Mind-Body Problem
The mind-body problem arises from an intuition that, somehow, the mind is fundamentally different than matter. If that is the case, then at least two questions immediately arise. First, if mind is different than matter, then what is its nature? Second, if mind and matter are distinct, then in what way do they exert causal influence over each other? How does the body affect the mind and how does the mind affect the body?
Descartes is, perhaps, the philosopher that most people reference when discussing the mind-body problem. For Descartes, there are two substances: Mind and Matter. Each substance has a defining attribute. In the case of Mind, the defining attribute is Thought. In the case of Matter, the defining attribute is spatial Extension. It is important to note that for Descartes, substances can have nothing in common, otherwise they would not be fundamentally different things. The mind-body problem arises out of this view of substances, because if mind and body have nothing in common, then in what way can they be said to interact? This is known as the problem of interaction.
Most modern philosophers have rejected the view that mind and matter are different substances, but many remain realists about the mind. In other words, it has become increasingly difficult to draw a strict, reducible identity between brain states and the mind. In response, numerous theories have been developed to preserve the unique qualities of the mind while avoiding the substance dualism espoused by Descartes. These theories include combinations and varieties of the following: functionalism, non-reductive physicalism, emergentism and property dualism.
It is worth pointing out that despite being guided by an ideal of physicalism, most philosophers have come to recognize the distinctive aspects of the mind as, in some way, irreducible. Some of these distinctive properties include experiential qualities, intentional content, unique causal powers, the unity of consciousness and the normative content of psychological states.
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