|
Author
|
Topic: Does intelligence imply “motive”?
|
Ermete22
Member
Member # 970
|
posted 09. November 2003 11:41
Dear Warren,
I beleive we are sitting on the opposite sides of something. meaning by that that there exists no profitable information exchange between us. Like between those who have a religious faith and those who do not share it. We fortunately are on the same side for what regards the curiosity about the world and the desire to understand it within our limits. And this is, in my opinion the most important point. I honestly cannot discuss your points as I literally do not see them. Being most of all a mathematician and a theoretical physics, I'm use to other more rigid (too rigid possibly) categories than the one you make use of. I do not mean in any sense you are wrong, and even less that I am right. Marbe you are saying truth, but a language I cannot understand. So best luck and I assure you, all my respect as, as I said we are sitting on the same side of curious part of the species.
Carlo
IP: Logged
|
|
brianjohnson
Member
Member # 979
|
posted 09. November 2003 17:57
i wish to pose a question for gedanken, regarding the early posts (pages 1 & 2)
you have stated that is not likely a criterion to be applied to recognize the easter island statues as designed that also rejects the old man of the mountain WITHOUT USING THE ACTUAL OBJECTS UNDER INSPECTION. i agree with you (for now), but then i ask, what does one infer from this.
i am thinking about the ability to discern design from non-design in general. isn't it appropriate to create a class of objects such that all objects of that class are only objects that have been designed by human beings for specific usage (i.e. tools yes, but not splatter-art). also, to create a class of non-human designed objects such that no objects of this class can also be in the other class.
AFTER we have established these classes, couldn't we then apply these distinctions to non-human artifacts for the sake of determining if there are a class of objects that more accurately resemble the first class and not the second? And from there, couldn't we infer that these objects are likely objects of deliberate design?
so, while we cannot create criteria to determine before hand if the easter island statues are really designed, it does seem that a post-facto, classifications are not an undesireable substitute.
IP: Logged
|
|
RBH
Member
Member # 380
|
posted 09. November 2003 22:11
Since this thread is now in the process of wandering far from gedanken's original ideas, I don't feel too bad about interjecting a request. warren_bergerson wrote quote:
Mathematical and AI analysis of designs and design processes clearly show that evolutionary change process are vastly more powerful and efficient than suggested by current so called evolutionary hypotheses.
Are there references to these "mathematical and AI analyses" that one can look up and read? Absent that, it's not at all clear in what respect(s) "evolutionary change processes" (by which I assume warren_bergerson means processes operating in biological systems) are allegedly clearly shown to be more powerful and efficient than current evolutionary theory suggests, and thus it's impossible to independently verify the claim.
RBH
[ 09. November 2003, 22:12: Message edited by: RBH ]
IP: Logged
|
|
gedanken
Member
Member # 594
|
posted 09. November 2003 23:37
Please, all, on "wandering", I have a great deal of additional material coming that is directly on topic! I would really like to get this material in this thread. I am sorry that it will arrive so slowly, but I have many priorities ahead of this.
But the material (which builds on previous posts in many ways) is the product of over an elapsed year of research (only occiasional spurts of actual work) in the mathematical probability relationships of the EF.
So I appreciate if we can stay on topic without space filling, as I think the material to come will be quite important with regard to previous material. Already at 6 pages, with probably as many to go in the next months, I would deeply appreciate restraint.
Very specifically, the topic is not "does intelligence imply motive." Perhaps I should request the moderator to extend the title to:
Does intelligence imply "motive"? Considerations of reliability of and improvements to the Explanatory Filter and similar design inference methods.
(The problem is that is so long, but I would not want to change the first few words as there are several outside links that use the title. "Motive" is an example of non-eliminative characteristics of the "design" process or agency which can constrain probabilities thereof, and can thus inform on the reliability of the EF in given circumstances.)
Thanks
--
With regard to BrianJohnson's question:
(Yes, I think this is on topic.)
I don't completely understand, but I do use a basic concept of classifying events. (And I use "events" rather than objects because that is the standard ID terminology, though the potential construction of the object is usually the event in question.) We can use classification of events wherein different classifications might differ in terms of universal agreement as to their "intelligence". For example various processes may or may not be accepted as "intelligent" by different readers. As long as the definition being used is clear, all is well, but if the definition of "intelligent" is not clear one can have problems.
