified by Mr. Langan), as even science must in its emergent manner occur somewhat along such lines.
[ 12. October 2003, 01:57: Message edited by: gedanken ]
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gedanken
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posted 12. October 2003 01:35
Perhaps an interesting note on holography:
Have you ever noticed that holograms give fuzzy images? The fact is that they give up resolution of their imaged objects in favor of distributed spatial representation of those objects.
There is probably a definable Godelian principle of holograms:
No hologram can image itself!
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Rex Kerr
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posted 12. October 2003 06:57
An added thought on crisp two-valued logic where things are true or false with no in between.
When applying such things to the real world, one may have difficulty constructing any statement that is not always true, always false, or undecidable. For example, "The man is in the room," could be always true if taken to mean that the probability density of particles centered in his body is nonzero inside the room (never mind how you crisply define room), always false if any part of him is outside, and plagued with undecidability if we use the conventional interpretation of the statement. (Is he in the room if only a foot is in? All but a foot is in? He's standing in the doorway? Etc..)
Of course, Gedanken has already posed the same questions, but possibly a slightly different way of looking at it could help some people understand what the problem is.
Our experience of the world shows it to be categorizable but imprecisely so. CTMU seems to take great notice of the former but little of the latter.
Finally, note that fuzzy logic and 2-valued logic are derivable from each other. Neither is needed "first". If you have one, you can get the other.
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Christopher M. Langan
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posted 12. October 2003 11:40
Gedanken likens the CTMU to "an argument with great complexity proposing to explain a free energy or perpetual motion system...a worldview lead(ing) one to consider the number of angels dancing on the head of a pin...(which) might have a great deal of self referential self consistency." Except for the last part, this analogy fails. Gedanken then offers this erroneous view of the CTMU as a reason not to "read the argument over and over until one actually understands it," going on to report that he "immediately suspected that [CTMU] premises and/or logic had failed, possibly due to fuzzy claims distributed throughout the work, simply upon reading the conclusion."
Somewhat inexplicably, gedanken follows up with: "I shall indeed continue to study Mr. Langan’s presentation. It does have very interesting aspects. I certainly don’t claim to disagree with either all of its methods or conclusions." However, apparently lest anyone get too comfortable with this grudging concession, he points out that he "particularly disagree(s) with certain conclusions presented...on page 1 and most clearly on page 4, relating (to the) syntactic nature of the universe." Finally, regarding those aspects with which gedanken does happen to agree, he "questions if they have actually been demonstrated in any meaningful way by Mr. Langan."
Gedanken can question whatever he wants to until the cows come home. But until he identifies some specific flaw in my argumentation, this has nothing whatsoever to do with its validity. To underscore this fact, I will answer his challenge to "name a single aspect of physical reality that can be described with logical statements in which there is no question of error or degree of imperfection in the description." Here's one such statement: "Physical reality must conform to 2-valued logic in every observable respect (whether or not it maps consistently to any particular set of contingent expressions)." Here's another: "The overall structure of physical reality must conform to a new mathematical structure called SCSPL." Here's another: "All aspects of physical reality, including such trivial matters as cosmogony and causality, must conform to all of the logical implications of the preceding statements." There are others, but they're in the paper too.
Rex Kerr then pipes in with "an added thought on crisp two-valued logic where things are true or false with no in between". To boil Rex's argument down to what seem to be its bare essentials, he is saying that (1) contingent statements like "The man is in the room" cannot be identified as true, false or undecidable until all terms and concepts therein, e.g. "being in a room", are properly defined; (2) it is notoriously impossible to define such concepts; (3) therefore, nothing in reality can be unequivocally identified as true, false or undecidable; (4) so 2-valued logic fails as a basis for reality theory.
Rex's argument begins to disintegrate at step 2. It is in fact possible to define descriptive predicates with respect to a given consistent model of reality. It gets worse at step 3; unlike the perceptual primitives and elementary logic functors in terms of which perception actually occurs, more or less fuzzy descriptions of perceptual states and observations do not equate to the observations themselves. This makes step 4 a simple non-sequitur.
Rex then compounds his error by asserting that "fuzzy logic and 2-valued logic are derivable from each other. Neither is needed first. If you have one, you can get the other."
If Rex means that (A) MVL is derivable from 2VL, and (B) 2VL is derivable from MVL, that's fine. But statement B ignores the fact that MVL cannot arise without 2VL in the first place, and that 2VL thus retains priority. While one can distinguish among 2VL (yer-or-no) possibilities using 2VL alone, one cannot distinguish among the (many-valued) possibilities of MVL without 2VL; they either are or are not distinct from each other. If they are, then 2VL is presupposed; if they are not, then MVL collapses to 2VL anyway.
[ 12. October 2003, 12:02: Message edited by: Christopher M. Langan ]
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gedanken
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posted 12. October 2003 16:29
quote:
"Physical reality must conform to 2-valued logic in every observable respect (whether or not it maps consistently to any particular set of contingent expressions)." Here's another: "The overall structure of physical reality must conform to a new mathematical structure called SCSPL." Here's another: "All aspects of physical reality, including such trivial matters as cosmogony and causality, must conform to all of the logical implications of the preceding statements."
I have in essence asked for a particular example of "Physical reality" conforming to "2-valued logic", and Mr. Langan replies with a statement that every aspect of physical reality must so conform as his demonstration of a particular. Oh well.
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chimp
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posted 12. October 2003 17:54
quote:
gedankin:
I have in essence asked for a particular example of "Physical reality" conforming to "2-valued logic", and Mr. Langan replies with a statement that every aspect of physical reality must so conform as his demonstration of a particular. Oh well.
Mr. Langan is correct with the realization that the tautology A or ~A governs reality.
[Existence or Not-Existence] is absolutely true.
Whether or not an individual is completely inside or outside a room, or whatever physical condition the individual is in, the individual exists
A or ~A
Yes, it appears to be an extremely trivial truth, but it is truth nonetheless.
Therefore
mathematical existence = physical existence
[ 12. October 2003, 17:57: Message edited by: Russell E. Rierson ]
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