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Author
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Topic: Cosmogony, Holography and Causality
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jasonyoung
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Member # 432
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posted 10. September 2003 02:12
Rex:
"Ignore reality when trying to understand truth"
This sort of thinking is precisely what induced David to respond with such acerbity. Notwithstanding your misinterpretation of what David G. wrote, as evidenced by a ludicrous transmogrification and subsequent submission of irrelevant advice, I would strongly advise you to avoid making statements which lend further credence to the presumptions of your interlocuter, especially when you're aiming to repugn those very presumptions by displaying a willingness to understand and then address the ideas proferred by him or her in the discussion of which you are participants (which I will assume you were doing). Denying that a galeate-blinder is secured to your shoulders while wearing one isn't a very effective strategy when you're facing an opponent who happens to have eyes to see you with.
Jacob:
"Its important to note that there seems to be two UBTs - one: a primordial realm full of infocognitive potential. The other one an[d] ever present "realm" that we can access by dint of peeling off the constraints."
The necessity of there 'being' a primordial realm of undifferentiated infocognitive potential is discovered in the process of stripping away the constraints of logic. A distinction between 'true' (real) and 'false' (unreal) implies the existence of a more basic logical generality in which the distinction between the two can be made, and this more basic logical generality is the concept sporting the very etymologically apt appellative 'Unbound Telesis'. We do not have 'access' to the UBT, meaning we cannot contemplate it or utter coherent statements regarding its nature, for the simple reason that the distinction between truth and falsity doesn't exist within it.
To repeat: there is only one UBT and we can say nothing about it other than that it must 'be', it must lack logical constraint, and it must serve as the logically prior generality from which reality emerges (1., 2., and 3. are basically the same).
[ 10. September 2003, 02:16: Message edited by: jasonyoung ]
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chimp
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posted 10. September 2003 04:13
Why not describe Einstein's equation as a rule that tells the geometry of space how to evolve as[time passes = changes of state]? Lorentzian manifolds M, diffeomorphic to R x S, where the manifold S represents space, and t, an element of R, represents time.
So spacetime is sliced into instants of time as an arbitrary choice, or possibly constraints-limits, imposed by Planck's constant.
F: M---> R x S
Spacetime becomes quantized or "sliced up" but that could be what nature really does.
According to relativity, an objects position and momentum can only be defined with respect to a frame of reference, i.e. another object. Yet the universe as a whole has no frame of reference outside of itself, so how can its momentum be defined? It can only be defined with reference to itself. Worldlines fill up spacetime and the criss crossing of world lines mark events beyond the need for coordinate systems or coordinates. Points in spacetime are given the name "events" so there is coordinate independence. The geometric view of physics means that the laws of physics are the same in every Lorentz reference system. Local Lorentz invariance. But since the universe has no exterior reference frame, and it must refer to itself, its world line intersects with itself.
This quantized-parameterized evolution of spacetime dictated by GR and QM, means that the world line of the past intersects with the world lines of the present, for the universe. A geometric stacking of space like slices, parameterized by t, The universe is a function of itself. Spacetime becomes compressed. As the time evolution proceeds in the thermodynamic direction of t, the space like sheets, continually increase in density. The information storage of space time.
(->(->(->(U)<-)<-)<-)
Since it is background independent, it agrees with the non-Euclidean geometry of Riemann and Einstein.
Nothing exists outside the universe. "Nothing" must have a type of perfect symmetry.
Invariance under all possible change = non existence = outside the universe = symmetrical push on the surface of existence.
--->|U|<---
[ 10. September 2003, 05:21: Message edited by: Russell E. Rierson ]
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Aliet Jacob
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posted 10. September 2003 07:53
I would be indebted to Garett if he demonstrated how he arrived at the idea that reality is atemporal at the global level, and if he could show what "global level" refers to.
IMHO, thwarting the infinite regress problem by erecting unexplained phenomena or positing unobservable "levels of existence" is not a solution. With due respect, there is need for an evidentiary explanation in terms of these "larger metrics" that Garett writes about so faithfully. I would like to remind him of Neils Bohr's sentiment that "no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon". I subscribe to that view. I suspect that Garett does too but I could be wrong. Its possible that Garett has some evidence that I am simply ignorant about. I beg for his patience for what he perceoves as my ignorance and "empirical hood".
I think of time as a measure of change. If there was no change, time would cease to exist. Based on this, if there is something external to reality, for reality to be emerge from it, it would be equally temporal. Garett disagrees and says "Temporalness is internal to reality". I believe he means to state that "Temporality is internal to reality". My argument however is that if something is atemporal, it would be incapable of experiencing or bringing about change. Again, I would be grateful if Garett explained how reality would be related in any way to something that is atemporal. I hope Garett also agrees that, per CTMU, reality represents an actuality of (one of) the potentials of the UBT. Going by the idea that reality evolves from the UBT, I argue that reality and the UBT are causally related. I do not know what Garetts thoughts are on this argument. But I would be glad to know.