But the topic I discuss it does not rely on a specific definition of "intelligent", rather only on a clear means of making such a distinction. In fact any lack of clarity in making such distinctions only reduces the reliability of the EF or other 'design' inference, and cannot improve the reliability.
I do not quite understand the usefulness of defining "classes" of objects this way, unless one is refer to some sort of classification that could be given by an omniscient being and is used as definition for comparison to what is measured by inference procedures. (In other words an inference procedure cannot use such a classification of object in question as input, as the entire problem is to classify the object or event as output of the classification procedure based on observation, and that would be circular reasoning.)
Now if one is considering these as "target classes" (e.g. generic classes to which existing objects are to be judged as to membership, rather than assumed), then there are important aspects to consider. I actually believe that archaeologists do, for example, uses concepts vaguely like that. Certain objects give the appearance of belonging to a certain class of objects due to details of construction that would be noted in objects in that class. (Once again, question is whether this object is in the defined "class".)
What is important about that level of analysis is that it is not possible with the EF methodology. The reason is that method is eliminative and does not consider the details of construction by intelligent agents as part of the aspects that are analyzed for probability.
Brian if you read on to later pages this comes up, as the details of theory construction are important in comparative methods. But being comparative is not enough per se, rather one must have details to relate to construction and implementation method in some greater theory (or proposition at least) so that the case can be assessed without as many coincidences possible.
When one has theory of construction by the intelligent agent (including especially all of motive, means, and opportunity, for example) then the objects characteristic "specification" is not nearly as subject to coincidence. This is quite different from the EF method, which looks for a pattern completely without regard to any detailed construction scenarios by intelligent agencey of the particular case in question. All that is considred is non-intelligent process action, and the eliminative method explicitly eschews the consideration of the intelligent process details.
The mathematics that I will be presenting will show that the control for coincidence is key. Dr. Dembski's "ProbRes" factors M and N are part of what establishes a very low level for the significance factor 'alpha' in the GCE procedure. But these very same factors are multipliers of any "missing distributions"--for precisely the same reasons of coincidence probability as the reason for using the factors M and N in calculating the cutoff 'alpha' in the first place.
Thus without a theory of intelligent agent construction and implementation of the event in question, factors M and N are only constrained as calculated by Dr. Dembski so as to control for coincidences. (In other words the factors M and N multiplicatively estimate opportunities for coincidences, which must be controlled for by lowering 'alpha'.) But theories of intelligent agent action in the specific case in question allow for reduction of M and N factors. This can only be done by considering the specifics of the given case with regard to considerations of scenarios of intelligent agent action in the detailed case in question. This is not possible with eliminative method.
Comparison per se (as is shown by Dr. Dembski) is not sufficient--as it leaves the sensitivities to "missing distributions" the same. But what Dr. Dembski misses is that theory about intelligent agent action, constraining probabilities thereof, are necessary to reduce the M,N factors. This is the failure of eliminative method--not the failure to compare per se.
[ 10. November 2003, 00:37: Message edited by: gedanken ]
IP: Logged
|
|
RBH
Member
Member # 380
|
posted 10. November 2003 01:11
gedanken,
I apologize, and withdraw my question of warren_bergerson.
RBH
IP: Logged
|
|
warren_bergerson
Member
Member # 262
|
posted 10. November 2003 06:34
While I am dubious of the benefits of arbitrarily framing ‘motive in intelligence’ and ‘explanatory filters’ to preclude discussion of design or design processes, I will respect his request to control his own topic. If RBH wishes to rephrase his question to "Are there references documenting and quantifying the amount or complexity of specific designs? And, are there references showing how much quantified design can be generated by specific design processes in specific periods of time?" Then I will be glad to address his questions in a separate thread.
IP: Logged
|
|
gedanken
Member
Member # 594
|
posted 10. November 2003 10:14
Warren, some of what your method addresses is indeed details of mechanism of the designing process, if I am not mistaken. As such, that is on topic. But this thread is also about reliability of inferences--that is the element that I wanted to request be present. See in my OP:
quote:
I am requesting that such conceptual work should begin to include aspects of mechanism in the ID event, so as to give some greater degree of scientific content to ID analysis.
