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Transcript of chat
with James Barham on August 7th, 2002
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:17:45 PM)
This session is entitled (roughly) "Can Natural Selection Explain
Teleology?" The readings for it were a short section entitled "Intentionality"
from a textbook by John F. Post and a paper published on the Web by
the philosopher of biology Andre Ariew entitled "The Proximate/Ultimate
Distinction Reconsidered and Reconstructed."
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:19:11 PM)
Micah---are you with us? Do we have enough folks to start yet?
Tristan (ID=22) (Aug 7, 2002 1:20:02 PM)
*whistles James Bond theme*
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:20:06 PM)
Well, I'll tell you what. Let me plunge in with a few introductory remarks
about myself. Then I'll ask the rest of you to introduce yourselves.
micah (ID=19) (Aug 7, 2002 1:21:04 PM)
ok. I'm here.
micah (ID=19) (Aug 7, 2002 1:21:06 PM)
sorry!
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:21:22 PM)
My name is James Barham. I am in Ephrata, Pennsylvania (near Lancaster).
I have a bit of an unusual background. I have a B.A. in Classics from
the University of Texas at Austin, and an M.A. in the History of Science
from Harvard University. I am now an independent scholar working primarily
in the philosophy of biology
micah (ID=19) (Aug 7, 2002 1:21:30 PM)
Yeah, we can get started, though there are some missing.
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 1:21:59 PM)
Glad to meet you James.
telic ontology (ID=24) (Aug 7, 2002 1:22:14 PM)
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James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:22:20 PM)
For many years, I was a convinced Darwinian, but the more I got interested
in what we might broadly term "evolutionary epistemology,"
the more problems I began to see with the Darwinian viewpoint (Hi, Jon!).
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:23:15 PM)
In the late 1980s, I stumbled across the literature on nonlinear dynamics,
and immediately saw (or thought I saw!) how that might form a more secure
foundation of the naturalization of normativity (of which, more later).
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:23:59 PM)
I have written about a dozen papers on this and related themes in the
time since then. Now, how about if the rest of you introduce yourselves
briefly. (Hi, Telic!)
Bart Dunlap (ID=21) (Aug 7, 2002 1:24:36 PM)
Nice to meet you James. I'm a junior physics major at the University
of Central Arkansas.
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 1:25:35 PM)
James, I'm a highschool student in Kansas, and have been studying evolution
in general for quite some time.
Tristan (ID=22)
(Aug 7, 2002 1:26:23 PM)
high schooler in san diego, CA.
micah (ID=19) (Aug 7, 2002 1:26:33 PM)
got interested in ID because of it was the first sophisticated attack
I'd ever seen on Darwinism
telic ontology (ID=24) (Aug 7, 2002 1:26:34 PM)
Hello James! My name is Allan Jackson III. I am 16 years old and entering
my senior year in high school.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:27:06 PM)
Ok. So I guess the best way to proceed is for me to give a little mini-"lecture"
to lay out the philosophical landscape, and then open it up to questions.
telic ontology (ID=24) (Aug 7, 2002 1:27:21 PM)
yes, i would like that...
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:28:27 PM)
This session asks whether the theory of natural selection can give an
adequate account of those phenomena in nature that we call "teleological."
Teleology, BTW, just means (literally) the study of "ends"
("telos" is "end" in Greek) or goals. It is also
used loosely to refer the phenomena themselves.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:29:14 PM)
Other euphemistic terms like "teleonomy" are sometimes used,
supposedly to make the discussion more scientific, but I personally
think they just give the appearance of rigor without the reality. Better
to call a spade a spade.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:30:09 PM)
What is it about teleology that makes it so hard to understand from
a scientific point of view? It is the normative or evaluative aspect
of goal-directed action---the way in which we can succeed or fail at
reaching our goal---that seems to elude our current scientific understanding.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:31:12 PM)
Goals are things that are somehow different from the mere effects of
causal processes. We do not say that the earth has the "goal"
of orbiting the sun, or that it is the "goal" of hydrogen
and oxygen to react together to form water. Physical and chemical events
are not normative in the same way that teleological phenomena are.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:32:27 PM)
When it comes to physics and chemistry, it does not make any sense to
ask questions like "Was what happened successful?," "Was
it good?," "Was it right?," "Was it enough?,"
etc. These questions are not only sensible, they are indispensable,
however, when it comes to human behavior---and also, I would argue,
to all biological processes.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:33:13 PM)
Philosophers say that these sorts of questions mark out a "domain
of reasons" as opposed to the "domain of causes" of the
physical world. The human world seems to take place simultaneously in
both domains.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:34:47 PM)
When I drive my car, I have to obey the laws of physics, but I also
USE the laws of physics for my own purposes to get where I want to go.