I understand spacetime as:
quote:
Spacetime is the seemingly boundless and continuous four-dimensional extent, consisting of three space-like dimensions and one time-like dimension, in which all matter is located and all events occur, and whose curvature is caused by mass-energy and in turn causes gravity.
All events have to occur in time, a timeless dimension would be an unchanging dimension. A dimension without events.
I understand existence to refer to "having a causal relationship with the rest of the universe". Perhaps Garett could be kind enough and help me understand why thats an inferior concept of existence.
He also states that when Langan speaks of peeling off time, he isn't speaking literally. Not that that is what I meant but perhaps Garett could explain the practicality or utility of what Langan says if we are never to think practically about Langans ideas. I do not believe the CTMU to be a work of poetry or a work meant to be treated only as a literary beauty what postmodernists would call "good-literature" - like the Bible. I earlier objected to the expression "pre-logical" because its incongruent just like "pre-biology" or "pre-reason". I never did state that optical ilussions are contradictory to reality so I will not respond to the accusation unless Garett wants to support it.
Bebbington doesn't see how optical illusions relate to the CTMU. The CTMU describes reality as a relationship - between information and cognition. Percept and percipient. Hence reality has a dual aspect monism called infocognition. When a mirage is seen, the link between information and cognition is broken. At that point there is an aberration or inhomogenity if you like. Someone stated earlier that we can say reality is "confused" in such an instance because the perceived is not real. There can be no mapping between reality and what is recognized - at that point. I do not know whether or not that is significant in a reality model that maps whats perceived to what exists.
My main objection with regards to placing cognition on one side of the cartesian divide is, it renders CTMU too anthropocentric. I consider cognition to be a wholly fortutous phenomena and I find it an unnecessary part of reality in the sense that its not fundamental to the ontology of reality.
I consider reality to be made up (ultimately) of matter and energy. Langan seems to hold that its made up of information and cognition. Percept and percipient. I would be most obliged if Garett is kind enough to point out to me why my concept of reality is incorrect.
Rex states "This is a diagram depicting the evolution of a set of observables (which can each be either . or #) over time.
But it is also a rectangle of text, and as such is non-temporal."
I believe Rex confuses two things: what is depicted and what is used to depict it. Or, if you like, the explans and the explanandum. A rectangle of text of course is a non-temporal/static representation. But by Rex's admission, what it represents is not static. Anything that evolves is temporal. Any medium under which the evolution takes place is temporal - because they would be part of one huge set.
Rex later says "but working backwards is not nearly so simple. This diagram is not reversible; it can "evolve" only forward in "time". Looks pretty temporal to me." and it becomes unclear to me whether he still holds that something temporal can be causally related to an atemporal entity. But perharps he can help me understand.
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Aliet Jacob
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posted 10. September 2003 10:06
I would like to respectfully state that the question of reality or unreality is not a logical question but a factual question.
This is based on my definition of reality above.
The question of true or false might be logical and it could be within an axiomatic system or within a physical/actual system or environment.
If seventy logicians were stripped naked and thrown to a dark cave underground, which would be completely dark and impenetrable to sound from above, no amount of logic would tell them whether it was actually noon. Or whether the sun was truly up.
Irrespective of the amount of logic they have.
Precisely because it would be a factual matter.
In the same way, IMHO, we cant logically strip any logical constraints from reality. Its an incongruous idea. Its like asking someone to strip off all logical constraints from a mountain.
That, my honourable friends, is why I find the idea of stripping off logical constraints from an actual system, respectfully, ridiculous.
As a site interested in areas to research on, I believe CTMU proponents would best indicate how they suggest we go about stripping logical constraints from actual things.
We need a starting point for the research.
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David Garrett
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posted 10. September 2003 10:16
Rex wrote:
quote:
Notwithstanding the tone, which is more acerbic than academic, I would advise using phrasing that sounds less like, "Ignore reality when trying to understand truth." Unless this is exactly what is meant, in which case I would advise extreme caution on empirical grounds: this approach has lead to many failures (some spectacular) and no successes thus far.
This statement only supports my suspicion that you don't understand that the truth of reality is that it is both mental and physical. For it necessarily follows that once an empirical observation has been made that it must be explained within a mental construction called an hypothesis, theory, explanation, etc. On a more general level, the very nature of space and time are but mental categories and the "recognition" of state-syntax transformations by the language of reality is a form of generalized cognition. The failure to understand this basic fact is what I meant.
Jacob wrote:
quote:
I would be indebted to Garett if he demonstrated how he arrived at the idea that reality is atemporal at the global level, and if he could show what "global level" refers to.
And I would be indebted to Jacob if he spells Russell's and my name correctly. It is Russell with two s's and two l's and Garrett with two r's and two t's.
quote:
IMHO, thwarting the infinite regress problem by erecting unexplained phenomena or positing unobservable "levels of existence" is not a solution. With due respect, there is need for an evidentiary explanation in terms of these "larger metrics" that Garett writes about so faithfully. I would like to remind him of Neils Bohr's sentiment that "no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed phenomenon". I subscribe to that view. I suspect that Garett does too but I could be wrong. Its possible that Garett has some evidence that I am simply ignorant about. I beg for his patience for what he perceoves as my ignorance and "empirical hood".
