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Topic: New Issue of PCID: Volume 2.3, Philosophy of Mind
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Claire
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Member # 725
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posted 27. November 2003 22:20
Micah,
Mind is a valuable part of reality. It is usually swept under the carpet as far as complexity and science is concerned. We need to address not just what it is but how it combines with what allready is.
Claire
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RBH
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Member # 380
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posted 28. November 2003 14:36
Claire wrote quote:
Mind is a valuable part of reality. It is usually swept under the carpet as far as complexity and science is concerned. We need to address not just what it is but how it combines with what allready is.
To say that mind is "usually swept under the carpet" by science is a substantial misrepresentation.
Here are a couple of examples of academic programs studying "mind" and/or mentation. First, the program in cognitive science at a Canadian university quote:
The cognition area offers a broad range of courses in language processing, memory, concepts, computational modeling, and cross-cultural cognition. Typically, availability of undergraduate courses is based on student enrollment. Graduate courses are offered on a rotational basis, with two or three being offered in any one year. Course and Thesis requirements for the Graduate program in Cognition are outlined below.
From an American universrity quote:
Cognitive science is an exciting and rapidly evolving field that deals with complex cognition, intelligent systems, and the emergent behavior of large-scale computational systems.
It synthesizes aspects of a wide variety of disciplines, including:
* psychology
* computer science
* linguistics
* philosophy
* neuroscience
The goals of the program include gaining a better understanding of the human mind, of teaching and learning; of mental abilities and of the development of intelligent machines that either simulate or augment the capabilities of human minds in illuminating ways.
And another American university quote:
The Cognitive Science Department provides theoretically-oriented, research and training opportunities for undergraduates, graduate students, and post doctoral fellows. As a fully autonomous academic unit, we provide a focused environment that is wholly dedicated to the multi-disciplinary intellectual challenge of integrating contemporary approaches to the study of the mind/brain.
The best succinct description of cognitive science I found in a brief search is from an Indian university quote:
Beginning in the mid-1950s, "Cognitive Science" has developed in a revolutionary way. In the last two decades, it has established itself as a truly interdisciplinary subject, having roots in psychology and interfaces with philosophy, computer science, mathematics, linguistics and neuro-sciences. The discipline of Cognitive Science is an intellectual enterprise that studies cognition and seeks to answer many fundamental and long-standing questions about the nature of mind and human mentation. A distinguishing feature of this field is that while attempting to answer such questions, it draws on the resources of a number of disciplines such as cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, philosophy, neuroscience and cognitive anthropology and hence it is truly interdisciplinary in nature. The goal of the teaching programme is to help to develop a richer appreciation of mental structures, physical and chemical laws that govern the activities of brain, the acquisition, storage, and modification of knowledge, learning, reasoning, thinking, planning, creativity creation and several other basic aspects of various mental activities.
Here is a partial list of some of the available academic programs in cognitive science. A Google search on "cognitive science" AND "graduate program" yields 9,500 hits. Obviously not all of those hits are actual programs in cogsci, but all 20 on the first two pages of results of that search are. They're not rare, and are not hard to find.
RBH
[ 28. November 2003, 14:43: Message edited by: RBH ]
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Claire
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posted 29. November 2003 00:13
RBH,
I can see where you are coming from in your reply. From reading the word usage and by showing some examples in your post, I think you might have misunderstood what I have said to a certain degree. The reason could have been because my post was very brief. I was considering topics of mind that lie more or less on the edge of current mainstream science because they are not really the physicalists view of nature or energy. This is why I said they are swept under the carpet whereby introducing a definate difference of perspective of mind by both parties.
Thanks
Claire
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RBH
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posted 29. November 2003 02:22
Claire wrote quote:
I can see where you are coming from in your reply. From reading the word usage and by showing some examples in your post, I think you might have misunderstood what I have said to a certain degree. The reason could have been because my post was very brief. I was considering topics of mind that lie more or less on the edge of current mainstream science because they are not really the physicalists view of nature or energy. This is why I said they are swept under the carpet whereby introducing a definate difference of perspective of mind by both parties.
