by Benjamin Wiker

Abstract— Ric Machuga's In Defense of the Soul challenges materialist approaches to the mind-body problem from an Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective. In so doing, Machuga charges the theory of intelligent design with many of the same faults that he finds in materialistic theories of mind. Machuga's critique of intelligent design hinges on his distinction between "form" and "shape." Those who are not familiar with Aristotle or St. Thomas will have a difficult time trying to understand the distinction at all (and hence how it helps recover the soul), and those who are familiar with Aristotle and St. Thomas will immediately recognize that Machuga is either being inaccurate or he is so drastically modifying the actual Aristotelian-Thomistic account that it is nearly unrecognizable. This review analyzes Machuga's handling of this distinction and argues that the consequent criticism he raises against intelligent design is seriously flawed.

The full paper is available below:
Review of Ric Machuga, In Defense of the Soul

Back to PCID Volume 4.1, July 2005