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Author
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Topic: New Issue of PCID: Volume 2.3, Philosophy of Mind
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Arm
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Member # 153
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posted 02. December 2003 02:12
Question and comments on terminology.
Is the term "cognitive science" a misnomer, an oxymoron? Some of the comments above, especially those by RBH, seem to logically lead us to that conclusion.
First, the following lines from the Indiana University website were quoted with approval:
quote:
Cognitive science is an exciting and rapidly evolving field that deals with complex cognition, intelligent systems, and the emergent behavior of large-scale computational systems.
It synthesizes aspects of a wide variety of disciplines, including:
*psychology
*computer science
*linguistics
*philosophy
*neuroscience [bolding added]
Agreed.
But then, RBH adds the following:
quote:
Science, as has been discussed at great length here and elsewhere, operates on the assumption of methodological naturalism, which (very briefly) to me means that knowledge claims are subject to test in the natural world. To the extent that those approaches make assertions about phenomena in the 'physicalist's' world, they are testable. And that's the kind of thing the various programs in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience are looking at.
If the 'topics of mind' you refer to don't have manifestations in, or observable consequences for, the physical world, then science doesn't so much sweep them under the carpet as ignore them as topic for research. They're inaccessible to scientific methodologies. [bolding added]
QUESTION: Assuming that "scientific methodologies" or "science" really exclusively "operates on the assumption of methodological naturalism" thereby limiting scientific "knowledge claims" to claims "subject to test in the natural world," then aren't the terms "cognitive science" and "cognitive neuroscience" misnomers/oxymorons because as stated previously "cognitive science is an exciting and rapidly evolving field... [which] synthesizes aspects of a wide variety of disciplines, including: *psychology *computer science *linguistics *philosophy *neuroscience"? Many of the knowledge claims derived from the fields of psychology, computer science, linguistics, and philosophy (fields which are synthesized to form "cognitive science") are not, afterall, "subject to test in the natural world." Depression has no weight in a physical sense, information has no chemical composition, language cannot be reduced to subatomic particles, syllogisms and inferences cannot be tested with beakers and particle accelerators. How then can "cognitive science" be truly a "science" if we assume that scientific knowledge claims are limited to claims "subject to test in the natural world"?
CONCLUSION: Cognition (or the study thereof), for those who assume methodological naturalism as the foundation of science, is by definition un/non/meta-scientific because "the kind of thing the various programs in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience are looking at" are in many respects not "subject to test in the natural world." Fortunately, however, contrary to the flawed epistemology of reductionists/physicalists/positivists, all objective knowledge claims are not limited to claims "subject to test in the natural world"; therefore, claims about cognition are objectively knowable even if they are arguably beyond science and its accepted methodologies.
[ 02. December 2003, 02:16: Message edited by: Arm ]
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Evan
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Member # 164
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posted 02. December 2003 08:05
ARM writes,
quote:
QUESTION: Assuming that "scientific methodologies" or "science" really exclusively "operates on the assumption of methodological naturalism" thereby limiting scientific "knowledge claims" to claims "subject to test in the natural world," then aren't the terms "cognitive science" and "cognitive neuroscience" misnomers/oxymorons because as stated previously "cognitive science is an exciting and rapidly evolving field... [which] synthesizes aspects of a wide variety of disciplines, including: *psychology *computer science *linguistics *philosophy *neuroscience"? Many of the knowledge claims derived from the fields of psychology, computer science, linguistics, and philosophy (fields which are synthesized to form "cognitive science") are not, afterall, "subject to test in the natural world." Depression has no weight in a physical sense, information has no chemical composition, language cannot be reduced to subatomic particles, syllogisms and inferences cannot be tested with beakers and particle accelerators. How then can "cognitive science" be truly a "science" if we assume that scientific knowledge claims are limited to claims "subject to test in the natural world"?
It seems to me that ARM is confusing RBH’s statement about things being “subject to test in the natural world" and some reductionistic idea that everything has to be reduced to physics.
Depression can be studied. There are observable overt behaviors (lack of sleep, lethargic movement, characteristic facial expressions), observable descriptions of feelings by the patient, observable responses to drug and talk therapy, and, increasingly, observable brain and chemical states. The thing that is not observable is the patient’s internal conscious feeling of being depressed, which the patient can report on but not directly present for observation.