I guess I did misunderstand. Science, as has been discussed at great length here and elsewhere, operates on the assumption of methodological naturalism, which (very briefly) to me means that knowledge claims are subject to test in the natural world. To the extent that those approaches make assertions about phenomena in the 'physicalist's' world, they are testable. And that's the kind of thing the various programs in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience are looking at.
If the 'topics of mind' you refer to don't have manifestations in, or observable consequences for, the physical world, then science doesn't so much sweep them under the carpet as ignore them as topics for research. They're inaccessible to scientific methodologies.
RBH
[ 29. November 2003, 02:23: Message edited by: RBH ]
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Mike Gene
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posted 29. November 2003 02:31
RBH: Here are a couple of examples of academic programs studying "mind" and/or mentation.
This really means that minds are studying mind, using mentation to understand mentation. ![[Smile]](smile.gif)
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Evan
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posted 29. November 2003 10:32
An interesting topic.
1) Lots of people are studying “minds,” but as usual in these discussions there is a spectrum of meanings and connotations about what this means. Of course, a large part of this area of study concerns the relationship between the brain and cognition/behavior. Irrespective of one’s metaphysical notions about mind, it is undeniably true that the manifestation of mind in any one individual is highly related to things that happen in the brain.
However, other branches of science study cognition from the experiential side - the way in which the individual experiences mind. Various schools of psychology (and especially therapeutic psychology) as well as numerous “alternative medicine” approaches are involved in studying the mind/body relationship.
Of course, as is always the case in science, there are differences of perspective - someone deeply involved in brain research concerning the limbic system, for instance, is likely to have a more reductionistic viewpoint (on a daily basis as a practicing scientist, although not necessarily in respect to their personal metaphysics) than someone studying Jungian psychotherapy. This doesn’t mean that the brain scientist is “sweeping” the cognitive aspect of mind “under the carpet” anymore than the analyst is sweeping biochemistry away - they are just concentrating on different aspects of the situation.
2) Related to my first point is the idea that when we study the world we study it at different levels of organization - there are hierarchies of properties (which are sometimes labeled “emergent”) that are at the least convenient to define in order to discuss the complexity of the world.
Let me try to explain what I mean.
A few months ago I listened to a set of lecture on tape by Robert Sapolsky on the Biological Basis of Human Behavior. Sapolsky takes a fairly strong reductionistic approach in these lectures. He starts with describing how one neuron works, and then how two neurons interact (via the synapse and neurotransmitters), then how systems of cells work together (including both the nervous and the endocrine systems), and so on, until he concludes with a lecture about how the whole body and mind work together in the individual.
The truth of the matter is that it’s all, at the moment by moment level, the actions of individual molecules that are happening (and even beyond that it is the moment-by-moment behavior of atoms, and really even quarks and ...), but it would be pointless (and add little to our understanding) to always try to describe things at those elementary levels.
The world does organize itself into larger entities in which we see properties of the entirety that don’t apply to it’s constituent parts. This is as true of inorganic things as it is of organic ones - properties of a galaxy such as spiraling, having a black hole at the center, birthing new stars, etc. are things to study in and of themselves even though they are also “nothing but” interactions of atoms.
My point here is that those that study the brain at it’s most elementary biochemical level (towards the bottom of the conceptual hierarchy) are not, by virtue of that perspective alone, advocates of reductionism nor working in opposition to those interested in the higher levels of the hierarchy.
[Of course, just as in the evolution debate, I must make the standard disclaimer - yes, there are scientists who are thoroughgoing materialistic reductionists. For some, this is both their working orientation and their personal metaphysic. However, this doesn’t mean they represent all of science.]
3) On the other end of the spectrum are those many people studying the mind/body connection, some within mainstream science and some not. For instance, yoga has for centuries offered an experiential (and in some ways scientific) approach to studying the relationship between one’s mind and one’s body. Likewise, many branches of psychotherapy (such as Gestalt therapy, Jungian psychotherapy, and many alternative health practices such as acupunction and acupressure, somato-emotional release, and others based on a blend of Eastern and Western ideas) explore the mind/body connection from a decidedly non-reductionistic perspective.
