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Author
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Topic: Jonathan Wells: Using Intelligent Design Theory to Guide Scientific Research
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Rex Kerr
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Member # 632
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posted 01. June 2004 19:32
Wells does spell out why it's an ID hypothesis. There may be other ways to come to the same hypothesis, but he came to it through intelligent design.
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In the electron microscope, centrioles look like tiny turbines. Using TOPS as my guide, I concluded that if centrioles look like turbines they might actually be turbines.
And what is TOPS?
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TOPS begins with the observation that the evidence is sufficient to warrant at least provisional acceptance of two propositions: (1) Darwinian evolution (the theory that new features of living things originate through natural selection acting on random variations) is false, and (2) ID (the theory that many features of living things could only have originated through intelligent agency) is true. . . .(2c) The implication that all features of living things should be presumed to have a function until proven otherwise, and that reverse engineering is the best way to understand them.
So, you look at a centriole, assume it's designed, figure out what else was designed that looks like a centriole, find a turbine, and see if the principles of operation and design of a turbine match those of a centriole.
Makes sense to me. The hypothesis may be wrong, of course, but the reasoning seems straightforward enough, and fairly clearly ID-motivated.
You could come up with the same hypothesis based on the principle that because of physical constraints, form and function are similar. This is a weaker inference than assuming design, since design is constrained not only by physics but by aesthetics, style, the design process, etc.. In this case, you'd probably give up quicker if initial results made the idea look incorrect.
Thus, the prescription from an ID perspective might be: if form suggests a design, or design suggests a mechanism, and at first you don't find it, look again! You may have just missed it on the first pass. (Wells apparently did this after the magnetic vortexer idea failed, and is trying a microturbine pump instead.)
Although a single example can't be used to make a reliable inference, I suspect that this is a case where the greater insistance on similarity in design isn't helpful. Without detailed calculations it's hard to be sure, but it seems to me that the biophysics of Wells' hypothesis is off by a few orders of magnitude. So my guess is that this example will turn out not to be an example of successful use of ID to generate biological hypotheses. But it's only a single example, and I'm sure there are plenty of different ID-based hypotheses one could make.
Note that even if the TRIZ/TOPS/ID method of coming up with scientific hypotheses were helpful, it wouldn't mean that ID was true. It could be that the results of evolution and the results of TOPS are similar, in which case using TOPS (which is easy for us to think about) would give us insight into an evolutionary process (which is hard for us to think about). Papers like Wells', it seems to me, simply answer the criticism that ID gives us no guide when constructing scientific hypotheses.
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Evan
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posted 02. June 2004 08:19
Rex, are you saying that Wells' hypothesis counts as "guided by ID" because it's based on an analogy with a machine?
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charlie d.
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Member # 159
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posted 02. June 2004 08:55
I agree with Rex: the main ID-inspired hypothesis in Wells' paper is that if things look similar to intelligently designed objects with a certain function, they could really be intelligently designed objects with the same function. This is an ID hypothesis in the sense that mainstream scientists, usually trained to mistrust superficial similarities, are less likely to draw such an inference compared to an ID advocate who's been raised on the flagellum/outboard motor paradigm. As Rex notes however, the similarity may well have drawn Wells into an erroneous inference in this specific case. Certainly in this paper the hypothesis is not fleshed out in sufficient detail to even say whether it makes any biophysical sense. Perhaps the mainstream paper Wells says he has submitted is better in that respect.
The second ID-based source of inspiration, I guess, is the minimization of the role of DNA in biological processes, though this is more unique to Wells than an a general ID requirement. Here, Wells' goal is clearly more to show that evolution cannot proceed by DNA mutation and selection, than to propose a real ID-based hypothesis. Apart from the fact that nothing in evolutionary theory precludes non-DNA based inheritance to play the same role as the source of selectable variation as DNA is known to, it appears that even in that case Wells' proposal falls somewhat short, as he seems to agree in fact that ultimately it is DNA mutations (translocations, in this case) that subvert the homeostatic mechanisms of cell replication and survival to cause cancer.
Regardless of the possible limitations of ID-based hypotheses in this specific instance, however, it has to be clear that creative inspiration in science can come from whatever source, including ID. This has little bearing on whether the source is scientific, or valid, or useful. As I said in an earlier post, chemical intoxication has undoubtedly contributed many new ideas to science, but it certainly isn't scientific per se! People can also do a lot of research based on a flat earth perspective, but much of it would eventually turn out wrong.
