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Author
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Topic: Cosmogony, Holography and Causality
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Christopher M. Langan
Member
Member # 264
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posted 21. July 2003 13:01
I notice several recent posts on this board asking about those aspects of ID theory having to do with cosmogony, holography, astronomy and other questions to which the biological aspect of ID theory is intimately related.
Dr. Frank Tipler of Tulane has a theory which says that the universe is a function of "front-loaded" design by the God of traditional monotheism. In essence, Dr. Tipler’s theory says that the evolution of the universe is following a pre-written script consisting of the laws of physics and implicitly containing the blueprint of life, and he offers what he and others consider to be strong physical evidence of such a relationship. I have a theory which goes somewhat farther, acknowledging the distributed or front-loaded aspect of design while making the universe a self-contained feedback system in which the design function can take specific local arguments and deliver specific localized output in the course of evolution. My theory, called the CTMU (short for Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe), implies that a self-aware designer distributes over reality, or in theological terms, that "God configures Himself as reality." This, of course, is fully consistent with the idea that God is the ultimate reality, an insight that has been oft-made but seldom explored by theologians and philosophers.
With regard to holography, the CTMU utilizes a concept called hology, which differs from holography in its dynamism; specifically, hology is a species of self-similarity involving a kind of space-time dualization in which certain general aspects of the structure of reality are internally self-distributed as rules of grammar. The associated language is called SCSPL (short for Self-Configuring Self-Processing Language), and it includes the laws of physics as a restricted "sublanguage". SCSPL can be characterized as a self-contained metaphysical extension of standard logic. While some of the informational and probabilistic aspects of this language have been generically addressed by the noted ID theorists Michael Behe and William Dembski, they have done so without committing themselves to specific cosmological and causal models (including those described by Dr. Tipler and myself). This has been convenient inasmuch as producing a true model of causality is a rather tall order.
With certain notable exceptions, many of those involved in the ID-neoDarwinism controversy seem not to grasp the full connection between the ID hypothesis and systems of cosmology. They want to restrict the discussion to conventional laboratory biology, which places severe limits on the kinds of problem that can be addressed and the kinds of solution that can be verified. These limits can be regarded as the price of undertaking causal analysis and attempting to verify causal hypotheses without committing to a specific model of causality. Since both neo-Darwinism and ID amount to (biological) theories of causality, neither side of the debate is in full compliance with the logical entailments of its position.
While I don’t know the level of support enjoyed by Dr. Tipler’s work, mine is officially unsupported and pursued strictly as a labor of love. So as near as I can tell, even if one asks the right questions - and certain questions that have recently appeared on Brainstorms at least resemble the right questions - one is unlikely to hear much about cosmology from rank-and-file ID supporters, who typically seem uninterested in such matters and evidently do not understand all of the logical issues involved. In answer to such questions, I'd thus have to respond that even though work on the causal and cosmological foundations of Intelligent Design is only infrequently acknowledged, it has been ongoing for quite some time.
However, this brings up another question in dire need of attention: why are so many biologists who formulate and express opinions on hypotheses and methods critically dependent on the fundamental nature of causality apparently so unconcerned with the fundamental nature of causality? This is a question to which I myself would one day like to see an answer.
[ 21. July 2003, 13:05: Message edited by: Christopher M. Langan ]
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David Garrett
Member
Member # 759
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posted 30. July 2003 19:00
quote:
Dr. Frank Tipler of Tulane has a theory which says that the universe is a function of "front-loaded" design by the God of traditional monotheism. In essence, Dr. Tipler’s theory says that the evolution of the universe is following a pre-written script consisting of the laws of physics and implicitly containing the blueprint of life, and he offers what he and others consider to be strong physical evidence of such a relationship. I have a theory which goes somewhat farther, acknowledging the distributed or front-loaded aspect of design while making the universe a self-contained feedback system in which the design function can take specific local arguments and deliver specific localized output in the course of evolution. My theory, called the CTMU (short for Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe), implies that a self-aware designer distributes over reality, or in theological terms, that "God configures Himself as reality." This, of course, is fully consistent with the idea that God is the ultimate reality, an insight that has been oft-made but seldom explored by theologians and philosophers.