For instance, Candace Pert, who did some of the very first studies of neuro-transmitters decades ago, is now involved in alternative health perspectives which emphasize the intelligent nature of the whole organism - looking at the highest hierarchical level which sees the whole individual as a unit., and calling herself a “recovering reductionist”
So I don’t think it’s correct to say that mainstream science is wedded to a “physicist” view of topics concerning the mind, nor that it routinely sweeps non-physicalist viewpoints under the carpet.
4) As is usually the case, we might ask what is our definition of mind - what exactly are we referring to when we use that word. Perhaps one is referring to just consciousness - if so, in my opinion, one is inaccurately restricting one’s view. I know (we all know) from personal experience as well as from scientific studies of the brain, that what appears to our conscious mind is the tip of a larger iceberg. The mind, in the larger sense, contains unconscious elements, some of which are undoubtedly embedded in physiological processes.
So even though consciousness itself is the big mystery - the phenomena that causes many people to posit an immaterial aspect to the world, there is ample evidence, both internal and external, that consciousness is inextricably entangled in the physical world - that our existence as a conscious self is a part of our larger existence as a biological organism in the physical world of physical and chemical interactions.
5) And last, Mike Gene writes,
quote:
This really means that minds are studying mind, using mentation to understand mentation.
Yes, this is a mystery and dilemma that the yogic traditions (from Buddhism, Hinduism and Taoism) have commented on for centuries - the mind can look at everything but itself. Whatever properties are inherent in consciousness will inevitably be present as we try to look at consciousness, so to some extent we are trapped - we will only see in consciousness what consciousness is equipped to see.
Reconciling this dilemma is one of the things mystic meditation is about - trying to experience consciousness without any content in order to experience the nature of consciousness itself.
This has to be done on an individual basis. Unlike the scientific investigation of the physical world, there is no way to have shared observations that can become the basis of an empirically-based consensual understanding. We can talk about our experiences and come to some agreement about those descriptions, but the yogic perspective is that it is the direct experiences of consciousness itself that is necessary, and that there is no way the descriptions of those experiences can substitute for the personal experience.
In fact, focusing on the descriptions and theories of mind is a direct impediment to understanding from this experiential perspective. The goal is to experience pure consciousness, devoid of content, so thinking about the mind (or anything else) gets in the way of understanding the mind.
It’s a paradox and a dilemma that can only be resolved at the personal level. Science itself (in the sense of shared, abstract theories about the world) will never be able to substitute for this more intimate type of personal knowledge about who we are as conscious beings.
[ 29. November 2003, 10:46: Message edited by: Evan ]
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The Deuce
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posted 29. November 2003 15:18
The best analogy I think I've seen to the brain/consciousness relationship (or at least my own view of the relationship) is that of an electron to its negative charge. I'm not certain that it's a perfect analogy, but I think it's closer than other analogies I've seen, such as the relationship of computer programs to individual machine instructions (though the program functions as a whole, the conceptual extrapolation of the whole from the sum of its parts is one-way, and conceptually easy to see. This holds for any complex mechanical systems that I can think of).
Though an electron always corresponds to a single unit of negative charge, it would be incorrect to say that negative electric charge is "made out of" an electron. You could say that negative charge is "emergent" from an electron, though it wouldn't be in quite the same way that programs are emergent from machine instructions. Likewise, the negative charge of an electron has a causal effect on the electron itself, and on other physical entities around the electron. The big difference, of course, is that brains are a lot more complex than an electron, and, I suspect, there is a good deal more to consciousness than there is to a unit of negative charge.
As for actually studying consciousness, the paradox that Mike brought up is tricky, but I don't think it's necessarily insurmountable. I relate it to trying to study the human eye. You can't observe your own eyes, because you use them in order to observe, and your eye can't see itself (no obnoxious counter-examples about using mirrors, or plucking out one eye to study it with the other, please). However, you can observe other eyes, and by assuming that they work more or less the same as yours, you can relate your studies back to your own eye. I don't see any reason, in principle, why the causal properties of consciousness couldn't be studied that way, or at least I can't see any reason to state a priori that it couldn't.
Rather, I think that the main obstacle to studying consciousness from a non-experientialist point of view is the lack of consensus over the causal abilities of consciousness. On the one extreme, you have those who assume it to have no causual abilities at all, and on the other, those who view the body as a zombie that is completely directed by an immaterial spirit. In my view, the first view is logically unsound, while the second view is experimentally disproven. But, of course, me thinking that doesn't change anybody's mind.
