posted 07. November 2003 03:05                    

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Deb Bebbington:
Can you explain what perception is? For example, is it the raw signals detected by human senses or the subjective experience of those senses.

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Cognition and perception are languages based on the SCSPL syntax, as explained in the CTMU writings. Logical tautologies are then the basis of our cognitive and perceptual syntax. So anything that is beyond logic, is beyond cognition, which is then beyond perception, which is then beyond the senses.
Perception is a cognitive process, logical information processing with degrees of complexity, that is to say, perception is a self processing language. Mind and reality are linked in mutual dependence[isomorphism ] on the most basic level of understanding. It is an interactive connection of the abstract and the concrete, the subjective and the objective, the internal and the external.
Therefore, it is impossible to separate mind from reality.

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Gedankin:
It may be claimed that mind is iso-morphic to reality. But that would eaither mean that every mind is omniscient, or is suportive of solipsism. (Solipsism because our limited minds "ISO-" morphic thus one to one onto all of reality means a very small and private reality. Remembrer this case is not omnicient mind, for which a one to one and onto of all of reality might be reasonable.)

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Gedankin:
But this is just what I have pointed out over many pages. This is not crisp logic. Rather it is argument with matter of degree.

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Rex:
The other half of the failure is at least as bad, as far as the CTMU goes. If we can only comprehend that part of the universe that is isomorphic to some syntax that we use, the syntax cannot possibly be logic, because we're only able to understand the simplest logical constructs. Rather, the universe has to be isomorphic to our actual thought processes: fuzzy, sometimes logical, sometimes emotional, beset by error, etc.. This is, on the one hand, exactly right: we can only understand what we can understand. But on the other hand, it's an absurdly bad model for an external reality, since it is our experience that some things (e.g. mechanics) behave much more predictably than our cognition does. So this approach seems wrong in principle. Why is it any better in principle if we take an abstraction of human cognition, namely logic, than if we take the cognition itself? There are many logical things that are incomprehensible, so this hardly seems to help; if the analysis is correct (and I believe it is not), that would allow many things in the universe that we couldn't perceive or understand, and hence were not in the universe by definition.

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posted 07. November 2003 04:52                    

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By design or logical necessity?

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We perceive a logically consistent universe, Aliet's fantasies notwithstanding.

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The SCSPL's general spatiotemporal structure is hologically replicated everywhere within itself as self-transductive syntax. Thus, the generative phase of reality is reduced to the generative grammar of SCSPL.

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posted 07. November 2003 06:41                    

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Aliet:

First, Russel needs to explain what is the syntax of reality and then explain what is the syntax of the mind.

By the very fact that he juxtaposes reality from mind, it means that Russel is talking about the non-sentient part of reality like water or a rock or a dust particle.

The dust particle is not isomorphic to the mind because the mind is capable of conceptualizing while the dust particle is not. The dust particle has no desires while it is desires/purpose/instincts that drive the mind to action. When one sees a rock on a stool, one cannot imagine that the rock had any choice in its being there because rocks do not have choices and do not think.

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Aliet:

The mind can see water where there is no water (mirage) and the mind will rush to the water only for the water to move further and further away. Thus reality in such cases is inconsistent with perception.
Thus the percept and percepient are not always on the same page.

From geocentricity to heliocentricity, one can see that cognition is not the same as reality as Langan argues. Reality theory is not equal to reality, but is a description of reality.

Russel's arguments can only hold for those that believe that electrons and atoms are sentient.

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By design or logical necessity?

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By design. A chair is not a chair by logical necessity. The laws of science are not the laws of science by logical necessity - we describe the phenomena in question as the laws of science. We dont get to prescribe them. A rose is not a rose by logical necessity.

You can call the laws of science "cupboard of stools" and they will still be the laws of science as we know them.

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A chair, like the dust particle, is an information processing system composed of interacting particles. Therefore the chair is a logically consistent aspect of a self contained reality. A thought process such as an emotion, making errors, etc. is result of cognitive processing. The cognitive processing must be by definition logical. The brain processes information according to logical rules. Laws of science must be logically consistent.
Repeat
Cognition and perception are languages based on the SCSPL syntax, as explained in the CTMU writings. Logical tautologies are then the basis of our cognitive and perceptual syntax. So anything that is beyond logic, is beyond cognition, which is then beyond perception, which is then beyond the senses.

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There is nothing logical by going to the toilet or having fever when we are sick. These are chain reactions that we have experienced over time and have come, via study, to integrate into our knowledge by knowing their causes. And even then, we still dont know plenty.

In making your arguments, like Langan, you have mightily confused force and energy with logic.