When you say "observed phenomenon" you automatically implicate cognition in the bargain. But you must understand (and I think this is where your "anthropocentric" problem arises) that humans aren't the only observers. Everything exhibits a very general level of cognition in that information on state and syntax are exchanged or recognized. This is how we can say that there is unobserved (by us) phenomena taking place right now.
quote:
I think of time as a measure of change. If there was no change, time would cease to exist. Based on this, if there is something external to reality, for reality to be emerge from it, it would be equally temporal. Garett disagrees and says "Temporalness is internal to reality". I believe he means to state that "Temporality is internal to reality". My argument however is that if something is atemporal, it would be incapable of experiencing or bringing about change. Again, I would be grateful if Garett explained how reality would be related in any way to something that is atemporal. I hope Garett also agrees that, per CTMU, reality represents an actuality of (one of) the potentials of the UBT. Going by the idea that reality evolves from the UBT, I argue that reality and the UBT are causally related. I do not know what Garetts thoughts are on this argument. But I would be glad to know.
Time is a measure of change. But the objects that are changing are connected by a common medium in which the relationship between them occurs. Since there is nothing outside of reality, reality as a whole isn't in any relation with another reality. If there were two realities with which a relationship of change relative to each other could be formed (and thus measure time between them), they would have to be connected by a common medium. If this were the case then we would call the entire system reality and we would be back at square one. So, at the global level, reality is atemporal.
This same line of logic can be used to show that the Many Worlds interpretation is flawed at explaining a connective medium for all of the branching realities. If another reality can't interact with our reality then it is, guess what? Unreal.
Now, as for "internal to reality", time arises because objects are being formed by the SCSPL of reality and these objects change relative to each other.
quote:
He also states that when Langan speaks of peeling off time, he isn't speaking literally. Not that that is what I meant but perhaps Garett could explain the practicality or utility of what Langan says if we are never to think practically about Langans ideas.
The practicality is in the explanation. That is, after all, what a theory is supposed to do. If you have a model with sufficient explanatory power then what more utility do you need? It explains reality!
quote:
My main objection with regards to placing cognition on one side of the cartesian divide is, it renders CTMU too anthropocentric. I consider cognition to be a wholly fortutous phenomena and I find it an unnecessary part of reality in the sense that its not fundamental to the ontology of reality.
The CTMU erases the Cartesian Divide completely by showing the manner in which everything exhibits a dual aspect from a common monic medium. The dual aspect being rational/empirical aspects.
quote:
I consider reality to be made up (ultimately) of matter and energy. Langan seems to hold that its made up of information and cognition. Percept and percipient. I would be most obliged if Garett is kind enough to point out to me why my concept of reality is incorrect.
Are not matter and energy really just different aspects of the same thing? E=MC^2. Energy/matter has a more basic existence that involves the syntax or laws that dictate how it evolves and relates to itself. Infocognition addresses both what is processed (matter/energy) and the processing (laws or syntax) of reality in an informational model, which also includes feedback.
Dave
[ 10. September 2003, 11:39: Message edited by: David Garrett ]
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RBH
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posted 10. September 2003 15:23
David Garrett wrote quote:
This statement only supports my suspicion that you don't understand that the truth of reality is that it is both mental and physical. For it necessarily follows that once an empirical observation has been made that it must be explained within a mental construction called an hypothesis, theory, explanation, etc. On a more general level, the very nature of space and time are but mental categories and the "recognition" of state-syntax transformations by the language of reality is a form of generalized cognition. The failure to understand this basic fact is what I meant.
I sense a pretty obvious map/territory category confusion lurking in those woods. Does anyone read Ryle these days?
RBH
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Rex Kerr
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Member # 632
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posted 10. September 2003 17:21
jason seems to think my advice--essentially asking David to be clearer--was "irrelevant", but simultaneously says I "misinterpreted" him. I'm not sure what to make of this, unless the goal is to be misunderstood?
Perhaps, given their responses, David and jacob are using a different definition of "empirical" than I am. I am using it in the "generous" standard sense, i.e. "Relying on or derived from observation or experiment." Perhaps they meant it in the pejorative sense, i.e. "Depending upon experience or observation alone, without due regard to science and theory". (Definitions taken from dictionary.com, which in turn took them from American Heritage (what I call "generous") and Webster's (what I call "pejorative"); both dictionaries had both definitions, but I picked my preferred phrasing.) Alternatively, he may be using CTMU-style definitions, where perhaps "empirical" and "rational" are opposites and roughly mean "physical" and "mental".
In any case, I am an unapologetic empiricist of the generous American Heritage sense.
