External World SkepticismExternal world skepticism is an epistemological view, often associated with Descartes’ preliminary Meditations. It states that since there is room for doubting the sources of our experiences, we can not know anything derived from our senses. Therefore, we can not know anything about the external world.
The intuition behind external world skepticism seems right. If I don’t know that I’m not a brain in a vat, then how can I possibly know that I have two hands? By the principle of closure, it seems that not knowing the first premise entails not knowing the second.
The strength of external world skepticism can be illustrated by a consideration of the following three premises (which are incompatible):
1. I know that I am in Princeton, New Jersey
2. I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat
3. If I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, then I do not know that I am in Princeton, New Jersey (Principle of Epistemic Closure)
It seems that unless I know that I am not a brain in a vat, I can not know that I am in Princeton, New Jersey.
Skepticism about the source of our experience is typically arrived at by consideration of dreams (what distinguishes dreams from reality), perceptual illusions (trustworthiness), and evil demon hypotheses (brain in a vat or matrix style virtual reality).
Book Resources On External World SkepticismSkepticism: A Contemporary Reader by Keith Derose
Meditations On First Philosophy by Rene Descartes
Skepticism About the External World by Panayot Butchvarov
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