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Author
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Topic: Is 2nd Law a special case of 4th Law?
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Christopher D. Beling
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Member # 723
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posted 02. June 2005 22:42
Jerry, quote:
The improbability comes in when we add in the specificity. Both Dembski's patterns involving low probabilities of an archer hitting a tiny target and Behe's highly specified parts in an IC system that no other part but that one could do is where the improbability comes in
My last post may have seemed critical - but I was only asking for a proper understanding and agreement on terms - so we are not talking at cross-purposes.
I want to acknowledge that I think you are in your posts saying something of fundamental importance - (want to thank you!) - namely that we do not need to worry too much about the 'subjectivity' of the target events - so long as we can define our target as epistemically objective [i.e. it is a working flagellum, or it is a replicating biotic system] then in this case it is only the 'improbability' (complexity a la Dembski)(specificity a al your self!) that needs concern us. We just want to be 100% sure that (a) it did not happen by natural law or (b) natural law plus chance. This we have if the complexity (a la Dembski)[=specificity (a la yourself)] lies below the UPB (500 bits of info). It is this 100% surity (of non-natural law initiation) that defines these things/events/phenomenon as CSI?! Right? I believe we agree? But can we agree on using the same definitions for complexity and specificity -or at least agree that at present we are not using these terms with the same sense?? ![[Smile]](smile.gif)
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Jerry D. Bauer
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posted 03. June 2005 19:13
Chris:
First, note that I could be simply wrong on all this.
We wish to keep ourselves focused on science and our job is to perpetuate ID as science and to question every work submitted by Dembski, Behe, Wells, or anybody else that is nationally known well enough to submit this stuff and have it universally perused. In fact, I will try to falsify it if I can, as this is what the scientific method demand I do. If it stands, it walks. If it does not, we can move onto something else. But my disagreement here is not necessarily with Dembski, it's with everyone.
I fully recognize that specificity is a process involving patterns in certain cases and I also recognize that Dembski is not the only one to use these terms and there are many more definitions than only one. Many predate Dembski:
"In brief, living organisms are distinguished by their ‘’specified‘’ complexity. Crystals are usually taken as the prototypes of simple well-specified structures, because they consist of a very large number of identical molecules packed together in a uniform way. Lumps of granite or random mixtures of polymers are examples of structures that are complex but not specified. The crystals fail to qualify as living because they lack complexity; the mixtures of polymers fail to qualify because they lack specificity." (L. Orgel, The Origins of Life, 1973, p. 189)
Now look at what Paul Davies has to say about the matter from one of Dembski's lectures: Paul Davies wrote a book in 1999 that discussed the origin of life problem. He titled it The Fifth Miracle because in the book of Genesis, the fifth act of God is the creation of life. Davies writes: “Living organisms are mysterious, not for their complexity per se, but for their tightly specified complexity.”
Now suddenly specificity as presented by Orgel represented by the simple repetition of like parts in crystals is reversed and the concept of specificity is used to express the opposite, or the interaction of complex and different parts as in living critters. Which is correct? Behe seems to think the latter.
But what does Dembski believe: (page 48 in The Design Inference): "Specified events of low probability do not occur by chance."
Well gee. Dembski and I agree completely that it is the specificities of low probability that do not occur by chance. How then, did the probabilities get switched over to the complexity factor and away from the specificity factor in the diagram you posted? This is not confusing to people??
Finally, you may have missed my point in the gravel analogy. I was considering my driveway as the system and when the gravel was washed doesn't the hill it was removed from the system. This is not an event involving low probability.
quote:
My last post may have seemed critical
I like them critical. ![[Wink]](wink.gif)
Yes, I can agree that 500 bits is the UPB and the rest may be miniscule. My dilemma is that I have completed a book on the science of ID and I'm afraid to release it because there remains too much stuff like this up in the air. I suppose it may be a bit early in this field for a book of that nature.