Evolutionary theory's advantage over ID at this stage is not that it inspires much more research, but that the research it inspires is so much more fruitful. Evolutionary theory explains stuff. This paper, especially when stripped of its frankly ideological overtones, is a step in the right direction for ID, in that it includes actual science rather than just phylosophy or politics. Whether the ID-based hypotheses it proposes will be vindicated, however, seems at the very least questionable at this point.
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Jack
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posted 02. June 2004 11:17
Rex Kerr<< So, you look at a centriole, assume it's designed, figure out what else was designed that looks like a centriole, find a turbine, and see if the principles of operation and design of a turbine match those of a centriole.
Makes sense to me. The hypothesis may be wrong, of course, but the reasoning seems straightforward enough, and fairly clearly ID-motivated.>>
This makes sense if Wells is presenting an argument that centrioles are designed but the hypothesis Wells is proposing is that a malfunction in the centriole causes cancer. Obviously something in the cell is malfunctioning and this causes cancer. While a non-IDist would view the centriole as something that fell together by chance and natural law why would this perspective necessarily blind them to the possibility that centriole malfunction could lead to cancer? It evidently hasn't because as Wells noted; "A growing number of researchers regard cancer not as a DNA disease, but as a centrosomal disease." They came to the same basic conclusion as Wells {though they differ on details} without ID as a guide. I fail to see how viewing the centriole as a turbine helped Wells generate his hypothesis that centriole malfunction leads to cancer. Does one have to view a biological thing as machine-like in order to conclude it's capable of malfunctioning?
[ 02. June 2004, 12:28: Message edited by: Jack ]
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Rex Kerr
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posted 03. June 2004 02:58
Yes, Evan, I'm saying that it's ID-driven because it's based on analogy with an intelligently designed object. A belief in ID is not the only reason one might draw such an analogy, but it is a reason to do so (and a fairly strong one compared to most).
Jack, I don't really follow Wells' logic with respect to cancer. But that doesn't bother me in terms of the title of the paper, because a core part of the biophysical model is (claimed to be) motivated by ID. Every single thought doesn't have to be guided by ID! Hypotheses that are guided by evolution are also guided by genetics, biology, physics, etc.. I'd rather figure out whether Wells' hypothesis is right before worrying about where each bit of motivation comes from. If the hypothesis is wrong, there isn't any credit to be assigned, and it's much easier to generate wrong hypotheses than right ones regardless of your framework, so we don't really learn anything in terms of ID's utility in generating useful hypotheses.
Incidentally, in terms of hypothesis correctness, one can do a rough calculation of whether 5g acceleration is enough to cause DNA breakage. Covalent bonds tend to have around 400kJ/mol of energy and are around 1A in length. So a very rough guess at the force required to break DNA is F * 100pm = 2 * 400kJ/mol / 6e23 molecules/mol. Solving for F gives about 1.3 * 1e5 * 1e10 / 1e23 = 1.3e-8 J/m = 1.3e-8 kg m^2 / s. (Experiments seem to indicate that DNA has a tensile strength of more like 5e-10 kg m^2 / s, but we're within a couple orders of magnitude.)
Now, F = m*a, so we can solve for the mass: m = (1.3e-8 kg m^2 / s) / (50 m^2 / s) = 2.6e-10 kg. A base pair weighs about 700g/mol, and we'll say that there are about 2e8 base pairs per chromosome (in humans), which gives a weight of 1.4e11 g / mol for a chromosome, or 1.4e11 / 6e23 ~= 2e-13 g / chromosome. This is three orders of magnitude too low (or about 50x too low if we use the tensile strength measurements) to cause breakage.
This calculation should be done much more carefully in conjunction with a biophysical model of the wobble and microtubule-DNA attachments (including friction/viscosity!), but my initial guess would be that 5g isn't enough force to cause any damage, at least under the "large frictionless moving body" assumption that Wells uses for his calculations (which is a very bad assumption on molecular scales, but as long as we're starting there, may as well continue).
[ 03. June 2004, 02:58: Message edited by: Rex Kerr ]
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Jack
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posted 03. June 2004 16:42
Rex Kerr<< Every single thought doesn't have to be guided by ID! Hypotheses that are guided by evolution are also guided by genetics, biology, physics, etc..>>
I understand that but the hypothesis in question is that malfunctioning centrioles cause cancer. I still fail to see how assuming centrioles are designed helps one come to this conclusion. Conversely how does viewing centrioles as products of evolution hinder one from coming to the conclusion that malfunctioning centrioles cause cancer?
