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Author
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Topic: What information is not.
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Matt Connally
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Member # 3076
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posted 09. January 2007 17:16
Neither the brain nor any computer we could ever make will ever be able to perceive, translate, interpret or author/create something that is immaterial. Does anyone out there not agree with that statement? Sometimes I really can’t tell amidst of all the philosophical ponderings about the manipulation of abstractions, synthetic information, semiotics, etc.
If information is in fact immaterial (let’s just use the information in the latest NY Times sports section as an example) then regardless of who authored it our brains cannot perceive it. No amount of philosophy can make up for the fact that the brain cannot use the five senses to perceive something that cannot be seen, heard, felt, tasted, or smelled. The neurons of the brain cannot give rise to an awareness of information. We are immaterial beings that are using our brains as tools.
As best I can tell a naturalist’s only defense against this is to bring in a whole lot of philosophical fog and go on and on about what we don’t know in hopes of changing the subject. But the fact is that there are some very simple truths we can know for absolute certain: information is not physical, and neither are its authors.
That's all I really came for, and its more than enough.
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2ndclass
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Member # 1979
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posted 09. January 2007 18:23
quote:
Neither the brain nor any computer we could ever make will ever be able to perceive, translate, interpret or author/create something that is immaterial. Does anyone out there not agree with that statement?
I think the whole "immateriality" issue is a red herring, so I'll comment on that statement only as it applies to information. Using the definition of information from, say, algorithmic information theory, brains and computers most definitely can perceive, translate, interpret, and author/create information. And that's true for any other definition of information that I can think of, so it's safe to say that I do not agree with your statement.
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Daniel Smith
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Member # 3004
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posted 09. January 2007 19:30
quote:
JT75: Daniel Smith,
This is gross misrepresentation to Zarathustra's reply. For between "ability to infer" and "no longer available" there is a specific object of knowledge mentioned, namely,"the existence of livestock from the markings on the baked clay". Z's reply has something very specific as its object, you represent him as referring to the ability to infer in general. You have moved his argument from something particular to a general, universal statment about "inferability per se," which was never intended. Then in your response you move from the obvious and uncontested fact that the ability to infer exists to the, as yet, unwarranted conclusion that this particular set of information (on the clay tablet) must still exist.
I realize that Z's statement had that qualifier (I posted his entire statement after all).
My point is that the only reason the "ability to infer the existence of livestock from the markings on the baked clay" would be unavailable would be if the ability to infer were unavailable.
What other possible limitation can exist that would make that particular inference "unavailable"?
Of course my "unwarranted conclusion" was based on his logic - not mine. Or I guess more correctly, my interpretation of his logic.
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Matt Connally
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Member # 3076
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posted 09. January 2007 21:14
2ndclass,
I’m so glad to hear a clear disagreement. So would you say that, since “brains and computers most definitely can perceive, translate, interpret, and author/create information,” that information must have physical qualities (mass or charge, etc.)?
The trouble is that no one can even begin to suggest what physical qualities or properties information has. Before scientists can test a theory they have to articulate it, and no one can articulate a theory of physical information—at least not that I’ve found. I’d be very glad if someone could point me to one. Until then they’re just assuming that information must be physical because otherwise…naturalism is so incredibly wrong.
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Matt Connally
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Member # 3076
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posted 09. January 2007 21:18
And here’s another statement I’m wondering where people stand on: We can observe that several physical mediums for information (black-and-white paper, electromagnetic waves, compact discs, brain tissue, etc.) have no physical qualities in common. We can observe an absence of physical qualities.
Zarathustra declared somewhere that we cannot observe the “absence” of anything, but he didn’t offer any argument. Because of course we can. For example, I am now observing that there are no elephants in my living room. I can see none. Zero is just as amazing a concept as any other number!
So IF those mediums have anything in common (such as the exact same rational, creative information), it is not physical.
Here’s how Bertrand Russell explained such a mystery a century ago, and it is still the most popular argument naturalists use today. (He is purporting to explain how we learning the meaning of the word “two”):
quote:
A certain number of instances are needed to make us think of two abstractly, rather than of two coins or two books or two people, or two of any other specific kind. But as soon as we are able to divest our thoughts of irrelevant particularity, we become able to see the general principle that two and two are four; any one instance is seen to be typical, and the examination of other instances becomes unnecessary.