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Christopher D. Beling
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posted 04. June 2005 10:40
Sal. Thanks for your posting. I am glad that I agree with your understanding of regularity. I also agree that 'inevitability' may be a better term than regularity. So we need a 'non-inevitability' (i.e. a contingency) check also in determining CSI! This is fine - but could you explain why Bill Dembski no longer requires this box at the first stage of the EF ?- i.e. explain the following:
quote:
Bill Dembski has said that his recent writings don't use the Explanatory Filter (EF) diagrams (where "regularity" is part of the diagram) any more.
[ 04. June 2005, 10:41: Message edited by: Christopher D. Beling ]
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Salvador T. Cordova
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posted 06. June 2005 17:58
Chris,
The following exchange betweein I and William Dembski might be informative. First I present a list of 4 diagrams (well, one of the links died, so it may show up only as 3), that I asked Bill Dembski to comment on.
quote:
From ARN:
Look at the diagram, Mike Gene Provided:
] 
and then the diagram ID's Bulldog Provided ( a rendering by typing :
quote:
START )
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|[HP]------- yes----- >(NECESSITY/ Law/ Regularity)
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yes
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[COMPLEXITY? (IP)]------- no---->(CHANCE)
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yes
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[SPECIFICATION (sp/SP)]-----no---> (CHANCE)
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yes
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(DESIGN)
Where HP = High Probabilty; IP = intermediate probability, SP = Small probability and sp = specification.
And now, from the IDEA Center:
Would you believe, that none of the above is exactly identical to diagram of the EF on page 13 of No Free Lunch.
which is
code:
start
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contingency -- no -- > necessity
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(yes)
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complexity -- no -- > chance
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(yes)
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specification -- no -- > chance
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(yes)
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design
There was method in my madness for asking my ID comrades to provide diagrams of the EF. A total of 4 diagrams have been provided by 4 different ID friendly sources, and each is nuanced differently.
The diagrams which Mike and the IDEA center provided was close to the one by Dembski in Mere Creation 1998.
The diagram by ID's bulldog is close to that by DembskiDesign Inference in 1998, page 37.
and then the one I provided is by No Free Lunch in 2002?
So which diagram do we use?? Get my drift?
I was trying to point out, that even among the ID faithful, the definition of the EF has changed.
I asked about the diagrams of the EF. In fact there are several, and each is slightly nuanced. Here is Bill's response to me:
quote:
Dear Salvador,
I saw essentially only two explanatory filters, one which appeared in THE DESIGN INFERENCE, and the other which appeared in NO FREE LUNCH. They are equivalent. But more importantly, the filter is just a tool for assessing specified complexity. That's why in my current writings in which I summarize my work on design detection, I don't even mention the filter. Instead I'll refer to the "complexity-specification criterion." Complexity here refers to improbability, specification to a particular type of pattern.
As for genetically modified foods being a candidate for a design-theoretic analysis (in terms of the complexity-specification criterion or, equivalently, in terms of the explanatory filter), my first reaction is to say "sure they are." The issue then is whether whether a successful design-theoretic analysis can be carried out on these foods showing that they are indeed designed.
You are free to post the two previous paragraphs on the ARN site.
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Christopher D. Beling
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posted 10. June 2005 12:57
Sal, Jerry and Andy and anyone else - I am seeking your agreement that the following diagram satisfactorily describes the complexity-specification criterion and the essense of the EF (particularly as in ID bulldog and NFL versions)?
* known as "complexity" in general ID parlance.
Diagram seeks to show difference between what Jerry has been refering to as "specificity" [where did you get this definition Jerry?] and "specification" (which simply means a detachable recognizable target - pattern/function)
Please note the four events/objects
(a) could be some randomized DNA code without any specification but with a probability below the UPB. (specificity = zero)
(b) could be a flagellum - or any other piece of biotic CSI (specificity > 10^150)
(c) is the word METHINKS - which has a (humanly recognizable) specification but which is not so improbable that it is classified as CSI. (specificity ~10^11)
(d) is a random event of high probability (specificity zero).
NOTE: The term "specificity" does not however appear in the iscid dictionary. How commonly used is it Jerry? Should we advise it to be included in the dictionary?
