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Author
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Topic: Cosmogony, Holography and Causality
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chimp
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Member # 333
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posted 06. October 2003 12:34
quote:
Aliet:
Did you notice the unsubstantiated relation of Wheeler's momenergy with the homological concept of "the boundary of a boundary is zero"? Can you attempt to link the two?
Hello?
When Wheeler talks about the "boundary of a boundary" he is talking about the conservation of momenergy Aliet.
All of the CTMU critics claim to be ...scientists...?
From the book "A Journey into Gravity and Spacetime"
quote:
Within a 4-D cube or block of spacetime - a region of space examined for an interval of time - momenergy is automatically conserved...
[...]
This conservation condition fulfills itself automatically. How? By the principle that the 2-boundary of the 3-boundary of a 4-region is zero. That is how nature ensures and guarantees conservation of momenergy.
I advise Rex and Jacob to do some serious homework before making ...
[ 06. October 2003, 12:37: Message edited by: Russell E. Rierson ]
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Mark
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posted 06. October 2003 18:25
Aliet, in his summary of CMTU premises, includes the following: "Language is always isomorphic to reality."
I understand Langan's position to be: The Real IS language.
This may be hair-splitting, but I don't think so.
I further understand Langan's position to be that classical deductive logic (not binary logic) is the syntax of this language called the Real (thus insuring the "heritability of truth," as Langan puts it).
Aliet also says:
quote:
Experiences of the shift from the flat earth to the elliptical earth, geocentricity to heliocentricity among others demonstrate how inferior congnition is as far as describing reality is concerned. . . .
I don't believe Langan claims that deductive logic IS cognition; he claims it is the syntax of cognition. Cognition consists of many things beyond syntax, including among other things experience, judgment, memory, imagination, creativity, etc. Deductive logic is content-free; it can as easily preserve false content as true content, but the preservation of true content is impossible without it. That is, a logical syntax is necessary, but not sufficient, to accurate or complete or functional cognition. The references to Godel's theorem are therefore irrelevant, since Langan doesn't claim completeness for deductive logic (far from it).
Rex rightly observes that a logical model sometimes works horribly, and any theory should explain that as well. I think Langan's model leaves room for this. As noted, a logical model "fits" well with both true or false premises -- deductive logic assumes the truth of the premises. But, eventually, given faulty premises, we will reach a contradiction or inconsistency; and, therefore, Rex is able to report that seemingly logical models sometimes "work horribly." This has nothing to do with the properties of logic; it merely reflects faulty premises (or inferences). It is logic that ultimately exposes how horribly a perfectly logical model sometimes works.
Rex also states:
quote:
Here's a statement which is simply false for me: "whereof that which cannot be linguistically described, one cannot perceive or conceive." I can smell and taste all sorts of things that I recognize, but am utterly powerless to linguistically describe. (This is related to premises (3) and (6).) This seems to undermine the attempt to perform a reality-closure operation based on human perception: qualia are experiences that are not necessarily dual-valued or easily dualizable. My linguistic sense of reality is affected by these non-linguistic sensations, so my perception of reality is super-linguistic.
Of course, a poet may be quite capable of linguistically describing an experience while I, or someone else, stands mute. I don't think Langan's test is a personal one; rather, it is categorical. I do think, however, that Rex raises an important point -- do the boundaries of our experience of the Real exceed the seeming limitations of language? Another question: does language enclose all experience?
Rex also comments on syndiffeonesis:
quote:
Also, as I suspect that Chris may not care to try to re-explain this at length, Aliet, do you have some insight into what Chris is trying to address with "syndiffeonesis"? That X and Y can have qualities in common and differences is hardly a surprising concept; generating these differences in the absence of initial difference is more challenging, but that doesn't seem to be what syndiffeonesis is used for. If the point of the whole section is merely, "Real things have similarities, and they have differences," then I agree.