Things don’t have to be reduced to fundamental properties such as weight or fundamental particles in order to be accessible to science.
[ 02. December 2003, 09:07: Message edited by: Evan ]
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Micah Sparacio
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Member # 6
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posted 02. December 2003 09:10
"phenomena in the 'physicalist's' world"
I wonder if the 'physicalist's' world is static?
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Evan
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posted 02. December 2003 09:59
Micah writes, "I wonder if the 'physicalist's' world is static?"
What does this mean? Obviously the physical world is not static, irrespective of one's metaphysical position.
Can you explain what issue of interest you see here, Micah?
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Mark Szlazak
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posted 02. December 2003 11:17
Arm, here's a draft of an upcoming paper that talks about experiments which *require* both "mentalist" and modern "physicalist" languages. There is no illusion that all aspects of consciousness can be reduced in principle into physicalist terms.
Click here: [PDF]
[ 09. December 2003, 10:27: Message edited by: Mark Szlazak ]
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 02. December 2003 12:29
Evan, it would have been better if I had written:
"I wonder if what constitutes the physicalists world is static."
I guess I'm wondering if the domain of cognitive science is capable of expanding with an expanded physicalist ontology.
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Mark Szlazak
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Member # 391
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posted 02. December 2003 18:08
Micah: quote:
I guess I'm wondering if the domain of cognitive science is capable of expanding with an expanded physicalist ontology.
My guess is the opposite. It maybe harder for physical science to expand its current ontology much into the expanding domain of the cognitive and consciousness sciences. There will be sharing but psychology is already better suited for this than physics, and I suspect the ball will be in psychology's court more often than not.
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Rex Kerr
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posted 02. December 2003 21:00
I'd suspect the opposite. Psychology deals with high-level epiphenomena, and hasn't much clue how cognition really works. Many of the most promising advances in cognitive science right now are driven by physics, mathematics, or chemistry: functional MRI, multielectrode recordings, optical dyes, infomation maximization, source-localized EEG, and so on.
Psychology of the 22nd century will probably be a synthesis of what it is today and cellular, network, and computational neurobiology, and it will not be because psychology has taken the ball and run with it, but rather because other disciplines have made contributions without which progress is next to impossible.
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Arm
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posted 03. December 2003 00:53
Thanks for the draft of your paper, Mark. I'll work my way through it once I can squeeze a little more time into my schedule. I, of course, agree that many aspects of consciousness cannot be reduced in principle into physicalist terms; my problem is with the view by some that knowledge claims of cognitive science (or any other "science") which cannot be reduced solely into physicalist terms cannot by definition be considered truly "scientific." Obviously, what is considered "science"/"scientific" must be broadened due to advancements and insights in fields such as yours and, perhaps, we must reconsider whether Methodological Naturalism/Materialism should remain the exclusive and sole foundation for "science." Allow me to quote approvingly from your long abstract:
quote:
The cognitive frame within which neuropsychological research is generally pursued assumes that science has mandated material properties to be the sole basis for causal description, and that these properties are logically adequate for that task... The meaning of the psychological terms cannot be fully described exclusively in terms of these material properties. This deficiency undermines the candidacy of material properties to be the exclusive basis of causal description. However, the origin of the purported demand that matter be the lone causal factor is a theory of nature that has been recognized for more than three quarters of a century to be profoundly incorrect, and particularly dubious at the crucial point of the causal role of the observer. [bolding added]
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Evan stated:
quote:
Things don't have to be reduced to fundamental properties such as weight or fundamental particles in order to be accessible to science. [bolding added]
I agree.
Question 1: Can only the "observable" (overt behaviors, descriptions of feelings, physical responses, physical states) be considered "science" in the discipline of psychology? Certainly, the most interesting and profound and substantial insights from psychology move well beyond the "observable" physical effects of psychological/mind states, i.e. mere facial characteristics/expressions, verbal descriptions of feelings, and observable brain and chemical states. Can these other insights and knowledge claims and hypotheses be considered "scientific" or consonant with legitimate scientific methodology even though they are for the most part not directly observable? Should we then characterize psychology as "scientific" psychology only for those minority of claims/hypotheses that can be directly observed (i.e., the mere physical effects of mental states), and as "nonscientific" psychology for the majority of claims/hypotheses within psychology that cannot be directly observed (i.e., the first-person mental states themselves, and their causes)?