PROBLEM in nomenclature - event "a" is classified as having "zero complexity" - and yet would fall under "complexity" according to the iscid (or complexity-specification criterion). ANY ADVICE? ![[Frown]](frown.gif) I am happy with the term specificity - but to use "complexity" as a measure given by the inverse of the "specificity" seems to lead to high CONFUSION, ie. when events are not specified!
[ 10. June 2005, 13:34: Message edited by: Christopher D. Beling ]
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Salvador T. Cordova
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posted 10. June 2005 17:34
Dr. Beling,
I just read your profile. I confess I feel honored you would be inquiring of my thoughts!
I may be able to help you better if I know which books by Dembski you have. If you don't have his literature, I'm happy to quote relevant sections. I point this out, to say, he offered his ideas to be subject to critique and discussion and development, not as some immutable text. However, on the whole, I find his ideas correct, it is the terminology that takes getting accustomed to.
Dembski offered the term "specified improbability" as an alternative to "specified complexity".
Regarding your diagram, I don't think it is quite accurate, but in the ball park. Let me offer what is the correct picture (which I derived from a diagram Dembski provided in No Free Lunch).
A specification must be already complex. A specification represents "conceptual information". What passes through the EF is for the most part "physical information". The last node testing to see if the "physical information" is aligning with the improbable "conceptual information" (called a specification or blue print). If the physical information lines up with the conceptual information (blue print), then the design inference is made.
And a point about universal improbability. Specified Information having an improbability of 10^150 (or equivalently 500 bits of information) is a sufficient condition to make the information Complex, it is (gasp) not a necessary condition. For example, phone numbers are far below the information threshhold of 500 bits in that they only have 10 digits ( information content = 33 bits) but they are considered CSI. 500 bits is sufficient but not necessary condition. What governs the choice of the number of bits is what is considered operationally effective for an application. For example, a password of say 8 letters more than suffices as CSI for most real world login applications.
Thus it is not wrong to say something has CSI if the specification has at least 500 bits, but that is a sufficient but not necessary condition for CSI.
The proper diagram is in Dembski's book, No Free Lunch. It looks like this:
The red spot describes the "conceptual information" (the specification), which the physical information will match.
For example, in the space OMEGA of all possbible coin strings of 500 coins, there are specifications which we would consider "human designs" such as all heads or all tails, or
H H T T H H T T
etc.
If we collected all of these single case specifications, we would form a set of specifications. The SET would itself be a specification in the Dembski sense. That is, it occupies a small percentage of possibilities out of the space OMEGA of all possible coin configurations.
If a Physical Outcome matches our pre-conceived specification, then we have CSI.
The trick obviously is establishing the specification was not post-dictively arrived at, that it is independent.
I must caution what the word "independent" means. It means the physical artifact does not influence the form of the specification. Ironically, it does not mean the converse is disallowed. That is the specification (blue print) can affect the physical aritfact, and still be considered "independent" from the artifact. Hence, artifacts we make by ourselves based on a blue print we created qaulify as designed. Such specification are considered "independent" in the sense Dembski proposes. It's the reverse direction (post diction) that is not permitted.
What may obviously be troubling is the fact that specificaiton are subjectively defined. That is correct. However, that does not imply that we can not empirically measure our ability to perceive each others subjective states. For example, it is the fact we can empirically measure each other's subjective states that enables you to read what I am writing.
[ 10. June 2005, 17:39: Message edited by: Salvador T. Cordova ]
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andyg
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posted 12. June 2005 19:34
Christopher,
As a result of my conversations with Sal in this and other recent threads, I don't have anything to contribute to your discussion. To me, the notion of specification as Sal has defined it is far too subjective to be a useful analytical tool. As he writes: quote:
What may obviously be troubling is the fact that specificaiton are subjectively defined. That is correct. However, that does not imply that we can not empirically measure our ability to perceive each others subjective states. For example, it is the fact we can empirically measure each other's subjective states that enables you to read what I am writing.