A complete description of my behavior must mention my reasons for doing
what I do, as well as a description of the way my foot moves on the
accelerator and brake, my hand turns the steering wheel, and the car
moves through space. Both kinds of descriptions are clearly necessary.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:35:51 PM)
For centuries, most philosophers assumed that this domain of reasons
existed apart from the domain of causes somehow. This is the old mind-body
problem. The mind---where the reasons reside---is a separate substance
and somehow interacts with the body---which is just a causal mechanism.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:36:45 PM)
But nowadays the ambition of most philosophers is to understand the
human being as a part of nature. We want to understand how the domain
of reasons has arisen somehow out of the domain of causes in a natural
way that science might potentially be able to explain.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:37:04 PM)
So, the big question is, How did the domain of reasons arise out of
the domain of causes?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:37:35 PM)
The main attempts to answer this question have been of two sorts. One
is in terms of cybernetic control theory and the other is in terms of
the theory of natural selection.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:38:24 PM)
That is what we will mostly talking about today. We want to ask ourselves,
Do the sciences of molecular biology, computer science, and evolutionary
biology---as they are currently constituted---really explain the domain
of reasons?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:38:34 PM)
If not, why not?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:38:51 PM)
And finally, if we have time, we might want to discuss what a better
alternative might look like.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:39:14 PM)
Before turning to the actual readings for today's session, does anyone
have any questions already at this point?
telic ontology (ID=24) (Aug 7, 2002 1:40:16 PM)
Do you hold the traditional mind-body dualism to be valid?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:42:20 PM)
No, actually, I don't. Although I believe natural selection is a complete
failure as an explanation of our place in nature, I remain hopeful that
a shift to a dynamical perspective can do a better job. I see the brain
as a dynamical system (not a computer), but more importantly, I see
the cell as a dynamical system, too, that already incorporates teleology,
by which I mean it already has its own internally generated goal states,
and a sort of cognitive capacity which allows it to reach its goals.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:44:02 PM)
If there are no other questions for the present, shall I discuss the
readings a little bit?
telic ontology (ID=24) (Aug 7, 2002 1:44:13 PM)
Would this view be consonant with the view of Berkely?Esse est percipi.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:45:06 PM)
No, I am a metaphysical realist, by which I mean, in this context, that
perception and cognition should be viewed as objectively real phenomena
in their own right.
micah (ID=19) (Aug 7, 2002 1:45:54 PM)
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micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 1:46:20 PM)
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James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:47:11 PM)
I am also an emergentist, which means that I think there was a time
when there was no teleology present in the universe (i.e., no life),
and then a later time when there was. I see why you might think that
my position is similar to Berkeley's, though, because I do extend cognition
to all of biological matter in a way that might be confused with a thoroughgoing
subjecitivism. There are people who would go farther than me and extend
teleology and cognition to all matter (panpsychists).
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:48:28 PM)
For a panpsychist, it might be difficult to distinguish between a Lebnizian
"monad" position and Berkeleyian idealism. If everything is
mind, then how can you make a coherent realist interpetation of our
experience stick?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:49:05 PM)
I would just say that not everything is mind, only some things---but
more than most people suppose!! (Also less---I do not believe mind can
be instantiated in silicon, for example.)
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:49:28 PM)
Well, let me go on to the readings.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:50:09 PM)
The first reading is an excerpt from a wonderful little introductory
philosophy textbook by John F. Post entitled "Metaphysics: A Contemporary
Introduction."
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:50:46 PM)
It is not easy going (nothin in philosophy is!), but it does present
a number of the key ideas we will be discussing in very concise form.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:51:56 PM)
It casts the discussion mainly in terms of the philosophy of language---specifically,
semantics, or the way that our thoughts and words acquire meaning through
interaction with other human beings and with the outside world in general.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:53:05 PM)
However, I don't want to focus on language today. Rather, I want to
focus today on Post's discussion of the ideas of Ruth Garrett Millikan.