Rex Kerr<< I'd rather figure out whether Wells' hypothesis is right before worrying about where each bit of motivation comes from. If the hypothesis is wrong, there isn't any credit to be assigned, and it's much easier to generate wrong hypotheses than right ones regardless of your framework, so we don't really learn anything in terms of ID's utility in generating useful hypotheses.>>
Sure, finding out if Wells' hypothesis is correct is important but if his hypothesis is indeed an ID hypothesis then even if it turns out to be wrong it still demonstrates that ID can produce testable hypotheses, something the critics say it can't do. Scientists working within the Darwinian framework propose hypotheses that turn out to be useless all the time. This is how science works. It will take time to determine if ID is a fruitful paradigm but this much we know right now: Wells' hypothesis doesn't invoke the supernatural. It is is methodologically naturalistic. It can be verified/falsified via the scientific method. It has the potential to help us better understand some aspect of biotic reality. In other words, it's a completely scientific hypothesis.
[ 04. June 2004, 11:05: Message edited by: Jack ]
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charlie d.
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Member # 159
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posted 03. June 2004 17:01
Again, I think it's two different hypotheses: centrioles as turbines (from the ID "what-looks-designed-probably-is" paradigm), and cancer not a DNA disease (from the "DNA-don't-do-squat" paradigm - ![[Wink]](wink.gif) - which I think is more Wells' own idea than a general ID thing, but anyway). The two hypotheses just happen to intersect where defects in the "turbines" cause the "non-DNA-caused disease" (though as discussed ultimately even this hypothesis boils down to DNA mutations).
Incidentally, it would take 10 minutes to Wells to address these issues, plus the several substantial ones that came up earlier. I hope he hasn't left for good.
[ 03. June 2004, 21:20: Message edited by: charlie d. ]
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Eric T. Malroy
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Member # 536
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posted 09. June 2004 14:05
I find it humorous that Charlie D and others criticize Dr. Wells for not having a "strong
enough" link to ID. Constantly, these critics have argued that ID is not scientifically useful and therefore should not be accepted by the scientific community. Dr. Wells has demonstrated how ID is potentially useful scientifically in a powerful way. Now these critics jump all over Dr Wells for not having a clear enough connection with ID. These critics don't seem to understand that Dr Wells is laying the groundwork for other ID proponents to build upon. Particularly, he is developing the side information that others can use with Dr Dembski's filter to examine the development of these novel components. Science builds upon itself!
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Evan
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Member # 164
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posted 09. June 2004 17:10
Eric writes,
quote:
Dr. Wells has demonstrated how ID is potentially useful scientifically in a powerful way. Now these critics jump all over Dr Wells for not having a clear enough connection with ID.
But as far as I can tell the only connection to ID that Wells is used is that he’s thought about an analogy with a machine to come up with his idea. How is this a “powerful idea?”
Eric also writes,
quote:
Particularly, he is developing the side information that others can use with Dr Dembski's filter to examine the development of these novel components.
And how does Wells’ hypothesis develop this side information? Dembski’s filter is about, as you say, “the development of these novel components,” but Wells’ hypothesis says nothing about this, and there is, as far as I can tell, not even a hint of how his hypothesis might relate to the hypothesis that some aspect of the systems in questions were designed. In fact he makes it clear in his opening paragraphs that this is about ID as a metatheory, not about “with inferring from the evidence whether a given feature of the world is designed.”
I think the remarks that have been made about this by myself, Jack, and Jerry were not “jumping all over” Wells, but rather reasonable critiques of Wells’ claim that his hypothesis had any connection with ID.
So I would be interested in specifics from Eric: in what way would Wells’ hypothesis, if confirmed, provide “side information” about inferring design, and in what specific way has Wells used ID “in a powerful way?”
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Nel
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Member # 614
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posted 09. June 2004 20:49
Evan wrote:
quote:
So I would be interested in specifics from Eric: in what way would Wells’ hypothesis, if confirmed, provide “side information” about inferring design, and in what specific way has Wells used ID “in a powerful way?”
I think Wells provided this in his paper. It's essentially the same side information that renders the bacterial flagellum so interesting. We designed turbines long before we found them in living systems.
I havn't finished reading the paper but thought I'd offer some comments on the posts in this thread.
From the article that AndyG linked to:
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This said, the vast majority of non-coding DNA is *not* sequence conserved but changes at rates consistent with random drift.