I think this crystallizes the problem that I have with Sal's examples of design detection - he uses human examples (dice, coins, human language) but these cannot really help us with biological design. When faced with biological objects, his criteria for specification seem to be (and Sal, correct me here if I'm wrong) "well, the contents of a cell can be compared to machines/computer storage systems/other human artefacts, so there's your specification - the designer is advertising his intentions by an appeal to our propensity to analogize".
I'm going to drop out of discussions for a while as I am travelling to meetings and giving talks until early July. I would, however like to thank Salvador for being both patient and civil with me. If I have ended up sounding peevish, I apologize and hope he can understand that my disappointment is not directed at him personally, just some of his arguments.
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Christopher D. Beling
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posted 12. June 2005 20:43
Andy: Sorry you are dropping out for a while. I was hoping to make some headway on discussing the 2nd and 4th laws - but maybe more time is needed for this. If we cannot get basic concepts and definitions (i.e. those for complexity and specificity) sorted out with regard to CSI how difficult to talk about its conservation!!
Even so, I do think you are right with regard to specification (I also think Sal is right too, but just has a different perspective). Specification is very objective and empirically detectable (even in the case of humanly generated CSI). A bacterial flagellum either exists/spins or it does not. Thus one can define a functional operator T^flag (stands for target function operator of the flagellum) on either a protein or DNA configuration (i.e. [DNA> ). We either have
T^flag[DNA> = +1*[DNA>
T^flag[DMA> = 0*[DNA> = 0
In the first case we have a DNA configuration that leads to the expression of a working flagellum (bacterial flagellum eigenvalue +1) and in the second case a DNA configuration that either leads to nothing or a broken non functional flagellum. It is an empirically determinable fact whether or not the DNA coding leads to a working functional flagellum (a yes - no answer - neglecting that there may be a small number of configurations that lead to a poorly functional mutated form where the eigenvalue would lie between 0 and 1). Then comes the second crucial and derivative point - that such a target function is not obtainable by chance - because its "specificity" using Jerry's language (or "complexity" using normal ID language) is just too great. I.E the summed probability of all such flagellum working configurations lies well below the UPB). Thus we are ruling out chance - and implicating design.
Incidentally the same argument also applies to humanly generated CSI. For example a person A decides (conceptual information) on a combination code (numerical configuration) for a lock - call it [Acode>. A then dials the information into the lock and at this stage the conceptual information becomes physical information embedded in the lock. Any person can now come along and check the lock's code empirically . If the code works then the lock opens. If it does not the lock stays shut. Again we are performing an experimental operation (applying functional target operator T^lock):
T^lock[Acode> = +1*[Acode> - if the lock opens
T^lock[Acode> = 0*[Acode>=0 - if lock stays shut
Now if [Acode> is real CSI observer B, C or D etc will not be able carry out the T^lock test for practicle reasons, because he/she will not live long enough to try all combinations! - but this does not negate the basic testability. But here note also that the observer(experimentalist) could have also received the [Acode> directly from A or second hand via C or D who had been in communication with A. The question is not how the code arose so much, but that it WORKS, and that it can be tested that it WORKS (i.e. does something functional - open the lock). Now secondarily it also follows that because the code is CSI it could not have been either produced by chance or found by chance and that in both cases (production and detection) some other form of explanation is implicated - but this is quite a different issue to the ability to empirically detect specification.
Sorry Andy you are dropping out for a while - have appreciated your posts. Will hope to get Sal's approval on the above, and then you may wish to come back in (latter that is!) .
[ 12. June 2005, 21:02: Message edited by: Christopher D. Beling ]
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Salvador T. Cordova
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posted 13. June 2005 15:17
quote:
andyg wrote:
I think this crystallizes the problem that I have with Sal's examples of design detection - he uses human examples (dice, coins, human language) but these cannot really help us with biological design. When faced with biological objects, his criteria for specification seem to be (and Sal, correct me here if I'm wrong) "well, the contents of a cell can be compared to machines/computer storage systems/other human artefacts, so there's your specification - the designer is advertising his intentions by an appeal to our propensity to analogize".