The grammar is sound. The sentence structure is clear. The paragraph is coherent. And yet all Russell does is beg the question.
“How does the brain perceive numbers?”
“By divesting our thoughts of irrelevant particularities.”
“What?! How do we do that? Wait…first, what is a particularity anyway?”
“Well…it’s nothing in particular. Besides, like I said, particularities are irrelevant.”
“If I divest myself of the irrelevant particularities—whatever they are—which ones are relevant?”
“Well…it’s kind of complicated.”
Neverthless, the standard for fuzzy thinking was set and continues to this day. Here is how MIT Psychologist Steven Pinker, three generations after Russell, tries to explain how the brain’s neural circuitry perceives the meaning of the word “three”:
quote:
Humans, like many animals, appear to have an innate sense of number, which can be explained by the advantages of reasoning about numerosity during our evolutionary history. (For example, if three bears go into a cave and two come out, is it safe to enter?) But the mere fact that a number faculty evolved does not mean that numbers are hallucinations. According to the Platonist conception of number favored by many mathematicians and philosophers, entities such as numbers and shapes have an existence independent of minds. The number three is not invented out of whole cloth; it has real properties that can be discovered and explored. No rational creature equipped with circuitry to understand the concept “two” and the concept of addition could discover that two plus one equals anything other than three.
Just because it feels easy and innate to use doesn’t mean we have the slightest clue how it happens. All this reasoning just takes innate reason and rationality for granted.
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Klaus Lange
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Member # 3101
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posted 10. January 2007 08:44
Ones more I try to use the picture of hardware and software.
Hardware means all physical components of the computer system: RAM, ROM, BUS-System, CPU and so on.
The software contains the algorithm of memory administration and calculations. Software could be wrote on a memory (it organises the memory structure). The reorganisation of the memory is only the fingerprint of the software, not the software by itself. So software is not physical. But, all members of that internet forum here knows it, without software no computer runs.
Software is a example for information.
It is not physical but real (and it is not a product of randomness, we know).
If we find such kind of information in nature, some software that organises physical structures for a function, than it is rational to look for a non physical source (because for example such software in DNA didn't designed by humans).
We know about the hardware of our universe, it is physical. And we know about some complex algorithm functions in nature. It is rational to look for the non physical software layer of our reality.
That is what I call: Informational dimensions.
Someone here titled it 'blueprints'. Yes, this is a wonderful picture for informational dimensions.
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JT75
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Member # 3262
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posted 10. January 2007 09:26
Daniel wrote,
quote:
My point is that the only reason the "ability to infer the existence of livestock from the markings on the baked clay" would be unavailable would be if the ability to infer were unavailable.
False.
quote:
What other possible limitation can exist that would make that particular inference "unavailable"?
The other possible limitation that would make that particular inference unavailable would be the loss of the cultural context in which the markings on the tablet are known/identified with their intended objects (chattle). In this case the "decoding agent," say an anthropologist, still retains his ability to infer per se, but not regarding this particular object. Therefore, there is a possible situation in which the ability to infer per se exists and the ability to infer this particular information (about the chattle) does not exist. This stands as a counter to your previous conclusion. And, I believe, was Zarathustra's original point.
Analogously, I could be handed a piece of paper with Chinese writing on it. To me this could be anything from a quotation of Confucius to a grocery recipt, since I don't have the cultural tools to decode it (i.e. familiarity with the written language) then, for me, the information is lost. Perhaps it is not lost in some absolute sense, but it must be admitted that it is lost in a relative sense. Then if we posited a situation in the future where no one was familiar with Chinese writing, the information could be considered lost in a practical sense. Further if the paper were destroyed having never been read, then the information could be considered effectively destroyed.
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Stephen Wright
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Member # 195
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posted 10. January 2007 13:52
quote:
Matt – “Neither the brain nor any computer we could ever make will ever be able to perceive, translate, interpret or author/create something that is immaterial.”