As I understand it, Langan's model simply says that "syndiffeionesis" is the quality in the medium of perception that makes the distinction between differences (or the comparison of identities or similarities) possible. In other words, I can't point out distinctions between event A in the Real, and event B in the not-Real, because there is no common medium by which any comparison (or perception) is even possible. Hence, the mere fact that a comparison is possible suggests that both events (or both things, or both phenomena) share a common medium that makes a distinction possible in the first instance. Thus, if one observes A, and then observes B, and concludes "A differs from B in some way," or, "A and B are identical," we already know that A and B MUST have something in common, that is, that medium of perception that makes any judgment or comparison possible in the first place.
This may seem trivial, but I think Langan is trying to emphasize the coherence and continuity of the Real, which we tend to take for granted.
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gedanken
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posted 06. October 2003 22:00
quote:
...and ged objects to being asked to refute arguments (premise, inference, conclusion) that have not been made on this thread.
Actually there are many cases in which the paper or body of papers describing the points to be discussed are not actually in the thread in question. I certainly don't object to that. My objection was to no firm link being pointed. Even the firm name of the paper would be sufficient. There have in fact been several threads on CTMU, and I suppose that if the "CTMU" concept is not a static and unchangable fixture, that it may have changed. If change occurs, then a pointer to the most recent version, or to the definitive paper of relevance to this thread would be helpful.
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Aliet Jacob
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posted 07. October 2003 03:25
Russel,
First of all I am not a scientist, and I have never pretended to be one. Neither is Langan and neither is Dembski. That is a non-issue.
Secondly, Langan quotes Wheeler to support the idea of ex-nihilo creation (something to do with it from bit - Wheelers quantum "ether")
Thirdly, Langan uses a tetrahedron while Wheeler uses a cubicle. He only mentions momenergy when explaining, in passing, how Physicists like Wheeler, use the concept of zero boundary. Yes Wheeler has linked the two concepts.
Is it the case that information and constraint - or state and syntax interact in exactly the same manner as energy and momentum/space and matter?
Can this be supported using the CTMU paper?
Fourth, my criticism of the CTMU, with regard to zero boundary and is his replacement of momentum and energy or space and matter with information and constraint is that the replacement is done in an arbitrary and not fully justified manner in his paper.
Thus I fault CTMU for explanatory failure. The concepts are not linked together and even those that have read Wheeler's book read into Langan's work what Langan has not fully integrated into his theory.
One can also wonder, If Wheeler had already done it, why didn't Langan simply quote Wheeler's relevant pages and reproduce the cube with permission and not come up with a tetrahedron?
Mark,
Langan doesnt do all the hair-splittings that you do. Simply put, cognition uses (the syntax of) logic and vice versa. They are the same thing. You can split it into deductive and predicate logic etc etc, but Langan doesn't do that spliting. It would involve adding new material to the CTMU to seal cracks.
That would be tantamount to an ad-hoc defense of the CTMU.
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Aliet Jacob
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Member # 908
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posted 07. October 2003 10:04
Langan, could you represent syntax and state or information and constraint (or whatever entities are interacting in CTMU) in form of tensor equations and some Lorentz metric and proceed to represent their interactions via the tetrahedron in the CTMU paper?
And could you kindly show whether and how information and constraint cancel out and whether based on whichever (conservation) laws, how your units interact and how the resulting "zero" is arrived at?
As it is, I see no clear way of linking the edges of the tetrahedron to information and constraint and how you relate it to the boundary of a boundary concept.
Rex, Russel - do you understand the interaction of the above units? How can they be represented using Langan's tetrahedron?
[ 07. October 2003, 10:08: Message edited by: Aliet Jacob ]
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Christopher M. Langan
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Member # 264
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posted 07. October 2003 12:13
Hello, folks. I'd just like to make some comments about the CTMU and my responsibility to defend it.
First, although I stand by the PCID paper down to the last jot and tittle, the CTMU is in some respects a work in progress, and I reserve the right to add to it or qualify it as I like and as time permits. In fact, I have several CTMU-related papers now in the process of creation or revision, and no one but me has anything to say about their content or timing.