(I didn't assign her own essays, because they are even more difficult!!
However, I do encourage you all to seek them out if you are interested
in this topic.)
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:53:50 PM)
On page 128, Post gets at the heart of the matter. He writes, "the
aboutness [i.e., the intentionality] of a belief is as real as the proper
function of the heart."
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:54:48 PM)
In other words, one of the traditional problems of the philosophy of
mind---intentionality---can be viewed as a special case of the general
problem of determining the "proper function" of biological
organs, structures, metabolic pathways, behaviors, etc.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:56:30 PM)
I like this way of putting the problem, and I actually do agree with
this basic approach. (I just don't agree with Millikan's solution!)
That is, I think that many of the philosophical problems usually discussed
in the context of human language must be re-thought in the more general
context of biology. We need to pose each philosophical problem at the
lowest level possible, because then we can better understand how an
evolutionary narrative story makes sense.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:57:14 PM)
So, what we want to do is to understand how the normativity of intentionality
of thought can be referred back to a more general theory of the proper
function of biological traits as such.
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 1:57:57 PM)
Have you read Denton's Natures Destiny, James?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:58:07 PM)
Notice that the word "proper" in Millikan's concept of "proper
function" is referring to the normative aspect. Proper here means
criterial or normative. It is the thing that the function is supposed
to do and may fail or succeed in doing.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:58:21 PM)
Yes, Jon. What did you think of that book?
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 1:58:30 PM)
I loved it, you?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:58:50 PM)
It is very challenging for me. Denton goes farther than I am comfortable
going at present.
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 1:59:15 PM)
I understand that, sorry to interrupt, go on..
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 1:59:50 PM)
I have not much studied the "large number coincidences." I
guess I suspect that our knowledge of physics is defective, and that
a better fundamental theory in physics might be able to show how they
are not contingent, but rather necessary, after all.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:00:07 PM)
That is a deep problem. It is just one I haven't investigated that much.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:00:24 PM)
That's fine. Anyone else feel free to jump in if you have a question.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:01:10 PM)
So, how does Millikan propose to explain the normativity of her "proper
functions" in a way that is compatible with science?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:01:45 PM)
Post tells us on page 125. "Biological functional properties are
a matter not of actual causal powers but of history."
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:02:28 PM)
In other words, the idea is that the proper function of any biological
entity is the thing that it did that caused it to be "selected
for" during its evolutionary history.
micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 2:02:36 PM)
curiousity question: Is Millikan's "proper function" derived
from Plantinga's: who came up with the term first?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:03:05 PM)
I feel sure that Plantinga is following Millikan here. Millikan's main
book came out way back in 1984.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:04:37 PM)
So, Millikan's idea is that what makes the fact that my heart beats
and circulates my blook today normative---the thing that makes this
the thing that my heart is SUPPOSED to do---is the fact that similar
organs did similar things in my hominid ancestors, conferring a selective
advantage on them, and thus causing those organs doing those particular
things to be propagated to future generations.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:05:54 PM)
In other words, my heart's proper function is not to pump my blood,
or even to keep me alive. The fact that it does those things is incidental.
My heart's proper function is simply to do whatever hearts always did
in my evolutionary lineage. It is the history per se that defines the
proper function. In other words, normativity derives from history.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:06:14 PM)
So far, so good?? Any questions?
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 2:06:57 PM)
If no one else does, I have a quick one.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:07:04 PM)
Shoot
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 2:07:53 PM)
So, if NS can't explain certain things in biology, how did life begin?
In your opinion, or do you take a position on this?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:08:25 PM)
Well, first of all, NS cannot explain the origin of life, so we are
no worse off without NS in this regard than we were with it!!
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:08:55 PM)
I don't think anyone has any idea how life began, but I am optimistic
that we will be able to figure it out one day.
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 2:09:09 PM)
Good point, thanks.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:09:44 PM)
I think that we first need to understand the normative and teleological
aspects of the cell as it exists at a given point in time. We do not
really understand how life itself works, so we don't know what questions
to ask about how it got started.