Matt – if semantic information is immaterial – but formal information is part of a model of physical theory – I don’t understand your comment. Semantic information is surely perceived, translated and interpreted. We define the word meaning, in just these process terms. If your point is that since computers and brains are matter they don’t connect with some aspect of meaning – I think this incorrect in a natural view where material and energetic configurations subsume the information realized from the physical environment. Further, there is the aspect of the physical environment that was possible but not realized. This too, is information, subsumed by real circumstances – but is immaterial (except maybe for some brief appearance as a superposition)
I think the key word is configuration. This is where structure comes in and structure is the connection to the math understanding of formal information and entropic concepts. When an object, event or process is considered – its patterns are observed in its structural relationships. These structures can be of many levels from crystalline in the material to inspirational from the artistic.
The important patterns we (all life) seek as functional living agents are those that afford us benefit in our environments. This is a Gibsonian concept from the school of Ecological Psychology. These patterns include the elements for making our tasks easier and more productive. Hence organization that maximizes work output is a basic strategy and is at the root of formal information via the concepts of R. Clausius, L. Boltzmann and W. Gibbs. Thermodynamic understandings are essential in unraveling this topic. They categorize the elements of work input/output so that we can math model these structural attributes and benefits.
A descriptive overview of the patterns that describe a physical system are immaterial vs. the material configurations. But they are subsumed by them and take their semantic meaning from the materiality of the circumstances, both real and possible. I suggest that JT75’s comments are well considered urging inclusion of a holistic perspective, as one of several important renderings of what is happening.
quote:
“I believe in your zeal to assert an immaterial aspect to your being you have gone so far as to make this aspect the sum total of your identity. This is a reaction against a materialistic view of you (an understanding that would see you as something wholly deducible in terms of physics and chemistry), which is false. I think a better form of dualism (rather than the extreme form you have asserted, in which your mental self and physical body have no relation) is one, which views you as a mental physical composite. You are one, unified ontological unit which is composed of two very different substances, one material the other immaterial.”
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2ndclass
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Member # 1979
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posted 10. January 2007 14:04
Matt: quote:
So would you say that, since “brains and computers most definitely can perceive, translate, interpret, and author/create information,” that information must have physical qualities (mass or charge, etc.)?
Actually, no. The fact that a physical calculator can add two numbers does not imply that numbers have physical qualities. The fact that physical rocks can form a circle doesn't make the concept of a circle any less abstract. We include abstract concepts in our descriptions of physical phenomena all the time, with no mystical implications.
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Daniel Smith
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posted 10. January 2007 15:19
quote:
JT75: Perhaps it is not lost in some absolute sense, but it must be admitted that it is lost in a relative sense.
I think I have discovered the difference in our logic.
My case has been all about information in the "absolute sense". Sure, the information can be "lost" to you, but the information remains unchanged in the absolute sense.
I think also, that we are confusing the concept of meaning with that of information. In essence, you are saying that unless we can decipher the meaning of the information, it is not information. I am saying that the meaning is inherent in the information - whether we have the tools to decipher it or not.
The clay tablets, the Chinese writing - all have an absolute information content which cannot be lost - even by the destruction of the object.
This ties into Matt's point. Let's say I take a picture of the clay tablet and then destroy the physical tablet. Did I destroy the information? No. I merely transfered it to another medium.
What if I just look at the tablet and then destroy it? Is the information lost? No. It resides in my memory. I might not know what it means, but that is irrelevant.
The information is real, but it has no physical properties. How can something with no physical properties be destroyed?
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JT75
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posted 10. January 2007 16:52
Daniel,
I think we're getting closer but we're not there yet. You wrote,
quote:
The clay tablets, the Chinese writing - all have an absolute information content which cannot be lost - even by the destruction of the object.
This ties into Matt's point. Let's say I take a picture of the clay tablet and then destroy the physical tablet. Did I destroy the information? No. I merely transfered it to another medium.
What if I just look at the tablet and then destroy it? Is the information lost? No. It resides in my memory. I might not know what it means, but that is irrelevant.