The moment we begin invoking terms like "fitness", "selective advantage", FUNCTION, we are already using human subjective perceptions. There is no law of physics that define these terms. Without realizing it, Darwinian theory is already invoking human subjective terms which are on the level of Teapots. Thus Darwinian theory is already invoking human subjectity without realizing it. If one is saying an object has function, that is already a mentalist projection, just like us calling a lump of metal a teapot!
The reason I opened the thread with the quotes by morowitz is that the problem of subjectivity is now beginning to pervade through all of physics with the rise of quantum mechanics.
quote:
Morwotz writes:
Third and last, atomic physics, which is now understood most fully by means of quantum mechanics, must be formulated with the mind as a primitive component of the system.
...
“What emerges from all this is the return of “mind” to all areas of scientific thought.
This may seem surprising at first, but one realizes when studying quantum theory, profound epistemological question arise. As quantum theory became formulated as information theory, the idea of an Observer somewhere in the pipeline becomes an issue. Even within the Transactional Interpretation which seeks to exorcise the Observer from the equations, the problem of the Observer is only temporarily displaced.....
Thus if one wishes to couch biology in terms of information theory one is confronted with this problem:
quote:
Dembski in No Free Lunch page 137:
There is a sense in which information, whatever its source is irreducibly conceptual and thus presupposes intelligent agency. This is because the very reference class of possibilities that sets the backdrop for the generation of information must invariably be delineated by an intelligent agent (see section 3.3). Thus information, whatever else we might want to say about it, can never be entirely mind-independent or concept free.
and
quote:
Barrow and Tipler, Cosmological Anthropic Principle, opening:
The central problem of science and epistemology is deciding which postulates to take as fundamental. The perennial solution of the great idealistic philosophers has been to regard Mind as logically prior...
the existence of Mind is taken as on of the basic postulates of a philosophical system. Physicists, on the other hand, are loath to admin any consideration of Mind into their theories...
But, during the past fifteen years there has grown up amongst cosmologists an interest in a collection of ideas, known as the Anthropic Cosmological Principle, which offer a means of relating Mind and observership directly to the phenomena traditionally within the encompass of physical science.
Objectivity in infromation theory is possible if one is willing to invoke a defining MIND that serves as a point of reference, but when dealing with biotic reality, this MIND is an uncomforatble concept since it has theological implications. However, as Barrow and Tipler pointed out, it leads to solving the "central problem of science and epistemology" in a self-consistent way.
When we use information theory in biology, we are inadvertantly invoking the presumption of MIND. Otherwise, we're just saying it's a coincidence that the physical information coincides with our conceptual information.
However, the "coincidence of conceptual information with physical information" is by definition, CSI. It is the subject of Dembski's reasearch whether that "coincidence" is really a coincidence, or whether it is by design.
[ 13. June 2005, 15:32: Message edited by: Salvador T. Cordova ]
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Salvador T. Cordova
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posted 13. June 2005 15:47
quote:
Christopher Beling wrote:
Incidentally the same argument also applies to humanly generated CSI. For example a person A decides (conceptual information) on a combination code (numerical configuration) for a lock - call it [Acode>. A then dials the information into the lock and at this stage the conceptual information becomes physical information embedded in the lock.
I think you have grasped the meaning of CSI!
The space OMEGA of possible events are basically all the combinations that one could try in attempting to open the lock. The one combination that would open the lock is the "target specification" (that corresponds to the red oval in my diagram above). If there were multiple valid combinations for the lock, rather than one, the calculations are adjusted accordingly.
When one understands what human generated CSI is, then that forms the basis for analyzing something like the flagellum. It takes a bit more care to analyze the flagellum, but I don't think the problems are insurmountable. The flagellum has a correspondence to our human made machines. The coincidence seems a little too fantasitic for raw chance or Darwinian processes to have caused. Accounting for the flagellum's design is essentially accounting for the existence of coincidence between our thoughts and designs and the designs we see in biology.
One may find it challenging to ensure there is no post-diction in describing the flagellum. Also the statistical analysis must carefully avoide the problem of post diction.
