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Author
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Topic: Practical experiments for testing the concept of intelligent design
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RBH
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Member # 380
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posted 26. March 2004 03:29
Scott wrote quote:
You however seem to agree with the statement. I say the same to you. This is a misrepresentation of ID. Are you truly unaware that this is a misrepresentation, even after admitting to having read a number of papers and/or books by Dembski?
You assert that the ID argument boils down to not A, therefore B. Is this your serious analysis of ID and Dembski's "explanatory filter"?
I not only "admit" to having read them, I actually own several 'primary' ID books and collections of essays. Dembski's Explanatory Filter as originally described in The Design Inference and as elaborated in No Free Lunch, does indeed boil down to 'Not A, therefore B.' Dembski's notion of "complexity," defined as improbability, is the core of the argument that natural processes cannot have generated something or other in biology, and that is the only evidence offered for the design inference: it's too improbable - Not A. (Though one should note that there's no fully worked out example of the application of the EF to a biological phenomenon according to the formal requirements of TDI.) The design inference has no other evidential support in Dembski's or Behe's work except the argument from excessive improbability.
And I am not aware that this is a misrepresentation. Perhaps Scott would be good enough to provide what he believes to be an accurate representation of ID in sufficient detail to distinguish it from Dembski's formulation of a purely eliminative argument.
RBH
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Scott
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posted 26. March 2004 20:48
What I will do is state that complexity or improbability is not sufficient. I must assume that you already know this.
regards
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RBH
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posted 26. March 2004 21:26
Scott wrote quote:
What I will do is state that complexity or improbability is not sufficient. I must assume that you already know this.
Yup, I'm aware of that. Behe's "irreducibly complex" systems can't evolve, therefore they must have been designed. Dembski's "specified complexity" can't arise via natural processes, and therefore must have been designed. Not A, therefore B.
RBH
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 26. March 2004 23:14
RBH,
Everyone agrees with the statement: "not all complex things were designed."
So, I'm not sure what your point is here. An artificial simplification that is prevalent in games of rhetoric and advocacy.
Added in Edit
Apologies to RBH. I guess my concern was that the design argument is more nuanced: the inference is made within a context where inductive inference is a perfectly fine mode of reason. Take Bertrand Russell's argument for the existence of other minds: it was an argument based on inductive analogy. Russell never claimed that his argument brought certainty to the problem, but that it approached certainty -> it was a causal argument: that I know that some of my utterances and actions are always produced by my thinking, therefore, with varying degrees of probability (based on perceptible evidence) when I perceive those utterances or behaviors, and know that my thinking did not produce them, I can say that some other thought in some other mind caused them to happen. I understand that one might say that robotics and AI call this into question (though I don't think they do, at the bottom, pose a problem for the argument).
How is this relevant to the design inference? Well, it introduces a contextual nuance, where in addition to having "irreducible complexity" or "specified complexity", we can make a positive causal inference, where such an inference is based on causal analogy.
The design inference does not amount to mere elimination. There is a positive causal argument involved in the design inference that seems on par with one of the best arguments (Russell's) for the existence of other minds.
[ 27. March 2004, 09:04: Message edited by: Micah Sparacio ]
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Pim van Meurs
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Member # 541
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posted 26. March 2004 23:37
Micah
quote:
RBH,
Everyone agrees with the statement: "not all complex things were designed."
So, I'm not sure what your point is here. An artificial simplification that is prevalent in games of rhetoric and advocacy.
But this is not what RBH's argument was. So I am not sure what your comments of rethoric or advocacy refer to but they don't appear to be relevant to RBH's arguments.
What RBH argues is that ID's argument boils down to 'not A therefor B' or in terms of Del Ratzsch 'the set theoretic complement of the disjunction regularity-or-chance".
RBH seems to clearly agree with Scott that complexity or improbability itself is not sufficient.
As Del states himself, there is nothing wrong with such an approach, as it is meant to address a rather limited proposition.
Even in this somewhat 'scifi' sounding article Dembski clearly makes the case.
"This came to be known as the No Free Lunch Principle, which states that apart from intelligent guidance, material processes cannot bring about the information required for biological complexity."
Perhaps Dembski's wise words in the preceding paragraph may ring true in this context
quote:
... the dreaming never stopped and the fun never began
Or perhaps I am taking these articles too seriously?
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Scott
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posted 27. March 2004 02:51
Pim van Meurs wrote:
quote:
RBH seems to clearly agree with Scott that complexity or improbability itself is not sufficient.
It does seem that way now.
However, what RBH originally wrote is as follows:
quote:
Dembski's notion of "complexity," defined as improbability, is the core of the argument that natural processes cannot have generated something or other in biology, and that is the ONLY evidence offered for the design inference: IT'S TOO IMPROBABLE - Not A.