Thus when David claims "On a more general level, the very nature of space and time are but mental categories and the "recognition" of state-syntax transformations by the language of reality is a form of generalized cognition", I say: provide evidence. If this is, as claimed, a "basic fact", then it is particularly important to have evidence. The evidence may be mostly a logical argument, but if it is completely a logical argument, it's pretty hard to tell that it applies to this world as opposed to some apparently logically consistent yet nonexistant (to us) world.
Saying "language of reality" presupposes there is a language of reality. Perhaps someone can point me at a portion of CTMU that establishes what this means. In particular, the assumption here seems to be that because it is language, it is mental. How is that justified (or defined)?
Also, languages do not recognize. Linguists (language-users) recognize. So, even with the scare-quotes, the phrase "recognition of X by language" seems nonsensical.
David also says
quote:
time arises because objects are being formed by the SCSPL of reality and these objects change relative to each other.
But the phrase "are being formed" presupposes a temporal ordering, as does "these objects change relative to each other". So this statement doesn't really show us where time arises, it just shows us that we use the idea of time in our statements. Perhaps he can explain again?
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Zachary Aufdemberg
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posted 11. September 2003 05:31
Rex Kerr says
quote:
Perhaps, given their responses, David and jacob are using a different definition of "empirical" than I am. I am using it in the "generous" standard sense, i.e. "Relying on or derived from observation or experiment." Perhaps they meant it in the pejorative sense, i.e. "Depending upon experience or observation alone, without due regard to science and theory". (Definitions taken from dictionary.com, which in turn took them from American Heritage (what I call "generous") and Webster's (what I call "pejorative"); both dictionaries had both definitions, but I picked my preferred phrasing.) Alternatively, he may be using CTMU-style definitions, where perhaps "empirical" and "rational" are opposites and roughly mean "physical" and "mental".
In any case, I am an unapologetic empiricist of the generous American Heritage sense.
Thus when David claims "On a more general level, the very nature of space and time are but mental categories and the "recognition" of state-syntax transformations by the language of reality is a form of generalized cognition", I say: provide evidence. If this is, as claimed, a "basic fact", then it is particularly important to have evidence. The evidence may be mostly a logical argument, but if it is completely a logical argument, it's pretty hard to tell that it applies to this world as opposed to some apparently logically consistent yet nonexistant (to us) world.
Even reasonable unapologetic empiricists in the American Heritage sense are still forced to use logic to order and give meaning to their perceptions. At this level, what other than a completely logical argument is possible? Also, since multiple mutually contradictory views can predict the very same phenomena, there's simply no way to perceptually verify problems of this sort as well. If an answer is out there, logic is the only way to find it.
Those that are unwilling to question their base beliefs regarding their perceptions are closed-minded. For example, treating observables as subjectively independent objects requires justification. Lacking one, the search should continue. It's always a good thing to keep in mind one's philosophical blind spots.
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gedanken
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posted 11. September 2003 08:33
On the general discussion, has anybody noticed that an empirically verifiable world of the apparently (if not actually) physical nature would still be meaningful even if the physical world existed as some characteristic (say figment) of the mind? Since we seem to be able to find a common consistent observation, the empiric methods are rational.
quote:
Even reasonable unapologetic empiricists in the American Heritage sense are still forced to use logic to order and give meaning to their perceptions. At this level, what other than a completely logical argument is possible? Also, since multiple mutually contradictory views can predict the very same phenomena, there's simply no way to perceptually verify problems of this sort as well. If an answer is out there, logic is the only way to find it.
Of course all of scientific statements must be logical. (Was there some debate on this?)
It is not true that mutually contradictory views will necessarily predict the same phenomena. (Yes, I realize that Zachary said “can”.) By that I mean that the contradictory aspects of “views” by their very nature of having some “contradiction” are likely to have some outcome in the physical world that differs.
But there are indeed views that contradict other views in some regard, but which predict the same observable (empirically verifiable) phenomena. In science there is a goal of finding “views” that are consistent across the broad scale of what is empirically verifiable, and not contradictory within that, as such a contradiction would invalidate the view as being actually “empirically verified”.
Views that cannot be empirically differentiated are not a matter of science, but could be matters of philosophical concern. Logic is of course very important in their resolution. But logic can only proceed from premises – from where do those premises arise? One place is from observation – but that of course returns us to the empirically verifiable. Another aspect is personal non-commonly verifiable experience. Thus the philosophical result may not be universally shared, because the premises of that which must be “logically consistent” are not derived from commonly shared experience. “Logic” cannot resolve these difficulties.
Of course where logic shows a view to be internally inconsistent – as in fallaciously argued – then the view is contradicted by logic. But then what is “Logic”? Logic itself is an empirically derived set of rules for use in communication of arguments, which have a generally even higher degree of agreement among us than even the empirically verifiable subjects of science. But even “logic” can have areas of dispute, as many conditions are matter of degree and not agreed as crisply certain. What is the logical conclusion from a premise of non-crisp logical certainty? All I am saying is not to raise logic to some sort of “absolute” as though it was not itself an art. (Indeed an art fairly universally shared.)