The other obstacle is a lack of starting point. Even if you had a group of researchers that agreed that consciousness fundamentally has real, causual propensity, it's doubtful that they'd agree at the outset on which things are caused by it, and how (after all, that would presumably be what they were trying to find out). The one thing that I think nearly everyone who believes that consciousness has causual ability would agree on is that consciousness results in us physically talking about our consciousness. Perhaps that could in some way be used as a starting point?
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RBH
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posted 29. November 2003 22:03
In its brevity this post (mildly at least) violates the posting norms of Brainstorms, but when The Deuce wrote quote:
The one thing that I think nearly everyone who believes that consciousness has causual ability would agree on is that consciousness results in us physically talking about our consciousness. Perhaps that could in some way be used as a starting point?
I got the strong flavor of a social version of Cogito, ergo sum! But that might not after all be a bad starting point. While I do not believe that language is a royal road to consciousness (any more than dreams are), and though I prefer "awareness" to "consciousness" because of the heavy connotational load the latter bears, nevertheless psycholinguistics is an indispensable component of cognitive science.
Mike Gene's remark that quote:
This really means that minds are studying mind, using mentation to understand mentation.
is consonant with that thought, though I'd rephrase it as "minds are studying other minds;" The Deuce's eye analogy is, I think, appropriate.
RBH
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Claire
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posted 30. November 2003 01:41
Ok,
Evan in general I am refering to "mind" not minds or others minds. I am not refering to cognitive sciences or psychology or neuro science and similar known arenas. What interests me also is the type of enquiry used whithin one domain transfered over to another and a forced relationship between those that seem unrelated that might create new emergent properties. RBH I am not against science that is not pursuing this, I do think that what science does not pursue is just as interesting as what it does, this is the fundamental twist. I am pointing out the sweeping under of an unkown notion within current mainsteam science because it intrigues me. The Deuce, your post was very informative and worth while thanks, I'll take time to re think it as it relates to what I have thought about in the past. I am suggesting a different route towards "mind" that has yet to be understood differently than how we allready do. By this route the understanding of what we think mind is now by its context(by how we allready combine it with what we know and our previous experiences of it) compared to new ideas that could combine with it which may or may not create new implications of it, that could include a new context. A new context then, could be classed as non mind and non matter, a new complexity all of its own.
Claire
[ 30. November 2003, 02:24: Message edited by: Claire ]
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 30. November 2003 08:31
quote:
though I prefer "awareness" to "consciousness" because of the heavy connotational load the latter bears
I'd just like to point out that while "consciousness" may have a heavy connotational load, it does have a fairly precise meaning to those who are working on the problem in contemporary philosophy. It means nothing more than "raw experience." It typically does not mean what RBH indicates -> awareness (unless specified as such).
Consciousness does not require awareness, only streams of raw experience. A worm can have consciousness (raw experience) but not be aware (in the sense of realizing that it is a thing having, say, sharp sensations of pain).
Anyway, perhaps that helps the conversation. Sure, consciousness has many connotations in modern everyday english. However, in the world of philosophy of the mind, when people discuss the problem of consciousness, they are talking about "raw experience" unless they qualify it as a different issue (intentionality, awareness, moods, etc.)
For many, this (the problem of raw experience) is the only current problem in Academia that contemporary physical theories can't even start to address because they don't have the concepts or vocabulary to do so.
A typical thought experiment
Mary, a scientist, has always lived in a black and white environment, and as such, has NEVER experienced the color "RED". However, she is a brilliant woman, and manages to do what no other human being before her has done: she learns *everything* there is to know scientifically about the experience of the color red. She not only learns about the physiology of the experience (every minute detail about the eye, optical nerve, visual cortex stimulation, etc.). She even goes a step further and learns about what's happening at the both the chemical level and the fundamental physical level of contemporary physics. Despite all this knowledge, she is still missing some fundamental knowledge about the experience of "red". The nature of the experience itself: the phenomenal qualities of red -> the sensation -> the qualia. Whatever you want to call it. There is something about the phenomenal aspect of experience that places it (in many philosopher's minds -> David Chalmers, Galen Strawson, Colin McGinn, etc.) beyond the scope of contemporary science. Indeed, there are steady calls for an "expansion" of contemporary physics to deal with experience. Or, at the very least, an assertion that experiential consciousness lies beyond our epistemic potential for knowledge, and thus will forever remain a mystery.