...The design inference has NO OTHER evidential support in Dembski's or Behe's work EXCEPT the argument from EXCESSIVE IMPROBABILITY. (emphasis added)
So, in spite of RBH's apparent agreement, I really am not sure that there is actual agreement.
cheers
[ 27. March 2004, 02:56: Message edited by: Scott ]
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gregory the grey
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posted 27. March 2004 05:46
It seems to me that RBH is simply calling someone’s bluff as to ‘rhetorical games and advocacy’ and there appears no one yet fit to reply to him. K7 has disappeared, Scott is relatively new (to RBH's subtleties) and Micah, you still haven’t responded to those challenges that are actually relevant to this thread. RBH appears just to have been defending against the simplest, standard, everyday American-on-the-street understanding of intelligent design as another form of complementary eliminativ-ism – Darwin was not right, but we in the 21st century U.S.A (i.e. since 1993) have one-upped him. Who and what do you think intelligent design is complementing?
As PvM suggests, there is not actual agreement because RBH doesn’t want to be force fed design theoretic concepts which would (along the way) require that he forget almost everything he knows about Evolution in order to do so. That is, unless you have a more suitable new duality to present than a simple nuanced version of nature/design, which is why I asked Micah and other ID-theorists for other acceptible design-theoretic concepts. But where’s the beef?
An un-important point for natural scientists and perhaps even philosophers of science:
I take exception to the statement that apparently ‘everybody’ agrees with, that ‘not all complex things were designed,’ in the sense that to add-on a word in the affirmative, ‘all complex human-made things were designed’ makes complete sense and I have not found a person yet who would deny or disagree with it. Although, I would of course substitute for the uplifted-in-1802 and somehow-still-floating-today concept of ‘design’ and its verb form as used here.
No disrespect meant as I suspect Micah and John are not the only ones out there searching for a way out from the theory/practise woes of the IDM generally speaking. Not to get rid of design, but to find new ways to apply it.
quote:
“So then does research and systematics take place in the natural or physical sciences alone or also in the social sciences, e.g. economics and psychology?” – gtg
What are some of the actual practical experiments [added in edit: that may lead to 'a positive causal inference...based on causal analogy']?
Sincerely,
gregory the grey
[ 27. March 2004, 09:52: Message edited by: gregory the grey ]
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 27. March 2004 10:21
GregTheGrey mentioned with inquiry:
"What are some of the actual practical experiments [added in edit: that may lead to 'a positive causal inference...based on causal analogy']? "
I'm not sure. That's why I started this thread. But there is a strong difference between practical experiments, and philosophical principles. I'm merely defending a philosophical principle: that design inferences consist in more than the elimination of natural pathways. There is a epistemically valid mode of reasoning that underlies design inferences. The big question is whether that mode of reasoning is workable/useful in a scientific context.
Furthermore...
GregTheGreyBeard mentions assertively:
"take exception to the statement that apparently ‘everybody’ agrees with, that ‘not all complex things were designed,’ in the sense that to add-on a word in the affirmative, ‘all complex human-made things were designed’ makes complete sense and I have not found a person yet who would deny or disagree with it."
"all complex things were designed" is a different proposition (bearing different content) than "all complex human-made things were designed." They are as different as "It is raining" and "It is raining in East Africa"
I would also add that, though not everyone would agree, it is not the case that "all complex human-made things were designed." Del Ratzsch makes a fine distinction on this point: a human can make a complex thing mindlessly without having designed the thing.
Anyway, I'm done with the philosophical posturing. The purpose of this thread was to encourage thought on design within a scientific context and my philosophical defense of design inferences as perfectly rational modes of thinking within certain epistemic contexts, probably serves to distract rather than focus.
Within the context of scientific practice (not an everyday epistemic context!), are there practical/concrete/specific uses for intelligent design concepts?
[ 27. March 2004, 10:25: Message edited by: Micah Sparacio ]
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Scott
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posted 28. March 2004 04:27
SETI comes immediately to mind.
I've always wanted to see a more rigorous identification between ID and the practices/methods of SETI research. Do you know if anyone has undertaken this?
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Scott
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posted 28. March 2004 05:56
At the risk of digressing:
quote:
One concern, expressed by people who've only heard about the filter second-hand, is that it assigns merely improbable events to design. But that clearly is not the case since, IN ADDITION TO identifying complexity or improbability, the filter needs to identify a specification before attributing design.
- Dembski, William A. The Design Revolution, p. 89
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Scott
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posted 28. March 2004 07:00
Cryptography also comes to mind.
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Mann
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posted 28. March 2004 17:29
By now I have almost completely lost track of what the thread originally was for. The original post by Micah had such an open question that everyone threw in their favourite shebang and took it for a ride. Quite an interesting study of how intellectual entropy rapidly destroys a complex thought system, when no strings are attached. :-D
Micah, are you asssuming that ID prevails everywhere, in all aspects of reality ( I suppose that reality is still something we need to have a consensus on before we can start discussing experiments to test for design)?