Secondly, none of the CTMU critics whom I have thus far seen has the understanding or the technical ability to speak authoritatively about my theory. I have found many criticisms of the CTMU to be motivated by incomprehension and serious misreadings and/or non-readings of the published material rather than any supposed conceptual or explanatory deficiency on my part, and while I do not claim that my presentation (or that of any other technical author) is beyond improvement, I lay a healthy measure of blame for such misunderstandings on the doorsteps of those who recurrently complain about them.
Thirdly, given that I am trying to present a new model of reality, I'm amazed by the number of CTMU criticisms that obviously rely on the very cognitive structures in need of correction or augmentation. The very existence of ISCID (and for that matter of complexity theory) testifies to the explanatory inadequacy of certain conceptual structures and models, and endlessly denying or belaboring their more-than-obvious weaknesses would be nothing but a waste of time for those of us who already know them for what they are.
Fourthly, while it may not be politically correct to observe that the viewpoints of some people are less evolved than those of others, there eventually comes a point at which certain viewpoints must be rationally identified as noise. As it happens, there are certain people regarding whom I have made this identification with what I consider to be a high degree of certainty, on the basis of not only their tendency to make technical errors but also their demeanor...for example, their readiness to lapse into ad hominem attacks and baseless, sometimes libelous accusations of plagiarism and other kinds of wrongdoing (e.g. "First of all, Syndiffeonesis is a concept whose originality has been disputed."). Nobody with a constructive agenda has the time for such people or their nonsense, and I am no exception.
Speaking strictly for myself, when I see a thread or a forum being dominated by such a person through sheer volume and vehemence of input, I begin to question the wisdom of involving myself at all. While this is merely a personal observation on my part, it suggests that those who desire my auctorial input regarding the CTMU not encourage such people in their abuse, particularly after they have been suspended for their mischief, transparently permuted their handles and come back for more.
I'm usually very happy to respond to questions and critiques as time permits; to some extent, I consider this a theorist's responsibility. But I cannot reasonably be expected to do it in venues conspicuously ridden by those with established tendencies to deviate from matters of content.
Thanks.
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gedanken
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posted 07. October 2003 15:52
Alright, since Mr. Langan has more or less identified the specifics, but does not provide a direct link close to the form of a citation, I shall assert what I think is meant, and Mr. Langan can disagree if he wishes.
All references to "CTMU" or "CTMU paper" are references to:
The Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe: A New Kind of Reality Theory, as published in PCID, combined issue Volume 1.2 and 1.3, April - September 2002, by Christopher Michael Langan.
Mr. Langan reserves (as would be natural) the right to update his argument and may have done so in various (but not necessarily referenced) threads here on ISCID "Brainstorms" and elsewhere. But the basic argument for which this thread is giving discussion is the citation above, if such argument does not appear in this thread -- or any specifically given link or citation to a new and updated argument (none appearing at this moment in the pages of this thread).
[ 07. October 2003, 15:57: Message edited by: gedanken ]
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gedanken
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posted 07. October 2003 21:45
Is CTMU inextricably linked to Copenhagen interpretation?
That is falling out of favor with physicists.
Just an example of problems: (here)
quote:
An unobserved system, according to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory, evolves in a deterministic way determined by a wave equation. An observed system changes in a random fashion, at the moment of observation, instantaneously, with the probability of any particular outcome given by the Born formula. This is known as the "collapse" or "reduction" of the wavefunction. The problems with this approach are:
(1) The collapse is an instantaneous process across an extended region ("non-local") which is non-relativistic.
(2) The idea of an observer having an effect on microphysics is repugnant to reductionism and smacks of a return to pre-scientific notions of vitalism. Copenhagenism is a return to the old vitalist notions that life is somehow different from other matter, operating by different laws from inanimate matter. The collapse is triggered by an observer, yet no definition of what an "observer" is available, in terms of an atomic scale description, even in principle.
By the way several pages ago we discussed how scientific theories could be described as "useful fictions", but not necessarily taken as true in some absolute manner. This is a prime example. The method of calculating QM results is extremely powerful and useful ("Useful"). But logically it is inconsistent and incoherent at some level ("fiction").