The problem is so big in modern philosophy, that it has spawned the series of conferences entitled "Toward a Science of Consciousness" - a title which implicitly acknowledges that a science to sufficiently deal with consciousness does not yet exist.
http://consciousness.arizona.edu/conference/tucson2004/index.php
[ 30. November 2003, 08:33: Message edited by: Micah Sparacio ]
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Evan
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posted 30. November 2003 10:39
In an effort to resolve the “mind studying mind” problem, the Deuce offers the eye as an example, and writes,
quote:
However, you can observe other eyes, and by assuming that they work more or less the same as yours, you can relate your studies back to your own eye. I don't see any reason, in principle, why the causal properties of consciousness couldn't be studied that way, or at least I can't see any reason to state a priori that it couldn't.
I see a big reason why in principle this analogy doesn’t work: you can’t observe other minds at work the way you can observe other eyes. That’s exactly the problem. This is the fundamental obstacle to have a science of “consciousness”*: that in science we can make common observations of the same thing, whatever it may be, and thus reach some consensual conclusions. But the only consciousness I can ever observe is my own, and the same is true for each person about their own consciousness; and therefore we don’t have the communal opportunity to observe the same data.
In addition there is the bigger problem that no one has addressed yet in this thread, really: that, to quote myself
quote:
Whatever properties are inherent in consciousness will inevitably be present as we try to look at consciousness, so to some extent we are trapped - we will only see in consciousness what consciousness is equipped to see.
[* Note: and I would like to respond to Micah’s definition of “consciousness” in a separate post.]
Also, the Deuce writes,
quote:
Rather, I think that the main obstacle to studying consciousness from a non-experientialist point of view is the lack of consensus over the causal abilities of consciousness. On the one extreme, you have those who assume it to have no causual abilities at all, and on the other, those who view the body as a zombie that is completely directed by an immaterial spirit.
I don’t agree that this is the main obstacle (as I have explained above), but I also don’t think this is the main obstacle to studying consciousness, although I do believe it is one of the interesting questions to try to answer.
Given that “studying consciousness” is dependent on each of us sharing verbal comments on our own consciousness, most of us would agree that conscious thoughts have causal connections with the physical world - a common example is to observe what happens if you start thinking about some nice sexual encounter you’ve had recently, or would like to have. Your body responds to thoughts. We all have that experience, I think.
Of course there are big questions about the relationship between our consciousness and the rest of us, whatever the “rest of us” might entail.
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Rex Kerr
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posted 30. November 2003 22:37
Claire was interested in "mind" not "minds" or "others' minds", but I do not know how to define "mind" without reference to minds of myself and others; nor without reference to cognitive science and the like. So I am not sure how to respond to that aspect of the argument.
Micah raised the classic "book learning of RED is not experience of RED" point. Yes, book-learning is not experience. Why is this supposed to be profound? I can see why philosophers got all flustered by this problem, as it highlights a number of errors in common assumptions of mind and experience. But it really isn't hard to explain.
Suppose that experience consists of neuronal firing, and different firing patterns are different experiences--most physical reductionists would probably find something like this agreeable. Now, compare two scenarios: Mary sees red, and Mary thinks about neuronal firing that happens when someone (e.g. Mary) sees red. Thinking about neuronal firing is a different process than seeing red, so obviously, Mary has different experiences in the two cases. Abstract knowledge is a different experience than direct perception--otherwise imagination and reality would be indistinguishable! (Not a good design--reality would rapidly select against such self-deluding creatures.)
Whether Mary "knows" more when she's seen red than (merely) learned about it depends on the definition of "knows". Upon seeing red, Mary's brain will be altered in ways that cannot be accomplished merely by learning about the thought processes of seeing red. Mary would know this, too, and it would come as no surprise to her that, for example, seeing a red sunset was moving in a way that analyzing the effects of a red sunset on her brain's emotional centers was not.