But "scientific content" was expanded as dealing with relibility of inferences, and not just general issues of what is scientific.
So if you have an entirely new method that discusses "mechanism" as opposed to "eliminative" approach that would per se be compatible with the OP. However I would still request that a completely new approach could be dealt with in a new thread, if it is not largely also discussing the other features like "reliability"--and simply leave a link here showing the relatioship to this thread. In fact, any "reliability" aspects developed (in that other thread) might be good opportunities to place another link HERE, showing the relationship to the reliability issue, as it might be highly relevant!
But I appreciate not using this thread for a long expanse on a different new theory, just simply due to the amount of additional information left to present that is very specific to the several pages of development that has occurred here. Thanks
[ 10. November 2003, 10:16: Message edited by: gedanken ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Moderator
Administrator
Member # 1
|
posted 11. November 2003 08:31
I'm going to politely request that all posts in this thread from this point forward directly address gedanken's ideas or else risk being deleted. Gedanken is embodying much of what Brainstorms is about in this topic and we'd like to see his arguments (and critiques of those arguments) get center stage.
Gedanken, if you feel that someone is leading the topic off track, please email me at:
moderator@iscid.org
IP: Logged
|
|
brianjohnson
Member
Member # 979
|
posted 11. November 2003 21:01
gedanken,
you have said,
"The reason I bring it up is that I was examining examples used in explaining why ID is thought or claimed to work. I have yet to find any of these examples in which “motive” was not obviously considered, even though it is explicitly excluded by the formally described method of ID."(pg.1)
do you have any suggestions as to how one might include "explicitly" the aspect of motive in the formal method of ID you are referring to?
i am asking because i want to better understand the 3 distinctions under discussion :
1) that motive is presupposed, or buried, within ID analysis, but not specified in the method
2) wich might lead one to desire the explication of motive entirely, or
3) the formal inclusion of motive as part of ID analysis
if i understand you correctly, you are not advocating 2, but rather raising the question of whether or not 3 is possible (relevent to the larger community of science, to garner more reputability). once more, my question is if you have any suggestions or models that satisfies for 3?
IP: Logged
|
|
gedanken
Member
Member # 594
|
posted 11. November 2003 22:45
BrianJohnson,
I am studying the reliability under different circumstances. And note again that I use “motive” only as an example (as I have said to a previous question at top of page 6). It is a characteristic of the “designer”.
Now the “formal” presentation of the explanatory filter (EF) in virtually all variants is one in which one formally computes the probabilities for the natural-non-intelligent processes that are known or understood. But the “formal” procedure does not tell one how to do such computation, rather that is left to the researcher using the method. So the EF is somewhat like a laboratory procedure, except that it makes quite extensive demands on the skill of the user and is not like a prepackaged chemical test that one cookbooks. The actual “formal” distinctions I make are simply to consider calculations of the probability of the “designer” scenario, in addition to calculations of the natural-non-intelligent scenario for the event. Here I do not give a “formal” procedure for arriving at that, rather leave that to the user just as the formal calculation of the natural-non-intelligent scenarios are calculated.
On 3 numbered distinctions:
1) “Motive” is explicitly not used, either “buried” or openly, in the “formal” ID analysis of the EF or its variants. However the examples used to supposedly demonstrate positive outcomes of the EF virtually always have quite obvious motive, means, and opportunity for the “designer” to effect the event in question. Just consider the “Caputo” example most often used as the prototypical example of the explanatory filter in operation.
2) I neither advocate for, nor against using “motive” as a consideration per se. Rather I note the presence in the examples given (see #1) and show how “motive” could be used to help constrain the probabilities of the “designer” activity in some generalized way. ID enthusiasts have upon some occasions discussed use of “motive”, but invariably eschew means and opportunity. I only use “motive” as the example because it is one of those three characteristics of the “designer” that is most often mentioned in some context by ID enthusiasts—even if left out of the formal EF procedures. To the extent that an ID enthusiast did consider “motive”, then to that extent the enthusiast is explicitly not using the EF formal procedure. When examples given to show how the EF supposedly work seem reasonable because we intuitively recognize the aspect of “motive” as part of constraining probabilities of intelligent agent action, but then do not use “motive” in the formal procedure, then the example is falsely giving the reader a sense of how the EF procedure actually works—precisely because the EF procedure does not use “motive” as a consideration.