Question 2: Should we also limit the term "computer science" only for those knowledge claims within that discipline which can be tested by "observable" "physical" effects? If we severely limit legitimate scientific methodology to merely observable physical effects (Methodological Naturalism/Materialism), then much within respected scientific disciplines such as psychology and computer science will necessarily have to considered un/non/meta-scientific. This conclusion is not necessarily problematic; it only becomes problematic when the further erroneous claim is made that "science" (within the strictures of Methodological Naturalism/Materialism) is the sole means of genuinely attaining objective knowledge.
Question 3: Since cognitive science is a synthesis of fields such as (among others) psychology, computer science, linguistics, and philosophy--fields in which the more substantial insights are usually not directly physically observable--should cognitive science (according to your and RBH's definition or usage of the term "science") be only considered a scientific discipline for the limited observations within it from neuroscience, such as brain and chemical states? If we adopt that physicalist/reductionist approach, then "cognitive science" becomes a mere euphemism for neuroscience.
[ 03. December 2003, 01:00: Message edited by: Arm ]
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Mark Szlazak
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posted 03. December 2003 01:23
Arm, that wasn't my paper. I'm just providing some reference material. Another good one by David Chalmers is Consciousness and its Place in Nature. Also, the term "naturalism" is only a problem if it's equated with "materialism."
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 03. December 2003 06:58
"I'd suspect the opposite. Psychology deals with high-level epiphenomena"
Rex, its might be worth remembering that everything you've come to know about models, networks and whatnot has been through the lens of experience. This belief that psychology is merely "epiphenomena" is a product of your training to think in a particular way: that fundamentally, all that exists are the units that make up physical networks, computational devices, etc. Once you've taken that step, it's easy to assert the things you do.
However, as Todd Moody's paper argues in this latest issue of PCID, there aren't any *good* reasons outside a committment to physicalism to draw any causal connection between network complexity and the phenomenal aspects of consciousness. Sure, there are correlations, but there's nothing about complexity that would lead us to predict the epiphenomenon.
[ 03. December 2003, 07:00: Message edited by: Micah Sparacio ]
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RBH
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Member # 380
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posted 03. December 2003 15:27
Arm asked two questions:
quote:
Question 1: Can only the "observable" (overt behaviors, descriptions of feelings, physical responses, physical states) be considered "science" in the discipline of psychology? Certainly, the most interesting and profound and substantial insights from psychology move well beyond the "observable" physical effects of psychological/mind states, i.e. mere facial characteristics/expressions, verbal descriptions of feelings, and observable brain and chemical states. Can these other insights and knowledge claims and hypotheses be considered "scientific" or consonant with legitimate scientific methodology even though they are for the most part not directly observable? Should we then characterize psychology as "scientific" psychology only for those minority of claims/hypotheses that can be directly observed (i.e., the mere physical effects of mental states), and as "nonscientific" psychology for the majority of claims/hypotheses within psychology that cannot be directly observed (i.e., the first-person mental states themselves, and their causes)?
To the extent that science depends on public data, the kinds of phenomena - first-person experience of mental states - Arm mentions can provide ideas, conjectures, or even perhaps hypotheses, but not justifications of knowledge claims in the sense that science makes them. The issue in psychology (and here I confine my remarks to experimental psychology) dating back to the introspectionists in the early 20th century, has been how to obtain data on private mental states that are publicly available and therefore intersubjectively replicable. Watsonian behaviorism was a reaction against the introspectionists whose data consisted in the verbal reports of people inspecting their mental innards. Those verbal reports turned out to depend primarily on whose lab the data were generated in, not on the contents of innards. Hence the abandonment of introspection as a methodology for garnering reliable data.
While some experimental psychologists (e.g., Bartlett in England) held out against radical behaviorism through the 1930s, '40s, and '50s, it wasn't until the 'cognitive revolution' in experimental psychology in the 1960s and 1970s that experimental methods for eliciting observable consequences of hypothesized structures and operations of mental innards developed in ways that allowed hypotheses about those innards to be systematically tested in ways that are replicable. Two landmark publications of that era were Chomsky's 1959 review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior, which argued against the adequacy of explanations couched solely in terms of observables, and Miller, Galanter, and Pribram's Plans and the Structure of Behavior in 1960, which provided a framework for formally describing the innards that had testable consequences. The latter can be fairly described as the primary founding document of cognitive science.