An electron does not attact another particle by logical necessity: its because of a force.

You need to define logic first before you start squandering it like you are doing. In failing to define it, you afford yourself an opportunity to abuse it and misapply its meaning, while buying the necessary wriggle room.

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If a human being has the standard digestive system, then it is logical that their body produces waste products at the end of the digestive process, and it is therefore logical that they complete the digestive process at the appropriate location.

If a person is sick, one possible symptom of sickness is a high temperature i.e. a fever.
It is therefore logical for certain sick prople to have a fever.

All of the laws of physics are based on mathematics and mathematics is based on logic. Therefore descriptions of force and energy are logical. Therefore force and energy are logical.
Energy is conserved. [1 Newton of force] = [1 Newton of force]. Very logical

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We perceive a logically consistent universe, Aliet's fantasies notwithstanding.

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There is nothing logical about the universe. Its stable. Thats all. And because its stable, we can explain it and have our explanations 'matching' what we observe. But if gravity becomes a repulsive force, we can explain in also - so long as its constantly repulsive. It wont be less logical.

Consistency allows logic. But 'logically consistent' is not the same as 'logical'. The former is a description while the latter has intrinsic connotations.

The aspects of reality that are consistent have got nothing to do with logic. So, 'logically consistent' is an incorrect expression.

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The SCSPL's general spatiotemporal structure is hologically replicated everywhere within itself as self-transductive syntax. Thus, the generative phase of reality is reduced to the generative grammar of SCSPL.

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Hology is an adoption of the cosmological principle under the cloak of holography.
There is nothing new or useful that it can offer. Hollow words like "spatiotemporal" are gramatically impressive but lack any useful concepts that we do not know. They are like rocking chairs: keep you busy but take you nowhere.

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Hology is a generalization of holography. A perfect fractal? would be isomorphic to succsessive magnifications of itself, so there is no associated cloak and dagger with respect to the hology principle

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Please provide evidence that there is a part of reality that "generates" grammar. And why if such a 'phase' exists, it violates the cosmological principle.

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And if you want to talk about automata, dont even try.

Yeah, ged's point about crispness is important. In advocating for hology over holography, Langan uses such terms as 'more powerful'. 'Powerful' means exactly nothing. Because it doesnt make a concept more correct or more explanatory and is not scientific. As such, its all hyperbole and aggrandizement of the arguments.

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It appears that SCSPL is more advanced than the cellular automata, in that SCSPL can explain its own genesis? and cellular automata cannot. But that brings us back to the UBT, and we cannot say anything about UBT because that would be giving UBT a constraint. Then it would no longer be pure freedom. But then again, the UBT can be explained as a perfect self cancellative symmetry and SCSPL would be a process of symmetry breaking. Yes?

"Ged" appears to totally miss the point about the 2 valued logic of the CTMU. According to ged, reality is not logical. Since all theories and explanations of reality must be logical, ged's illogical musings about reality being illogical appear to be incorrect along with being illogical

[ 07. November 2003, 07:06: Message edited by: Russell E. Rierson ]

posted 07. November 2003 14:51                

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If a human being has the standard digestive system, then it is logical that their body produces waste products at the end of the digestive process, and it is therefore logical that they complete the digestive process at the appropriate location.

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"Ged" appears to totally miss the point about the 2 valued logic of the CTMU. According to ged, reality is not logical. Since all theories and explanations of reality must be logical, ged's illogical musings about reality being illogical appear to be incorrect along with being illogical

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posted 08. November 2003 02:52                    

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If (by definition) "all theories and explanations of reality must be logical", then how do we know that there are any theories or any explanations? Our argument will go back into a circle if you try to demonstrate one of them, and I poke a little hole in the explanation by showing that it is not perfectly "logical".

Or do you mean that there are theories and explanations of reality, and that some of them exist and by definition are "logical", but that these theories and explanations are not known to conform to reality? (For if they are known to conform to reality, I suggest showing that, and showing that they have no points whatsoever of divergence from strictly and completely "logical" conformance to observation. If that cannot be shown, you have not made that point.)

Or lastly, are you simply claiming (as I think Rex pointed out) that there might be some theory or explanation of reality that is completely logical. But this has not been demonstrated.

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Logical-mathematical existence, simply means freedom from contradiction. Reality does not contradict itself. Therefore a theory that can prove both a statement and its negation is nonsensical and useless, because its statements and their negations can both be true.
Every aspect of reality is isomorphic to a description and theories are descriptions of reality
Language describes things, so reality is isomorphic to a language.