Chris,
The issue with whether or not reality was "front loaded" leads to numerous philosophical questions concerning time, freewill, and eschatology.
The first question I have is this - if, at the global level, reality is atemporal, how can we really say that the universe was "front loaded" or not? When you use the term "atemporal" what do you mean?
One could interpret Tipler's Omega Point Theory as wiping out any chance of us having freewill. But, it could also be interpreted that in either Tipler or De Chardin's theories that reality has set out on a goal to achieve infinite information processing by setting up the laws of nature and leaving the path of how it's achieved to local freedom. From a global perspective there is not really any freewill but at a local perspective freewill is left in tact. What does the CTMU say about global freewill?
Finally, there is the issue of achieving higher degrees of self-actualization, information processing, and complexity. If reality is using a self-selection process of utility or efficiency, then would it be correct to say that reality, or God, is becoming more powerful?
Dave
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Jack Foster
Member
Member # 79
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posted 07. September 2003 23:16
Hi Chris:
I'm not sure how I missed this thread!
Can the CTMU help provide a Theory of Variation for Evolutuionary Biology? To me, that's what the field needs. There's a huge outcry within the ID community for such an advancement! ![[Wink]](wink.gif)
I've always enjoyed reading about the CTMU, and I wish you well with it.
regards,
jazz
[ 07. September 2003, 23:17: Message edited by: Jack Foster ]
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Rex Kerr
Member
Member # 632
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posted 08. September 2003 03:28
Chris asks:
quote:
Why are so many biologists who formulate and express opinions on hypotheses and methods critically dependent on the fundamental nature of causality apparently so unconcerned with the fundamental nature of causality?
I would like to offer an explanation. Experimental sciences build knowledge in a bottom-up fashion more than a top-down one, and this is especially true in biology.
This state of affairs is not an accident. As the saying goes, "Once burned, twice shy." People investigating biology have been burned many a time by working top-down. For example, as near as I can tell, the entire field of "organic chemistry" is labeled as such because people used to think that many chemical compounds could only be created by life and by no other means. Oops. And, of course, cells are just undifferentiated protoplasm, whatever that is. Oops. Meat spontaneously generates flies. Oops. And so on.
The reason I chose these examples is because people were led astray from reality based on some broader philosophical or "common-sense" theory. The lesson has been to focus as much as possible on what you can test and measure, and to assume as little as possible about the nature of reality, causality, etc. etc..
And indeed, although biology is ultimately crucially dependent on causality, one can learn an enormous amount without worrying about such philosophical issues (aside from presupposing that they work out well enough, somehow, to enable our experiences to not be wholly delusional). Thus I would contend that the fundamental nature of causality is something that biologists should be unconcerned with. The burden is upon those who propose a theory of causality to show how it is directly and testably of bearing to biology in a way that is substantially different from a generic theory of causality.
As an analogy, I might ask: Why do so many message-board posters who compose and exchange messages critically dependent on modern integrated circuit design apparently so unconcerned with modern integrated circuit design?
The answer here seems similarly clear: because I don't need to know about P-N junctions, NAND gates, and so on, to type out my message and hit "Add Reply". However the computer/internet stuff works out, it is enough to me that it works. The how may be interesting, but can largely be ignored.
My take on the irrelevance of the fundamental nature of causality to most/all biological research also leads me to my primary criticism of CTMU: it is entirely too arbitrary, in that it postulates a framework and a host of structures in order to have reality be a certain way without (insofar as I can tell) arguing that reality is or should be that way. It is, to be sure, very difficult to make a comprehensive theory that doesn't immediately fall apart at the seams under inspection, and as near as I can tell CTMU doesn't. However, being internally consistent is not the same thing as being a good model of reality.
(In this way, my criticism of CTMU is fairly similar to my criticism of the "Transcendental Argument for God", which is basically a logical argument that uses God to terminate what would otherwise be an infinite logical regress of causality. I wonder if anyone here is familiar with both?)
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chimp
Member
Member # 333
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posted 08. September 2003 05:22
It seems that certain abstract structures must correspond to the world.
Causality must exist, in order for the world to be non-contradictory.
http://www.hep.upenn.edu/~max/toe.pdf
quote:
II. MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURES
Our proposed TOE can be summarized as follows:
Physical existence is equivalent to mathematical existence.