(Don't misunderstand, its agreement with observation makes it very useful.)
Key is the approximate nature of the scientific result--failing at "absolute" description of nature.
[ 07. October 2003, 23:10: Message edited by: gedanken ]
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Aliet Jacob
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posted 08. October 2003 02:35
I agree with Langan's statements in the CTMU paper about where explanatory bucks for theories must be placed. It seems however, that he doesnt subscribe fully to the same sentiments himself.
Langan has pointed out, correctly, that questions of originality are tangential to the contents of CTMU. Being one guilty as charged, I apologise for that. That said, I am confident that there are no more than 5 people on this planet that understand CTMU better than I do. Langan can set a CTMU exam and put it at some site - I will readily take it and pass (actually, thats a joke ![[Smile]](smile.gif) ).
More seriously though, other than the faults Langan has found with my posts, there are relevant and significant issues that I have raised and that Rex has put forward. I believe Langan would do best to inject some useful responses into his criticisms, and not throw away the baby with the bathwater. By his own admission, the new-fangled CTMU is incomplete and its presentation is not the best.
Regarding Langan's comments that there is a faceless group of people that know the "explanatory inadequacy of certain conceptual structures and models" and his characterization of of ISCID as evidence of this, his statements indicate that they share a common belief. Which is a great thing. However, some links to arguments that explain "the explanatory inadequacy of certain conceptual structures and models" and the corresponding solutions would be helpful for those like me that lack this "insider" information.
I assume that Russel and Rex have read (at least to a reasonable degree) the CTMU paper. What I am interested in knowing is whether they have any insights regarding how we would get data regarding constraint and information or state and syntax or how we can quantify them and perharps use the data to derive an equation that can express the relationship between the two entities. Without this equation (and perhaps a graph), I do not see any basis for assuming that state and syntax can be compared to energy and momentum. And further, how to link them to boundary of a boundary (in most explanations, 8 cubes are used).
Perhaps Langan could offer some insight? Its possible that I am just applying the wrong handle on this - being a layman as I am.
I spent a huge amount of time reading relevant sections of Wheeler's work (A Journey through Gravity and Spacetime) and I wonder if Langan could help in simplifying how Wheeler links momenergy and boundary of boundary concepts.
Wheeler, through Minerva, the godess of wisdom, writes that the key to the magic grip of gravity lies in the boundary of the boundary.
I have no problem with the concept of a boundary of a boundary being zero. I have no problem with momenergy either.
Who can help a layman like me understand how the two are linked together - is Wheeler speaking metaphorically? It sounds so mystical.
How different is his approach to Lao Tzu's approach in explaining how nothingness (space) gives value to things? Lao Tzu explains, in Tao Te Ching that the door has nothing and thats why we can pass through them, he explains that vessels have the power to contain whats useful because they contain nothing.
RBH?
[ 08. October 2003, 05:22: Message edited by: Aliet Jacob ]
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chimp
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posted 08. October 2003 04:30
Another very helpful book that explains the "boundary of a boundary is zero" and conservation of momentum-energy is "Gravitation", by Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler. Very interesting...
I found this article that explains some of the CTMU basics:
http://www.megafoundation.org/UltraHIQ/UltraHIQNews/index.html
quote:
News of the Ultranet
Fall, 2001
The November, 2001, issue of Popular Science features (on Page 64) the Chairman of the Mega Foundation, Christopher Langan. The article, entitled “Wise Guy ”, trades first upon the fact that such an extraordinary individual would be found in such an ordinary setting. A sidebar touches upon a discussion of Chris’ Cognitive Theoretical Model of the Universe (CTMU).
The CTMU seeks to answer such existential questions as “What came before the beginning?”, “Into what meta-space is our universe expanding?”, and “Our universe seems to be impossibly improbable. How did our life-supporting continuum manage to come into being in the face of impossible odds?”