Even if it is true that the vast majority of non-coding DNA changes at rates consistent with random drift, it's not necessarily true that they are non-functional. Functional genes may evolve at rates similar to what we'd expect from drift as well. This is because the selection on some genes is so weak that drift is actually stronger than natural selection. Nobody has proved that pseudogenes are non-functional - many do not encode protein, but one was recently shown to be genetically active as an RNA. How many of the others might be active in this way is unknown, but it is worth noting that at least 60% of all human genes have antisense transcripts. The calculations on random drift are based on assumptions about the rate of evolution of presumed neutral sequences, such as ancient repeats and the third base of four-fold redundant codons, which again may not be the case.
Rex Kerr:
quote:
Now, F = m*a, so we can solve for the mass: m = (1.3e-8 kg m^2 / s) / (50 m^2 / s) = 2.6e-10 kg. A base pair weighs about 700g/mol, and we'll say that there are about 2e8 base pairs per chromosome (in humans), which gives a weight of 1.4e11 g / mol for a chromosome, or 1.4e11 / 6e23 ~= 2e-13 g / chromosome. This is three orders of magnitude too low (or about 50x too low if we use the tensile strength measurements) to cause breakage.
In your calculation you make the assumption that DNA is anchored somewhere and that the weight of the chromosome is pulling on the DNA. I'm not sure how accurate these assumptions are (something I might revisit later) with respect to Wells' hypothesis. I find it interesting however, that, practically your scenario means that the end base pair of a chromosome is immobilized to a solid phase. In such a case a chromosome will be
easily broken by hydrodynamic forces, which still might be consistent with Wells's hypothesis.
[ 13. June 2004, 23:21: Message edited by: Nelson-Alonso ]
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Evan
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posted 09. June 2004 22:00
Would you care to comment, Nelson, on whether you see any aspect of this that relates to ID, and if so how? So far the only connection seems to be (and you seemed to refer to this also) is that Wells used an analogy with a machine in thinking about his hypothesis. The question that I and some others on this thread are interested in is whether that analogical thinking adds any support to ID as a scientific inference, or whether it is just a useful metaphor to stimulate our thought? Any comments on this?
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Nel
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posted 09. June 2004 22:17
Evan,
I may be wrong, but I don't think Wells is making an analogy. He is saying, for all intents and purposes, this is a turbine, it even functions like one (much the bacterial flagellum functions as an outboard motor). One can make a seperate argument as to whether the complexity and closeness of the function to a designed turbine argues for intelligent design, but Wells is making a different argument, in that the observation and logic is leading him to ask scientifically fruitful questions. Something that is supposed to be impossible (according to some ID critics who claim ID is a "science stopper") under a teleological paradigm.
[ 09. June 2004, 22:20: Message edited by: Nelson-Alonso ]
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Eric T. Malroy
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posted 10. June 2004 04:48
The simple reality is that we don't find functioning machines naturally arising in nature. Now Neodarwinists claim that these biological devices, which clearly behave like a turbomachine, are due to natural selection and mutation. But the interconnectedness of these machines presents naturalists with a serious problem. If naturalists can't show a steady increase of function or efficiency in explaining the development of a biological artifact, then naturalistic explanations are unreasonable. Showing that biological devices behave like intricate man-made machines does support the notion of ID. Dr Wells is demonstrating that useful scientific work can be realized by starting from IDT. If Dr. Wells' work does prove successful, then a potential cure for cancer may be realized. This is significant work.
Not only is Dr Wells demonstrating the usefulness of IDT, but he is developing the side information that can be used for further ID analysis. Modeling the biophysics is important in analyzing the limits of evolutionary development. Future ID researchers can expand on this work by incorporating Dembski's explanatory filter. For example, molecular dynamics and molecular machanics can be used in analyzing the turbomachinery biological device and assessing the probability associated with the supposed evolutionary development of these devices.
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charlie d.
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posted 10. June 2004 08:28
Just a few points:
a) most here agree that Wells was inspired by ID at some level in his two hypotheses (centrioles as turbines, and that defects in centrioles, not DNA, cause cancer)
b) IMO those hypotheses are however, at a scientific level, quite weak. Indeed, I'd say the second one is patently false, as Wells himself admits that centrioles would cause cancer by causing DNA breakage (and hence, translocations). As for the centrioles-as-turbines hypothesis, as a non-biophysicist I find Rex's comments quite significant, but I'll leave it to the main paper's reviewers to evaluate. At the very least, this hypothesis would seem to need a far more detailed development and think-through than what has been presented here (I expect the paper to be better in that respect).
c) Everyone here agrees that anyone can derive inspiration for science wherever they want - that doesn't make the source of inspiration valid, or useful, by default. YECs have pioneered the use of patently false premises to conduct what would look superficially as valid science, reaching wrong conclusions in the process.
d) It's a little frustrating that Wells seems to have bailed out of this thread, and failed to engage the scientific objections in it. I hope this does not degenerate into another vacuum thread of the kind the mods were trying to avoid with the brainstorms overhaul, but the recent attempts at blanket ideological statements about "neo-darwinists" and "ID critics", and provocatory cheerleading tone do not bode well. Perhaps the mods can steer the discussion back on substantive matters?