I do consider that Dr. Dembski is incorrect in claiming that the courts were using in essence the explanatory filter in part of its decision making process, in the “Caputo” case. I think that the courts were actually considering motive, means, and opportunity, along with the calculations of the natural-non-intelligent process probabilities. In essence a dual-eliminative process was used, in which the “elimination” of the “Caputo did it” case was so demonstrably a negative result that it was hardly commented upon in a “formal” manner. A “dual-eliminative” approach, with one positive, and one negative, is in essence a comparative approach. And additionally there was a ‘theory’ of what happened (see #3), namely “Caputo did it” by rigging the drawing that was “out of view”!
I will also note that “motive, means, and opportunity” are standard considerations for police work. Such studies as “forensics” are used by ID enthusiasts as supposed examples of ID inference procedures in action. As such, ID enthusiasts should have been noticing the importance of motive, means, and opportunity as important ID considerations.
3) As I have also explained elsewhere, formal inclusion of “motive” per se is somewhat meaningless. Rather what demonstrates changes in the reliability of inferences about intelligent causation of events in more general terms is if one has a theory or constraining scenario of how intelligent agency could cause the event. Having all of “motive”, means, and opportunity could allow the probabilities of intelligent agency as cause of event to be constrained. But another aspect is even more important, in that “theory” of how the intelligent agency effected the event also gives the possibility of different ways of arriving at the “specification” pattern used, and those different ways could allow for reduction of the “ProbRes” factors M and N which are necessary to control for coincidence in one manner. Doing so will often change the reliability of the EF as predictor of either actual case (discovered by other means of confirmatory independent evidence) or of future output of the EF when more knowledge of “missing distributions” may come to light. As such, having motive, means, and opportunity could form the basis of a “theory” of the intelligent agency action, and allow for such reduction of the M and N factors needed to control for coincidence.
Now I refer you back to the second paragraph of this post, in which I point out that the EF is somewhat like a laboratory procedure in which the user is required to do a much greater amount of theoretical work than is normal for a laboratory test. This is the case for any use of “motive”, that must be left to the user to formalize, just as the other probabilities are left to the user to formalize.
What I see as quite important is whether the ID enthusiasts will stick to the “central dogma” of ID, which is that the eliminative procedure must be adhered to and that characteristics of the designing intelligence (to which motive, means, and opportunity are exemplary) are not discussed.
[ 11. November 2003, 23:08: Message edited by: gedanken ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Salvador T. Cordova
Member
Member # 959
|
posted 12. November 2003 12:39
I got on this thread late. I will contribute my thoughts on this.
I do believe a quality of intelligence is motive, but with some qualifications.
Gedanken wrote:
"If ID is to be a truly “scientific” concept, it must in my opinion move to more details of mechanism. "
I appreciate the reasons for the belief that intelligence can be decomposed into mechanisms. However, there are reasons to think the core of intelligence is an irreducible aspect of quantum physics. That is a radical statement I know. Tipler and Barrow said consciousness may be an irreducible aspect of physics (irreducible implies no underlying mechanism). That idea is expressed as the Participatory Anthropic Principle. As Einstein said, "the more one understands quantum mechanics, the sillier it seems."
Mathematical physicist Penrose in "Emperor's New Mind" believes consciousness and intelligence are tied together. By way of extension, I'm saying intelligence may be irreducible. Penrose may be mistaken on a few points, but his general case is very compelling.
Our belief that intelligence is mechanistic is strengthened by the fact we can build mechanisms that mimic aspects of intelligence. We repair brain-damaged people and they can think better. We can build computer viruses and smart missiles that demonstrate motive and determination behaviorally, but are mindless. But to use these examples as proof that intelligence is mechanistic is invalid, just like trying to prove people are pictures by looking at pictures of people.
Some believe our brains are a mechanism which taps into intelligence. This sounds radical, but do mathematics and information need a physical universe to exist? Consider the belief that information is independent of the medium which conveys it. Intelligence and consciousness may be similarly transcendent. Philosophical, but relevant, if one believes intelligence is non-mechanistic and irreducible, since mathematics and information are deeply related to intelligence.