And furthermore we have the parsimony principle. We must remember that empirically derived scientific statements are not “absolutes”, they are statements of relationships that can be said to hold in the physical world. They are usually predictive in some manner, but always relational. (Thus “predictive” in the sense that the relation is expected to hold.) Parsimony simply says that the simplest description is best in the sense that a more complex description that describes the same relationships gives no additional value and is harder to understand and communicate. Logic per se cannot arbitrate such variant descriptions that describe the same relationships among the physically observable.
[ 11. September 2003, 08:51: Message edited by: gedanken ]
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Zachary Aufdemberg
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posted 11. September 2003 22:52
gedanken wrote
quote:
On the general discussion, has anybody noticed that an empirically verifiable world of the apparently (if not actually) physical nature would still be meaningful even if the physical world existed as some characteristic (say figment) of the mind? Since we seem to be able to find a common consistent observation, the empiric methods are rational.
This is a good point. If the empirical world was found to exist in the mind, much of the scienfic method would remain unchanged. The standard scienfific method alone is incabable of deciding the issue.
quote:
Of course all of scientific statements must be logical. (Was there some debate on this?)
No the debate is over the epistemological relationship of logic and observation. My point was that to have meaningful sense-based knowledge logic is required for interpretation at square one.
quote:
Views that cannot be empirically differentiated are not a matter of science, but could be matters of philosophical concern. Logic is of course very important in their resolution. But logic can only proceed from premises – from where do those premises arise? One place is from observation – but that of course returns us to the empirically verifiable. Another aspect is personal non-commonly verifiable experience. Thus the philosophical result may not be universally shared, because the premises of that which must be “logically consistent” are not derived from commonly shared experience. “Logic” cannot resolve these difficulties.
Though we may learn the rules of logic inductively through experience of the observable world, logic does not depend on the emprical to validate it. The "premises" of logic are tautologies implicit of every consistent idea.
quote:
Of course where logic shows a view to be internally inconsistent – as in fallaciously argued – then the view is contradicted by logic. But then what is “Logic”? Logic itself is an empirically derived set of rules for use in communication of arguments, which have a generally even higher degree of agreement among us than even the empirically verifiable subjects of science. But even “logic” can have areas of dispute, as many conditions are matter of degree and not agreed as crisply certain. What is the logical conclusion from a premise of non-crisp logical certainty? All I am saying is not to raise logic to some sort of “absolute” as though it was not itself an art. (Indeed an art fairly universally shared.)
But at the foundation of logic, there are no consistent alternate rules since, essentially, they are rules of consistency. Whether or not men agree on them or not is irrelevent. Thus it hasn't been shown that there isn't only one consistent view of the foundation of reality.
quote:
And furthermore we have the parsimony principle. We must remember that empirically derived scientific statements are not “absolutes”, they are statements of relationships that can be said to hold in the physical world. They are usually predictive in some manner, but always relational. (Thus “predictive” in the sense that the relation is expected to hold.) Parsimony simply says that the simplest description is best in the sense that a more complex description that describes the same relationships gives no additional value and is harder to understand and communicate.
Surely you aren't agruing simplisity at the expense of sufficiency. What may be required to explain currently mysterious processes of the universe might be more complex than an incomplete yet "more parsimonious" explanation.
quote:
Logic per se cannot arbitrate such variant descriptions that describe the same relationships among the physically observable.
This is your assumption. It can only be shown to be true of the standard scientific method. And until this is proven to be true of logic in general, I see no reason not to try the only chance we have.
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Rex Kerr
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posted 11. September 2003 23:24
Zachary wrote:
quote:
Though we may learn the rules of logic inductively through experience of the observable world, logic does not depend on the emprical to validate it. The "premises" of logic are tautologies implicit of every consistent idea.
But it seems that in epistemology, one must account for this observation. First, note that it is an observation, since it refers to "ideas" which are not rigorously defined.
One possibility is to suppose that the Universe is Rational and Rationality is True, and then figure out what conditions are necessary for this, and then show that there's some consistent framework where the supposition is the case. (This would result in knowledge of the style of a theorem, i.e. non-tentative and proven.)
Another possiblity is to suppose that our perceptions are generally reliable (and carefully define what "reliable" means), and proceed in a scientific manner to show that perceptions are reliable and that logic works. (This would result in knowledge of the style of a scientific theory, i.e. tentative.)
I see no logical basis for choosing the first approach over the second. However, I do see a strong empirical basis for choosing the second approach over the first. So, although it runs contrary to philosophical tradition, I choose the second method. (I believe the Churchlands take this approach also, although I'm not terribly familiar with their work.)
quote:
But at the foundation of logic, there are no consistent alternate rules since, essentially, they are rules of consistency. Whether or not men agree on them or not is irrelevent. Thus it hasn't been shown that there isn't only one consistent view of the foundation of reality.
Are you making an in-principle claim here about there-does-not-exist-alternate-rules, or simply I-haven't-seen-any? Note that the latter isn't a logical argument as it is of the form, "I have not seen a yellow cat, therefore yellow cats do not exist."
