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Author
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Topic: Rational Survivalism: An Objective Natural Morality
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John Newman
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Member # 1121
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posted 18. February 2004 02:39
If the moderator feels this post is inappropriate for this forum, he or she is welcome to delete it. The reason I brought it here is because I once had brought an argument here concerning morality that discussed "systemic agency." Some folks here found it to be of some interest and we discussed it. Since then, my ideas about it have evolved some, but I still maintain that there is an objective morality. I thought some folks here may be interested in it. It's primarily an argument for objective morality, but if it is challenged, we will likely end up in a debate about complexity and whether there is direction to evolution. So I think it may be an appropriate discussion here.
Rational Survivalism: An Objective Natural Morality
P1 The rightness or wrongness of any statement, object, or action can only be objectively true or false relative to the existence or occurrence of some state of affairs. (i.e. inferences depend on premises)
P2 Morality is a systematic methodology of conduct implemented by individuals in a group.
P3 The state of affairs that morality most generally applies to is the survival of the group in which it is implemented.
I1 The most objective definition of the term ‘morality’ is: A systematic methodology of conduct that is conducive to the survival of the group in which it is implemented. (For the time being, and for the sake of clarity, we will call this Rational Survivalism Morality (RSM)) (From P2 and P3)
C1 The rightness or wrongness of an RSM statement can be objectively either true or false. (From P1 and I1)
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warren_bergerson
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posted 18. February 2004 11:16
John,
I believe I am in agreement with the principle you express. I would note two additional features. First, the ‘state of affairs’ applicable to any group is highly dynamic and thus the morality or morality value of an act is variable or dynamic. Second, the morality value of an act perceived or recognized by a group is only an imperfect measure of the ‘theoretically’ true morality value.
Again, I think I am in agreement with the principles you express, but, IMO, the actual application of the expressed principles to behavior is more complicated than it might at first appear. Is my interpretation compatible with yours?
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Moderator
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posted 18. February 2004 11:29
John,
Arguments about morality aren't appropriate for Brainstorms.
Please do take this thread in the direction of addressing complexity and whether evolution has direction. This thread will be watched carefully.
the friendly
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John Newman
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posted 18. February 2004 18:51
Warren, yes, the group and it's environment are dynamic things, and therefore particular actions will be more or less advantageous depending on the circumstances of the system in question.
Your second point ties into this in that the ignorance that the group and it's individuals have about the "actual" condition of the system will limit their ability to formulate the optimal methodology for survival. Therefore it is propitious for the group to factor in it's own lack of full awareness of ‘actuality,’ when formulating and updating it's methodology.
There seems to be two kinds of moral formulation in this regard--the short-view method of focusing on the present state and defining a method for getting from the present state to the desired end state; and the long-view method of trying factor in all possible future conditions and coming up with a generalized methodology that exhibits a more generalized probability of success. The formulation of the short-view methodology is defined on a moment to moment basis by individuals in the group--for example, not crashing into another car would be an appropriate short term analysis for not hindering the survival of the group. The formulation of the long-view methodology is more of a group thing, like principles and ethics that will generally lead the group toward the desired end-state, survival—statements like, “do unto others as you have them do unto you.”
As far as how complicated the application of this system might be, I would say that some things would be complicated while others not. Under this system, torturing babies to see their reaction or murdering innocent people of the group would seem like obvious ‘no-nos.’
To discern whether Rational Survivalism is a relevant model of morality, we need to evaluate the premises of the argument. Just how fundamental is "survival" to moral agents, biological agents, goal directed systems, and complex systems in general? What does survival mean?
Survival is the opposite of termination--it is basically continuation. There are processes; some of them terminate; some of them continue. Some processes change, and then continue or terminate. And some change further. Consider the system of sub-atomic particles. If there are atomic configurations simpler than the hydrogen atom, then they are too unstable to continue for observable periods of time. The same goes for ultra-heavy elements. There is a limited range of possible configurations that subatomic particles can compose that do not quickly terminate. So, even in this basic realm, the rules and parameters of the system seem to set a certain criterion for continuation/survivability.