The question of whether intelligence is irreducible may be beyond proof. There is distaste for accepting foundational truths without ultimate proof, but Godel set the standard.
The question of motive of figures strongly in questions of Ultimate Intelligence. Why would Intelligence create disease and pain? As physicist Stephen Weinberg said of the universe, "pointless it seems". The question of Ultimate Intelligence and Motive yield disturbing answers for sure, and it creeps up in every discussion of Intelligent Design of living systems.
In detecting motive, one problem is that intelligent beings often want to conceal ultimate motives (like in the dating game or chess). Would the Ultimate Intelligence, conceal His motives like a great Playwright conceals the final resolution of the play until the end? Perhaps. That thought was echoed thousands of years ago, "It is the glory of God to conceal a matter, the glory of kings is to search out a matter."
Gedanken wrote:
"If it does not, it can’t possibly expect to be accepted as scientific “theory”, having in fact no theory of how the events come about but being rather a classification scheme only for events."
I agree with such sympathies on an emotional level. It is easier to believe in things we understand and can define perfectly. But consider the "point" in Euclidean geometry. It is an undefined term! We can write theorems about "points", and though undefined, "points" are still scientific and not pointless (pun intended). Likewise intelligence to me is an undefined term, we can only make statements about it's properties, not it's underlying mechanisms (since I believe there are none). In that vein, intelligence implies free will motives with no prior antecedents.
IP: Logged
|
|
gedanken
Member
Member # 594
|
posted 12. November 2003 12:50
quote:
I appreciate the reasons for the belief that intelligence can be decomposed into mechanisms. However, there are reasons to think the core of intelligence is an irreducible aspect of quantum physics.
Since the subject is the explanatory filter, which is about event sequences and their probabilities, I must ask about the relevance of "quantum mechanics".
For example suppose an unembodied intelligence only affected events through the determining the indeterminate aspects of QM events in sequence. How would, for example, an evolutionary sequence, such as the flagellum, possibly fail to go through intermediate forms, if what is being affected is base level physical evens of individual elementary particles at the level of quantum mechanics? And by that I mean affect QM events in a way that is not readibly measurable or visable deviation from QM probability theory--in other words NOT AT ALL within the distributions of QM theory.
For the flagellum to arise, not going through such sequence, could only pertain to larger scale "unembodied intelligent" agent action, rather than on the quantum scale. Now an E.T., dropping in with a space ship, could drop in a "designed" flagellum--but that does not qualify as a "quantum event", and is not relevant to the discussion except that it is a somewhat detailed scenario.
Once again (repeated often in this thread) "motive" is only an example of a non-eliminative characteristic of a "designing" agency which can be used to constrain the joint probability of the intelligent agency cause of the event.
As to details on intelligent agency and its implementation of events, consider the Caputo example given by Dr. Dembski. It contains all of the information for at least a crude model dealing with motive, means, and opportunity to effect the event. These can be used to constrain events, and the frequency of politicians cheating can be measured and estimated giving at least general bounds. Consider that the range of probabilities are numbers between 1.0 and 10^-150, for example. Being within a 10,000 to 1 accuracy of probability can be very significant improvement in probability estimates. The modeling of motive, means, and opportunity does not have to have extreme level of detail.
[ 12. November 2003, 13:38: Message edited by: gedanken ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Salvador T. Cordova
Member
Member # 959
|
posted 12. November 2003 21:57
My understanding of the aim of your thread: it is more scientifically acceptable if implicit assumptions of "motive" can be removed or at least "accounted for" in the procedures of detecting intelligence.
(My earlier post was not to highlight QM, but to highlight problems definitions of intelligence and by way of extention the definition of "motive" since I believe motive relates to conscious thought processes. I included it only for definition sake, I thought it relevant for that reason, if not, I'll not elaborate further in this thread unless you request.)
We can infer intelligence if the artifact demonstrates evidence of willful and deliberate motive. We may not know the explicit motive (such as in works of art). Is there a general means of doing so in every case? No. As I stated earlier, intelligence may want to conceal appearance of deliberate intent. Are there cases we can detect deliberate intent without knowing explicit motives, yes, but only under certain circumstances.