Or do you lean towards the more conservative idea that ID is a property only possessed by some objects/mechanisms/whatever? If this is the case, then I think that it is inevitable that the issue of detection becomes an important one, not only for mere classification (it is/it's not) but as a starting point for constructing experiments. A methodological seeding point. Personally I think this could be the source for a more interesting discussion.
(Remainder of original post snipped)
[ 30. March 2004, 04:50: Message edited by: Mann ]
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Wilston
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posted 29. March 2004 01:44
As a refresher, here is the first post of this thread, from Micah: quote:
I'd like to see a brainstorm develop in which posts reflect the following:
1. Realism: let's move from philosophical thought experiments to the practical labratory
2. Identification of the problem to be addressed
3. Ideas for constructing the experiment
The thread is not for those who:
1. Want to "make a point" or advocate
The thread is for those who:
2. Are seriously interested in whether design concepts can be tested and/or turned into labratory experiments (or computer simulations)
On the first page of the thread, let's try to stay constructive: make your own offering.
Beyond the first page, maybe we can critique or make suggestions on how to improve other people's ideas.
I would like to concentrate on point number one, realism. Firstly, I don't wish to digress into a question of what is real or a question of how much more real one can get. Secondly, I don't think it will be possible for ID to get off the ground, without a working theory or paradigm about the underlying process of reality and/or intelligence and perception.
I could be incorrect about this, but consider the following. Methodological naturalism/metaphysical naturalism, is the paradigm under which neo-Darwinism subsists as an explanation of our biological origins. So my question to all of you is this: Exactly, what paradigm will ID fall under, or is there currently any scientific paradigm in which ID can work, and if yes, what is it? I ask these questions as a sincere ID advocate, but I am extremely concerned about how ID will become an empirical science.
As of date, I believe that ID is the only theory that can challenge neo-Darwinism, however, I believe that Reality Theory is probably the more pertinent issue that must be resolved, or at least given considerable thought. Unless this happens, it seems to me that the “origins science” scuffle between ID and neo-Darwinism will remain in an "epistemological limbo".
As we all know, empiricism is the philosophy by which most scientific materialists base their science, but is ID compatible with such a philosophy? For instance, we know nothing about the designers, not to mention whether we are dealing with supernatural interventionism or a super technologically advanced alien race. Then again, it is claimed by some ID theoreticians that we really don’t have to know anything about the designers. But, if we can really determine if something is intelligently designed, without having explicit knowledge about whomever or whatever the designer is, then surely, intelligence must be a deep-seated property of reality in order for us to even make a supposition about some non-human artifact being designed. Then again, this is based on the presumption that the intelligence we posses is similar to other intelligences. In other words, without having knowledge of the design methodology of some other intelligent entity, we can only presume that our kind of intelligence is able to discern the work of design from such another intelligence.
What really nags my mind is that the whole debate between ID and neo-Darwinism seems to be an epistemological problem, that is, unless we can really agree on the causal powers of the very reality in which we have our being, we invariably have a case of causal fallacy.
Turning ID into a science as say, physics or chemistry, may require an utterly new view of reality, seeing that not all of us reasonable humans have a consensus on the underlying structure of reality. Aside from this being a long stretch, I remain confident that ID can become a scientific enterprise, but I always find myself wondering. If ID is true, how can we ever know that if science is equivocated with methodological naturalism?
Mann writes: quote:
Micah, are you assuming that ID prevails everywhere, in all aspects of reality (I suppose that reality is still something we need to have a consensus on before we can start discussing experiments to test for design)?
Mann, you have hit the nail on the head. Could it be that the origins science debate will go nowhere without our understanding the nature of reality? Or maybe, we should be more concerned with deciphering how our minds work and perceive the world. By default, the human brain usually makes an inference of design for what appear to be designed objects, so, does this point to an objective or systemic process of intelligent design recognition at work? Maybe, just maybe, this finding will be of significant help to the ID research program. If we can reverse engineer the brain, this may give us a glimpse into how to recognize the hallmarks of intelligent design.
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RBH
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posted 29. March 2004 02:22
Willston wrote quote:
As we all know, empiricism is the philosophy by which most scientific materialists base their science, but is ID compatible with such a philosophy?
Every time a claim that intelligent design can be detected by a suitable analysis (say, a probabilistic analysis of the structure of the bacterial flagellum) of a biological structure or process, that claim is founded on empiricism, and indeed presupposes an epistemology founded on empiricism. Any attempt to detect the fingerprints of a designing agency in the phenomena of the world is an explicitly empirical enterprise. Dembski's Explanatory Filter is an empirical procedure for discovering design.
RBH
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Micah Sparacio
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posted 29. March 2004 07:52
Wilston,
RBH is right. Unless you suppose that we can do science with our eyes closed, our noses plugged, our ears covered etc. In other words, science without empiricism is mere cognition.
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