I would characterize only those hypotheses and conjectures that can be tested against observables as being "scientific," be those observables neural activity detected by appropriate instruments or reaction times in perceptual tasks or systematic patterns in recall of emotionally loaded items. Unsystematic descriptions of conjectures about mental structures and/or processes that have no observable consequences or correlates, therefore being purely private, are sometimes interesting, occasionally profound, but they are not "scientific." The hypothesized structures and processes may be hidden and private, but their consequences and correlates cannot be in order for claims about them to be "scientific" claims.
Arm's second question was quote:
Should we also limit the term "computer science" only for those knowledge claims within that discipline which can be tested by "observable" "physical" effects?
Yes.
RBH
[ 03. December 2003, 15:45: Message edited by: RBH ]
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Rex Kerr
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posted 03. December 2003 15:30
Perhaps it would be more fair to say that psychology deals with high-level phenomena.
Yet, given the success of psychoactive medications, studies of psychological changes after brain damage, and so on, there's a good deal of evidence that much of psychology does deal with epiphenomena rather than intrinsic, irreducible phenomena.
Also, Todd's paper deals with consciousness, not with psychology, and deals with the uncertainty in how much complexity, if any, is required for consciousness. He raises some good points. Yet, sleeping gas works. Unless we are to attribute a direct link between disembodied mind and a particular molecular structure delivered to the brain, that would seem to indicate that consciousness is emergent from the brain. I don't think Todd's paper argues against this--only that we don't understand and perhaps can't understand the nature and cause of the emergence.
(I do wonder, though, if Todd's paper can't be viewed as an argument that we are not conscious after all--if, as he says, there are no distinguishing features between sentient conscious beings and non-sentient conscious beings that are relevant to, say, survival.)
In any case, I say things like "epiphenomena" based on experience, but it is not primarily experience of people telling me that this is how things must be (as you seem to suggest); rather, it is experience of what a model is, and of how reality matches up with various models. It is not a "product of my training to think in a particular way", unless you mean to think about observation and evidence and whether things make sense and whether arguments follow logically and so on. If that is what you mean, I enthusiastically plead guilty! But the parts about all that exists are the units that make up physical networks, that's not training, but rather a conclusion. (I'm not entirely sure the conclusion is correct, but there is little evidence for other conclusions. It's a lot of evidence for, and a lot of "don't know"s.)
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 03. December 2003 18:37
Rex,
I'm not sure that any of us on this board are arguing for a "disembodied" mind. I'm sure not. Indeed, I would argue for a strong dependence of mental activity upon brain structure, etc. I also agree that various gasses can not only modify consciousness, but also eliminate it completely.
I'm just arguing that the mind's activities and experiences are *not all* deducible nor predictable from a strict physicalists model. I think it is too simplistic to appeal to neural structure as the "explain all" for mental phenomena. In fact, I think of it much as I do a gaps argument. Sure, there are somethings for which we can causally specify the connection between brain structure and mental phenomena. However there are clearly phenomena for which sharp dijuncts exist. Acknowledging these disjuncts between the physical world and various mental phenomena is all I'm asking for (well maybe not - I'm making the stronger claim that there is reason to think that the disjuncts are permanent given our current scientific methodologies a - methodologies which very well may be an inescapable burden of being human.).
Anyway, to make a long story short:
1. no disembodied mind 2. strong dependence of mental activity on brain structure 3. drugs do affect mental activity 4. still, some mental phenomena have no physical correlation nor is there any causal specificity in invoking the complex neural structure of the brain for explaining certain "epiphenomenal" features of mind.
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Evan
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posted 03. December 2003 22:04
Micah writes,
quote:
4. still, some mental phenomena have no physical correlation nor is there any causal specificity in invoking the complex neural structure of the brain for explaining certain "epiphenomenal" features of mind.
I'd love to be spending more time on this thread... , but here are some comments/questions in response to Micah's post.
Micah, can you give an example of a phenomena that you think might "have no physical correlation nor ...causal specificity" with the brain?
And, if there is such a phenomena, doesn't that mean that at least in regards to that phenomena there is a "disembodied" aspect of mind?
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