However, the lock-and-key metaphor is a good start at helping to put hard figures to the improbability of a coincidence.
The one specification however, that has very good numbers assigned to it is the Biological Turing Machine.
[ 13. June 2005, 15:49: Message edited by: Salvador T. Cordova ]
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Christopher D. Beling
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posted 16. June 2005 22:25
[1]
quote:
I am no expert on these issues, but my impression is the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics is a special case of the 4th Law of Thermodynamics.
Sal - forgive me I think we need to start adressing your original concern and stop beating about the bush regarding the nature or definition of CSI. We basically agree on the CSI definition anyway. It is only recently that I have understood your main idea of connecting the 2nd and 4th law. The way I see it (correct me if I am wrong) is that you are basically making a metaphysical suggestion of mind/intelligence being a necessity of the 2nd law - and through the inference of "conceptual information" (as required in the definition of CSI) also in the 4th? If I understand correctly it is this common metaphysical link that leads you to make the hypothesis/speculation that
quote:
the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics is a special case of the 4th Law of Thermodynamics
[2]
quote:
The moment we begin invoking terms like "fitness", "selective advantage", FUNCTION, we are already using human subjective perceptions
To lend you some encouragement, I must say I do agree at a fundamental level with your point. "Mentalist projections" are common in science (perhaps even necessary!)- and are essentially there in the 'conceptual information' side of CSI. I guess for you and me it is basically a theistic belief system that supports this view. We naturally see these "mentalist projections" in science as deriving from God's eternal Mind, and this derivative commonality is is suggestive and explanatory for us. Developing this metaphysical understanding to deeper levels (filling in the details) is both important for us as persons, and in occasionally helping the understanding of others. Moreover, we understand that metaphysics has always been important in true scientific development .
However for the naturalist - or indeed theistic evolutionist (i.e. like George Ellis in the interesting Teapots article) the apologetic that relies too much on metaphysics/philosophy is not particularly persuasive. This is the reason, for example, why I think you cannot persuade Andy regarding the detection of CSI. I think you will agree with me that there are two distinct sides to ID:
(i) The coincidence of conceptual in physical information (i.e. things look to us humans as designed artifacts)
(ii) The fact that no natural causes (deterministic or stochastic) can produce CSI. CSI is observed - implication something beyond natural law.
(i) is from the more metaphysical-philosophical direction, while (ii) is more from the "scientific" direction. We are on much safer ground just dealing with (ii), because with (ii) we are always talking the with the same language - i.e. phenomenon - those universally accepted "mentalist constructs" of modern science(and usually following the same story).
For the naturalist/theistic evolutionists we have quoting George Ellis quote:
Darwinian processes of selection guided the physical development of living systems, including the human brain
The human mind is seen as an 'emergence' deriving from a certain 'context' - although this process is not presently understood it is nevertheless strongly believed in. Complicating this view is the Kantian view of science - which deletes all a-priori concepts and deals with (critique of pure reason)
quote:
knowledge which concerns itself not with objects, but with the way we recognize objects, to the extent that this is possible a-priori
i.e. those categories - with which our brains/minds think - are the fundamentals. Science cannot go any deeper. I say these things only to support my view that in staying with (ii) we are on more productive territory. That is why I tend to prefer argument more along the lines:
1. CSI exists- empirically detectable
2. CSI cannot derive from natural law or stochastics -
3. from (1) and (2) something non-natural is implicated
4. CSI only decreases with time (or stays constant) - 4th law
5. from (4) CSI must have been infused into the universe at some time in the past - again supporting non-natural causation.
1. and 4. are subject to empirical testing. Conclusions 3. and 5. (which support each other by internal consistency) are the products of acceptable rational argument.
With regard to 1. the feeling has been in this thread that the subjectivity of "conceptual information" is a problem. This is perhaps true from that deep metaphysical direction - one could be criticized for "post-diction". It is not, however, true from the normal scientific direction - which accepts categories/classifications such as "flagella". From this direction the idea of a spinning whip like object that gives motility is empirically detectable. The question for science is how did such structures originate. The reason CSI (and non-natural causation) is implicated for the flagella is because its configuration is far too improbable to have come about by chance.