What precisely is meant by mathematical existence, or
ME for brevity? A generally accepted interpretation of
ME is that of David Hilbert:
Mathematical existence is merely freedom from contradiction.
In other words, if the set of axioms that
defne a mathematical
structure cannot be used to prove both a statement
and its negation, then the mathematical structure
is said to have ME.
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Rex Kerr
Member
Member # 632
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posted 08. September 2003 22:11
Russ, thanks for the link, which is interesting, but it's a little thin on its support for your assertion. Tegmark merely says, when classifying theories of everything:
quote:
1. The physical world is completely mathematical.
(a) Everything that exists mathematically exists physically.
(b) Some things that exist mathematically exist physically, others do not.
...
2. The physical world is not completely mathematical.
Category 2 TOEs are somewhat of a resignation in the sense of giving up physical predictive power, and will not be further discussed here.
He then goes on to discuss why he favors 1a over 1b. (Interesting, but I'm unconvinced for reasons that I won't go into here, but basically boil down to the universe being too simple/inductive for (1a).)
In terms of epistemology, I think assuming (1) is a gigantic and unsupportable leap of faith. It would be nice if (1), whether (1b) or (1a), but wishing it to be so (even if one expresses one's wishes as the premise that anything that prevents one from creating an inviolably true and always applicable theory of logic, is a contradiction and therefore false) does not make it so.
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chimp
Member
Member # 333
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posted 09. September 2003 02:56
quote:
II. MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURES
Our proposed TOE can be summarized as follows:
Physical existence is equivalent to mathematical existence.
I agree that not all mathematical structures exist as physical quantities Rex. But it appears to be a self evident truth that some sort of mathematical structure is equivalent to physical existence. A finite number of axioms that correspond exactly with the observable universe.
Since the scientific method could not exist without a logical foundation, it appears that logic itself is a generalization which specifies what the scientific method can tell ...us.
quote:
What precisely is meant by mathematical existence, or
ME for brevity? A generally accepted interpretation of
ME is that of David Hilbert:
Mathematical existence is merely freedom from contradiction.
In other words, if the set of axioms that
defne a mathematical
structure cannot be used to prove both a statement
and its negation, then the mathematical structure
is said to have ME.
The above quote is direct and to the point. Mathematical existence is freedom from contradiction. Therefore physical existence is freedom from contradiction. Any theory that contains contradictions, is not corresponding to ...the real universe.
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Rex Kerr
Member
Member # 632
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posted 09. September 2003 03:54
quote:
It appears to be a self evident truth that some sort of mathematical structure is equivalent to physical existence. A finite number of axioms that correspond exactly with the observable universe.
It certainly isn't self-evident to me! In fact, given that every mathematical theory we have ever come up with has been demonstrated to not correspond exactly with the observable universe, I'd have thought that one would suspect that the universe isn't conveniently axiomatizable.
Note, for example, how much more difficult general relativity is than Newtonian mechanics.
Of course, trivially, the observable universe can be put into 1-1 correspondence with some mathematical structure, i.e. a giant list of everything that ever was, is, and could be observable. Given what we know of quantum mechanics and the heat death of the universe, it could be arbitrarily good of a correspondence and still be finite. However, this is a merely a statement that mathematics is as powerful as our powers of description and observation, and doesn't necessitate any grand conclusions about the nature of reality.
I agree that any theory that contains contradictions doesn't correspond to the real universe, but that is because when we make an observation, we generate a new category any time we would otherwise have a contradiction. E.g. a single photon interfering with itself and giving a diffraction pattern is not called a contradiction, but an observation; we relax our rules to allow things to act like both particles and waves, instead of only one (thus removing the contradiction).
What isn't clear is that there exists a high-level theory that corresponds to the real universe; one containing rules that map onto our notion of spin, charge, etc. etc..
Maybe one does. If one does, I suppose it might be along the lines of Stephan Wolfram's conjecture of a universe of simple, recursive rules. Or maybe not. I don't really know.