The CTMU postulates that,
(A) Our Universe Only Appears to Be Expanding
Our universe, instead of expanding, is shrinking uniformly in such a way that from the inside, it appears to be expanding. (This sidesteps the question. “If our universe is expanding, into what “meta-space” is it expanding?”)
(B) An Unbounded Sea of Possibilities
Our universe has evolved from a seed in an initial, “informational sea” of unbounded possibilities to its current state through a “filtration process” in which various possibilities and classes of possibilities have been eliminated. A minute subset of possibilities is eliminated every time a quantum wave function “collapses” to produce a single outcome. Before the “collapse” of the yy* probability function occurs, an entire envelope of possibilities exists; but once a measurement is made to determine the outcome, the yy* distribution collapses to a single, actual outcome. In other words, before the wave function collapses, there exists a seemingly infinite (or at least very large) number of outcomes that is consistent with that quantum-mechanical wave function. After the quantum-mechanical system is forced to “make a decision”, those seemingly infinite potentialities are eliminated. This is just like what happens to us when we have to choose among a number of possible courses of action.
Applied to the universe as a whole, this constitutes an infinitesimal reduction in the set of potential ways the universe can branch.
(C) The Telic Principle
One of the problems in cosmogony is the problem of the extreme improbability of finding a universe suitable for the evolution of intelligent life. One proposed answer is the Anthropic Principle. The Anthropic Principle assumes that an enormous number of parallel universes exist that differ minutely in the values of their various physical constants or initial conditions. Virtually all of these parallel universes are devoid of intelligent life, but we’re in one that is the incomparably rare exception. But we’re also in one of the only universes that harbors life that can ask such questions.
The CTMU posits instead a “Telic Principle”. The Telic Principle postulates that intelligence in our universe can retroactively influence quantum-mechanical outcomes at the myriad times that a wave-function collapses to a single outcome. This intelligence influences quantum-mechanical condensations in ways that are calculated to generate our universe. (Talk about “the fall of every sparrow”!) In other words, our universe, acting as its own architect, creates itself.
(D) Instant Communication of Quantum-Mechanical State Information
Once a quantum-mechanical wave function condenses to a single outcome (makes a decision), news of that outcome spreads at the speed of light. However, within that spreading sphere, quantum-mechanical wave functions can instantaneously exchange wave function information at great distances.
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gedanken
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posted 08. October 2003 09:39
quote:
The CTMU postulates that,
[ ... ]
(D) Instant Communication of Quantum-Mechanical State Information
Once a quantum-mechanical wave function condenses to a single outcome (makes a decision), news of that outcome spreads at the speed of light. However, within that spreading sphere, quantum-mechanical wave functions can instantaneously exchange wave function information at great distances.
But consider: Can wavefunctions collapse? (A portion of the THE EVERETT FAQ on Many Worlds interpretation of QM. I think that the idea of "instant communication" is not supported by the Many-Worlds concept that is supported by so many physicists, including Tipler.
For example: (Tipler, here, and just for reference.)
quote:
Quantum nonlocality may be an artifact of the assumption that observers obey the laws of classical mechanics, while observed systems obey quantum mechanics. I show that, at least in the case of Bell's Theorem, locality is restored if observed and observer are both assumed to obey quantum mechanics, as in the Many-Worlds Interpretation.
I think there is a fundamental misunderstanding to think that QM requires any such faster than light communication. Rather the answers were simply discovered, they did not occur as a communication.
Mr. Langan does not really give reason to accept any alternative to MW. I agree there are problems with MW (which I think can be solved), but those as far as I can tell are not resolved in CTMU.
So far I have not understood how CTMU can avoid standing on some of the same mistakes that lead to "Copenhagen".
[ 08. October 2003, 10:10: Message edited by: gedanken ]
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chimp
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posted 08. October 2003 11:43
quote:
Mr. Langan does not really give reason to accept any alternative to MW. I agree there are problems with MW (which I think can be solved), but those as far as I can tell are not resolved in CTMU.
So far I have not understood how CTMU can avoid standing on some of the same mistakes that lead to "Copenhagen".