This distinction is important, since I see so-called logical foundations smuggling in empirical results and treating it as okay, but then giving empirical methods a hard time when they're applied at more basic (and vastly more reliable!) levels.
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Aliet Jacob
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posted 12. September 2003 11:45
In his OP, Langan takes a gentle swipe at Tiplers' theory of the universe (Omega Point Theory) which, in part, states that the universe was Front Loaded by the God of "traditional" monotheism and then left to run as per a pre-written script. Tiplers theory, of course, represents a "modern" and "scientific" version of deism. In its place, Langan posits his pantheist theory which engulfs the front-loading aspect and goes further to have the self-aware God distributing himself over reality. Langan also injects a panpsychist streak when he adds that God is the ultimate reality.
So, on the face of it, we are confronted with two competing theistic theories. Assuming there is any validity to theism in general, how do we know which theistic viewpoint is the better one in terms of cosmogony?
Langan states that his CTMU theory "goes further" than Tipler's. Whether going further makes it more comprehensive or more correct is another question. Langan states that there is a concept called hology which he compares to Tiplers' holography and notes that CTMU's hology is more dynamic than Tipler's holography. From the little that I know from Tipler's theory, Tipler claims its testable and in contrast to how Langan presents CTMU, Tipler is more unabashed about presenting it as a theistic system/theory from which necessary and derivable consequences are "free-will, personal immortality, the resurrection of the dead, grace and the action of the Holy Spirit, heaven, hell, and purgatory". All of these, it is claimed, emerge as physical-mathematical concepts, or inevitable consequences of them". Langan OTOH, doesn't present CTMU as a scientific theory - he presents it more as a metalogical, metascientific theory. Its not testable nor subject to falsifiability or verifiability criterions. It stands above science and is thus metascientific and metalogic. Langan states with regard to hology: "The associated language is called SCSPL (short for Self-Configuring Self-Processing Language), and it includes the laws of physics as a restricted "sublanguage". SCSPL can be characterized as a self-contained metaphysical extension of standard logic."
Both theorists demonstrate good understanding of logic, physics, mathematics and philosophy. Both theories are blanketed in thick technical cloaks with CTMU employing neologisms in addition and its difficult for the non-specialist to grasp them fully. Tipler posits a single-point c-boundary (causal boundary) of the universe. Langan, through his principle of self-determinacy, posits a "reflexive and therefore closed boundary, the formation of which involves neither preexisting laws nor external structure." he also adds that the boundary of a boundary is zero and adds: "this intuitive notion from algebraic topology says that closed structures embody a certain kind of “self-cancellative” symmetry." The theories can be compared and contrasted and their similarities are more striking that the differences. IMHO, whichever theory one leans towards will only be the preferred theory not the correct one - because they dont lend themselves to testability and verifiability. But we have something more interesting at hand.
More interesting is Langans puzzlement in his OP where he wonders how those involved in ID and "neo-darwinism" can be busy "attempting to verify causal hypotheses without committing to a specific model of causality". Remarkable, is that Tiplers theistic Omega point theory and Langans theistic CTMU are the "models of causality" Langan is referring to. Rex Kerr provided a very meaningful response to Langan's puzzle and I hope Langan feels the same. I earlier asked questions that were designed to expose the teleologic suppositions concerning the nature of reality, that likely was present behind the demand for theories to be mapped to a "causal model". I have not received any answers but I am confident that my point was well taken.
Langan states: "While I don’t know the level of support enjoyed by Dr. Tipler’s work, mine is officially unsupported and pursued strictly as a labor of love...". Well, there is Martin Gardner's fideistic objection to Tiplers' Anthropic Cosmological Principle and many others have found Tiplers theory hard to accept because he goes beyond the boundaries of physics to describe a physical system. Many are concerned that Tipler's theories have influenced theologians like Wolfgang Pannenberg and G. F. R. Ellis W. R. Stoeger for example stated the following concerning some theologians taking Tipler's theory seriously: "As a result, there is the very real danger that the uncontrolled speculation represented by the Omega-Point Theory will drag both serious scientific research and serious theological research into disrepute in the public eye, and also will damage important new discussions which have recently begun between scientists and theologians."
Langan is correct in stating that "work on the causal and cosmological foundations of Intelligent Design is only infrequently acknowledged, it has been ongoing for quite some time". The "work" has been going on for some time now. Heck, Tipler's Omega Point was derived from the Jesuit priest-theologian Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's cosmogenesis. The only shortcoming, IMHO, is that those that have been "working" on these "cosmological foundations" have been largely relying on introspection. There has been paucity of scientific research from them and this has largely rendered the "work" conjectural and based on "thought" rather than fact. Human experience demonstrates that the fact that something sounds logical does not mean it is factual - in fact it often isn't. All introspective ideas regarding actual things have to be verified via experimentation based on actual things; thats the last frontier that these "cosmological theorists" have to cross to even make their theories examinable. I earlier gave the example of the futility of a group of expert logicians huddled in the dark below trying to use logic alone to determine the actual location of the sun above.
