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Author
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Topic: Critical Questions
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RBH
Member
Member # 380
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posted 07. August 2003 14:29
I'm pressed for time lately and so have not thought about this much. But it's still of interest to me.
Langan wrote quote:
In particular, while it may not be superficially apparent how a global model of causality might (computably) generate specific predictions, its ability to do cannot be ruled out on the basis of a general introduction. Because the CTMU is in a unique position with respect to the derivation of logical truths about the natural world, a little caution may be appropriate when it comes to setting limits on its implicative power.
That was actually my focus when I wrote quote:
But until and unless I see some fairly specific mappings that describe the correspondences leading from a general theory of everything to the operation of a GA on my machines, I'm comfortable not worrying overmuch about the cosmic level of analysis.
While in his remarks on that sentence Langan focused on the last clause, in fact I'm more interested in the first clause, and specifically in the mapping of correspondences from the 'cosmic' level to the more specific and concrete phenomena to be explained. If one does not have clear connections between terms in the explananda and explanandum, one doesn't have an explanation. Put another way, if one can't phrase biological questions in terms that the CTMU (or any general theory of everything) contains, and if one can't phrase the CTMU's explanations in terms that refer to (or are translatable to) biological entities, relationships, and processes, one can't explain biological phenomena in the terms of that general theory. Absent those correspondences one has only the same sort of promissory that IDists criticize evolutionary theory (on much thinner ground) for offering. So I await the elucidation and establishment of those correspondences. Until they appear, skepticism is an appropriate stance.
RBH
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Christopher M. Langan
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Member # 264
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posted 07. August 2003 23:41
Certainly, one can understand RBH's desire for specificity. Specificity is what allows those occupied with concrete reality to deal directly with specific concrete objects. However, too much specificity is not always a good thing, particularly with regard to universal abstractions (or if one likes, abstract universals). For one thing, specificity is inversely related to generality and thus to scope. So if one is seeking a general mapping, e.g. the kind of cause-to-effect mapping that would be associated with a fundamental (and therefore general) model of causality, excessive specificity is something that one wants to avoid. Since (for reasons I've already given) providing context-specific theories of physical and biological evolution with a fundamental model of causality is an urgent necessity for those seeking answers for questions about physical and biological origins, we must reason on the most general possible level. But that's fine, because specifics are generatively deduced from generalities. And that's really the whole point: the only way to maximize our deductive capacity with respect to natural causation is to identify and work from the proper generalities within an appropriate deductive framework. Since this is the motivation behind the CTMU, attempting to marginalize the CTMU on grounds of insufficient initial specificity is like discounting the utility of horses because they are not initially preceded by carts...especially when CTMU generalities can themselves be rationally deduced.
Now let me attempt to clarify something else. I'm not in a position to say what constitutes an "appropriate stance" in the mind of anyone but myself. I don't know what anyone else understands or doesn't understand of the CTMU, or what constitutes "adequate phrasing" as far as anyone else is concerned, or even what differentiates terra firma from "thinner ground" in anyone else's worldview. But as far as I'm concerned, I've explained enough of the CTMU, and enough of the overall relationship of the CTMU to natural phenomena (including biological phenomena), to reject any suggestion that I'm unilaterally responsible for anyone else's total ignorance regarding them. I don't claim to be a perfect expositor; I have only my personal conviction that the lightbulb should by now have started to come on on for anyone paying a reasonable amount of attention to what I say. But there are two things of which I'm quite certain: (1) the CTMU is not merely a "promissory note", and (2) somewhat like RBH, I don't have the time to worry overmuch about people who persistently fall short of my pedagogical expectations. Suffice it to say that I'm in the process of elaborating on the general framework I've already established, and answering certain questions arising from the answers I've already given.
That being said, I'll reiterate: without a fundamental model of causality, Darwinism has precisely nothing to offer that couldn't be had for the price of a statistics calculator (and a mix of data and conjectures that do not depend in any way on Darwinism). Some would no doubt respond that the same is true of ID, and it's no secret where they'd be coming from. But then again, at least there's someone on the ID side of the fence coherently addressing the issue. If someone would like to offer another model of causality than my own, then by all means, feel free. But bear in mind that if and when you do, it will be my turn to play Skeptical Inquisitor in The Case of the Counterfeit Promissory Notes. And bear in mind that if you can't, then you're not in as strong a position as you might like others to believe.
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Argon
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Member # 276
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posted 08. August 2003 10:39
Chris writes:
quote:
In particular, while it may not be superficially apparent how a global model of causality might (computably) generate specific predictions, its ability to do cannot be ruled out on the basis of a general introduction. Because the CTMU is in a unique position with respect to the derivation of logical truths about the natural world, a little caution may be appropriate when it comes to setting limits on its implicative power.
I'm not saying that in principle, the CTMU can't generate specific predictions of historically contingent phenomena like weather. Maybe it can, but in practice, perhaps not yet. But so what? I'm not dismissing the theory on this basis. I'm not dismissing it at all. I'm not demanding or expecting that level of specificity at this level of development. It took decades to extend chemistry to organismal developmental pathways.
OTOH, if the CTMU could be sufficiently extended to make novel predictions that one could test in practical biological experiments, that would be neat.
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Argon
Member
Member # 276
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posted 08. August 2003 10:49
Chris writes:
quote:
That being said, I'll reiterate: without a fundamental model of causality, Darwinism has precisely nothing to offer that couldn't be had for the price of a statistics calculator (and a mix of data and conjectures that do not depend in any way on Darwinism).
It's been the work of evolutionary biologists to define and extend the general concepts of Darwinism into mathematical models (sometimes using fancy statistical calculations) that can permit empirical testing. So the ability to do this is actually a good thing.
And FWIW - This is exactly how Behe formulated his IC hypothesis and how Dembski attempted to calculate the CSI of the bacterial flagellum.
I'll be offline for a while -- Too much work ahead. Thanks for the conversations, RBH & Chris.
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