If information is contained within the light cone of an event, then, when two light cones intersect, they share information. Faster than light communication would not occur ...
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gedanken
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posted 08. October 2003 12:15
Russel said:
quote:
If information is contained within the light cone of an event, then, when two light cones intersect, they share information. Faster than light communication would not occur ...
But compare to his original "D" point
quote:
However, within that spreading sphere, quantum-mechanical wave functions can instantaneously exchange wave function information at great distances.
It is the "instantaneous" exchange of "information" that I am disputing and think is disputed with MW presentations.
Then I must point out (again if I have not made that clear) I am not a fan of MW. Rather I present this as becoming somewhat accepted -- including by Tipler himself -- because it provides superior answers to problems than Copenhagen. That the answers are "superior" does not mean that the work is complete.
For example from Mark's first link (from last post)
quote:
I do not claim that this problem has no solution. But Mirman's observation that a world evolving via the Schroedinger equation alone is evolving continuously does not SOLVE the measurement problem: it CREATES the measurement problem.
Key point "I do not claim that this problem has no solution." I am mainly pointing out that the objections in the MW presentations to Copenhagen still hold, whether or not MW itself has resolved. And secondarily I think that CTMU is inextricably based on some of the assumptions used to arrive at Copenhagen. The objections to "emergent" views of various sorts may indeed be compatible with an MW-like resolution (not necessarily, for example, actually positing the multiple worlds themselves as necessary).
Interesting bit from Mark's second link:
quote:
> But
> there is a fundamental assumption underlying the entire field of
> quantum computing that the designer of the algorithm specifies when
> measurements are taken. The engineering challenge is to make this a
> reality by creating controllable quantum systems of more than a few
> qbits entangled over macroscopic ranges. It seems, though, that this
> essential dependence on a strikingly Copenhagen-like measurement
> process is rarely stated explicitly as an assumption.
RIGHT!
Let me give an example:
A Geiger counter has a meter and speaker making a "click". A quantum event is 'detected' (so to speak) and the speaker clicks and the meter jumps.
Now is an observer necessary for the meter to jump? There is no difference here from a computational system recording the click. Or Schrodinger's cat. The nonsense is that the quantum issues are resolved by the observer. I claim the problem is still present. The MW may not resolve--but still provides the necessary argument that Copenhagen is insufficiently coherent.
More from Mark's second link, which occurs just before another quote sub-quoted in first paper:
quote:
Once, long ago, I characterized the many-worlds solution as shifting the whole measurement problem onto the mind-brain problem, about which it says nothing. For the theory, to be empirically meaningful it must be tied to probabilistic statements about alternative possible human experiences. But the smeared-out state of the brain does not cleanly separate vectors from other vectors that differ from them by very tiny amounts. But then what principle, involving nothing but the evolving amorphous state of the universe, can separate the space of brain states into othogonal subspaces, such as those defined by P and (I-P), associable with different experiences?
I have discussed the issue before here of knowledge not being absolute or of great accuracy about individual events. For example consider the Geiger counter again. I don't see it as particularly distinct from the "observer" in that it is itself a system that reacts. That the observer's brain may be "smeared-out state" does not seem to be a problem. The problem, rather, is that we seem to make additional demands of our concept of ourselves. For example demanding that our thoughts are "crisp" rather than existing in a somewhat "smeared-out state", for example.
I think we can have, for example, a fuzzy smeared-out concept (distributed through our brains's function) of the notion of a crisp boolean logic statement. But did the Geiger counter click or not? We are pretty sure it did! (But we could have been in a dream state, having dozed off.) Use of more precise recording equipment helps resolve, of course. But then the problem is displaced to the "more precise recording equipment" taking a stand as the "observer". (i.e. we could have deposited that recording in Shcrodinger's cat, in that particularly gruesome form of recording.)
[ 08. October 2003, 13:07: Message edited by: gedanken ]
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chimp
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posted 08. October 2003 12:37
Yes, "D" says instantaneous exchange of information, which is a problem.
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