On the question of the temporal arising from an atemporal realm, Rex Kerr posted a very interesting model to which I responded. I would appreciate Rex's thoughts on my response and I hope my post was not off-putting to him.
On reality being both mental and physical, I would like to respectfully state that reality is not both mental and physical: reality contains both the mental and the physical. But I regard the mental as just a higher-level emergent property of the physical. In that respect, Garrett had only accounted for one fundamental property of reality. If I was to describe the composition of reality using properties I would state that its both energetic and physical. Not is both mental and physical.
Garrett states that "the very nature of space and time are but mental categories and the "recognition" of state-syntax transformations by the language of reality is a form of generalized cognition" to which Rex aptly responded that language is not cognition. I would like to add that in making that statement, Garrett confused whats recognized with the tool used for describing it.
Garrett failed to explain what "global level" means but I should have expected it since he had asked Langan earlier a similar question - indeed, he even asked what the word "atemporal" means.. Whats puzzling is that Garrett used the expression as part of an explanation before Langan had explained to him what "global level" and atemporality (or atemporalness - per Garrett) means. Failing to have a clear meaning concerning the meaning of the phrase, its impossible to assess the value of Garretts claim that reality is atemporal at the global level. Until Garrett explains what he meant, one can only get as much meaning as from his statement as from the phrase "reality is atemporal at the jugru bapla".
Garrett states: "you must understand (and I think this is where your "anthropocentric" problem arises) that humans aren't the only observers." I would like Garrett to remember that based on Langan's statement in his OP alone, all cognition is an instance of the cognition from a self-aware intelligent designer that self-distributes over the universe. This attribution of intelligence to the designer of course is an anthropomorphism. And all other species of cognition Garrett might think of are simply dumbed-down versions of the intelligent designer that self-configures over reality. To wit, there is still no standard methodology for detecting design. This renders the attribution of intelligence to the designer quite inexplicable.
Garrett states with regart to MWI: "If another reality can't interact with our reality then it is, guess what? Unreal." I would like to remind Garrett that the MWI is closely linked to the Multiverse theory which, by its formulation allows for many worlds. This is unlike the CTMU which argues that there is only one universe but then turns around and claims there is one thing thats not part of the universe. IOW, the MWI is consistent with respect to many universes while the CTMu is not because it employs special pleading with regard to the UBT. The construction of other realities in MWI is built in the framework of the theory while the UBT seems to be an attempt to tie a loose end: the CTMU does not adequately account for the causal linkage between the UBT and the universe and whether the self-aware designer emerged from the UBT of whether the designer caused the UBT.
Garrett states when I ask him about the practicality of the idea of "stripping" logical constraints from reality: "The practicality is in the explanation.". But I fail to understand because the explanation has no practical underpinnings nor any guideline about how and whether the explanation is practical. Garrett adds: "That is, after all, what a theory is supposed to do. If you have a model with sufficient explanatory power then what more utility do you need? It explains reality!" With all due respect, I would like to politely ask Garrett to explain which part of reality CTMU explains. For example, does the CTMU explain why reality is self-configuring as it claims? Does it explain to us why men have nipples/breasts?
On another note, a reality theory should be an explanation that is supported with observables and should demonstrate a high level of correspondence with reality. An explanation alone is not enough.
Regarding the questionable "dual aspect monism" of the CTMU, Garrett states: "The CTMU erases the Cartesian Divide completely by showing the manner in which everything exhibits a dual aspect from a common monic medium. The dual aspect being rational/empirical aspects.". First of all, this statement is self-contradictory because if there is still a "dual" aspect, then the divide is still present - except with different entities on either side.
Its unfortunate that a CTMU proponent can state this because Langan states that one of his objectives was to build a "footworthy" bridge accross the cartesian divide. Meaning, from the get-go, Langan realized the importance of a dualistic reality model - he never intended to erase it as Garrett claims - he only tries to "bridge" it and revise it. And he ends up with infocognition and hology.
It saddens me that those that purport to support the CTMU do not even understand it.
Concerning reality being composed of matter and energy, Garrett states that it is better to view reality as infocognitive because "Infocognition addresses both what is processed (matter/energy) and the processing (laws or syntax) of reality in an informational model, which also includes feedback."
Respectfully, I would like Garrett to explain under wich criteria he argues that the "better" reality theory is the one that addresses both what is processed and the processing. And perhaps if he is kind enough, he could enlighten me on other criterions that a reality theory/view must conform to. Failure to do so will render his criteria arbitrary .
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gedanken
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Member # 594
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posted 12. September 2003 12:03
I have little time at the moment, so this will be short.
I learned language slowly. It may have been inherent that I would learn some language communication skills even if I was alone with others who had not previously developed communication, but in my case I certainly did learn from my elders and others in my environment.
Then I remember learning about “logic” at different times, and at different levels of precision and of different aspects. I remember vaguely trying logic precepts as I learned them in terms of examples – examples which are based on real-world experience. So in essence I validated my concepts of “logic” in terms of language that I learned (by experience) by applying to my experience in the real world.