Also fundamental to this whole process of survival is competition and cooperation. The interactions between subatomic particles could conceivably be interpreted as a kind of competition, instantiated by some amount of randomness in the system. It is the randomness that allows for the chance interactions such that certain cooperative interactions could emerge among the sub-atomic particles. This all presumably happened when the universe was much hotter and denser, but you see the analogy working here.
The basic structure of the hierarchy is that you start off with a chaotic, rule based system (the original chaos is likely a product of the rule system exhibiting intrinsic randomness generation, not too dissimilar to Wolfram's Rule 30). The base system must be a universal machine of sorts, and thus be capable of emulating novel dynamics and rule systems on top of it's own. The intrinsic randomness generation acts as a search function that leads to the eventual emergence of the new meta-dynamics. In this way, atomic dynamics can be seen as a system of meta-dynamics being emulated on the simpler dynamics of the sub-atomic system.
So you start off with that base system, the RNG/search-function produces a large set of processes, non-continuative processes die out, continuative processes interact until cooperative interactions are found. At that point, entirely new dynamics emerge at a higher magnitude of the universal scale. Applying this to our atomic analogy, the atoms then interact competitively until cooperative relationships emerge and then they enter into the larger realm of molecules, with new meta-dynamics being emulated on top of the atomic model. At each step in the hierarchy, a phase-transition of sorts occurs, where new properties and dynamics emerge.
So, to reiterate, the hierarchical patter goes like: Base dynamics -> competition -> cooperation --> new dynamics -> competition -> cooperation --> new dynamics -> ... and so forth.
And at the heart of it all is continuation... or survival. What continues and survives in this universe seems to wear the ontological crown, so to speak. If we are to look at the pattern we see in nature, we see that competition is something of a default condition, and cooperation seems to be the ideal methodology for survival in each level of the hierarchy.
Our current structure of morality already supports this archetypal pattern. Our morality has to do with how _we_treat_others_. Once we start serving each other, our group becomes a self-serving entity. That seems to be the natural universal goal.
I hope I brought this argument into the realm of discussion appropriate for this board, Moderator. So what do you guys think?
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warren_bergerson
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posted 19. February 2004 09:33
John,
It appears to me that based you are describing or defining morality as a type of fitness value assigned to ‘actions, objects, and acts’. As you define it, a relatively simple ‘good-bad’ or ‘do-don’t do’ binary value is simplified code for a very complex calculation of ‘benefits the long term survival of the group-harms the long term survival of the group’.
If morality is viewed as a simplified survival value code or symbol, then, IMO, there are three distinct operation which need to be understood. First, you need to understand the process by which morality values are calculated. Second, you need to understand how these values are communicated among group members. Finally, you need to understand how individual members utilize the stored codes.
In terms of the concepts you have defined, we at least some aspects of morality are dynamic, we know that animals other than humans have some type of ‘moral code’, and finally, we know or have reason to believe that the mechanisms involved in calculating, communicating, and using ‘morality values’ are different for humans and some ‘higher’ organisms than they are for other animals(instinct versus learning?).
As you have framed the issue, it does, IMO, appear to be relevant to the discussion of complexity and design.
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John Newman
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posted 20. February 2004 22:15
Warren,
I think you have a firm grasp of what I'm talking about. About your comments on exploring the nature of the moral dynamics and codifying morality, I think a very good example of this the present legal system. Rational Survivalism would only objectify that system. As of now, our moral compasses are largely oriented by the concepts of 'maximizing happiness' and 'maximizing the wellfare,' both of which are inherently subjective concepts, leading to an unstable moral system (those, and of course the emotional and religious predispositions of the masses). Happiness and welfare seem to be predicated on survival anyway, and survival can be objectively measured, so why not base one's moral system on that?
While the legal system can handle most of the moral issues relative to the survival of the group, I believe much can also be contributed to this ethical paradigm through the use of multi-agent systems simulations, as well as simulations as simple as the iterated prinoner's dillema. Tit-for-tat has already had an influence on social sciences and I believe it will move into the ethic sciences as well.