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 2:10:17 PM)
What other aproach can we take besides NS?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:10:24 PM)
So, back to Millikan. What is wrong with using selection history to
give a naturalistic foundation for the normativity in biological functions?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:10:30 PM)
Sorry
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 2:10:39 PM)
no prob
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:10:59 PM)
I believe there are basically two ways to go: nonlinear dynamics and
quantum field theory.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:11:43 PM)
But both of these are highly speculative. What we have to do is understand
how the massive amount of coherence and coordination of the thousands
of separate reactions within the cell can occur.
micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 2:12:07 PM)
james is an independent scholar
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:12:13 PM)
There are some ideas out there in the literature. I can give you some
bibliographical references later on, if you are interested.
micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 2:12:14 PM)
sorry!
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 2:12:32 PM)
Yes, I would be..
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:12:44 PM)
That's okay, Micah. What were you going to say?
micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 2:13:07 PM)
actually, someone privately asked me what your occupation was. that
was my answer.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:13:31 PM)
OK. I want to be sure and get to the critique of Millikan's position.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:13:55 PM)
There are basically two problems. Actually, two ways of looking at basically
one and the same problem.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:14:28 PM)
The best known problem with Millikan's idea of using history to naturalize
normativity is illustrated by the philosophical "thought experiment"
called Swampman.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:15:17 PM)
Swampman is an instantaneously created organism. (The whole story is
not necessary, but basically a philosopher is wandering in a swamp and
gets hit by a bolt of lightning.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:15:49 PM)
The samp instant, the same bolt of lightning evaporates an old tree
stump sitting on the ground next to the poor philosopher.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:16:24 PM)
Then, by a cosmic coincidence (reminiscent of Darwinism!) the molecules
from the tree stump rearrange themselves into an exact duplicate of
the philosopher.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:17:07 PM)
The duplicate---Swampman---is identical to the philosopher down to every
synapse in his brain. Thus, he walks and talks exactly like the philosopher.
However, he lacks the philosopher's selection history.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:17:53 PM)
Having been created ex nihilo an instant before, none of his functions
have any history at all. Thus Millikan's theory cannot explain how they
can be the PROPER (normative) functions for Swampman.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:18:15 PM)
My (James Barham's) heart has the proper function to pump blood only
because of my selection history.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:18:55 PM)
Swampman's heart, having no selection history, has NO proper function.
It pumps blood, yes, but it also makes thumping sounds, and according
to Millikan's theory there is absolutely no difference between the two
"functions".
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:19:26 PM)
Now, a lot of Darwinian philosophers have bitten the bullet and said,
Yes, that is right, Swampman has no proper functions.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:19:58 PM)
Me, I say that's ridiculous. The Swampman example simply shows that
the original premise was false---what philosophers call a redutio ad
absurdum.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:20:27 PM)
The Swampman example shows that whatever underwrites the normativity
of biological functions, it certainly can't be selection history.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:20:34 PM)
any questions?
micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 2:21:11 PM)
I've got one.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:21:24 PM)
I said there were two problems with Millikan. The other problem is a
very general problem with selection-style ---Sure, Micah---shoot
micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 2:21:47 PM)
what good is this thought experiment if it has no basis in reality?
micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 2:22:00 PM)
Could such a thing happen?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:22:07 PM)
Ah---good question! That is one of Millikan's main defenses.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:22:29 PM)
OF course, Swampman is absurd---but so are most philosophical thought
experiments.
micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 2:23:03 PM)
right, Kurzweil attacks Searle from the same line regarding the Chinese
Room
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:23:07 PM)
In a new paper I am working on entitled "Intrinsic Function,"
I try to translate the intuition working behind Swampman into some more
realistic examples.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:23:49 PM)
For example, if the same "melt" is cooled rapidly or abruptly,
two different microstructures can result ---crystalline and amorphous.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:24:17 PM)
But we don't say it was the histories per se that make the difference.
History is just a short-hand way of alluding to a sequence of dynamical
states.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:24:48 PM)
I say that "selection history" should be looked at the same
way. It is the sequence of dynamical states that is doing the explaining,
not "history" per se.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:25:18 PM)
Well, it's getting late, so let me just make a couple of quick points.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:25:56 PM)
The other, more general problem with selection-style explanations is
that they assume what they claim to explain ("begging the question"
in philosophical parlance).