[ 10. June 2004, 11:21: Message edited by: charlie d. ]
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Evan
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posted 10. June 2004 09:30
Eric writes,
quote:
The simple reality is that we don't find functioning machines naturally arising in nature.
This is not a “simple reality” - it is the key claim of ID, and is one which has not been established.
As is usual, ambiguity about words confuses the issue. If by machine we mean “something that has been assembled from parts which would not have organized themselves in the same way on their own” (such as a airplane turbine or an outboard motor), then of course by definition “we don't find functioning machines naturally arising in nature.” But then, of course, the question of whether the flagellum or the centriole is a machine is an empirical question, the answer to which depends on the history of its origination, not on whether it is exhibits properties similar to a man-made machine.
On the other hand, if by machine we mean “something whose parts interact with each other and perform a function within a system, obeying the laws of physics as they do so,” then there seems to be lots of evidence that such things do arise in nature.
The ambiguity of the word machine leads to a circularity of reason that adds a misleading sense of tautological certainty. If one starts with the second meaning of machine (this thing exhibits these properties, which is a statement about the nature of the thing without regard to its origin) and then shift to the first meaning (this thing was therefore assembled from parts ...), then one can appear to draw a conclusion about the origin of the thing that is devoid of actual evidence.
This is the key issue in Wells’ opening remarks to his paper, and the key to my question: does ID as a “metatheory” - either as a stimulus to ideas or as a metaphysical overlay on top of empirical knowledge, add anything at all to the empirical claim that in fact some aspects of the physical world were designed by other than natural processes?
I know that Charlie and Rex are interested in the actual hypothesis offered by Wells, and others (myself, Jack, and Jerry) have been more interested in the issue addressed in the title of the thread - is this really an example of using ID to guide scientific research. Jack put it well when he said,
quote:
Just because a hypothesis is generated by an ID proponent doesn't automatically make the hypothesis an ID hypothesis. More information is needed such as what exactly is the ID logic/reasoning that inspired the hypothesis? Explain why a scientist working within a non-ID paradigm would not be likely to propose the same hypothesis? In my opinion, answering questions like these are more important than defending the hypothesis itself. Why? Because even if the hypothesis turns out to be valid if it can't be shown to be an ID hypothesis then the point Wells is trying to make that ID can guide scientific research has not been established. More attention to demonstrating that his hypothesis is in fact an ID hypothesis should have been given in the paper Wells presented to Brainstorms.
Clearly ISCID’s new policies have led to a severe drop in participation, and I am really unclear as to what the administrators of this site want to accomplish at this time. In fact, at one point the moderator implied that the whole subject of whether the hypothesis was related to ID was moving us “off-topic,” and that what he wanted was more discussion of the scientific details, even though the title of the thread is “Using Intelligent Design Theory to Guide Scientific Research.”
Also, I too am puzzled that Wells only posted a few times here. I wonder about his purpose in doing so. I would hope and expect that when someone posts at Brainstorms, it is with the intention of discussing one’s ideas. However, it may be for other purposes.
In Dembski’s recent essay “Dealing with the Backlash Against Intelligent Design,” Dembski talked about how to make use of his critics. He wrote,
quote:
one thing I sometimes do is post on the web a chapter or section from a forthcoming book, let the critics descend, and then revise it so that what appears in book form preempts the critics’ objections. An additional advantage with this approach is that I can cite the website on which the objections appear, which typically gives me the last word in the exchange. And even if the critics choose to revise the objections on their website, books are far more permanent and influential than webpages.
I consider myself a thoughtful critic of ID, interested in the big issue of the nature of the physical world and its relationship to the metaphysical. However, it doesn’t sit too well with me to think that Dembski (or Wells) would use this site in the manner described above.
I realize that the moderator may feel that these remarks are inappropriate. So be it. I am one of the few people who still seems to be interested in this site, and I enjoy civil and carefully considered discussions about the issues related to complexity and design in nature. I think the issues be raised here are important- for instance, whether the machine analogy really tells us anything about nature, and I think the people who start a thread should be interested in discussing responses they get to it. If the moderator thinks either or both of these are unrealistic expectations, then I would willingly accept the revocation of my posting privileges.
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