One of the main problems confronting us is the question of how do we organize cooperative competition? What rules can we apply to competitive systems such that we maximize productivity? If history were our lab experiment, we might see evidence that capitalism is a superior productivity mechanism over pure socialism. However, social programs are also necessary for survival and productivity of a nation, so I think multi-agent systems may shed some light on how to balance those two methods. Such methods could also be applied to world trade laws.
Simulations and autonomous agent systems may also play a role in the automation and optimization of some government systems, such as the economy and the tax system. Work could be done to simplify the system, while increasing productivity.
Morality and social policy are very similar concepts, but as far as individual discissions on a moment to moment basis goes, a large part of our lives cannot be codified into a complete methodology. Individuals will simply have to personally analyze a situation for which there is sometimes no prescribed methodology, and then formulate the best method they can. Having a specified goal, like the survival of the group, can at least give some direction on which to premise one's process of reason and action. Being that the survival of the group is the state of affairs that morality most generally affects, it is coherent to adopt that goal as the primary axiom of our moral system.
So far, I have only being discussing the "group's" survival as it relates to a moral system. Some might view this as an ethno-centric system of morality. But I believe a reasonable case could be made, as well as experimentally proven in mult-agent simulations, that a method of 'maximum inclusivity' would be an optimal method for discerning who and what falls under the term 'moral group.' By this I mean, individuals or individual groups that are more prone to cooperating with eachother (and including each other into a unified group) have a higher survival fitness than individuals or individual groups that do not cooperate together. And, mind you, ordered, cooperative competition can take place within and individual group. It is non-cooperative competition that is likely the more detrimental method for survival.
However, keeping the term 'group' is necessary, because there will be hostile individuals or groups that harbor the intention to destroy another group. So it is rational for the other group to fight back and protect it's own survival.
This does not mean that no moral code should exist for inter-group interactions. There is always a potential chance for cooperation among two groups, no matter how hostile one perceives the other. Therefore, the most rational position is to treat external groups with the maximum morality possible until cooperation is no longer rationally consistent with the imperitive of a group's own survival. All these ideas can be evaluated for their merit in multi-agent simulations, and I think it is probable that they will one day, with increasing accuracy as the technology of these simulations progress over time. I think in these simulations we will likely uncover truths not very dissimilar to those handed down to us from the sages and spiritual leaders of antiquity.
I believe there is evidence that some of these concepts may be emergent within dynamics of social systems, without necessarily a rational formulation. Without regard to even modern religions, consider how the ancient men worshiped the animals they hunted like they were Gods. This is a clear example of the conceptual emergence of cooperative competition.
What do you guys think?
[ 20. February 2004, 22:36: Message edited by: John Newman ]
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warren_bergerson
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posted 21. February 2004 09:10
John,
I would be interested in hearing your views on how the rational survivalism concept would be formally applied. It would seem to me that the RS concept could be used to calculate some type of RS value for a particular act or set of acts. It would seem that the ‘moral value’ associated with the same act could be measured or quantified for different legal systems and different religious groups.
It would seem to me it would be interesting to observe and study situations where there were there are significant differences between morality values based on RS and an existing religious or legal system, or where there are differences in morality values between different religious or legal systems. Finally, it might be interesting to study how different individuals in a group interpret and use ‘morality values’.
It would seem to me that even if a particular form of RS values do not turn out to provide useful morality values, RS values would provide an interesting benchmark for defining, measuring and studying how humans calculate and use morality values. However, at least IMO, you would need to formalize the concept and the quantification of the concept before you could actually apply it.
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warren_bergerson
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posted 23. February 2004 09:43
The concept of ‘rational survival values’ leads to the question of irrational or inefficient or biased survival values. If, for example, rational survival values of particular behaviors are calculated based on the likely impact on group survival, an inefficient or biased survival value might be calculated based on ‘the likely short term benefits to some subset of individuals to the detriment of the long term survival of the larger group’. Once you developing techniques for calculating both rational survival values and irrational or inefficient survival values, it might be possible to compare these values to actual morality values associated with an specific legal system or set of religious beliefs. You could even use such analysis in the study of the ‘moral behavior’ of animals other than humans.
It may or may not be apparent, but concepts such as rational survival values and inefficient survival values can play an important role in constructing predictive models and predictive hypotheses of human and animal decision making.
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