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The Deuce
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posted 01. December 2003 11:49
Evan wrote:
quote:
I see a big reason why in principle this analogy doesn’t work: you can’t observe other minds at work the way you can observe other eyes.
I agree that this may be a reason that studying consciousness is impossible, though I don't see it as being a reason why it's impossible in principle. Certainly, there are ways of observing various phenomena besides direct visual observation, including hypothetical ways that don't actually exist at this point in time, and possibly never will.
But, in reality, I think you are correct. Technically, my analogy doesn't work if you follow it all the way, because for any physical phenomenon that can be correlated with consciousness, there will always exist the distinction between that phenomenon, and the related actual raw experience itself (barring the development of some hypothetical, incomprehendable means of observing consciousness itself).
But, I don't think this necessarily keeps us from "observing" consciousness in the sense of getting a tighter specification of the first-order observable effects of consciousness (this is sort of what I had in mind when I wrote my post, but I was trying to keep it succinct). Maybe certain categories of conscious thought can be generally correlated with certain quantum patterns, or maybe it's something totally different. This kind of study would be limited by language, of course (since we would have to rely on the study patient's description of their own conscious experience, and the researcher's ability to understand what they meant), but perhaps even that could be partially alleviated by studying certain conscious experiences that we suspect are more or less the same for most people, and which are described the same way.
I suspect that a "science of consciousness" would probably be speculatively flailing about like alchemy for a good while, shedding light on various ways that consciousness doesn't work before figuring out how it does, and in this day and age, we're not used to that. But, I think it would be a worthwhile endeavor for some brave researchers with open minds (BTW, I hate how every mundane expression with the word "mind" in it comes out sounding like some sort of bad pun when you're discussing this subject).
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Claire
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posted 01. December 2003 21:00
Very quickly, condensed version,
Rex, Yes I see your point. I was suggesting a new unknown route, pushing forward, so it wasn't really an argument because I don't really like to argue. Micah, I have thought the Mary thought experiment over in the past (it is on another forum I have been on for about 2 years now)about the how it does tie in with experience, it ties in with many problems that i find interesting here. I think philosophy has its important say, because it does, epistemology is also good to look at, I’ll come back to that here. The reason I say this is because like "thinking is tinkering" thinking is greater in its power for change of assumptions of scientific hypothesis for many reasons. The subject of thinking in cognitive science models of perception and information (Classical) are important because of the joining and combining that create context for thinking. Thinking plays a part in designing new values for design science too. Thinking (not thought) is also a subject matter all of its own (See De Bono) that can make us change our perception about our current understanding (patterns of perception about information). Most mistakes are about perception not thinking, however we can change the way we think. I have followed D Bono's ideas about "thinking" for many years (and last night found his forum I used to use is still on the net afer all which is good!). Thought is a different concept depending on what subject it is you put it in for context. Example, psychology deals with human behaviour, psychiatry deals with mental illness, but they deal with minds and mind (descriptive). So it is useful to know what changes our perception and that is the act of being able to think differently. We have decided that these faculties are for a reason, like the universe has space-time for a reason, we have perception-thinking. But we can make physical changes of these current patterns of perception of "assumptions" of phenomena (information), like design science or complexity, within the brain, by changing our thinking about them, if that information cannot be changed by physical means itself. The big next thing would be, if we discussed design, or complexity, would we have to:
Re-think "what" it means to mean;
Re-think what it means to "mean"?
about this type of science. The “what does it mean” science comes under some context. The variables for context of meaning are wide and undecided and to a certain degree subjective. Un deciding does not mean we have no meaning, it means, we have no syntactical consensus because semantics changes meaning by how we can think "outwards"(divergent) from previous experiences of order (logic, second law of thermodynamics, see brain science and various cognitive models). Thinking changes forward causal memory and physical brain dynamics! This is why it is important that it should be included in mathematical complexity (Dembski, I think I spelt that right, sorry fi not William/Bill so have a drink on me). So even if we decide that there is one type of design science now for example, we must be able to cope with a change in what it could be later via thinking. Back to the start. Epistemology, and knowledge, it changes.
thanks
Claire
[ 01. December 2003, 21:35: Message edited by: Claire ]
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