[3] QUANTUM MECHANICS and ENTROPY
I admit to being a non-expert in these areas. However, I admit also to being highly sceptical of the normal "Copenhagen Interpretation" of QM. I think it is quite likely that this interpretation is more a product of 20th century positivism. I do not believe consciousness is anyway demanded by QM. To demonstrate this let me ask you a question. Do you believe that our Universe would be any different today in its basic structure - if man the conscious observer (or the CSI that generates him) was not in the Universe? I sincerely believe that the physical universe would be the same - i.e. all wavefunctions would have collapsed in exactly the same way in the huge causal nexus - even if man was not existing. I also believe that animals and plants would be living just as they are today - even if man and his mind was not in existence - providing the CSI that generated them had been there and that their existence is not demanded by the conscious observer - man. So much these days is put down to man's mind/consciousness - to me it is ludicrous. The same could be said of entropy (perhaps). Although it is a humanly generated concept - would not the state of the universe (and hence its entropy - in an objective ontological sense) not be the same - irrespective of human observation?
Look forward to your comments. Chris
[ 16. June 2005, 22:52: Message edited by: Christopher D. Beling ]
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Jerry D. Bauer
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posted 17. June 2005 00:19
quote:
The way I see it (correct me if I am wrong) is that you are basically making a metaphysical suggestion of mind/intelligence being a necessity of the 2nd law
Yep. Love Sal to death. But we will never connect until he understands the difference between science and religion.
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Christopher D. Beling
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posted 20. June 2005 05:26
Sal: Hope you are not recoiling too much in shock from the last posts of me and Jerry. Did not mean to be critical but constructive. In response to and earlier question the books I have by Bill Dembski are:
1) The Design Inference
2) Intelligent Design - The bridge between Science and Theology
3) No Free Lunch
I try and study these. Like you I do not consider that what they say is absolute or written in stone. However, these are truly excellent books and most important they can be used as a benchmark for testing truth concerning evolution and ID. I.E. if anything contained within is wrong or only partially true - this can be ascertained by further investigation/dialogue. If these books had not been written by Bill, however, then we would have no benchmark to work with - and more confusion.
I want to say something more about the 2nd and 4th law, that I hope you will comment upon. There is something highly confusing and intriguing. The 4th law is derived by Bill based upon mapping of state of affairs "i" onto state of affairs "j" through a set of deterministic or stochastic functions. Such functions cannot add new information - hence the law of CSI. What intrigues me here, and I don't know if it has been discussed by anyone, is that the same mapping of "i" onto "j" will apply to any collection/system of particles - for which the 2nd law applies. One would expect the information content of a collection/system of particles to stay fixed based on this concept, but it does not - the information content decreases (entropy increases). Perhaps it is comforting that the information in a system of particles goes down rather than up - but what has happened to the conservation of information?
Consider also that in 1994 Evans and Searles derived for the first time the 2nd law of thermodynamics from first principles for any system of particles obeying classical mechanics [Phys Rev E50, 1645(1994)]. This derivation resolved the paradox (Loschmidt’s paradox) that had been around from the time of Boltzmann (late 1800s), that while particle dynamics is governed by time reversible dynamics, the overall behaviour of an assembly of particles is time irreversible – with entropy (disorder) always tending to increase. The Evans and Searles proof uses the exact time reversible equations of motion - as embodied in Liouville’s equation and computes the probability of time averages of entropy production from a given initial distribution of molecular states.
I don't know why Evans and Searles have not yet received a Nobel prize for their great contribution to physics!? But the point is this - why is it that deterministic equations leading from state of affairs "i" in a gas to state of affairs "j" generally reveal information loss. Why does the entropy go up!!?? Why are things different in biotic systems where CSI is probably exactly conserved except for the degenative action due to the 2nd law on the CSI storage medium (DNA)?.
[ 20. June 2005, 18:44: Message edited by: Christopher D. Beling ]
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Salvador T. Cordova
Member
Member # 959
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posted 22. June 2005 17:10
quote:
Jerry wrote:
Yep. Love Sal to death.