The information is real, but it has no physical properties. How can something with no physical properties be destroyed?
But the information that the tablet has recorded is the number of goats a Mesopotamian farmer had 3,000 years ago, does this information still exist, or merely an indecipherable artifact that has no discernable connection with its original meaning? If the former, then where does this information reside?
If information is an immaterial, mental object, that is it is apprehended by the immaterial intellect the way material objects are apprehended by the senses (though this analogy is limited), then it resides, like all mental objects, in a the mind of a rational agent. The information could be destroyed if the mind of the rational agent is destoyed. For example, there are some people who, because of severe head trauma, have lost all or part of their memory. If memory is a type of information (the rich, first person impressions from an agent's past), then it would seem that information can be destroyed.
This is not to say brain trauma causes "mind trauma" (?), but it is to say that as a mental/physical composite the mind and body are interdependent (though not identical).
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Matt Connally
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posted 10. January 2007 17:59
Stephen,
quote:
Matt – if semantic information is immaterial – but formal information is part of a model of physical theory – I don’t understand your comment. Semantic information is surely perceived, translated and interpreted. We define the word meaning, in just these process terms.
It sounds like you’re starting with the assumption that the brain can perceive, translate, and interpret information—“We define the word meaning, in just these process terms”—and that therefore, my comment doesn’t make sense since it would contradict that assumption. And of course all of naturalism makes this assumption.
Nevertheless, it is nothing more than an assumption. Many naturalists will not even consider the possibility that it could be wrong. “Of course the brain gives rise to consciousness, you nitwit!! Therefore, your arguments are nonsense!”
I’m not making any contradictory assumptions; I’m making an outrageously simple argument. Let me rephrase the statement: the brain cannot use the five senses to perceive something that cannot directly or indirectly be seen, heard, felt, tasted, or smelled (i.e. something immaterial). And of course if information is immaterial then it cannot be seen, heard, felt, tasted, or smelled. No amount of philosophy can make up for that.
As to JT75’s comment, whatever my motives might be for making these various arguments is totally irrelevant. But since he brought it up I thought it was a classic example of someone having a log in their eye and trying to take a spec out of someone else’s. In his zeal to justify a whole bunch of philosophical ideas and assumptions, he’s made them the sum total of our identity. That is to say, calling myself a “soul” seems much clearer and less presumptuous than calling myself a “mental physical composite” or a “unified ontological unit(?!)”.
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Matt Connally
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posted 10. January 2007 18:08
2ndclass,
quote:
The fact that a physical calculator can add two numbers does not imply that numbers have physical qualities. The fact that physical rocks can form a circle doesn't make the concept of a circle any less abstract. We include abstract concepts in our descriptions of physical phenomena all the time, with no mystical implications.
Calculators don’t know what numbers are any more than an abacus does, any more than rocks know what circles are, anymore than a telephone knows English (though, technically, when I talk on the phone I am interacting which a little plastic-and-silicon gadget). But we do, and so if information is immaterial then that’s not just a mystical implication but a mystical fact.
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2ndclass
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Member # 1979
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posted 10. January 2007 19:31
Matt: quote:
Calculators don’t know what numbers are any more than an abacus does, any more than rocks know what circles are, anymore than a telephone knows English (though, technically, when I talk on the phone I am interacting which a little plastic-and-silicon gadget). But we do, and so if information is immaterial then that’s not just a mystical implication but a mystical fact.
Granted, humans are a lot smarter than calculators and rocks, but my point doesn't hinge on whether calculators "know what numbers are", whatever that means.
You've given us a list of things that physical objects cannot do with abstractions, which so far includes perceive, translate, interpret, author, create, see, hear, feel, taste, and smell. Can physical objects perform arithmetic operations on abstractions? What is the logical basis for including or excluding items from your list?
My point from the previous post remains. We include abstract concepts in our descriptions of physical phenomena all the time. Mixing the physical with the abstract in statements like "brains interpret information" poses no more of a logical problem than saying that "calculators add numbers" or "rocks form circles".
[ 10. January 2007, 19:36: Message edited by: 2ndclass ]
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