I find the notion that “logic” some how comes from some other source to be perplexing.
PS Zachary, I certainly am not arguing simplicity at expense of sufficiency. I carefully said:
quote:
But there are indeed views that contradict other views in some regard, but which predict the same observable (empirically verifiable) phenomena. In science there is a goal of finding “views” that are consistent across the broad scale of what is empirically verifiable, and not contradictory within that, as such a contradiction would invalidate the view as being actually “empirically verified”.
Indeed one of the problems that occurs is that someone finds a small consistency with some observation and draws a conclusion, without checking that with the larger body of implications it would have. That is not an issue of “logic”, it is an issue of properly applying the empirical method (logic per se will not resolve the issue).
Zachary said:
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If the empirical world was found to exist in the mind, much of the scientific method would remain unchanged. The standard scientific method alone is incapable of deciding the issue.
(spelling corrected).
But the “scientific method” includes making the subject broadly accessible by way of observation and without regard to assumptions that cannot be validated by observational methods. The statement above seems to indicate a differentiation between using observational methods to obtain wide consistency or universality of acceptance, and “the standard scientific method”.
I would say that such a case of ”empirical world … found to exist in the mind” would be of two cases: Further revelation in terms of actually observable evidence, or considerations that are philosophical in nature and not based on observable conditions that can be universally accepted. In the former we have simply turned up new observational evidence, not found the answer by “logic”. In the latter, we don’t have universally agreement – unless some alternate technique is used like enforcing universality by external means rather than self-derived observation. (There are cultures in which all members voice universal agreement to concepts that we outsiders would find foreign and contradicted by our observation.)
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David Garrett
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posted 12. September 2003 15:58
Jacob wrote all this rediculous blather:
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On reality being both mental and physical...
Garrett states ...
Garrett failed to explain...
Garrett states...
Garrett states ...
Garrett states...
Regarding the questionable ...
Its unfortunate that a CTMU proponent...
Concerning reality being...
Which points to the fact that Jacob is not interested in understanding and has obviously NOT read (or maybe I should say NOT comprehended) the CTMU. The need to attempt to counter every explanation with some un-insightful rejoinder isn't a mark of critical thinking but more a mark of unwillingness to learn and maybe even an inability to comprehend.
For starters he (and Rex) failed to understand the manner in which the CTMU's SCSPL incorporates language, information, and communication into reality possessing read, write, execute, and feedback functions. Simply knowing what the acronym stands for should keep someone from having to explain an entire course of Communication Theory and its models.
Next, on the issue of the global atemporal level of reality, I made my original post in this thread on 30 July 2003. Since that time I have had my question answered in way of an explanation by Chris. Just because the reply doesn't appear here doesn't mean it never happened. That being said, I think I adequately explained myself regarding the other items you fail to grasp. Your counterarguments are week at best and I am quite sure that anyone who seriously wants to understand the CTMU will see that my explanations are in agreement with the CTMU. Furthermore, downplaying the mental aspects of reality as mere emergent properties of matter is quite probably the worst path a person could wander down if the person is in any way serious about understanding the true nature of reality.
Dave
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Zachary Aufdemberg
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Member # 335
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posted 12. September 2003 23:12
Rex Kerr wrote
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One possibility is to suppose that the Universe is Rational and Rationality is True, and then figure out what conditions are necessary for this, and then show that there's some consistent framework where the supposition is the case. (This would result in knowledge of the style of a theorem, i.e. non-tentative and proven.)
You're assuming that this possibility can only be reached by supposition.
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Another possiblity is to suppose that our perceptions are generally reliable (and carefully define what "reliable" means), and proceed in a scientific manner to show that perceptions are reliable and that logic works. (This would result in knowledge of the style of a scientific theory, i.e. tentative.)
Not only is a careful definition of "reliable" required but an explanation of perception in general would seem to be of paramount importance to one attempting to extract meaning from it.
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I see no logical basis for choosing the first approach over the second. However, I do see a strong empirical basis for choosing the second approach over the first. So, although it runs contrary to philosophical tradition, I choose the second method. (I believe the Churchlands take this approach also, although I'm not terribly familiar with their work.)
These two approaches don't seem to me to be mutually contradictory.
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Are you making an in-principle claim here about there-does-not-exist-alternate-rules, or simply I-haven't-seen-any? Note that the latter isn't a logical argument as it is of the form, "I have not seen a yellow cat, therefore yellow cats do not exist."
No, there simply are no consistent mutually contradictory axioms of logic. In other words, the supposition that there are multiple systems of two-valued logic is impossible. Because of logic's generality, any argument to the contrary would, of course, be based in the very rules of which the alternative wishes to avoid.
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This distinction is important, since I see so-called logical foundations smuggling in empirical results and treating it as okay, but then giving empirical methods a hard time when they're applied at more basic (and vastly more reliable!) levels.
But the distinction between so-called logical foundations and a true logical foundation is also important.
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