Your post stimulated my imagination and I will discuss a possible experiment with a chemist at the university of which I'm an alum (Morowitz now teaches there too and I'm excited at possibility of meeting him someday). Under what special circumstances can we distinguish intelligently designed chemicals vs. naturally occurring ones with no assumption of motive? Can we create chemical artifacts that are so obviously designed that they will pass stringent filters? And will those stringent filters reliably reject junk? (The filter will reject many intelligently created artifacts, but that's ok. The important thing is it rejects random or naturally occurring substances).
I will post a thread as soon as the idea is more mature. The implcation is if the filter detects chemicals created with human intelligence, and can reliably reject junk, then we may have more confidence in our filters. We need not know the exact motives of why the chemicals were made to apply the test.
IP: Logged
|
|
gedanken
Member
Member # 594
|
posted 13. November 2003 02:01
quote:
My understanding of the aim of your thread: it is more scientifically acceptable if implicit assumptions of "motive" can be removed or at least "accounted for" in the procedures of detecting intelligence.
No. First remember that "motive" is only an example! (I repeat, again of many times!!)
The issue is how to produce higher reliability (if possible) in a filter. Whatever theory of aspects of the designing process might lend to constraining the joint prior probability of intelligent agency cause will improve reliability in some circumstances. But what will have the greatest effect is theory that allows the "ProbRes" factors that control for coincidence to be reduced or eliminated.
Then recognizing that we are moving beyond "eliminative" to including some aspects of the designing process, we look at additional aspects. We note, for example, that means and opportunity might help. In fact having all of motive, means, and opportunity might then allow for a meaningful constraining of intelligent agency joint prior probability of causing event, and furthermore allow for reduction of "ProbRes" factors M and N.
Remember that having motive and means, but failing opportunity can cause as low of a joint probability of causing event as low motive with high means and opportunity. So "motive" by itself, while informative, is not sufficient!
But noting these improvements will not make the EF inference "scientific" in a case like the flagellum, for example, because there is no consideration being given to finding these relevant constraining aspects. Discovering "motive" alone for a flagellum will not produce means and opportunity constraints. "Motive" of producing systems that 'work' is insufficient to reduce "ProbRes" factors, since it leaves wide open the entire set of patterns that 'work' in any system, and thus opportunities for coincidental match are still high.
[ 13. November 2003, 02:12: Message edited by: gedanken ]
IP: Logged
|
|
Steve Petermann
Member
Member # 884
|
posted 15. November 2003 13:52
quote:
No. First remember that "motive" is only an example! (I repeat, again of many times!!)
The issue is how to produce higher reliability (if possible) in a filter. Whatever theory of aspects of the designing process might lend to constraining the joint prior probability of intelligent agency cause will improve reliability in some circumstances. But what will have the greatest effect is theory that allows the "ProbRes" factors that control for coincidence to be reduced or eliminated.
I agree that "motive" is only one means of constraining the EF. Something that I haven't seen in these discussions(or search of the archives) is an examination of design processes.
Having been a design engineer for over 30 years I can attest that good designers have a great deal in common in their design processes. For one thing, the overarching consideration for good designers is that the design works in the real world. This means that design processes must be adopted that promote this. Accordingly here are a few of the common strategies of good designers:
- They fully flesh out the purpose and goals of the design.
- They fully examine the constraints within which they must work.
- They winnow out unnecessary elements that do not serve the overarching goal.
- Since simplicity breeds reliability, they follow Einstein's maxim that "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler."
- They utilized any existing, tested technology wherever they can.
- They take existing technology that doesn't quite fit their needs, modify it minimally and test it before incorporating it into their designs.
- Since any unique design has design features that have a higher level of risk(not working), they always design in open spaces for change that have minimal impact on the rest of the design.
- For modifications to existing complex systems, good designers keep changes small and infrequent so that effects of the change can be evaluated before they become catastrophic.
- They recognize the tentativeness of their analysis and test the hell out of things that may have impact on what they value most.
- They design to facilitate movement to future versions.
These are a few of the common elements of the design process of good designers. Consideration of the design process might not only facilitate probability calculations but it might also dispel misguided notions of what design and designers means.
IP: Logged
|
|
|
Printer-friendly view of this topic