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:26:57 PM)
I claim that Millikan's theory has things backwards. It is not being
selected that magically confers normativity on a biological function.
Rather, it is the fact that a function is normatively superior to begin
with that leads to its being selected.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:27:27 PM)
Which brings us to the other reading, "The Ultimate/Proximate Distinction
Reconsidered and Reconstructed," by Andre Ariew.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:28:15 PM)
I assigned this because one of the main defensive strategies of Darwinians
when confronted with the charge of begging the question of normativity
is to make the distintion made originally by Ernst Mary and discussed
in that paper.
micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 2:28:56 PM)
Mayr;-)
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:29:11 PM)
The idea is to say that NS only explains "ultimate causes,"
and shouldn't be expected to explain all the "proximate" causal
details of the operation of organisms, which is where the normativity
really lies.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:29:25 PM)
Thanks, Micah! I'm typing real fast here.
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 2:29:39 PM)
You're better than Behe, though.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:30:18 PM)
But, then, when you ask a molecular biologist to justify HIS use of
normative concepts (messengers, codes, regulation, instructions, etc.),
what does he say?
Tristan (ID=22) (Aug 7, 2002 2:30:22 PM)
What's a proximate cause?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:30:37 PM)
He says, "Oh that's not my problem, that's the problem of evolutionary
biology."
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:31:15 PM)
"Proximate" means all the stuff that's happening in the organism
at a given moment. "Ultimate" means the evolutionary explanation
of where it all came from.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:31:26 PM)
So, what we have here is a con game.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:31:55 PM)
It's exactly like the old "shell game." Whichever shell you
look under, the answer is always under the other one!
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:32:21 PM)
But what neither molecular biology nor selection theory can explain
separately, they cannot explain together.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:32:58 PM)
Both of them simply presuppose the normativity inherent in the functional
organization of organisms, and neither of them has any coherent explanation
of where the normativity comes from.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:33:19 PM)
In short, there is still no bridge from the domain of causes over to
the domain of reasons.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:33:31 PM)
IMHO, of course . . .
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:33:42 PM)
Questions?
Bart Dunlap (ID=21) (Aug 7, 2002 2:35:54 PM)
You say a thing is normatively superior to begin with and this leads
to its being selected, but what makes it normatively superior?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:36:15 PM)
There is a lot more to say about the Ariew paper, but we are out of
time. He does not really address the issue of normativity in that paper,
but he does say a lot that undermines the Mayr/Millikan shell game,
which is why I like it. I am basically taking his ideas and extending
them farther than he would probably be willing to go himself.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:36:44 PM)
Bart: Yes, that is indeed the question. What is the real explanation
for normative superiority, if it is not NS?
micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 2:37:01 PM)
Thanks for joining us today, James.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:37:01 PM)
This gets us back to a topic we just touched on previously.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:37:31 PM)
OK---I'll be happy to send references on QFT and nonlinear dynamical
approaches to whoever is interested.
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 2:38:32 PM)
I am.
telic ontology (ID=24) (Aug 7, 2002 2:38:33 PM)
Would you be so kind as to recommend further books, resources, et cetera,
for our use?
telic ontology (ID=24) (Aug 7, 2002 2:38:39 PM)
i, too!
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:39:04 PM)
Micah: Would you be able to give me a list of e-mail addresses?
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:40:06 PM)
I'll get together a short reading list of the alternative approaches
that I favor (along with some plugs for my own papers, of course!).
telic ontology (ID=24) (Aug 7, 2002 2:40:18 PM)
hehe
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 2:41:44 PM)
Righto!
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:41:49 PM)
Ok, Jon. I have it. Give me a day or two to get the list together.
micah s. (ID=25) (Aug 7, 2002 2:41:56 PM)
yes, I'll send it to you via email.
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 2:42:04 PM)
Thanks!
Bart Dunlap (ID=21) (Aug 7, 2002 2:42:14 PM)
Thanks a lot. I enjoyed it.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:42:22 PM)
Sounds good. Thanks to everyone for dropping by.
Jon Runyan (ID=23) (Aug 7, 2002 2:42:33 PM)
Good luck!
telic ontology (ID=24) (Aug 7, 2002 2:42:37 PM)
Thanks you, James.
James Barham (Aug 7, 2002 2:42:49 PM)
Thanks. You, too! |