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But Russell, I suggest looking at my statement above in terms of paradox. One cannot state that No statement is completely and crisply "logical", and do so within "logic". I think that Godelian issues apply.

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Gödel's completeness theorem is a fundamental theorem in mathematical logic proved by Kurt Gödel in 1929 . It states, in its most familiar form, that in first-order predicate calculus every universally valid formula can be proved.

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Nevertheless, first-order logic is strong enough to formalize all of set theory and thereby virtually all of mathematics . It is the classical logical theory underlying mathematics. It is a stronger theory than sentential logic , but a weaker theory than arithmetic , set theory, or Second-order logic.

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It can be shown that every finite Boolean algebra is isomorphic to the Boolean algebra of all subsets of a finite set; in particular, the number of elements of every finite Boolean algebra is a power of two.

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According to physicist Lee Smolin, a description of any entity inside the real universe can only be with reference to other things in the universe. Space is then relational. For example, if an object has a momentum, that momentum can only be explained with respect to another object. Space then becomes an aspect of the relationships between things in the real universe. Space becomes analogous to a sentence, and Smolin says it is absurd to say that a sentence has no words in it. So the grammatical structure of each sentence[space] is defined by the relationships that hold between the words in it. For example, relationships like object-subject or adjective-noun. So there are many different grammatical structures composed of different arrangements of words, and the varied relationships between them.

Language describes the universe. The universe is isomorphic to a description and reality can only refer to itself, because, there is nothing outside of ...reality.
Since descriptions make distinctions, or references to other entities, and distinctions are tautologically logical, [A or ~A], reality is logical, in that its contents can be described by a language. The contents within reality are distinctive objects, individually different from the others.
You make a very good point about the theory of relativity Gedankin, when you say that relativity is really a theory of invariants. Tautologies of logic are also invariance principles, and it appears that the concept of an invariance is more general and ...powerful, than the concept of absolute truth, as expressed by the tautologies of logic...
That could be the ultimate failure of the CTMU? It relies on the logic of Aristotle, which is very riddled with paradox

posted 08. November 2003 03:07                

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The universe is isomorphic to a description...

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posted 08. November 2003 04:16                    

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You may or may not see the relation, but please bear with me. Are not classical mechanics “laws” correct? (Note that classical mechanics predictions can be used to put a man on the Moon, and many other physical measurements of classical mechanics can be done with many digits of precision in the measurements!) Then if classical mechanics is ‘correct’, how do you explain the anomalies seen as required for further theories like relativity, QM, etc. And if it is not ‘correct’, then describe why and now it is not correct, and why and how one gets such precise correspondence in so many measurements, even sufficient to put a man on the Moon.

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A closed formal system may be stratified, including variables and metavariables of arbitrary logical order. This makes the system self-referential, enabling it to internally express high-level truths regarding itself while leaving no level of truth internally unsubstantiated (provided that there exists a mechanism for transfinite referential closure, e.g. conspansive self-axiomatizing grammar and a form of logical self-similarity called “hology”). In other words, no ultimate level of truth is left in need of external validation; self-containment is satisfied.

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posted 09. November 2003 14:46                   

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A description has fewer parts than the universe. Therefore it cannot possibly be "onto", because a bijective mapping must be between sets of equal cardinality. In the world of models where mathematically defined logic is crisp, a crisp relationship here is important.

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posted 10. November 2003 01:28                

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An isomorphism is itself a description of sets of equal cardinality.

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Einstein:

R_uv - [1/2]g_uv R = 8pi G T_uv

is more correct than

Newton:

F = G m1 m2 /r^2

The Einstein field equations look very elegant and they contain much more information in their tensor formulations with regards to structure of spacetime and its relation to matter and energy, than does the Newtonian law of gravity. Tensors are a generalization of the "vector" concept. So, generalizations can be more "isomorphic" to reality than the more primitive abstract constructs.

So the exact description becomes a type of limit, in the compression of information via powerful generalizations.

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posted 10. November 2003 04:03                    

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Gedankin:
I thought that “correct” was “logical”, as in “binary” or 1/0 or “true”/“false”. How can one statement be more “true” than another? How can one system be more “isomorphic” than another? (Isomorphic is a mathematically defined model statement, it is either ‘true’ or ‘false’!) But of course it can—that has been precisely what I was talking about for several pages here. Logic as actually used in human conversation has degree, logic is “fuzzy”, not crisp! (At least the logic that Russell appears to be using in this argument!)