Awh shucks Jerry. The feeling is mutual, bro.
As far as the seperation of science and religion, what has been happening is the metaphysical component is becoming a factor because of the rise of quantum mechanics and the growing demise of reductionism.
Physicists George Ellis on Teapots
quote:
But this view omits important aspects of the world that physics has yet to come to terms with. Our environment is dominated by objects that embody the outcomes of intentional design (buildings, books, computers, teaspoons). Today's physics has nothing to say about the intentionality that has resulted in the existence of such objects, even though this intentionality is clearly causally effective.
A simple statement of fact: there is no physics theory that explains the nature of, or even the existence of, football matches, teapots, or jumbo-jet aircraft.
PS FYI:
Somewhat distantly related to the idea of teapots is the growing field of emergent phenomenon which are experimentally anti-reductionistic. We are now at the brink of finding irreducible complexity in physics, and thus, if we find phenomna in biology that specicially exploit irreducibly complex features of physics, we may be able to make design inferences. We will see...
These developments have been noted by Nobel Laureate Laughlin:
Robert Laughlin in New York Times
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Salvador T. Cordova
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Member # 959
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posted 22. June 2005 17:27
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The way I see it (correct me if I am wrong) is that you are basically making a metaphysical suggestion of mind/intelligence being a necessity of the 2nd law - and through the inference of "conceptual information" (as required in the definition of CSI) also in the 4th? If I understand correctly it is this common metaphysical link that leads you to make the hypothesis/speculation that
I think the better way to phase it is as Morowitz said, all of physics now is being couched in terms of information theory, including thermodynamics. As Barrow and Tipler noted, with the invocation of information theory, MIND (our mind's or possibly God's mind), are having to be invoked to resolve problems in physics. As morowitz said:
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"It was not possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics in a fully consistent way without reference to the consciousness." And he [Wigner] concludes by noting how remarkable it is that the scientific study of the world led to the content of consciousness as the ultimate reality.
....
The founders of modern atomic theory did not start out to impose a "mentalist" picture of the world. Rather, they began with the opposite point of view and were forced to the present-day position in order to explain experimental results.
And specifically to thermodynamics:
quote:
A further development in yet another field of physics reinforces Wigner's viewpoint. The introduction of information theory and its application to thermodynamics has led to the conclusion that entropy, a basic concept of that science, is a measure of the observer's ignorance of the atomic details of the system.
Dembski's formulation of the Fourth Law is tied to his formulation of CSI. If we relax the requirement that the Fourh Law to not be soley CSI but simply "I" (for information), then I think we're in a position to have a unified view of the 2nd law being a special case of the Fourth Law. However, I think the digression into understanding CSI has been enlightening as some of the concepts are useful in understanding the generalized for of information which I simply call "I".
I did not intend that I would be the principle pro-ponent of the brainstorm. I simply put it out to solicit what people thought, as I am no expert. However, my intuition tells me that this is the right path to take because Physics is becoming rooted in information theory, and thus, the laws of physics will be eventually related to the laws of information theory.
I've thrown out a lot in this brainstorm, and as ideas come to me, I'll offer them.
If it sounds unsatisfying, and that this thread is not reaching closure on my brainstorm, it is because I am leaving it as an open idea....however, I think it has a chance of being the correct view. I would not be surprised in light of Morowitz's comment, and the work of physicist Hans Christian von Bayer on quantum mechanics and information theory, that we will see the 2nd law eventually being viewed as part of some larger entropy law like the 4th law.
PS
just as side note:
Ironically, we have a peculiar development with emergence. Within the realm of information theory we have phenomena like undecidable statements (Godel statements) which are irreducibly complex. That is these phenomena cannot be explained by the systems that underlie them. And in an odd sort of way the anti-reductionists who pointed to Godel's theorem as somewhat of a prophecy that we would find irreducible phenomena in physics are finding vindication.
[ 23. June 2005, 11:13: Message edited by: Salvador T. Cordova ]
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