What I do know is that mathematics is useful for modeling and predicting the behavior of the universe on scales that I am familiar with, just like Newtonian mechanics works well at low velocity and vaguely humanoid scales. I don't worry too much about relativity when I'm placing CDs into a stack, nor do I worry about the next theory that will extend relativity. And I resist all temptation to assume that the universe must be isomorphic to finite, discoverable mathematical axioms on the basis that it would make theoretical physics much easier and more promising for me.
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Aliet Jacob
Member
Member # 908
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posted 09. September 2003 05:04
Rex Kerr mentions a concept that is called abstraction or information hiding in computer programming when he explains the scientists disinterest concerning the mechanism of causality.
And that concept that Rex doesn't deem to be an important subject for scientists is what Langan attempts to address in the CTMU - what Langan describes as "a new kind of reality theory".
It of course has to be metascientific. Even metalogic and metamathematical. Precisely because "scientists don't bother with such things".
But why don't they? Rex has stated one of the reasons is the "no assumptions" approach that scientists use when they are investigating phenomena - which minimizes error and eliminates tunnel vision. He has also mentioned something akin to occams razor.
Why else?
Before we answer that, we need to understand what the statement "nature of reality" means. Is there a significant difference between nature and reality in the context of the statement? (bearing in mind they are both groups/sets).
We need to understand that first. And to examine Rex's post from another angle:
Imagine seeing a mechanic (with a background in fluid mechanics, electricity and physics) assemble a car from ground up, then repairing the car every time it breaks down, cleaning the parts and the engine, adding fuel, repairing punctures etc etc.
How would an observer be able to judge whether or not the mechanic understands the nature of the car? (or even the nature of the medium in which the car works)
Can we state that the mechanic is ignorant of the causal mechanism behind cars working?
How would we explain the significance of the mechanic understanding the nature of the car?
This reminds me of a statement I used to make some years ago: A technician knows how and an engineer knows why.
Does the scientist know both how and why?
Are they both scientific questions with regard to causality?
For example once a scientists has known how HIV causes AIDS, is it important to know why HIV causes AIDS?
Or, once a scientist has known that bodies at rest remain at rest unless a force acts upon such bodies, does a scientist then need to understand why they remain at rest? Or why F=ma?
What would be the validity of such questions with regard to causality?
What fundamental assumptions would one need to hold in order to ask such questions?
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chimp
Member
Member # 333
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posted 09. September 2003 06:51
Very interesting Rex. Thanks.
From one fundamental principle, it should be possible to derive the other principles of relativity, quantum mechanics, Newton's laws, etc.
The CTMU explains the UBT as a non-extential non-durational pre-logical outsidefor the universe. Why postulate a UBT that can never be proven to exist? Why not explain that nothing is outside the universe?
Nothingness is a difficult concept in itself, but it seems that a total nothingness would be a type of massless solid! Also, it would have no distance-metric properties. In other words, it would be equivalent to a symmetric push on the surface of existence.
---->|U|<----
From this one force, all other forces, can be derived.
Perhaps that is what the "UBT" really is?
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Aliet Jacob
Member
Member # 908
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posted 09. September 2003 08:27
Russel,
It's impossible for something temporal (like our universe) to arise from a non-temporal realm. Precisely because the temporal entity would render its precursor temporal. Once they are causally related, they become a system. If they are not causally related, one cannot arise from the other.
One cannot peel off the constraints from reality to reach the UBT because of how our universe is structured. Langan states that when one peels off the constraints, one of the first things to go would be time hence the question of when (when was the universe created?) would vanish.
But this assumes an earth-like structure to reality (bound Telesis) - where one can peel off the mantle, the crust etc as one approaches the core.
Langans idea would compel us to use nuclear fission (peeling off constraints) and of course break the fundamental forces of nature. It would be an exothermic procedure that would release a lot of heat. I do not know to what extent we would be able to compare that to the singularity.
Its important to note that there seems to be two UBTs - one: a primordial realm full of infocognitive potential. The other one and ever present "realm" that we can access by dint of peeling off the constraints.
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David Garrett
Member
Member # 759
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posted 09. September 2003 14:08
Inte...Ali...Jac wrote:
quote:
It's impossible for something temporal (like our universe) to arise from a non-temporal realm. Precisely because the temporal entity would render its precursor temporal. Once they are causally related, they become a system. If they are not causally related, one cannot arise from the other.