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If my interpretation is correct, the "exact" correspondence[isomorphism] is a limit. Theories are mental constructs that approach this limit. My apologies for the confusion, and consequent Gedankin "hair splitting"
The phrase should be: "closer to isomorphism" instead of "more isomorphic" but thanks very much for the correction Gedankin
Now Gedankin keeps mentioning the "combinatorial explosion" of terms that invariably must result from a description that is exactly isomorphic to the described universe. But the Riemann tensors are able to "compress" the information. So a large number of terms becomes informationally compressible, getting closer to the correspondence that is one to one and onto.
The exact "crisp" correspondence exists at the limit. We see that the limit is a convergence. Can Gedankin, or Rex, prove otherwise?

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Gedankin:
But the response about self-generating of axioms (is that what “self-axiomatizing grammar” means?) does not demonstrate an escape from infinite quantity of syntactic data needed to represent that “limit”!

I have never claimed that an amount of syntactically represented binary or crisp logic statements which increases in limit to infinity could not approximate reality (or all of reality) to any arbitrary degree of precision. Does SCSPL require infinite quantity of syntactic language?

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Gedankin:
Of course this is a model concept—I’m just making a point. The existence of the limit per se is not demonstrated by the example points, it is only suggested.

It is possible that there is a theory of everything as a physics theory. Will it be deterministic, or probabilistic? If it is probabilistic, what does that notion of a limit mean, as the basic concept is itself fuzzy? Is the TOE the only aspect that would be computed in the SCSPL? (No higher order logical relationships?)

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If my understanding is correct, the "CTMU" is a framework designed to incorperate the increasingly more correct theoretical constructs. The syntax is a set of rules governing the contextual structure of cognition and perception, where cognition and perception are defined as languages.
The syntax does not need to be completely specified as long as that which IS specified is necessary and logical.

[ 10. November 2003, 05:47: Message edited by: Russell E. Rierson ]

posted 11. November 2003 02:17                    

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What sort of language system only approximately processes its constructs? I mean mathematically defined precise processing of such a language? Or is CTMU just a statement of a bunch of fuzzy relationships, not clearly and crisply defined?

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That a tautology constitutes absolute truth can be proven as follows. First, logic is absolute within any system for which (a) the complementary truth values T (true) and F (false) correspond to systemic inclusion and exclusion, a semantic necessity without which meaningful reference is impossible; and (b) lesser predicates and their complements equal subsystemic inclusion and exclusion. Because a tautology is an axiom of 2-valued logic, violating it disrupts the T/F distinction and results in the corruption of informational boundaries between perceptual and cognitive predicates recognized or applied in the system, as well as between each predicate and its negation. Thus, the observable fact that perceptual boundaries are intact across reality at large implies that no tautology within its syntax, or set of structural and functional rules, has been violated; indeed, if such a tautology ever were violated, then reality would disintegrate due to corruption of the informational boundaries which define it. So a tautology is "absolute truth" not only with respect to logic, but with respect to reality at large.
What does this mean? Uncertainty or non-absoluteness of truth value always involves some kind of confusion or ambiguity regarding the distinction between the sentential predicates true and false. Where these predicates are applied to a more specific predicate and its negation - e.g., "it is true that the earth is round and false that the earth is not-round" - the confusion devolves to the contextual distinction between these lesser predicates, in this case round and not-round within the context of the earth. Because all of the ambiguity can be localized to a specific distinction in a particular context, it presents no general problem for reality at large; we can be uncertain about whether or not the earth is round without disrupting the logic of reality in general. However, where a statement is directly about reality in general, any disruption of or ambiguity regarding the T/F distinction disrupts the distinction between reality and not-reality. Were such a disruption to occur at the level of basic cognition or perception, reality would become impossible to perceive, recognize, or acknowledge as something that "exists".
By definition, this is the case with regard to our cognitive-perceptual syntax, the set of structural and inferential rules governing perception and cognition in general. Since a tautology is a necessary and universal element of this syntax, tautologies can under no circumstances be violated within reality. Thus, they are "absolute knowledge". We may not be able to specify every element of absolute knowledge, but we can be sure of two things about it: that it exists in reality to the full extent necessary to guarantee its non-violation, and that no part of it yet to be determined can violate absolute knowledge already in hand. Whether or not we can write up an exhaustive itemized list of absolute truths, we can be sure that such a list exists, and that its contents are sufficiently "recognizable" by reality at large to ensure their functionality. Absolute truth, being essential to the integrity of reality, must exist on the level of reference associated with the preservation of global consistency, and may thus be duly incorporated in a theory of reality.

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posted 11. November 2003 08:29                

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Were such a disruption to occur at the level of basic cognition or perception, reality would become impossible to perceive, recognize, or acknowledge as something that "exists".

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