This is wrong. First of all, reality is not temporal at the global level. If it were it would be imbedded in a larger metric. If this were so then that larger metric would be included as part of reality and we would encounter an infinite regress. Temporalness is internal to reality where relations of real objects form state-change relations giving rise to time.
quote:
One cannot peel off the constraints from reality to reach the UBT because of how our universe is structured. Langan states that when one peels off the constraints, one of the first things to go would be time hence the question of when (when was the universe created?) would vanish.
But this assumes an earth-like structure to reality (bound Telesis) - where one can peel off the mantle, the crust etc as one approaches the core.
Langans idea would compel us to use nuclear fission (peeling off constraints) and of course break the fundamental forces of nature. It would be an exothermic procedure that would release a lot of heat. I do not know to what extent we would be able to compare that to the singularity.
I don't know where you get this silly "earth-like mantel" analogy but it is very wrong. Do you actually think that we are discussing a literal, physical peeling off of logical constraints?
Let's face it, you can't grasp the concept of the UBT being pre-logical. You are still trying to make some sort of objection to its physical location outside of reality when we are discussing the mental correspondence to physical reality. You don't get it. You obviously won't get it until you remove the empirical hood that is blinding you.
And one more thing, optical illusions are not contridictory to reality. They are 2-dimensional representations that we find paradoxical by trying to map them into a 3-dimensional world. This was made evident by these fellows when they attempted to reproduce one of Escher's drawings with Legos. It was impossible to render in 3-D so they would up "tricking" the audience by taking a 2-D picture from the proper angle!
Escher Legos
Dave
[ 09. September 2003, 14:10: Message edited by: David Garrett ]
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Dene Bebbington
Member
Member # 168
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posted 09. September 2003 16:42
David Garrett:
quote:
And one more thing, optical illusions are not contridictory to reality. They are 2-dimensional representations that we find paradoxical by trying to map them into a 3-dimensional world. This was made evident by these fellows when they attempted to reproduce one of Escher's drawings with Legos. It was impossible to render in 3-D so they would up "tricking" the audience by taking a 2-D picture from the proper angle!
But there are other kinds of illusions which are contradictory to reality. How this relates to the CTMU though, I have no idea.
--
Dene
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David Garrett
Member
Member # 759
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posted 09. September 2003 17:23
quote:
But there are other kinds of illusions which are contradictory to reality. How this relates to the CTMU though, I have no idea.
Hey, David Blane is not really magical...its all fake.
Dave
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Rex Kerr
Member
Member # 632
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posted 09. September 2003 22:11
Russ, when you say, "From one fundamental principle, it should be possible to derive the other principles of relativity, quantum mechanics, Newton's laws, etc.", is this a claim about reality or a definition of the concept of fundamental principle?
I accept it as a definition, and as a prescription for something to look for, and a hope for what we may one day find. However, I can see little justification for it as a claim.
Aliet asks some interesting questions to which I do not have answers.
He also makes the claim that "It's impossible for something temporal to arise from a non-temporal realm." Here is a counterexample:
code:
-------- space ----->
|.........#.........
|........###........
|.......##..#.......
t......##.####......
i.....##..#...#.....
m....##.####.###....
e...##..#....#..#...
|..##.####..######..
|.##..#...###.....#.
|##.####.##..#...###
v
This is a diagram depicting the evolution of a set of observables (which can each be either . or #) over time.
But it is also a rectangle of text, and as such is non-temporal.
It seems that examples like this allow something temporal to arise from a non-temporal realm.
But wait! Is this really temporal? If we look through the time evolution carefully, we will notice that:
code:
if line N has ... ..# .#. #.. .## #.# ##. ###
then N+1 has . # # # # . . .
but working backwards is not nearly so simple. This diagram is not reversible; it can "evolve" only forward in "time". Looks pretty temporal to me.
David wrote, "You obviously won't get it until you remove the empirical hood that is blinding you."
Notwithstanding the tone, which is more acerbic than academic, I would advise using phrasing that sounds less like, "Ignore reality when trying to understand truth." Unless this is exactly what is meant, in which case I would advise extreme caution on empirical grounds: this approach has lead to many failures (some spectacular) and no successes thus far.
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